Udac v. Takata Corp.

Citations: 214 P.3d 1133; 121 Haw. 143; 2009 Haw. App. LEXIS 596Docket: 28328

Court: Hawaii Intermediate Court of Appeals; August 19, 2009; Hawaii; State Appellate Court

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Takata Corporation appeals the Second Amended Judgment from the Circuit Court of the Third Circuit, which ruled in favor of Dason Udac and Gwendolyn N. Udac, Trustee for the Alfredo Udac Revocable Living Trust, following a jury trial. The court found Takata liable for Dason's claims of negligence, product liability, and punitive damages. It also ruled against Takata on Gwendolyn's claims for negligent infliction of emotional distress and loss of consortium. Conversely, the court ruled in favor of Takata on the Udacs' claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress, failure to warn, breach of warranty, and manufacturing defects. Takata also prevailed against the Udacs in their claims against Hawaii Motors, Inc. 

On appeal, Takata argues that the circuit court made several errors: (1) it improperly excluded expert testimony from Dr. Robert Douglas Banks; (2) it wrongly admitted Takata's seatbelt-buckle patent applications (TK-52 and A-95 patents) into evidence; (3) it incorrectly admitted Nissan Design Specifications for the 1992 Nissan Pathfinder; (4) it improperly instructed the jury on negligent failure to warn and the latent-danger theory of product defect; and (5) it denied Takata's motion for judgment as a matter of law at the close of evidence.

Takata filed a Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law (JMOL), arguing that the Udacs did not provide sufficient evidence for their false-latch defect claim. The circuit court denied this motion regarding the jury's punitive damages award, asserting it was supported by adequate evidence. Additionally, the court denied Takata's renewed JMOL motion, which challenged the $12.5 million punitive damages as excessive under Hawai`i law and federal due process. The Udacs cross-appealed the court’s decision on costs and prejudgment interest, arguing they were wrongly denied interest on both compensatory and punitive damages. 

The incident occurred on October 8, 2000, when Dason was driving a 1987 Nissan Pathfinder and lost control, resulting in a crash that left him paraplegic. Both Dason and his passenger, Ikaika, had no recollection of the accident. Dason and his father filed a complaint against Takata and Hawaii Motors in 2002, alleging multiple claims including negligence and product liability, specifically citing the failure of the driver-side seatbelt designed by Takata. The jury awarded the Udacs $6.85 million in compensatory damages and $12.5 million in punitive damages, attributing 35% fault to Dason and 65% to Takata. Following the jury’s verdict, the circuit court issued several judgments, ultimately awarding the Udacs a total of $4,452,500 in damages, along with $81,213.69 in costs.

The circuit court mandated the accrual of prejudgment interest on all compensatory damages and costs awarded at the statutory rate from December 22, 2005, until the first judgment was entered on April 19, 2006. Additionally, post-judgment interest on all awarded sums, including punitive damages, will accrue at the statutory rate from April 19, 2006, until the Second Amended Judgment is satisfied. 

Under Hawaii Rules of Evidence (HRE) Rule 702, an expert witness must possess the necessary qualifications through knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education to provide testimony that aids the trier of fact. The court evaluates the trustworthiness and validity of the expert's scientific technique or analysis. The determination of a witness's expert status is within the trial court's discretion and can only be overturned for clear abuse of that discretion. 

For expert testimony to be admissible, it must be both relevant and reliable. The trial court's evaluation of relevance is subject to de novo review, while the reliability assessment is reviewed for abuse of discretion. 

Different appellate review standards apply to trial court decisions on evidence admissibility based on the specific evidentiary rule involved. If a rule yields only one correct outcome, the review standard is right/wrong. For relevance-based admissibility under HRE Rules 401 and 402, the same right/wrong standard applies, whereas decisions under HRE Rule 403, which require the trial court's judgment, are reviewed for abuse of discretion.

The trial court has discretion over the admission of expert testimony, with legal interpretations of court rules reviewed de novo. Lastly, the standard for reviewing jury instructions is whether they are prejudicially insufficient, erroneous, inconsistent, or misleading when considered as a whole.

