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In Re KMH
Citation: 169 P.3d 1025Docket: 96,102
Court: Supreme Court of Kansas; October 26, 2007; Kansas; State Supreme Court
The Kansas Supreme Court case, 169 P.3d 1025 (2007), involves a paternity dispute stemming from artificial insemination that resulted in the birth of twins, K.M.H. and K.C.H. The mother, S.H., initiated a child in need of care (CINC) petition to assert that the known sperm donor, D.H., had no parental rights under Kansas law. D.H. contested this by filing for paternity, claiming an agreement with S.H. to act as the twins' father. The district court dismissed D.H.'s paternity claim based on K.S.A. 38-1114(f), which states that a sperm donor is not considered the legal father unless there is a written agreement with the mother. The facts indicate that S.H. and D.H. had an oral agreement regarding the donation, but no formal written contract existed regarding parental rights. The insemination procedures occurred in Missouri, although both parties were Kansas residents and the initial agreement was made in Kansas. S.H.'s CINC petition described D.H. as the twins' father and sought to terminate his rights, while D.H. acknowledged his financial responsibility and sought custody and visitation rights. The cases were consolidated, and the court examined the applicability and constitutionality of the Kansas statute, leading to further legal briefs on choice of law. S.H. argued for Kansas law based on the circumstances of the agreement and the residency of all parties involved. The argument centers on the jurisdiction and interpretation of Kansas law regarding parental rights in a case involving a sperm donor, D.H., and the mother, S.H. S.H. contends that Missouri, where the insemination took place, lacks significant contact with the parties or the dispute, and therefore, Kansas law should apply. She maintains that her petition did not imply consent to parental rights for D.H., emphasizing that their intentions were clear: she sought to be a single mother, with D.H. only as a sperm donor, as evidenced by his lack of involvement during the pregnancy and lack of support afterward. D.H. asserts his standing as the biological father and argues for the application of Missouri law, claiming that Kansas law’s provision for nonpaternity of known sperm donors violates his rights and public policy regarding legitimacy and inheritance. He further argues that K.S.A. 38-1114(f) should not apply to him since he provided sperm directly to S.H., not through a licensed physician. D.H. cites the CINC petition, which identifies him as the twins' father, as evidence of mutual intent to deviate from the statutory provision. The district judge ruled in favor of S.H., determining that Kansas law applies, K.S.A. 38-1114(f) is constitutional and applicable, and the CINC petition does not constitute a written agreement that negates the statute’s nonpaternity clause. Consequently, the judge concluded that D.H. has no legal rights or responsibilities regarding the children. On appeal, both parties reiterate their arguments, with D.H. introducing a new statutory provision and equity considerations to bolster his case. The appeal addresses six key issues, including the application of Kansas law, constitutionality of K.S.A. 38-1114(f), its interpretation, the CINC petition's sufficiency, the grant of parental rights under K.S.A. 38-1114(a)(4), and whether equity necessitates a reversal of the district court’s decision. Amici curiae briefs were submitted by the Washburn University School of Law's Children and Family Law Center, arguing the unconstitutionality of K.S.A. 38-1114(f) as applied to known sperm donors, and by family law professors asserting its constitutionality and proper application to prevent D.H. from claiming paternity. D.H.'s standing to pursue a paternity action is acknowledged under K.S.A. 38-1115(a)(1), which allows a child or representative to establish a father-child relationship presumed under K.S.A. 38-1114. The court will review the appeal de novo, as the issues presented are pure questions of law. Although S.H.'s motion was labeled as a "Motion to Dismiss," the district court considered additional materials, effectively treating it as a motion for summary judgment. The court must view evidence favorably to D.H. and will affirm S.H.’s motion if no genuine issue of material fact exists. In terms of choice of law, the court must ensure the application of Kansas law is not arbitrary or fundamentally unfair, considering the state's contacts with the parties and the transaction in question. Relevant factors include the nature of the legal issue, party residences, and state interests. Kansas law applies the Restatement (First) of Conflict of Laws for contractual disputes, governed by the lex loci contractus principle. A contract is formed at the location where the last act necessary for its creation occurs. The burden is on the party advocating for the application of a jurisdiction's law other than the forum to present adequate facts justifying that choice. If insufficient facts are provided, the forum law may be applied by default. Kansas courts typically favor applying Kansas law unless a clear