Board of Lincoln County Comm'rs v. Nielander

Citations: 62 P.3d 247; 275 Kan. 257; 2003 Kan. LEXIS 33Docket: 88,844

Court: Supreme Court of Kansas; January 31, 2003; Kansas; State Supreme Court

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An injunction was issued allowing the Lincoln County Board of Commissioners to terminate part-time deputy sheriff Jack Jackson and requiring Sheriff Wray Nielander to obtain prior approval from the Board for expenditures over $250. Jackson, initially employed part-time from November 3, 2001, transitioned to full-time on January 1, 2002. The Board attempted to discharge Jackson twice, citing unsatisfactory job performance, with the second attempt following the adoption of a personnel policy granting the Board exclusive hiring and firing authority. Nielander contested this authority, leading to a legal dispute where the Board obtained an injunction preventing Jackson's employment. 

On January 22, 2002, the Board officially terminated Jackson's employment, but Nielander continued to employ him. On February 28, 2002, the Board revised its Employee Rules and Regulations to clarify that all Lincoln County employees are at-will, can be discharged at any time, and that only the Board has the authority to hire or discharge employees. The Board again terminated Jackson's employment on the same day for unsatisfactory performance, while releasing his payroll warrant for February 2002. Nielander remained resistant to the Board's termination efforts.

Jackson maintained full-time employment during the litigation and intended to continue until Nielander made a different decision. The Board established a purchase policy on September 10, 2001, requiring that all county departments, except the highway department, obtain approval from the County Commissioners for equipment or supply purchases exceeding $250.00. Department heads were required to submit a purchase request form, including cost quotations for purchases over the threshold. If budgets were exceeded, pre-approval for all purchases was mandated.

The Board and Nielander acknowledged that Nielander exceeded his 2001 budget by approximately $37,000 and admitted to occasionally failing to secure prior approval for purchases over $250. On March 6, 2002, the Board filed a petition for an ex parte restraining order and injunction against Nielander and Jackson to prevent Jackson's employment and Nielander's unauthorized purchases. The district court determined that Nielander was bound by the Lincoln County Employee Rules and that the Board acted within its authority in discharging Jackson on February 28, 2002. The court upheld the reasonableness of the Board's purchase policy and ordered Jackson's discharge, prohibiting him from working in Lincoln County, and mandated Nielander's compliance with the purchase policy.

Nielander and Jackson appealed the decision, challenging the Board's authority to terminate a deputy's employment and require preapproval for sheriff expenditures. They argued that the Board lacked constitutional or statutory authority to supervise the employment decisions of the sheriff's office, asserting that the sheriff operates independently as an elected official with powers granted by the legislature, without subordination to the county board.

The court is tasked with interpreting statutory provisions regarding the powers of county commissioners and sheriffs. The Board claims authority under K.S.A. 2001 Supp. 19-101a(a) to manage county business and local legislation, and argues that K.S.A. 19-805(d) allows them to override sheriffs' personnel decisions. However, Nielander and Jackson assert that the Kansas Constitution grants the legislature the power to establish necessary county officers, including sheriffs, who are empowered by K.S.A. 19-805(a) to make personnel decisions independently. They argue that the district court's finding, which suggested the Board had unchecked authority over hiring and firing, misinterprets the statutes and infringes upon the sheriff's legislatively granted powers. Additionally, they contend that the court's reading of K.S.A. 19-805(d) disregards the statute's introductory clause. Various associations, as amici curiae, support preserving the statutory authority of elected officials over personnel matters, warning that a ruling favoring the Board would undermine this authority and grant excessive control to county commissioners. They specifically challenge the Board's February 28, 2001, resolution terminating Jackson as conflicting with K.S.A. 19-805. The amici curiae emphasize that the legislature has endowed elected officials with similar authority regarding personnel issues, ensuring a proper balance of power.

The legislature has imposed restrictions on personnel actions taken by certain county officials, including clerks, sheriffs, registers of deeds, and treasurers, as outlined in specific Kansas statutes (K.S.A. 19-302(c), K.S.A. 19-503(c), K.S.A. 19-805(d), K.S.A. 19-1202(c)). The appeal raises issues regarding the potential conflict between the Board's home rule authority under K.S.A. 2001 Supp. 19-101a(a) and the sheriff's authority to manage personnel as per K.S.A. 19-805(a) and 19-810. 