Erroneous jury instructions raise a presumption of harm but can be rebutted if the record demonstrates the error was not prejudicial. Trial judges must provide sufficient legal instructions while avoiding unnecessary repetition. Failing to give a relevant and accurate instruction, not fully covered by others, constitutes an error. Rulings on motions for judgment as a matter of law are reviewed de novo, with such motions granted only when there is no evidence supporting a jury verdict in favor of the non-moving party, after considering all evidence and inferences favorably for them. The awarding or denial of punitive damages lies within the discretion of the trier of fact and will not be overturned absent clear abuse of discretion.

In Takata's appeal, the exclusion of Dr. Banks's testimony regarding his surrogate study results, which indicated no "loading marks" on Dason's seatbelt, is contested. Takata also disputes the court's decision to prevent Dr. Banks from stating that certain bruises on Dason were due to ejection from the vehicle rather than the seatbelt. Under HRE Rule 403, relevant evidence can be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by potential prejudice, confusion, or other factors. The Hawai`i Supreme Court has recognized that the admissibility of evidence under this rule is best assessed by the trial court's discretion, balancing probative value against prejudicial effects.

David Allen Renfroe, Ph.D., a witness for the Udacs, testified that he found loading marks on the seatbelt webbing, indicating that Dason was wearing the seatbelt during the accident, as opposed to normal wear and tear. Takata's counsel sought to introduce testimony from Dr. Banks regarding a surrogate study he conducted on seatbelt marks, which the Udacs' counsel, Steven Hisaka, objected to on two grounds: that it was cumulative of Cooper's testimony and that Dr. Banks lacked qualifications as a seatbelt expert. The court sustained Hisaka's objection without explanation.

The text cites legal precedents, including State v. Pulse and State v. Klafta, to define "cumulative" evidence and establish that it must be substantially similar to previously received evidence to warrant exclusion. It emphasizes that the trial court must consider the time required to present such evidence against its probative value. The conclusion drawn is that Dr. Banks's testimony was not cumulative and the circuit court erred in excluding it. Additionally, Cooper testified that he found marks on the seatbelt consistent with typical wear, contrasting Renfroe's findings.

Cooper's testimony indicates that there are no signs of load transfer on the seatbelt webbing, suggesting it was not loaded during the incident in question. He noted that the "particular weave pattern" of the webbing would be evident on the sliding latch plate if it had been loaded. Marks on the D-ring were consistent with vehicles that have not been in accidents, indicating normal wear and tear rather than load stress. Cooper elaborated on the expected load distribution during a collision, stating that if 12 Gs of force were involved, the resulting load could exceed fourteen hundred pounds, distributed through the belt system and various anchor points. He specified that load marks would likely be found on the latch plate, and "webbing grabber" or emergency locking retractor marks would be expected on the webbing at a distance of over 100 inches from the D-ring. The Udacs referenced Cooper's testimony to support their claims regarding the expected locations of load marks, but the document disputes their characterization of his statements.

Cooper's testimony primarily presented a hypothesis regarding the location of "webbing grabber or emergency locking retractor marks" on a vehicle under significant force, but it lacked direct relevance to the specific facts of the case. There were notable distinctions between Dr. Banks's proposed testimony, which stemmed from a biomechanics surrogate study aimed at countering Dr. Renfroe's claim regarding seatbelt webbing marks, and Cooper's hypothetical analysis, indicating that Dr. Banks's testimony was not merely cumulative. The Udacs claimed that only one expert could testify about seatbelt safety, but they provided no legal basis for this assertion.

Additionally, the circuit court did not evaluate the potential duration of Dr. Banks's testimony or consider whether to limit it, nor did it balance the probative value of his testimony against potential trial delays or confusion for other litigants. Thus, the court's exclusion of Dr. Banks's testimony on the grounds of cumulative evidence was deemed erroneous.

Regarding qualifications, although the Udacs contended that Dr. Banks was not qualified as a seatbelt expert, the law permits a witness to qualify as an expert based on relevant experience or education in any of the specified areas under HRE Rule 702. The Hawai`i Supreme Court has indicated that an expert need not have the highest qualifications but must possess sufficient skill, knowledge, or experience to assist the trier of fact, with the depth of knowledge affecting the weight of testimony rather than its admissibility.

