Dewey v. State

Citations: 169 P.3d 1149; 123 Nev. 483; 123 Nev. Adv. Rep. 47; 2007 Nev. LEXIS 58Docket: 46854

Court: Nevada Supreme Court; November 1, 2007; Nevada; State Supreme Court

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The Supreme Court of Nevada addressed the interpretation of the Fifth Amendment and the Miranda rights in the case of Shelli Rose Dewey v. The State of Nevada. The court concluded that a suspect's assertion of the right to remain silent does not automatically invoke the right to counsel unless it includes a clear and unambiguous request for an attorney. The ruling emphasizes that merely exercising the right to remain silent is insufficient to also request counsel under Miranda. Furthermore, it stated that police may resume questioning a suspect who has invoked the right to remain silent only if they have fully respected the suspect's prior decision to end questioning and have issued a new set of Miranda warnings before any further interrogation. 

The facts of the case involved a 911 call made by Dewey reporting that her husband had been stabbed. Upon arrival, police found Dewey in a distressed state, and after establishing she was a suspect, they proceeded to interview her at the station. During the interview, Dewey indicated she did not wish to talk, stating, "No," when asked if she wanted to speak. Following this, the interview was terminated, and Dewey was arrested. After a brief interval, another set of officers approached her for questioning, reminding her of her Miranda rights again.

Dewey signed a waiver form and was informed she could terminate the interview at any time. During the second interview, she admitted to "hitting" Steven, stating she held a knife with the blade flat in her palm and intended to punch him but instead struck him with the knife. Dewey indicated that the knife might be in their truck, leading police to obtain a warrant and discover a nine-inch knife under a seat in the truck, as she described. The following day, Dewey invoked her right to counsel, prompting the police to cease questioning. She was charged with open murder with a deadly weapon. The district court ruled that while Dewey refused to speak during the first interview, she did not clearly invoke her right to counsel. At trial, she was convicted of second-degree murder with a deadly weapon and subsequently appealed, claiming her statements during the second interview were obtained in violation of her constitutional rights.

Dewey's appeal argued that her statements should have been suppressed on three grounds: violation of her Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights, violation of her Fifth Amendment right to remain silent, and involuntariness of her statements. The court found no merit in these arguments. Regarding the right to counsel, Dewey contended that her "No" response during the first interview indicated an invocation of her right to counsel, which the court disagreed with, citing substantial evidence supporting the district court's conclusion that she did not invoke her right during the first interview. The court clarified that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel is only applicable after formal judicial proceedings begin. Instead, her right to counsel during interrogation is protected under the Miranda decision, which requires that police must stop questioning only if a suspect clearly invokes the right to remain silent or requests an attorney unambiguously.

A request for counsel requires an explicit expression of the desire for an attorney, which must be affirmatively invoked by the suspect and is distinct from merely wishing to remain silent. In Dewey's case, she did not explicitly request an attorney until the third police interview, and her initial statement of not wanting to talk was deemed insufficient to constitute an unequivocal request for counsel. The district court concluded that Dewey's lack of a clear request was supported by substantial evidence. The Supreme Court's decision in Connecticut v. Barrett illustrated that a limited invocation of the right to counsel does not halt all interrogations, as seen when Barrett expressed his willingness to speak but not in writing. 

Dewey also claimed that her statements were in violation of her right to remain silent, which she had invoked during the first interview. However, the Fifth Amendment protects against self-incrimination, ensuring that once a suspect indicates a desire to remain silent, any subsequent statements cannot be used unless she voluntarily waives that right. The police must adhere to Miranda requirements, informing suspects of their rights during custodial interrogations.

The ability of police to resume questioning after a suspect invokes their rights depends on the nature of that invocation. If a suspect requests counsel, all questioning must cease until an attorney is present. Conversely, if a suspect only asserts their right to remain silent, police may reinitiate questioning if they respect the initial invocation and re-inform the suspect of their rights. In Dewey's situation, the State contended that the police "scrupulously honored" her right to remain silent, which the court affirmed. The analysis referenced Michigan v. Mosley, which considered factors such as the immediate cessation of questioning and the time elapsed before resuming interrogation to determine if the police appropriately respected the suspect's rights.

The police provided new Miranda warnings before conducting a second interview with Dewey, focusing on a different crime. The Court found that the police "scrupulously honored" Dewey’s right to remain silent, concluding that her statements were not coerced. Citing United States v. Hsu, the Ninth Circuit's approach emphasizes the validity of a waiver and the issuance of fresh warnings over the time elapsed or subject matter changes. The police halted questioning immediately after Dewey invoked her right to silence, waited two hours before the next interview, and supplied new Miranda warnings at its commencement. Dewey signed a waiver form and was reminded of her right to terminate the interview. Considering these circumstances, the Court determined that Dewey's rights were respected, and her statements were voluntary.

Dewey also contended that her statements were involuntary. The standard for a voluntary confession requires it to be made freely without coercion. The State must prove voluntariness based on the totality of circumstances. Relevant factors include the suspect’s age, education, prior experiences with law enforcement, and the conditions surrounding the interrogation. In this instance, Dewey, over thirty and a high school graduate with some college education, had been advised of her rights multiple times and had previously exercised her right to remain silent. She had been detained for only a few hours at the time of the second interview and demonstrated a clear understanding of her rights. This led to the conclusion that her statements were indeed voluntary and made with a rational intellect and free will.

Dewey's confession was deemed voluntary based on her educational background, her ability to invoke her Fifth Amendment right to silence, and the police's repeated reminders of her right to terminate the interview. The court concluded that Dewey did not clearly invoke her right to counsel when she initially stated she did not want to speak with anyone. Although she invoked her right to remain silent, the police respected this right and appropriately resumed questioning afterward. Dewey subsequently waived her Miranda rights and made inculpatory statements voluntarily, leading the district court to correctly admit these statements into evidence. Additionally, the court found no merit in Dewey's claims regarding insufficient evidence for her conviction or alleged constitutional issues with jury instructions related to second-degree murder and the definition of "deadly weapon." As a result, the judgment of conviction was affirmed.