justification for another jurisdiction's law is provided. In matters concerning legitimacy, particularly in a mobile society, the relevant law is determined by the state with the most significant relationship to the child and parent, considering factors such as state interests, justified expectations, and policy considerations. In a cited case, the Illinois Supreme Court applied Florida law to a paternity dispute involving a couple who had significant ties to Florida, emphasizing predictability and fulfillment of expectations. However, the current case involves parties who are Kansas residents, with the agreement and insemination occurring in Kansas. The twins were also born and reside in Kansas, with the only connection to Missouri being the clinic where insemination took place. Consequently, Kansas law is deemed applicable, as the significant contacts with Kansas support this choice, making it fair and constitutionally valid. D.H. challenges the constitutionality of K.S.A. 38-1114(f), alleging it violates the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of both the U.S. and Kansas Constitutions. He concedes that his challenge is not against the statute as unconstitutional on its face, but rather as applied to him, a known sperm donor who claims he had an oral agreement granting him parental rights concerning twins born from this arrangement. An amicus brief from the Center supports D.H.'s position, asserting that the statute infringes on his parental rights without due process and without a required finding of unfitness. They argue for an interpretation aligned with the Kansas Parentage Act's intent to promote voluntary acknowledgment of paternity and child support obligations while emphasizing the importance of a child's right to have two parents. The court notes that the review of a statute's constitutionality is a legal question assessed de novo, with a presumption of validity favoring the statute. Any doubts about its constitutional validity must be resolved in its favor, and a statute should not be invalidated unless its unconstitutionality is evident beyond substantial doubt. The court also recognizes the novelty of artificial insemination and the regulation of related relationships under K.S.A. 38-1114(f), indicating that this issue is unprecedented not just in Kansas but across the nation. To contextualize the analysis, the court considers the legal frameworks of various states regarding the rights of sperm donors in artificial insemination cases, noting that many states assign full paternal rights and responsibilities to the husband of a woman undergoing artificial insemination, regardless of the sperm source. Several state statutes stipulate that a semen donor who inseminates a married woman, with the exception of her husband, is not legally recognized as the child's father. Notable examples include Alabama, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, and Nevada. These rules aim to protect the rights and expectations of the married couple, the child's best interests, and the donor's expectations, as highlighted in the case of *People v. Sorensen*. The 1973 Uniform Parentage Act, established by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, served as a model for many states' artificial insemination laws, affirming that a husband is legally considered the natural father if he consents in writing to the artificial insemination of his wife with a donor's sperm. This consent must be certified by a physician and kept confidential. Conversely, the donor remains legally unrecognized as the father. However, the Uniform Parentage Act did not address the paternity of sperm donors when an unmarried woman conceived. This issue was first examined in *C.M. v. C.C.*, where a sperm donor sought visitation rights to a child conceived through artificial insemination with an unmarried mother who had previously been in a romantic relationship with him. The New Jersey court awarded visitation rights based on a common-law presumption of paternity, reasoning that the couple's intent to parent together warranted recognition of the donor as the child's father, despite their unmarried status. Some states have since adjusted their statutes to include provisions for sperm donors in cases involving unmarried recipients. States' statutes establish complete bars to paternity for sperm donors who are not married to the recipient, irrespective of the recipient's marital status or the donor's anonymity. For instance, California Family Code § 7613(b) and similar provisions in Illinois and Wisconsin affirm that a sperm donor is legally treated as if he is not the natural father of a child conceived via artificial insemination provided to a woman other than his wife. Additionally, statutes in several states specify that donors inseminating married women (not their wives) are also not recognized as legal fathers, as noted in Alabama Code § 26-17-21(b), Minnesota Statutes § 257.56 Subd. 2, and others. These laws are designed to protect the expectations of married couples, the child's best interests, and the donor's expectations, as highlighted in the case People v. Sorensen. The 1973 Uniform Parentage Act provided a model for many state statutes, stipulating