The Hawai`i Supreme Court determined that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in qualifying an expert from Wailea Resort Co. who testified that inorganic chemicals from the resort's golf course did not cause pipe corrosion. The expert's qualifications included degrees in metallurgy and engineering, along with relevant work experience in corrosion issues. In Yap v. Controlled Parasailing of Honolulu, Inc., the court upheld a witness's qualification to testify on the necessity of a restraining device on a parasail chair, emphasizing that the witness's doctorate in mechanical engineering and expertise in aerodynamic devices supported his testimony's admissibility, despite not having designed parasails. Similarly, in Larsen v. State Sav. Loan Ass'n, a witness with extensive academic and practical experience in engineering was deemed qualified to testify on the defectiveness of a champagne bottle stopper, despite not having direct experience in champagne manufacturing. The court clarified that deficiencies in experience should affect the weight of testimony rather than its admissibility. In contrast, Craft v. Peebles involved a medical malpractice claim related to silicone breast implants.

The Hawai`i Supreme Court determined that the circuit court appropriately limited a chemical engineer's testimony to his expertise in chemical engineering, excluding his opinions on the effects of silicone on the human body, specifically regarding the migration of silicone. The court emphasized that the engineer lacked formal education in relevant medical fields, including physiology and biomedical engineering. Conversely, Dr. Banks was qualified as a biomechanical expert due to his medical degree, engineering background, residency in aerospace medicine, and extensive experience in biomechanics and injury analysis. The court compared Dr. Banks’ qualifications favorably to those in prior cases (Wailea Elua, Yap, and Larsen), asserting that he did not need to be a seatbelt expert to testify about his surrogate study results. The court concluded that any deficiencies in Dr. Banks' expertise should affect the weight of his testimony rather than its admissibility. Additionally, the court found that the circuit court erred in preventing Dr. Banks from rebutting testimony regarding seatbelt marks on the plaintiff Dason, and in restricting Takata from questioning a witness about bruises and marks on Dason's body, which were claimed to have been caused by the seatbelt during the accident.

Testimony revealed that during caregiver training at the Rehabilitation Hospital of the Pacific prior to November 15, 2000, a witness observed Dason unclothed with visible black marks on his left shoulder, which he identified as seat belt burns. He elaborated that the bruises appeared purplish and fresh. Dr. Banks testified that a CD image of abrasions on Dason's upper back corresponded with a broken metal piece from the vehicle, indicating these injuries were caused by Dason’s ejection through the sunroof. Further, Dr. Banks noted suture marks on Dason’s left shoulder from a subclavian catheter placement. During cross-examination, there was an objection to Takata's counsel questioning Dr. Banks about family members' testimony regarding Dason's injuries, with the court sustaining the objection on grounds that it was outside the scope of previously allowed testimony. Takata's counsel attempted to inquire about standard medical procedures for documenting seat belt-related bruises, but the court ruled this line of questioning inadmissible. Dr. Banks's pretrial report indicated that Dason's thoracic injuries occurred during his ejection through the sunroof, with left-side scrapes and abrasions likely resulting from contact with the sunroof frame and the ground.

Dr. Banks's testimony was intended to counter claims made by Paul regarding the cause of bruises on Dason, which were allegedly attributed to a seatbelt. The court allowed expert testimony to address or rebut other testimonies, as seen in Porter v. Hu. The circuit court's decision to exclude Dr. Banks's testimony was deemed an abuse of discretion, as it deprived Takata of a fair trial, necessitating the vacation of the Second Amended Judgment. Additionally, Takata argued that the circuit court erred in admitting the TK-52 and A-95 patents, asserting their irrelevance in demonstrating a defect in the TK-821 seatbelt. Takata interpreted the patents to indicate that while strong springs in buckles prevent inertial release, they may also complicate manual release for users. The TK-52 patent highlighted that prior latch buckles aimed for easy engagement and release while maintaining safety under high impact. It described the mechanics of a known seatbelt latch buckle system, emphasizing the need for strong spring force to avoid inertial release during collisions.

The invention addresses the challenges associated with seat belt buckles, particularly the difficulty users face when applying the necessary force to release the latch plate from the tongue. Current locking mechanisms for latch plates are often complicated and fail to secure the latch effectively. This invention introduces a latch buckle that allows for positive locking of the latch plate in the latched position while enabling easy operation of the release member with minimal force.

