Roe v. Department of Social & Rehabilitation Services

Citations: 102 P.3d 396; 278 Kan. 584; 2004 Kan. LEXIS 777Docket: 89,462

Court: Supreme Court of Kansas; December 17, 2004; Kansas; State Supreme Court

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Robert Booth Roe, a minor, along with his adoptive parents and conservator, initiated a lawsuit against the Kansas Department of Social and Rehabilitation Services (SRS), the State of Kansas, and individual case workers following severe injuries sustained by Baby Roe due to parental neglect. The case arose after concerns were raised about the parents' mental health, substance abuse, and domestic violence prior to Baby Roe's birth. Despite being monitored by SRS, Baby Roe suffered injuries after being discharged. The district court initially ruled in favor of the defendants, granting summary judgment. However, the Court of Appeals reversed that decision, stating that SRS had a duty to provide monitoring services under Restatement (Second) of Torts. Key facts included that SRS worker Mary Keady attempted to engage with the mother, Terri, prior to childbirth but faced resistance. Concerns about the family's ability to care for Baby Roe led to inter-agency meetings, with the Bureau of Indian Affairs involved due to the parents' Native American heritage, to ensure the baby's safety post-discharge.

Personnel were informed of potential issues regarding the care of an infant, leading to a follow-up plan coordinated by Lisa Luther from the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA). BIA officials, including Sally Whitecrow-Ollis and Lisa Luther, assessed the needs of parents Terri and Booth at the hospital, deciding that Luther would serve as their primary contact for daily supervision. Terri expressed anxiety over the number of professionals involved, requesting to work primarily with Luther. It was arranged for Terri and the infant to stay in the hospital over the weekend for further instruction, with discharge planned for August 10th, during which Luther would accompany them home.

Luther recounted a meeting on August 7, 1992, where jurisdiction over the case was discussed. Sally Whitecrow-Ollis asserted that the BIA had jurisdiction, countering attempts by other workers to terminate parental rights. Whitecrow-Ollis indicated that while Keady wanted the BIA to take full control of the case, it was not feasible. The BIA was to provide parenting education, but not conduct abuse investigations. The BIA planned to visit the Tuthills once or twice a week for support, while the State Rehabilitation Services (SRS) was responsible for monitoring the services provided post-discharge.

Keady noted that she would ensure BIA and mental health services were adequate, consulting with Sramek if necessary. Sramek acknowledged that creating a family services plan for the Tuthills would have been standard practice, but this was not executed.

A proposed care plan aimed to specify each agency's commitments to support Terri and Booth after their discharge from the hospital with Baby Roe, who was in good condition post-birth. Upon returning home to the Oak Place Residential Facility, a care plan was documented, indicating that the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) would provide a worker from 8 am to 5 pm, Monday through Friday, to assist Terri with parenting. The BIA had jurisdiction over potential placements of Baby Roe outside the family. Despite some home visits by BIA worker Luther, she noted Terri's and Booth's lack of basic parenting skills. Luther did not communicate with the Social Rehabilitation Services (SRS) or provide written reports about her visits, recalling only Ollis's remarks on Terri’s mental state and Booth’s cognitive delays. Luther was soon replaced by Linda Turner Smith, who faced an 'uneasy' relationship with Terri due to gaps in services. Testimony from Whitecrow-Ollis indicated that Terri eventually barred Smith from the home, a situation reported to SRS. Keady expressed concern over mental health staff's difficulties accessing the home, complicating monitoring efforts. On September 24, 1992, Terri expressed fears regarding Booth's potential harm to Baby Roe, which was relayed to SRS. The following day, Sramek learned of an abuse allegation but deemed it 'not valid,' instructing Keady to inform BIA. Despite acknowledging the mother's mental illness and the potential risk to the baby, Sramek did not follow standard procedures for investigation, as he relied on the opinion of the mandated reporter who did not believe the abuse was occurring.

Terri Brown did not receive a Notice of Action from SRS regarding allegations of abuse involving Booth and Baby Roe, which Sramek indicated deviated from SRS's standard procedures. The report was forwarded to Mary Keady, who did not personally investigate, believing it was a child protection worker's responsibility. Keady attempted to contact the BIA but reported difficulties in obtaining information about the family's situation. Despite Keady’s logs indicating a conversation with Whitecrow-Ollis, it was unclear whether the abuse allegation was discussed. Keady claimed to have spoken with Brown about the allegations, which Brown denied, asserting she would not downplay the report or suggest Terri was mentally ill. Following additional concerns about neglect, SRS failed to follow up on the situation. On October 12, 1992, Baby Roe was hospitalized with severe injuries and later suffered permanent mental disabilities. Booth was convicted of attempted abuse, and Terri has since died. Baby Roe, his adoptive parents, and his conservator sued SRS and its employees, claiming breach of duty under the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 324A. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants, stating they owed no duty as they did not provide necessary services to protect Baby Roe. The Court of Appeals reversed this decision, concluding that SRS had voluntarily undertaken a duty to monitor family support services necessary for Baby Roe's protection. Judge Malone dissented, arguing that SRS's monitoring did not constitute a duty under § 324A.

