Crandall v. City and County of Denver

Citations: 143 P.3d 1105; 2006 WL 1348458Docket: 04CA1989

Court: Colorado Court of Appeals; October 10, 2006; Colorado; State Appellate Court

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The Colorado Court of Appeals ruled in the case of Terri Crandall and Joann Hubbard v. City and County of Denver, affirming the trial court's denial of the City’s motion to dismiss based on governmental immunity. The plaintiffs, employed by United Airlines at Denver International Airport (DIA), sought damages for injuries allegedly caused by harmful environmental conditions at the airport. They asserted multiple claims, including negligence, premises liability, and injunctive relief, while seeking class certification, which the trial court had not yet addressed.

The City claimed the plaintiffs’ suit was barred by the Colorado Governmental Immunity Act (GIA) due to insufficient notice of their claims, arguing they did not file a notice within the required 180 days and that the notice did not adequately identify the class members. The plaintiffs contended their notice was timely and met all GIA requirements.

The trial court determined that the notice was sufficient for class claimants and granted the City’s motion to dismiss only for injuries occurring prior to February 2, 2002, the date 180 days before the notice was filed. The appellate court emphasized that compliance with the GIA's notice requirements is a mixed question of law and fact, which the trial court must resolve, and upheld the trial court's findings regarding the notice's sufficiency.

When jurisdictional facts regarding immunity are disputed, a court must conduct an evidentiary hearing and issue findings of fact. Trial court factual findings are subject to review under a clear error standard. Claimants must provide notice that substantially complies with the requirements outlined in 24-10-109(2), C.R.S.2005, which necessitates a good faith effort to include all specified information. The trial court may assess whether any omissions adversely impacted the public entity's defense against the claim. The notice requirement aims to enable public entities to investigate and address hazardous conditions, facilitate prompt settlements of valid claims, manage potential liability, and prepare for defenses.

In the factual background, the trial court identified various environmental issues at Denver International Airport (DIA) since its opening in 1995, including clogged drains, sewage backups, mold from water leaks, and chemical spills. Most issues were resolved by the City or external consultants. The maintenance department received weekly reports of noxious odors from Concourse B, where plaintiff Hubbard worked. Hubbard, employed from 1995 until February 19, 2002, claimed her health deteriorated due to these environmental issues. Although the court found she exaggerated the severity of her symptoms, she experienced numerous adverse health effects, including chronic dermatitis and respiratory problems. Her symptoms subsided during a medical leave in 1999 but resurfaced upon her return. The last incident on February 19, 2002, led to a severe skin condition requiring medical attention. After leaving DIA, her symptoms improved significantly. Plaintiff Crandall has also worked at DIA since its opening and remained employed there at the time of the trial court's decision.

Crandall suffered from multiple respiratory conditions, including chronic pneumonitis, chronic bronchitis, and chronic pulmonary disease, which she linked to environmental conditions on Concourse B. The court noted her history of pneumonia and that symptoms flared up during her exposure to this area, although no medical evidence established a direct link between the conditions and the environmental factors at Denver International Airport (DIA). Symptoms occurred frequently and were associated with various locations on Concourse B, but plaintiffs could not pinpoint the specific source of the environmental issues. 

On August 2, 2002, plaintiffs filed a notice of claim against the City and County of Denver, including a list of claimants and mention of unidentified individuals affected by similar conditions due to exposure at DIA. The notice cited health issues related to mold contamination and sewage exposure, alongside laboratory findings indicating recent sewage contamination and the presence of mold in carpet samples from the airport.

The City contended that the notice was untimely, arguing that the plaintiffs should have known of their injuries since DIA's opening in 1995, which would bar their claims under the Governmental Immunity Act (GIA). The court referenced the Gallagher v. Board of Trustees case, emphasizing that the discovery of injury is critical for determining the 180-day notice requirement under the GIA. It clarified that the continuing violation doctrine does not apply, and if any acts of retaliation occurred outside the 180-day period, they would be barred from the claim.

A prior act of retaliation does not bar a claimant from filing a valid notice of claim for subsequent acts of retaliation. The trial court ruled that the plaintiffs' recurring symptoms constituted separate injuries under the Governmental Immunity Act (GIA), as they were linked to varying environmental conditions on Concourse B. Despite lacking medical expert testimony, the plaintiffs' accounts and medical records supported their claims of injury due to environmental issues at Denver International Airport (DIA). The court found that the plaintiffs' ongoing health issues did not negate the existence of distinct incidents at DIA that warranted notice under the GIA. The burden of establishing notice is lenient, and the trial court's findings must be upheld unless clearly erroneous, leading to the conclusion that the plaintiffs' notice of claim was valid for injuries occurring after February 2, 2002.

Regarding the specificity of the notice, the City contended it was insufficiently detailed, hindering its ability to investigate. However, the trial court determined that the notice substantially complied with the requirements of C.R.S. 24-10-109(2), as it provided a concise factual basis for the claims. Although the notice could have been more specific about locations, the plaintiffs testified about experiencing foul odors in various parts of Concourse B, and the City was already aware of ongoing odor and mold issues there. The trial court found that the notice allowed the City to investigate adequately, and thus, it did not err in denying the City's motion to dismiss based on the alleged lack of specificity regarding location.

The City argues that no valid notice of claim was submitted for unidentified prospective class members under the Governmental Immunity Act (GIA). This position is countered by the assertion that the GIA does not explicitly prohibit class action tort claims against public entities. Relevant statutes, specifically 24-10-114.5 and 13-17-203, limit the attorney fees recoverable in such class actions, indicating legislative intent to allow these claims. Once immunity is waived under the GIA, liability is treated as if the public entity were a private individual. 

While the GIA does not specify notice requirements for unnamed class members, case law from other jurisdictions suggests that individual claims from each class member are not necessary. The California Supreme Court ruled that a class claim must include details about the representative plaintiff and sufficient information to identify the class, while the Utah Supreme Court concluded that class action notice need not list each potential class member. A Washington court further affirmed that a properly filed notice by a lead plaintiff suffices for the entire class once certified. Collectively, these interpretations support the notion that class actions against public entities can proceed without requiring every member to file individual claims.

A class action aims to consolidate numerous individuals, often unknown to the original parties, into a single lawsuit, as per C.R.C.P. 23. Procedures for identifying and notifying class members are only available post-commencement of the action. As such, dismissing class plaintiffs who haven't filed a notice of claim before the suit begins would hinder class tort actions against public entities. However, courts have determined that a notice of claim must inform the public entity of a potential class action. If the notice complies with the Governmental Immunity Act (GIA) and indicates it is on behalf of potential class members, it suffices for unnamed individuals. In this case, the plaintiffs' notice named twenty-five other claimants and was filed on behalf of "all others similarly situated," detailing injuries from environmental issues at Denver International Airport, such as mold and sewage contamination. The notice met the GIA's requirements, sufficiently alerting the City of a potential class action. The trial court's finding that the notice was adequate for unnamed potential class members was affirmed, with Judges Márquez and Román concurring.