Gold v. Duncan Ostrander & Dingess, PC

Citations: 143 P.3d 1192; 2006 Colo. App. LEXIS 1386; 2006 WL 2435260Docket: 05CA0870

Court: Colorado Court of Appeals; August 24, 2006; Colorado; State Appellate Court

SummaryOriginalCytator Case TreatmentBackward CitatorAnalysis

EnglishEspañolSimplified EnglishEspañol Fácil

Lisa Dawn Gold appealed a judgment awarding an attorney's lien to Duncan Ostrander Dingess, P.C. The Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment. Duncan represented Gold in an eminent domain case, and after a final judgment on damages was entered on July 19, 2004, Duncan filed an attorney's lien notice and a motion to withdraw on October 22, 2004. On February 18, 2005, Duncan sought to reduce the lien to judgment, which Gold contested, claiming the motion was untimely under C.R.C.P. 121.1-22. The trial court ruled that this rule did not apply, as it pertains to disputes involving attorney fees for prevailing parties, and thus found the motion timely. 

The court clarified that Colorado does not recognize a common law right to an attorney's lien; instead, it is governed by statutes 12-5-119 (charging liens) and 12-5-120 (retaining liens). A charging lien automatically attaches to any money or property due to the client based on judgments obtained by the attorney. The court confirmed that Duncan's lien attached upon the entry of judgment and that the statute allows for enforcement through a civil action, including a motion within the original case. There is no specific limitation period for enforcing an attorney's lien, but it must be enforced within the limitations period for the underlying debt.

In *In re Marriage of Mitchell*, the court determined that an attorney's right to enforce a lien was extinguished due to the expiration of the statute of limitations, as nineteen years had passed since filing the lien notice with no further action taken. Similar rulings in other jurisdictions affirm that enforcement of attorney fee liens is barred when the underlying debt claim is time-barred. The court noted that without an explicit statutory limitation, imposing a time bar would be inappropriate unless facts clearly indicated the relevance of laches or estoppel. 

Approximately seven months after the judgment related to his services, attorney Duncan sought to enforce a lien for $79,767.23 against various claims and properties. Gold did not argue that Duncan's motion was barred by any applicable limitations period for the underlying debt. Consequently, the court found Duncan's motion timely and rejected Gold's claim that C.R.C.P. 121.1-22 required a different outcome. This rule pertains to requests for attorney fees made at the conclusion of an action and does not apply to motions enforcing an attorney's lien. Gold acknowledged owing fees to Duncan, who was not involved in the initial proceedings but sought to enforce the lien after the final judgment was entered.

The trial court's determination that C.R.C.P. 121.1-22 is not applicable is affirmed. Gold contends that, even if the fifteen-day limitation does not apply, precedents such as In re Marriage of Mitchell and Colorado State Bank v. Davidson require attorneys to notify the judgment debtor of their claim and file suit within a reasonable time. Gold argues that Duncan's motion to enforce the attorney's lien was not timely, as it was filed four months after the initial notice. However, the court disagrees, clarifying that an attorney must enforce a charging lien within the limitations period of the underlying debt. The court emphasizes that the notice serves only to inform others of the attorney's claim and does not initiate a civil action. Ultimately, Duncan's motion to reduce its lien to judgment was deemed timely, with the court referencing a precedent that allowed a motion filed seven months after judgment to be considered reasonable. The judgment is affirmed, with Judges Graham and Terry concurring.