Defendant SRS, along with defendants Keady and Sramek, filed petitions for review, which were granted by the court. SRS's petition raises four key issues: 1) the existence of a legal duty to Baby Roe under 324A as determined by the Court of Appeals; 2) applicability of the public duty doctrine to shield SRS from liability; 3) applicability of sovereign immunity to protect SRS from liability; and 4) whether exceptions under the Kansas Tort Claims Act (KTCA) apply to shield SRS from liability. SRS asserts that the latter three issues were not addressed by the Court of Appeals. Keady and Sramek argue that the Court of Appeals incorrectly concluded that SRS owed a legal duty to Baby Roe and erred in reversing the district court's summary judgment in their favor, which was based solely on the legal duty of SRS and the State of Kansas to the plaintiff.

In response, the plaintiffs, supported by the Kansas Trial Lawyers Association, defend the Court of Appeals' ruling and seek to address an additional issue regarding the defendants' liability for the negligent selection of BIA for Baby Roe’s protective services—an issue the Court of Appeals declined to consider as it was allegedly not presented to the district court. The plaintiffs contend it was included in the pretrial order but acknowledge that their argument pertains to negligence and duty breach rather than the existence of a duty, which the district court found did not exist.

The document outlines the standards for appellate review of summary judgment, emphasizing that it is appropriate when there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The court must interpret facts in favor of the party opposing the motion, requiring the adverse party to present evidence of material disputes to avoid summary judgment.

The central question pertains to whether the promise made by an SRS case worker to monitor services provided by BIA and a mental health center constitutes an undertaking under 324A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. In Kansas, establishing a duty owed by the defendant is a legal question, subject to unlimited review. Restatement 324A outlines liability for those who undertake to render services that are necessary for the protection of a third party, contingent on their failure to exercise reasonable care in their undertaking, which could increase the risk of harm or result from reliance on the undertaking.

The Court of Appeals determined that the Kansas Department of Social and Rehabilitation Services (SRS) had a duty under K.S.A. 324A to monitor and coordinate support services for Baby Roe, contradicting the district court's ruling. It found that SRS fulfilled part of the duty owed to Baby Roe by his parents, who required assistance. SRS contended this conclusion conflicted with prior rulings, particularly in P.W., where it was established that SRS and the Kansas Department of Health and Environment (KDHE) owed no duty to parents of abused children due to a lack of affirmative acts or agreements between SRS and the plaintiffs. The P.W. case emphasized that SRS's statutory duty to investigate allegations was a public duty, not a special duty owed to individuals. Similar outcomes were observed in cases like Beebe and Burney, where the courts ruled that SRS's actions did not establish a legal duty towards individuals, reiterating that their investigations were discretionary functions protected under the Kansas Tort Claims Act (KTCA). The Court of Appeals referenced these precedents to assert that SRS's engagement in Baby Roe's case was part of its broader public duty, as outlined in K.S.A. 38-1524, which mandates protective measures if a child's welfare is at risk.

A child in need of care petition can only be filed after the Kansas Department of Social and Rehabilitation Services (SRS) determines that it cannot provide necessary protective services. The actions taken in this case, including monitoring services from the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) and a mental health center, were deemed adequate to protect Baby Roe's welfare. However, the court concluded that SRS's monitoring did not establish a duty under Restatement (Second) of Torts § 324A, as it was a limited undertaking and did not equate to a direct obligation to prevent abuse. This conclusion was supported by precedents such as *Estate of Beckner v. Jensen* and *McGee v. Chalfant*, where defendants were found not liable due to the nature of their limited actions toward the tortfeasors. The court reversed the Court of Appeals' ruling and affirmed the district court's decision.

Justice Luckert dissented, arguing that SRS did assume a duty to monitor family support services for Baby Roe, which could establish liability under § 324A. Luckert emphasized that the distinction between public and special duties allows for a finding of liability if a governmental entity takes affirmative actions that cause injury, as noted in previous cases like *P.W. v. Kansas Dept. of SRS*. This dissent highlighted the potential for a special duty arising from SRS's affirmative acts, thereby challenging the majority's conclusion regarding the absence of a duty.

SRS's deviations from its established policies regarding the late September abuse allegation and the early October neglect report may indicate a breach of statutory duty to the public, but they are only relevant if a party with a tort duty should have acted differently than Keady and Sramek. SRS did not owe a statutory duty to Baby Roe individually; however, it did owe a tort duty based on the facts presented. Under Section 324A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, SRS and its employees had an obligation to exercise reasonable care in monitoring services provided to the Tuthills to protect Baby Roe, a duty they voluntarily accepted. A jury must determine if the defendants’ actions met the 324A standard and if any failure caused Baby Roe's injury. SRS's undertaking was specifically for Baby Roe's benefit, not for the general public, and while K.S.A. 38-1524 outlines service delivery by SRS, it does not impose a duty to monitor other service providers. The dissent argues against the majority's view that the duty to monitor is separate from ensuring safety, asserting that SRS did commit to a monitoring duty. Questions remain regarding whether SRS breached this duty and whether that breach caused harm to Baby Roe, which should not be resolved through summary judgment. Judges DAVIS and GERNON concur with this dissent.