The design features a slidable control member on the latch plate, which has two positions: one that prevents the latch plate from pivoting (latched position) and another that allows it to pivot for tongue release. When the tongue is inserted, the control member slides into the position that locks the latch plate, effectively distributing impact and pulling forces through a flat surface to the frame, ensuring robust locking against high forces like those experienced during a collision.

The control member’s design allows it to be engaged by the release member, ensuring that as the release member is activated, it moves the control member to the release position before disengaging the latch plate. This mechanism prevents inadvertent release and allows for a weaker spring to maintain the latch plate's position, making the buckle easier to operate. The invention is particularly beneficial for seat belt buckles, which have evolved from lever-operated types to more user-friendly push-button mechanisms that require less force for operation while preventing unintentional release during impacts.

Reducing the force of the spring on a latch member in a seat belt buckle can lead to "inertial fallout" during a vehicle collision, where the latch member displaces under inertia, releasing the tongue member from the buckle. Conversely, increasing the spring force to prevent this fallout makes the release operation more difficult. To address these issues, U.S. Patent No. 4,575,907 proposes a buckle design featuring a control member that prevents accidental release of the latch plate unless the release button is pressed. This design mitigates inertial fallout while maintaining a lower release force. However, the existing design's extension portions increase the buckle's width and assembly costs due to additional springs.

The present invention builds on the previous patent's concepts with enhancements, including lateral portions on the latch plate with notches, control projections from the frame to engage these notches, and blocking portions on the control member that prevent latch movement unless the release button is depressed. A spring biases the control member and release button to their respective positions, and cam surfaces facilitate the release mechanism when the button is pressed. Takata filed a trial memorandum on November 21, 2005, opposing the admission of two patents, claiming they were unrelated to the TK-821 buckle and not substantially similar.

The co-inventor of the TK-821, TK-52, and A-95 seatbelt buckles stated in a deposition that the TK-821 did not belong to the same product line as the TK-52 and A-95, rendering the "prior art" reference in the patents inapplicable to the TK-821. On November 21, 2005, the Udacs submitted a memorandum supporting the admissibility of the patents, arguing that the new designs aimed to prevent inertial and inadvertent release—defects that contributed to the TK-821's failure during Dason's accident. The circuit court admitted the patents into evidence despite Takata's objections. 

The court found that the TK-52 patent's language indicated that Takata had prior knowledge of the TK-821's potential for inertial and inadvertent release. The findings highlighted Takata's reprehensible conduct in producing the TK-821, which had several safety defects and was known to be susceptible to inertial and inadvertent release prior to 1987. The court could not definitively determine whether the patents referenced the TK-821 but did not err in admitting the TK-52 patent to demonstrate a defect in the TK-821. Testimony suggested that the TK-821's mechanism was indeed prone to the issues described in the TK-52 patent. Conversely, the court concluded that the A-95 patent was improperly admitted as it lacked relevance to the case, as defined by HRE Rule 401.

The A-95 patent critiques prior art for failing to balance the ease of releasing a seatbelt buckle with the need to prevent unintended release during an accident, but it does not identify any defects that make prior art unsafe. Takata argues for the exclusion of patents based on the case Tabieros v. Clark Equip. Co., where Tabieros was injured by a Series 510 straddle carrier made by Clark Equipment while working for Matson Terminals. The Hawai`i Supreme Court noted that Clark sold the straddle carrier to Matson in 1963, continued producing it until 1968, and sold its manufacturing business in 1975. The straddle carrier involved in the incident was maintained by Matson and transferred to Terminals in 1973. At trial, Tabieros sought to introduce a 1973 report from the National Ports Council (NPCR), which evaluated newer straddle carriers, as evidence of defective design and notice of defects. Clark opposed its admission, citing hearsay and irrelevance due to the NPCR's focus on different models. The circuit court excluded the NPCR as substantive evidence but allowed expert references to it, contingent on establishing a proper foundation. On appeal, Tabieros contended that the exclusion impaired his case regarding liability and punitive damages, noting the low punitive damage award against Clark.