that if a wife is inseminated with a donor's sperm, her husband is legally considered the father, provided he consents in writing. The Act also clarifies that the donor is not regarded as the child's father if insemination occurs with a married woman other than his wife. Notably, the original Act did not address scenarios involving unmarried women conceiving through artificial insemination. This issue was first examined in the case C.M. v. C.C., where a sperm donor sought parental rights after a child was conceived through insemination performed by the child's unmarried mother, with whom he had a romantic relationship and discussions of marriage. Three months into her pregnancy, the mother ended her relationship with the sperm donor and denied him access to the child after birth. The New Jersey court invoked a common-law presumption of paternity, granting visitation rights to the donor as the "natural father" of the illegitimate child, based on the parties' intent to parent together, despite not being married. Other states, unlike New Jersey, have statutes that completely bar paternity claims by sperm donors not married to the recipient, regardless of the recipient's marital status or the donor's identity. Examples of such statutes include provisions from California, Illinois, Wisconsin, Colorado, Connecticut, Idaho, Ohio, and Virginia, which legally treat sperm donors as if they are not the child's natural fathers if the semen is provided to an unmarried woman. Pre-2000 interpretations of similar statutes confirmed this bar to donor paternity, notably in the California case Jhordan C. v. Mary K., where the court emphasized that California law allows both married and unmarried women to obtain sperm without donor paternity claims. However, since the sperm donation in Jhordan C. was not facilitated through a licensed physician, it fell outside the statutory protections, leading to the court's ruling that the donor retained potential paternity rights. The court affirmed the lower court's recognition of the donor's paternity in Jhordan C., while acknowledging the constitutional rights of the two women involved but omitting any mention of the donor's constitutional implications. In the case of In Interest of R.C., the Colorado Supreme Court reversed a district court's dismissal of a paternity suit, emphasizing that an unmarried recipient does not lose statutory protections simply due to acquaintance with the donor. The Colorado statute, similar to California's, barred donor parental rights but was deemed ambiguous, allowing for evidence of an oral agreement where the donor acted as a father. In McIntyre v. Crouch, an unmarried woman used a known donor's semen for artificial insemination; the donor sought paternity recognition and challenged the Oregon statute, which denied rights to non-husband donors. The court applied strict scrutiny to the donor's equal protection claim, contrasting it with Kansas' intermediate scrutiny for gender discrimination cases. The donor argued he relied on an agreement to remain involved in the child's upbringing, seeking visitation and assuming responsibilities equivalent to those of a married father, but the district court ruled against his claim based on the statute. A statute that privileges women over men is subject to strict scrutiny unless it is based on biological differences and is rationally related to its purposes. The Oregon court determined that the statute in question appropriately classified unmarried males and females based on biological differences, as only males contribute sperm and only females can conceive. The statute's purposes included enabling married couples to have children despite male infertility, allowing unmarried women to conceive without intercourse, resolving parental rights disputes, encouraging semen donation by protecting donors from parental claims, and legitimizing children born from such arrangements. The court found no equal protection violation in the statute's application. However, the court acknowledged a potential due process violation for a known sperm donor who had an agreement with the mother regarding shared parental rights. The court referenced *Lehr v. Robertson*, emphasizing that while a biological connection does not confer significant due process protection, a father's commitment to parenting does. Thus, if the donor could prove such an agreement, the statute would violate his due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment, aligning the protections afforded to him with those of an unwed father demonstrating a commitment to parenthood. The court reversed the summary judgment favoring the mother, determining that the sperm donor had the right to prove the existence of an agreement with her that established his reliance on it. This decision hinged on the constitutionality of the Oregon statute as applied to the donor. Similarly, in C.O. v. W.S., the Ohio court found that while the statute generally prevented sperm donors from being recognized as fathers unless an agreement existed, it could be unconstitutional if the donor could demonstrate a parenting agreement with the mother. The Ohio statute stated that a sperm donor would not be regarded as the natural