In Re Disciplinary Proc. Against Sanders

Citation: 145 P.3d 1208Docket: 200,271-4

Court: Washington Supreme Court; October 26, 2006; Washington; State Supreme Court

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A judicial visit to a facility for sexually violent predators is not inherently inappropriate under the Code of Judicial Conduct; however, engaging in conversations with residents regarding their confinement, especially when they have pending cases, constitutes a violation. Justice Richard B. Sanders breached the Code by questioning inmates, who were litigants or potential litigants, creating an appearance of partiality through ex parte communications.

The Washington Commission on Judicial Conduct received a complaint about Justice Sanders' conduct during a visit to the Special Commitment Center (SCC) on March 18, 2003. Following an investigation, the Commission found sufficient evidence to support the complaint and issued a Statement of Allegations on October 8, 2003. In April 2004, the Commission determined that probable cause existed for violations of Canons 1, 2(A), and 3(A)(4) of the Code. After a fact-finding hearing, it concluded that Justice Sanders violated Canons 1 and 2(A), failing to uphold judicial standards and failing to maintain public confidence in judicial integrity, resulting in an admonishment. Justice Sanders contested this decision.

Disciplinary proceedings are subject to de novo review, requiring the court to independently assess the facts and law. The Commission must prove its findings with clear, cogent, and convincing evidence. During his SCC tour, Justice Sanders ignored warnings about potential ex parte contact, accepted documents from inmates, and discussed volitional control with residents, some of whom had cases before the court. At the time of his visit, the Supreme Court was deliberating on In re Detention of Thorell, a key case involving issues pertinent to the residents he met, further establishing the relevance of the ex parte interactions. The Commission’s findings that Justice Sanders violated Canons 1 and 2(A) were upheld by the court based on the strong evidentiary record.

Two letters from resident Andre Brigham Young invited justices to McNeil Island, indicating that residents desired more than a mere tour, suggesting the presence of opposing counsel to mitigate partiality concerns. These letters should have alerted Justice Sanders to the visit's potential implications beyond an institutional tour. Additionally, three justices expressed concerns, and a basic computer check would have revealed that Rickey Calhoun and Young had pending cases before the Supreme Court. Despite warning residents about discussing their specific cases, Justice Sanders engaged them on sensitive topics like confinement and volitional control, raising serious concerns about partiality and violating the Code of Judicial Conduct. Justice Sanders argued that without a direct violation of Canon 3(A)(4), no violation of Canons 1 and 2(A) could be found, a stance the Commission disagreed with, citing precedent that judicial conduct can lead to violations of the canons. The case also referenced In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against Ritchie, where a judge was disciplined not for violating a statute but for breaches of the canons that require maintaining integrity and avoiding appearances of impropriety. The Commission noted that the cumulative facts suggested a foreseeable appearance of partiality, which undermines public confidence in the judiciary. Canon 3(D)(1) mandates judges disqualify themselves when their impartiality might reasonably be questioned.

In Sherman, the court determined that a trial judge’s inadvertent acquisition of critical information on remand could lead a reasonable person to question the judge's impartiality. The standard for recusal is not actual prejudice but rather an objective test based on what a reasonable person would know about the facts. The Commission acknowledged that even a suspicion of partiality can undermine public confidence in the judiciary. In In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against Sanders, the court emphasized the State's compelling interest in upholding high judicial standards under Canon 1, which serves as the framework for Canon 2(A). Canon 2(A) mandates that judges must act to promote public confidence in judicial integrity and impartiality. The court found a substantial expectation that Justice Sanders would improperly communicate with litigants involved in pending cases, leading to reasonable questions about his impartiality. 

Justice Sanders claimed a denial of due process due to his discovery requests being denied, framing the proceedings as criminal. However, the court clarified that judicial disciplinary proceedings are civil, and the scope of discovery is at the trial court's discretion, initially resting with the Commission. Justice Sanders received adequate information regarding conversations he had and was able to cross-examine witnesses during the hearing, negating any due process violation.

Regarding the sanction, the court affirmed that the Commission appropriately applied the nonexclusive factors outlined in CJCRP 6(b) and Deming, deeming the admonishment sanction to be fitting and sufficient. The justices concurred with the findings, noting their pro tempore status under Washington law. Canon 1 underscores the necessity for judges to uphold judicial integrity and standards.

Judges are required to avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all activities, upholding the law and fostering public confidence in the judiciary's integrity and impartiality. They must perform their duties impartially and diligently, ensuring that all parties involved in a legal proceeding have the right to be heard according to the law. Judges should not engage in ex parte communications related to ongoing proceedings unless permitted by law, although they may seek legal advice from disinterested experts with due opportunity for parties to respond.

In disciplinary proceedings, the reviewing authority is not bound by the Commission's findings and must independently assess the evidence to determine if a judge has violated the Code and the appropriate sanction, giving significant weight to the Commission's credibility assessments. A judge's recusal can alleviate concerns of partiality in specific instances but does not erase potential violations of other ethical standards. Previous cases illustrate that conduct deemed prejudicial to justice, even if unintentional, can result in disciplinary actions, reflecting the high standards expected of judicial conduct and the importance of judges as symbols of the law.

The defendants challenge the standard applied by the court in assessing their motion for recusal, asserting that it should be an objective standard rather than the judge’s subjective belief in their impartiality. Connecticut law, specifically General Statutes 51-39 and Canon 3(C) of the Code of Judicial Conduct, governs judicial disqualification. Under Canon 3(C)(1), a judge must disqualify themselves if their impartiality could reasonably be questioned. This standard considers whether a reasonable person, aware of all relevant circumstances, would conclude that the judge's impartiality is in doubt. The emphasis is on the appearance of impropriety, not the actual impartiality of the judge. This principle is supported by case law, including Rice v. McKenzie, which clarifies that the inquiry focuses on the perception of impartiality from the perspective of others, rather than the judge’s own assessment.