The Hawai`i Supreme Court upheld the circuit court's decision to exclude the NPCR as independent evidence, citing two main reasons. First, the NPCR was deemed inadmissible hearsay, despite attempts to invoke exceptions under HRE 803(b)(8)(C) (public records), 803(b)(18) (learned treatise), and 803(b)(24) (catchall). Second, the NPCR's findings were not relevant to the Series 510 straddle carrier involved in the accident, as the NPCR focused on larger, newer, and structurally different straddle carriers, rendering any references to prior accidents insufficiently similar. Consequently, the circuit court acted within its discretion under HRE 403 to reject the NPCR due to issues of relevance, data reliability, and a lack of substantive facts regarding the reported accidents.

In contrast to the NPCR, the Udacs sought to admit patents not to demonstrate performance similarities among various buckles but to argue that the TK-821 buckle had a defect, referencing prior art that indicated Takata's awareness of the defect before selling the buckle. The structural differences between the TK-821 and other buckles did not negate the patents' relevance.

Regarding the 1992 Nissan Design Specifications (1992 NDS), Takata contended that the circuit court erred in admitting it as evidence, asserting its irrelevance to the 1987 Pathfinder involved in the case and claiming it was cumulative to the previously admitted 1981 Nissan Design Specifications (1981 NDS). The Udacs aimed to use the 1992 NDS to illustrate the TK-821's defect, specifically its failure to meet the 40-millimeter ball-press test requirement, which was not applicable to the 1981 NDS. Takata objected to the admission of the 1992 NDS on relevance grounds, emphasizing that it did not pertain to the TK-821 buckle.

Prior to Mr. Kitamura's deposition, only one version of the specifications was produced; however, a prior version surfaced the night before the deposition, which became a point of contention during an earlier motion in limine that the Court allowed to proceed to the jury. Testimony indicated that some aspects of this document were relevant to the TK-821 buckle manufactured for the vehicle in question, although it was classified as a protected document. The circuit court admitted the 1992 NDS into evidence, acknowledging its protected status. During trial on December 6, 2005, Hisaka sought to publish portions of the 1992 NDS, which Takata's counsel objected to, claiming irrelevance due to the document referencing a 40mm-ball test not in existence at the time the vehicle was sold. Despite the objection, the court permitted the publication, determining the 1992 NDS was pertinent in assessing whether Takata was aware of the TK-821's risk of inadvertent release post-issuance of the 1992 NDS, which related to potential punitive damages against Udacs.

The circuit court's admission of the 1992 NDS was not erroneous, as HRE Rule 407 prohibits the use of subsequent remedial measures to prove negligence. Additionally, Takata's argument that the 1992 NDS was cumulative to the 1981 NDS was rejected, as the 1992 document included the 40mm-ball test requirement absent from the 1981 version. 

Regarding jury instructions on latent danger and negligent failure to warn, Takata contended that any warnings about known defects would have been futile and thus could not have caused Dason's injuries. The latent danger test requires manufacturers to adequately warn of known dangers. The Hawai’i Supreme Court articulates that a manufacturer is liable for failing to warn if it has a duty to warn, and this breach is the legal cause of the plaintiff's injuries. The circuit court instructed the jury that a product could be deemed defective under the latent defect test if the following criteria are met: the product poses a substantial danger when used as intended, the manufacturer is aware of this danger, and other specific conditions are satisfied.

The ordinary user or consumer would not readily recognize the danger associated with the product, and the manufacturer failed to provide adequate warnings or instructions for safe use. Manufacturers have a duty to exercise reasonable care in product design and to warn users of any known dangers that they would not typically discover. Takata argued that the plaintiffs, the Udacs, did not demonstrate that the failure to warn legally caused Dason's injuries. Even assuming the TK-821 seatbelt posed risks of inertial and inadvertent release and Takata had a duty to warn, there was no evidence presented showing that Dason would have altered his actions had he received such a warning. The Udacs did not provide testimony indicating that a warning would have led Dason to replace the seatbelt or change his driving behavior. For jury instructions to be valid, sufficient evidence must support the issues of fact. Since no evidence linked Takata's failure to warn to Dason's injuries, the jury instructions on this matter lacked sufficient evidentiary support. Additionally, the instructions contradicted a previous ruling by the circuit court, which stated that the Udacs could not pursue latent danger and failure to warn as separate claims. Takata successfully filed for partial summary judgment on all warning claims, with acknowledgment from the Udacs' counsel that they had not presented a lack of warning as an independent claim. The court granted this motion but allowed the Udacs to reference warning issues as part of other claims. However, the jury instructions mistakenly did not prevent the jury from considering failure to warn as an independent cause of action, leading to a clear error by the circuit court.