father of a child conceived through artificial insemination unless certain conditions were met, including physician supervision. The court noted that the statute could violate due process if it disregarded an established agreement between the donor and the mother. The Uniform Act was amended in 2000 to clarify that a donor is not considered a parent of a child conceived through assisted reproduction. Subsequent cases from Texas and California examined similar statutes but primarily focused on standing issues rather than the core constitutional concerns. In Texas, one case denied a known donor standing to seek parentage due to procedural circumstances, while another recognized standing based on a preinsemination agreement. In California, despite the statutory bar against paternity claims for unmarried sperm donors, the court ruled in favor of a donor based on equitable estoppel after he had been actively involved in the child's life. The donor was identified as the father of the child, having had sexual intercourse with the unwed mother, who acknowledged him and allowed his involvement in the pregnancy and birth. The California Court of Appeals ruled that under Cal. Fam. Code section 7613(b), no paternity claim could be made due to the statute's absolute bar. Kansas adopted parts of the Uniform Parentage Act in 1985 but did not include provisions on artificial insemination. In 1994, it amended its statute to incorporate a provision allowing for an opt-out written agreement between a sperm donor and a recipient, which deviated from the original Uniform Act that applied only to married women. This change indicates that the Kansas Legislature intended to apply the donor paternity bar irrespective of the marital status of the recipient. The Kansas statute K.S.A. 38-1114(f) allows a written agreement for a sperm donor to assert parental rights, contrasting with similar laws in Oregon and Ohio, which lack such provisions. The case raises the question of whether the requirement for a written opt-out agreement constitutes a violation of equal protection or due process. The statute establishes a gender-based distinction, where the female recipient is always considered a potential or actual parent, while the male donor requires a written agreement to achieve parental status. After donation, the male donor loses the ability to assert fatherhood unless previously agreed upon in writing. The female has the unilateral authority to decide when to use sperm donations for artificial insemination and can deny the male any parental rights by refusing to sign a written agreement. In Kansas, gender classifications like those in K.S.A. 38-1114(f) are subject to intermediate scrutiny under equal protection analysis, requiring that such classifications substantially further a legitimate governmental purpose. The biological differences between genders raise skepticism about the equal treatment of males and females in this context, but assuming equality for argument's sake, K.S.A. 38-1114(f) serves several important legislative purposes. It allows both married and unmarried women to become parents without sexual intercourse, encourages sperm donation by protecting donors from future claims for support, and safeguards women by preventing donors from asserting parental rights without a written agreement. The statute's requirement for written agreements enhances clarity and enforceability and implicitly promotes early resolution of parental rights before donation, ensuring balanced bargaining power. Overall, the gender classification in the statute is deemed to substantially further legitimate legislative objectives, establishing clear default positions for parties involved in artificial insemination while allowing for alternative arrangements if documented in writing. The legislative goal of avoiding D.H.'s limbo is upheld, as the application of K.S.A. 38-1114(f) to him does not infringe on equal protection rights. The due process challenge raised by D.H. lacks clarity regarding whether it is procedural or substantive. While D.H. argues that the statute's written agreement requirement undermines his opportunity to present a claim based on an oral agreement, the court disagrees, asserting that D.H. was not denied procedural rights; rather, his failure to meet the statute's burden of proof stems from his inaction. Ignorance of the statute does not invalidate its constitutional application. The primary due process concern pertains to D.H.'s fundamental rights to child custody and control, leaning towards substantive due process rather than procedural inadequacy. D.H. and the Center assert that the writing requirement imposes an undue burden; however, they misinterpret relevant case law, as the precedents cited (McIntyre and Lehr) do not support their position under the circumstances of Kansas law. The court clarifies that Kansas law allows a sperm donor to establish and protect parental rights through a written agreement, and it does not prevent biological parents from asserting their rights. D.H.'s claims about his intentions and efforts to exercise parental rights, hampered by S.H., are insufficient to override the statutory requirements. D.H.'s substantive due process argument is