K.S.A. 19-805(a) permits the sheriff to appoint, promote, demote, and dismiss deputies and assistants essential for office operations, holding responsibility for their actions. The sheriff must operate within the budget approved by the county commissioners and is required to submit a budget for the sheriff's office. Personnel actions taken by the sheriff must adhere to the personnel policies, pay plans, applicable collective bargaining agreements, and the approved budget of the county. 

The sheriff's hiring and firing authority must be viewed alongside the county commissioners' powers to govern local affairs, which includes home rule powers granted to counties in Kansas. These powers allow counties to manage local business and administrative duties but are subject to limitations, including restrictions on altering certain statutes such as K.S.A. 19-805(a). The court has affirmed that the sheriff is accountable for his department and must follow county personnel policies concerning employees under his supervision.

K.S.A. 19-805(d) outlines the authority of county officials and the limitations on boards of county commissioners concerning personnel management. The statute was amended in 1983 through S.B. 46, reflecting legislative intent to empower elected county officials, like sheriffs, with the authority to hire, promote, demote, and dismiss employees, while restricting commissioners to budgetary roles. Courts interpret statutes based on legislative intent, which is determined by examining the act's overall context, historical background, and purpose. Testimonies during the Senate Committee hearings emphasized the importance of S.B. 46 for county treasurers and clerks, asserting that those who work closely with employees are best positioned to evaluate performance. The hearings revealed concerns from county commissioners about their lack of control over budgetary processes. The legislative history supports the conclusion that sheriffs hold the exclusive authority to manage their personnel. Attempts by the Board to assert unilateral hiring and firing authority over Lincoln County employees violated K.S.A. 19-805(a) and K.S.A. 2001 Supp. 19-101a(a)(15), which restrict commissioners from altering the sheriff's authority. While commissioners can set personnel policies for non-elected county personnel, their authority does not extend to personnel management of elected officials such as sheriffs.

K.S.A. 19-805(d) stipulates that while sheriff personnel actions are subject to county policies and budgets, county commissioners cannot override a sheriff's authority to appoint, promote, demote, or dismiss personnel. The district court erred in ruling that the Board had the authority to discharge Jackson, leading to the vacating of the court's injunction against Jackson's employment with Lincoln County. Nielander and Jackson contested the district court's injunction requiring Nielander to obtain Board approval for expenditures over $250, arguing it conflicted with the sheriff's obligation to operate within an approved budget. The Board claimed that it retains exclusive control over county finances, except when expenditures are necessary for elected officials to perform their statutory duties. Both parties agreed that while the Board has general authority over finances, this authority does not extend to necessary expenditures for fulfilling statutory duties. Importantly, it was noted that Nielander had not exceeded the Board's budget nor had the expenditures been deemed unnecessary for his duties. The Board sought injunctive relief for future protection, but its argument regarding discretionary versus necessary expenditures was not considered because it was not raised in the lower court. The appellate court concluded that the district court erred in asserting that the Board could mandate advance approval for necessary purchases within the approved budget.

Expenditures exceeding the budget require the sheriff to seek prior approval from the board, regardless of the amount. The board must approve necessary expenditures for the sheriff to fulfill statutory duties; failure to do so allows the sheriff to mandamus the board. Kansas Attorney General Opinions provide persuasive authority on this matter. Statutes K.S.A. 19-212, K.S.A. 19-229, and K.S.A. 2001 Supp. 19-101a empower county boards to mandate preapproval for discretionary expenses over $250 outside the sheriff's budget, but not for those necessary for statutory duties. The district court improperly ordered Nielander to adhere to Lincoln County purchasing policies without recognizing that he need not seek board preapproval for budgeted expenses. Consequently, the appellate court reversed the district court's injunction as inconsistent with its ruling. Additionally, the injunction against Jackson was overly broad, extending beyond the Board's request, and failed to meet K.S.A. 60-906’s specificity requirements. The appellate court vacated the injunction and noted that the issue was moot, affirming in part and reversing in part.