Takata contends that the circuit court erred in denying its motion for judgment as a matter of law (JMOL) concerning the Udacs' false-latch theory, arguing that they did not present sufficient evidence to establish that a false-latch defect in the TK-821 was the legal cause of Dason's injuries. Takata emphasized the lack of expert testimony supporting the Udacs' claims and maintained that they failed to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the TK-821 buckle was defectively designed. Despite Takata not specifying the ruling that denied its JMOL Motion, the court allowed the jury to consider the issue. The court concluded that there was sufficient evidence, when viewed in favor of the Udacs, for a jury to potentially find that a defect in the TK-821 caused Dason's injuries based on the false-latch theory. Testimony indicated that Dason habitually wore his seatbelt, and there was no dispute that he was ejected from his vehicle, suggesting that a properly designed seatbelt would have remained fastened. Consequently, the court found no error in denying Takata's JMOL Motion related to the false-latch theory.

Additionally, Takata argued that the court improperly denied its JMOL Motion regarding punitive damages, claiming there was insufficient evidence to demonstrate that Takata was aware of a defect in the TK-821 or was indifferent to its safety. Takata asserted that the Udacs failed to present legally sufficient evidence for a jury to find, by clear and convincing evidence, that Takata's conduct was willful, wanton, oppressive, or malicious.

There is insufficient legal evidence for a jury to reasonably rule in favor of the Udacs regarding their claim for punitive damages against Takata. The circuit court did not specify the order or ruling related to the denial of Takata's Judgment as a Matter of Law (JMOL) motion, nor is there any record of such a denial. However, the court upheld the jury's punitive damages verdict in its Findings on Excessive Punitive Damages Claim. According to the Hawai`i Supreme Court, punitive damages are intended to punish defendants for severe misconduct and deter future similar actions, serving as an exception to the usual compensatory damage principle. Such damages are awarded only when a defendant's actions are intentional and egregious, necessitating a conscious element of wrongdoing beyond mere mistakes or errors in judgment. The doctrine of punitive damages remains a critical aspect of common law, aimed at expressing societal disapproval of intolerable behavior and enhancing deterrence when other remedies are inadequate. The court established a clear and convincing standard of proof for all punitive damages claims.

The plaintiff must demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant acted with wantonness, oppression, or malice indicating a disregard for civil obligations, or exhibited willful misconduct or a complete lack of care suggesting conscious indifference to consequences. The "clear and convincing" standard is an intermediate level of proof that is more stringent than the preponderance of the evidence but less than beyond a reasonable doubt, aiming to instill a firm belief in the trier of fact regarding the allegations. This standard is often required in civil cases with significant social implications or severe repercussions for individuals, necessitating greater certainty to justify punitive damages.

In this case, the Udacs needed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that Takata acted in a manner that warranted punitive damages. The circuit court assessed the Udacs' evidence favorably, applying federal due process standards. The findings indicated that Takata's behavior was highly reprehensible, particularly in relation to the TK-821 seatbelt buckle, which had known safety defects. Despite being aware of the risks associated with the TK-821, Takata continued to supply it for installation in a Nissan Pathfinder, even when a safer alternative was available. Moreover, Takata received additional information confirming the product's defects after its installation, further exacerbating the severity of its actions.

Takata did not respond to issues regarding the TK-821 seatbelt buckle for years. The circuit court found clear and convincing evidence that Takata was aware of the TK-821's susceptibility to inertial and inadvertent release prior to 1987, relying on multiple factors including the TK-52 patent application, depositions from Kitamura and Dr. Renfroe, the 1992 Nissan Design Specification (NDS), and the Emmert Complaint. 

1. **TK-52 Patent**: The patent criticized previous designs for failing to prevent unintended release during accidents. While it suggested a possible defect in the TK-821, it did not establish that Takata had prior knowledge of such a defect with clear and convincing evidence.

2. **Dr. Renfroe's Testimony**: Although Dr. Renfroe provided detailed testing results, he did not demonstrate that Takata was aware or should have been aware of a defect in the TK-821.