weakened by the lack of written evidence for an agreement with S.H., despite his oral claims. The court holds that the requirement for a written agreement does not violate D.H.'s constitutional rights. The Kansas Parentage Act aims to prevent the establishment of parental rights for sperm donors unless explicitly agreed upon in writing, thereby respecting the expectations of anonymous sperm donors. The statute does not infringe on existing rights but clarifies the conditions under which a known sperm donor can assert parental status. The court finds that the notion of a female being the sole decision-maker post-donation does not render the statute unconstitutional, as it aligns with established Supreme Court precedent regarding a woman's autonomy over her pregnancy choices. The sperm donor retains control by requiring an agreement before making a donation. The court acknowledges the advocacy for increased availability of two-parent resources for children but highlights that constitutional validity does not equate to policy wisdom, noting international shifts in regulation, such as bans on anonymous sperm donations in the UK and the Netherlands. Shifts in legal recognition acknowledge the wishes of some children conceived via artificial insemination to know their biological fathers. The Human Fertilization and Embryology Authority Act of 1990, amended in 2004, mandates that British sperm donors' identities be disclosed to donor-conceived individuals upon reaching 18. Similarly, the Netherlands Embryos Bill grants children conceived with donated sperm the right to information about their biological fathers at age 16. A child highlighted the emotional impact of anonymity in donor conception, emphasizing the desire to understand their origins and parental history. The Kansas Legislature is tasked with balancing the interests of all parties involved in artificial insemination, rather than the court. The appeal of D.H. argues that the district court incorrectly applied K.S.A. 38-1114(f) because his sperm was not given directly to a licensed physician but rather to S.H., who then provided it to medical personnel. Citing a prior Kansas Court of Appeals case, D.H. asserts that statutes governing adoption and parental rights must be strictly interpreted as they affect personal liberty. However, the court finds that D.H. is not a putative father as per K.S.A. 38-1114(f) due to the absence of a written agreement, classifying him only as a sperm donor with no constitutional rights pertaining to the twins. The interpretation of statutes should align with the legislature's intent as expressed in clear language, and ambiguity necessitates a deeper analysis of legislative history, which was deemed unnecessary in this case. A semen donor, when providing to a licensed physician for artificial insemination of a woman other than his wife, is legally considered not to be the child's birth father. The statute (K.S.A. 38-1114(f)) does not require the donor to personally provide his sperm; it is sufficient that it is provided by someone else. D.H. argues that a written agreement regarding his fatherhood status is satisfied by a CINC petition filed by S.H., but the court finds no evidence of a mutual agreement between D.H. and S.H. regarding coparenting. The terms "agreed to" and "writing" in the Kansas Parentage Act lack a technical definition, leading the court to interpret them based on common English usage. The pleadings filed do not demonstrate an agreement; rather, they indicate a lack of consensus, necessitating legal action. D.H. also contends that K.S.A. 38-1114(a)(4) should apply, which states a man can be presumed to be the father of a child under certain conditions, but the focus remains on the applicability of K.S.A. 38-1114(f). A man can recognize paternity of a child through written acknowledgment, including amendments to the birth certificate under K.S.A. 38-1130 or K.S.A. 65-2409a. In his brief, D.H. attempted to reserve rights related to ratification, estoppel, and common law, but this contention was not raised in the lower court. The case, being one of first impression with potential fundamental rights implications, warranted examination. A specific statute prevails over a general one, and K.S.A. 38-1114(f) specifically addresses artificial insemination scenarios, making D.H.'s claims under K.S.A. 38-1114(a)(4) meritless. D.H. also argued for reversal based on S.H.'s alleged "unclean hands," claiming he was misled by S.H., a lawyer, regarding the necessity of legal advice and a written agreement. However, D.H. failed to preserve this equitable argument for review, as it was not adequately raised in the lower court or in his appellate brief. Even if the merits were to be considered, the appellate court could not proceed due to an inadequate record and a lack of evidence supporting D.H.'s claims against S.H. Ignorance of the law does not excuse noncompliance, and while future cases might allow a donor to prove concealment of K.S.A. 38-1114(f) or fraudulent inducement regarding legal advice, D.H.'s situation did not meet those criteria. K.S.A. 38-1114(f) is ruled constitutionally permissible, preventing D.H. from claiming parental rights over twins K.M.H. and K.C.H. The statute outlines presumptions of paternity under various circumstances, including marriage status and acknowledgment of paternity. Key provisions include: 1. A man is presumed the father if he is or was married to the child's mother when the child was born or within 300 days post-marriage termination. 