Anderson v. State

Citation: 246 P.3d 930Docket: A-10297

Court: Court of Appeals of Alaska; January 27, 2011; Alaska; State Appellate Court

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Kevin J. Anderson was involved in a fatal accident while driving in snowy conditions, hitting and killing a pedestrian. The police investigated but initially did not suspect him of wrongdoing. An officer informed Anderson that he was required to provide blood and urine samples due to the accident, transporting him to a substation where he could contact his attorney. After consulting with his attorney, Anderson submitted the samples, which indicated a blood alcohol level of .08 percent and the presence of marijuana. As a result, the State charged him with driving under the influence.

Anderson filed a motion to suppress the evidence from the samples, arguing the police had misrepresented their authority—asserting they could only require samples if they had probable cause of a crime. District Court Judge Alex Swiderski agreed that the police lacked statutory authority to seize the samples, deeming the transport of Anderson to the substation as an illegal detention. However, he ruled that Anderson’s consultation with his attorney sufficiently insulated his consent from the illegal conduct, deeming it voluntary.

Anderson's subsequent motions for reconsideration were denied, with Judge Swiderski finding that he had engaged in a meaningful conversation with his attorney. Following these denials, Anderson underwent a bench trial based on stipulated facts and was found guilty of driving under the influence by District Court Judge Gregory Motyka. 

Anderson appealed his conviction, challenging the conclusions regarding the voluntariness of his consent. The appellate court affirmed the conviction, noting that the evidence supported Judge Swiderski's findings. The officer's misrepresentation was deemed unintentional, and the circumstances of the police interaction—being polite and not coercive—were factors in determining the voluntariness of Anderson's consent. Anderson did not contest the officer's belief that no crime had been committed, which further supported the trial court's decision.

Anderson was allowed to call his wife and an insurance adjuster, as well as anyone else he wished, while being detained by the police. After his attorney, Rex Lamont Butler, returned his call, they discussed the implied consent law with Anchorage Police Officer Thomas Gaulke, who referred Butler to Lieutenant Nancy Reeder. Following these conversations, Anderson spoke with Butler again and subsequently consented to provide blood and urine samples. The police did not restrict Anderson's time to consult with his attorney, allowing him to make personal calls. Although there was a roughly forty-minute gap between the police's erroneous claim of authority and Anderson's consent, Judge Swiderski found that this provided adequate time for Anderson to reflect on his decision. Initially, Anderson had refused to cooperate with police demands until after consulting with Butler. The consent to provide samples came only after this second conversation. Judge Swiderski concluded that Anderson's consent was not influenced by the police's incorrect assertion of authority. Despite Anderson's claim of insufficient privacy during his consultation, the judge determined that the conversation was not overheard and noted that neither party requested more privacy. The specifics of their conversation were not disclosed, but the attorney's competence was not disputed. It was suggested that Butler might have advised Anderson to provide the samples to defend against potential legal repercussions, as Anderson had just been involved in a fatal accident but had only consumed one beer beforehand, which might have led him to underestimate his impairment. Judge Swiderski deemed it reasonable to conclude that Anderson's decision to consent was influenced by his attorney's advice rather than police coercion. In dissent, Judge Mannheimer questioned the plausibility of Anderson receiving correct legal advice regarding the requirement to submit samples under the relevant state statute.

The Alaska Supreme Court ruled in Blank that for a statute to be constitutional, the State must demonstrate both probable cause for a search and that it falls under a recognized exception to the warrant requirement. Judge Mannheimer noted that Butler, presumably Anderson's attorney, had limited opportunity to conduct independent research, which raises the possibility that he mistakenly advised Anderson that he was obligated to provide blood and urine samples. Alternatively, Butler may have believed that the samples would exonerate Anderson based on Anderson's statements. If either party had testified, the outcome regarding Anderson's motion to suppress may have been different. However, Anderson did not present evidence that Butler provided incorrect legal advice or that he was coerced into providing the samples. Consequently, Judge Swiderski had no basis to assume that Anderson received poor legal counsel and properly concluded that Anderson's discussions with his attorney mitigated the effects of the police's unlawful actions, leading to a voluntary decision to provide the samples. Therefore, the trial court's denial of Anderson's motion to suppress was affirmed.