3. **1992 NDS**: The Udacs contended that the 1992 NDS indicated a defect in the TK-821 and that Takata’s inaction constituted reprehensible behavior. However, the NDS did not apply retroactively nor did it require compliance from pre-1992 vehicles. The TK-821 had been widely used without reports of failure, and it complied with the earlier 1981 NDS specifications.

4. **Emmert Complaint**: The circuit court referenced the Emmert Complaint as potential evidence of Takata's notice of a defect, but Takata argued that reliance on this complaint was erroneous.

Overall, while there may have been a preponderance of evidence suggesting the TK-821 was defective, clear and convincing evidence of Takata's prior knowledge of that defect was lacking.

Takata argues that the Udacs' complaint lacks sufficient evidence to prove that Takata was aware of or should have been aware of a defect in the TK-821 seatbelt buckle, pointing to a single, isolated allegation. During the trial on December 8, 2005, the circuit court permitted the Udacs to present part of an interrogatory question and Takata's answer to challenge Kitamura's deposition testimony. The court noted that while the Udacs mentioned the Emmert v. Nissan lawsuit, they did not introduce the Emmert Complaint into evidence. Takata submitted this complaint with a motion, which stated that the seatbelt system failed during an accident, causing injuries, but did not identify the specific model of the seatbelt involved. 

The circuit court's reliance on the Emmert Complaint, deemed inadmissible hearsay, to support the punitive damages award was identified as erroneous, as the allegations did not constitute clear and convincing evidence of Takata's notice of a defect in the TK-821. The court noted that only one person had raised a defect allegation regarding the TK-821 in over 20 years, suggesting the seatbelt was not defective. Consequently, the circuit court's findings regarding Takata's knowledge of the TK-821's potential for failure were insufficient to support punitive damages. Takata's renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law (JMOL) regarding the punitive damages was denied, but the court concluded that this denial was an abuse of discretion, thus negating the need to address the argument concerning the excessiveness of the $12,500,000 punitive damages award.

The Udacs argue that the circuit court erred by not awarding them prejudgment interest on both compensatory damages from the accident date and the punitive damages award. However, these issues are rendered moot as the Second Amended Judgment is vacated and the case is remanded for further proceedings. Notably, the Udacs had previously terminated their claims against Hawaii Motors, Inc. through summary judgment in September 2005. The court also noted non-compliance with Hawai`i Rules of Appellate Procedure by both parties regarding required record references in their briefs, warning of potential sanctions for future violations. Additionally, Alfredo Udac's death during the lawsuit led to Gwendolyn being substituted as Trustee of his Revocable Living Trust as a plaintiff. Relevant procedural rules, such as HRCP Rule 58 concerning judgment entry and HRE Rule 702 regarding expert testimony, are referenced. The document includes details about the seatbelt system and the methodology of Dr. Banks, who performed an injury causation analysis and conducted a surrogate study to assess seatbelt performance during the crash. The trial also referenced the application of FRE Rule 403 regarding the admissibility of evidence.

Scientific, technical, or specialized knowledge can aid the trier of fact in understanding evidence or determining key issues, allowing qualified expert witnesses to testify in opinion form. The circuit court's reference to a "previous order" is unclear, and part of the Udacs' Exhibit 1481 is illegible, with Takata indicating missing words. Dr. Renfroe provided testimony on "inertial unlatching," which occurs during lateral impacts or vertical accelerations, and "inadvertent unlatching," resulting from external contact with the buckle button. HRE Rule 407 was not addressed in the appeal concerning Udac's claims. The 40mm-ball test assesses seatbelt buckle button operability and inadvertent release. Dr. Renfroe described "false latch" as a scenario where the buckle appears latched but releases upon force. The U.S. Supreme Court's case law establishes three guideposts for punitive damages: the defendant's misconduct degree, the harm disparity between the plaintiff and the punitive award, and the comparison between awarded punitive damages and civil penalties in similar cases. These guidelines emphasize the importance of de novo appellate review to ensure punitive damages are lawfully determined. Additionally, the circuit court referenced a complaint from Emmert v. Nissan Motor Corporation filed in 1996, but no record indicates its resolution.