2. Presumptions can arise from attempted marriages, acknowledgment of paternity, or genetic testing with a 97% probability of fatherhood. 3. A presumption can only be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence, and if rebutted, the burden of proof shifts to the party claiming the father-child relationship. Subsection (f) notably diverges from these presumptions by stating that a semen donor for artificial insemination is legally treated as not the father unless a written agreement specifies otherwise. This emphasizes the lack of presumption in cases of artificial insemination, contrasting with the rest of the statute focused on establishing paternity presumptions. An unmarried woman seeking to conceive through artificial insemination must do so with a licensed physician and may choose an anonymous sperm donor from a sperm bank. The statute ensures that anonymous donors have no parental rights, even if identified later. If she chooses an acquaintance as a donor, he retains no parental rights unless both parties sign a written agreement. Should they agree, the donor accepts potential parental privileges and obligations, including child support for up to 18 years. Without the statute, the donor could face child support claims from the mother or child. The statute allows the prospective mother to be a single parent upon successful insemination, assuming all parental duties unless a written agreement with the donor is made. If the donor wishes to assume parental rights but the mother disagrees, he can withdraw, allowing her to seek alternative options. The provision aims to protect both parties from unwanted obligations. In dissent, Judge Caplinger argues that K.S.A. 38-1114(f) is unconstitutional as it infringes on a known donor's due process rights to parent his children. Citing similar cases, he emphasizes that absolute bars to donor paternity violate due process when there is an agreement for the donor to have a parental role. While he agrees with the majority that absolute bar statutes are unconstitutional, he disagrees that the opt-out provision in K.S.A. 38-1114(f) preserves its constitutionality in this case. The statute states that a semen donor is legally treated as if he is not the child's father unless a written agreement is made. The excerpt critiques the majority's conclusion that a statute is constitutional as applied to sperm donors due to an "opt-out" provision. It clarifies that prior courts, specifically McIntyre and C.O., did not deem their state statutes unconstitutional for lacking an escape clause but rather for imposing absolute bars on paternal rights, which conflicted with due process. McIntyre highlighted that the relevant statute restricted a father's rights even if an agreement existed, while C.O. noted the absence of consideration for oral agreements between parties. Neither court suggested that a written opt-out would resolve due process issues, and the excerpt emphasizes that public policy supports the legitimacy of children and paternal responsibility. The author argues that the inclusion of an opt-out provision in K.S.A. 38-1114(f) does not address the constitutional concerns raised by the previous cases. The majority's stance that the donor's inaction negates his rights is contested; the author asserts that fundamental rights cannot be waived passively and criticizes the terminology used by the majority regarding the donor's failure to "opt out." The statute mandates that a known sperm donor must actively choose to accept parental rights or permanently waive them, irrespective of any prior agreements regarding his role in parenting. This requirement, compelling D.H. to take affirmative steps to preserve his right to parent, is argued to breach due process principles under the Fourteenth Amendment, which prohibits deprivation of fundamental rights without due process. The Supreme Court has established that the right to parent is a fundamental constitutional right, deserving of heightened protection against government interference. Courts are instructed to presume against the waiver of such rights, necessitating clear and intentional relinquishment of known rights. The statute's provision allowing a donor to forfeit parental rights through inaction, rather than intentional act, is deemed incompatible with due process. Furthermore, the majority's assertion that D.H.'s ignorance of the statute's requirements does not affect its application is contested. Previous case law cited does not support the notion that fundamental rights can be waived merely due to ignorance of the law, thereby raising concerns about the validity of the statute's demands for affirmative action to protect the right to parent. The key issue in Murray revolves around whether the county hospital board's meetings fell under the Kansas Open Meetings Act, despite board members claiming their "good faith" based on advice from the county