Judge Bolger, concurring, highlighted the factors from Brown v. Illinois relevant to assessing whether consent to a search is tainted by prior illegal arrests: the temporal proximity between the arrest and confession, the presence of intervening circumstances, and the nature of the official misconduct. Anderson consented to provide samples only forty minutes post-detention, which weighs in favor of suppression. However, the opportunity for legal counsel, recognized as a significant intervening circumstance, mitigated the taint of the illegal detention, leading to a conclusion against suppression. Additionally, the officers' conduct was deemed not egregious since they acted in good faith reliance on a statute, further supporting the decision.

Officers did not threaten Anderson to obtain blood and urine samples, but intended to secure a search warrant if he refused. The determination of whether consent is voluntary or coerced is a factual question for the trial court, evaluated based on the totality of the circumstances. Judge Swiderski concluded that Anderson's opportunity to consult with counsel mitigated any issues stemming from the officers’ good faith request. Anderson's conviction for driving under the influence was based on these samples, which he "consented" to provide after being unlawfully taken to the police station. The police mistakenly informed him and his attorney that they could compel him to submit to testing. The dissent argues that Anderson's consent was not truly voluntary due to his illegal arrest, as the police lacked probable cause at the time of the demand. The dissent emphasizes that the transportation to the station constituted an unlawful arrest, thus tainting any evidence obtained thereafter unless it was sufficiently disconnected from the arrest. The dissent challenges the majority's reasoning that politeness and good faith of the officers could justify the legality of Anderson's consent, asserting that the illegal nature of the arrest fundamentally undermines the admissibility of the evidence.

Key factors cited by colleagues regarding Anderson's case include: the officers' polite treatment of Anderson, their good faith belief in their authority to demand body samples, and the opportunity given to Anderson to consult his attorney before complying. However, these factors are deemed insufficient to eliminate the impact of Anderson's illegal arrest. Professor LaFave's treatise highlights that an illegal arrest undermines the voluntariness of any subsequent consent to search, as it constitutes a false assertion of authority over the individual. In Anderson's situation, the officers explicitly claimed the right to demand samples, which reinforces the coercive nature of their actions.

Additionally, Anderson's polite treatment does not change the involuntariness of his compliance, nor does the officers’ good faith mistake about their authority mitigate this issue. While consultation with an attorney can sometimes dissipate the taint of an unlawful arrest, this assumption does not hold in Anderson's case. Both he and his attorney were misled by the officers regarding their rights, specifically that Anderson had no option to refuse the sample request. Although a hypothetical scenario exists where Anderson might have been correctly informed of his rights and voluntarily chose to cooperate, it is regarded as implausible in this context.

Anderson's legal representation appears inadequate, with no evidence indicating he received proper legal advice regarding his obligation to provide body samples after his arrest. The attorney, after being informed by Anderson about the custody situation, consulted with the arresting officer and later with a police lieutenant, both of whom asserted that Anderson was required to submit the samples. The attorney did not challenge these assertions and ultimately instructed Anderson to comply. The record indicates that the attorney had limited opportunity to research the relevant law, given the timing during a holiday weekend. Although the precise details of the conversation between Anderson and his attorney remain unclear, it is established that Anderson was subjected to an unlawful arrest. Consequently, the burden lay with the State to demonstrate that Anderson's decision to provide samples was not influenced by this illegal arrest. The court's assumption that the conversation mitigated the effects of the unlawful arrest and rendered Anderson's decision voluntary was improper. Therefore, the dissenting opinion argues that the test results from Anderson's samples should be suppressed, leading to a reversal of his conviction.

Key legal principles regarding consent to search and relevant case law are outlined. Alaska Statute AS 28.35.030(a) and several cases, including *State v. Blank* and *Skjervem v. State*, emphasize the importance of voluntary consent in search and seizure contexts. Notably, the consultation with legal counsel has been recognized as a factor influencing the voluntariness of consent. The precedent set in *Brown v. Illinois* is frequently cited, highlighting its significance in evaluating consent legality. Additional cases, such as *Frink v. State* and *McBath v. State*, also contribute to the understanding of consent and its implications, with particular attention to the criteria for determining whether consent was given freely and voluntarily. The treatise by Wayne R. LaFave on the Fourth Amendment is referenced, indicating its relevance to the discussion on search and seizure laws.