attorney that the Act did not apply. The comparison made between this "ignorance" and a father's waiver of parental rights due to ignorance of a statute is deemed inappropriate. The case of Jhordan C. is cited but considered unpersuasive since it lacks precedential authority and did not address whether ignorance of the law could waive parental rights. The Jhordan C. court noted the parties were unaware of the statute but ultimately ruled that the donor's sperm provision did not meet the requirements to bar parental rights. The majority's reliance on Lehr, a U.S. Supreme Court case, is critiqued; while Lehr recognized the constitutional protection of familial relationships, it emphasized that the biological father's ignorance of the registry requirement did not invalidate the law itself. The Lehr decision focused on whether New York's law allowed the father the opportunity to establish a relationship with his child, ultimately upholding the law within the context of an adoption proceeding and referencing the need to balance the interests of biological fathers and the prompt adoption of children. A nonbiological father was deemed ready and able to take on parental responsibilities, leading the Lehr Court to reject delaying a child's adoption based on the sudden assertion of rights by an absentee biological father who failed to meet statutory requirements to preserve those rights. The Court affirmed the termination of the biological father's rights, emphasizing that parental rights do not automatically derive from biological connections. The situation differed from cases where multiple parties seek parental rights; here, only the biological father was asserting claims. The need for a prompt determination of parental rights was less pressing than in typical adoption contexts. The majority opinion was urged to consider the full rationale of Lehr, which protects an unwed father's interests when he demonstrates commitment to parenting. The dissent argued that D.H., a putative father, had shown intent to participate in raising his children and deserved due process protection. D.H.'s lack of awareness of the statute requiring him to "opt in" to fatherhood before sperm donation was highlighted as problematic. The dissent contended that his ignorance did not constitute a waiver of his fundamental parental rights, which can only be waived through informed and intentional choices. Additionally, the statute's requirement for a known sperm donor to take proactive steps to secure his parenting rights was deemed a violation of due process. The dissent criticized the majority's view that the statute enhanced predictability and clarity, arguing that such goals do not address the statute's constitutionality. In Stanley v. Illinois, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that an unwed father must have a hearing to determine his fitness before being separated from his children, rejecting the state's argument that unmarried fathers are "per se" unfit. The Court emphasized that due process requires more than administrative convenience, acknowledging that the state's interest in efficiency cannot override constitutional protections. The Kansas statute K.S.A. 38-1114(f), which presumes sperm donors are not legal parents without a written agreement, similarly cannot justify a constitutional violation. It is stated that a known sperm donor should have the opportunity for a hearing to assert his parental rights. The clarity of the statute does not compensate for its potential infringement on due process. Additionally, the interpretation of pleadings in this context, particularly regarding the designation of a sperm donor as a father, should consider inconsistent statements made by the parties involved. In particular, the mother's actions in seeking to terminate the sperm donor's parental rights shortly after the twins' birth suggest an intended parental role, despite not referencing K.S.A. 38-1114(f) in her petition. Petitioner filed an amended petition over two weeks after the initial petition, which introduced K.S.A. 38-1114(f) regarding nonpaternity. The dissenting opinion calls for a remand to the district court to examine evidence of any agreement between D.H. and S.H., considering S.H.'s inconsistent statements about D.H.'s parental role and her consistent labeling of him as the children's father. The dissent argues against the application of K.S.A. 38-1114(f) as unconstitutional for denying D.H. fundamental parental rights without due process. It stresses the need for a factual determination on whether D.H. was agreed to be recognized as the natural father, asserting that if such an agreement is found, the statute should not nullify D.H.'s rights. Additionally, the dissent raises concerns about the children's interests, arguing they are left voiceless in proceedings that could sever their connection to their biological father, branding him merely as a "semen donor." It criticizes the lack of due process protections and highlights the importance of recognizing a father's role and responsibilities, referencing supportive legal precedents. Overall, the dissent advocates for the children's welfare and the recognition of D.H.'s rights in the context of parentage.