Ake v. State

Citations: 663 P.2d 1; 1983 OK CR 48; 1983 Okla. Crim. App. LEXIS 225Docket: F-80-523

Court: Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma; April 12, 1983; Oklahoma; State Appellate Court

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Glen Burton Ake, also known as Johnny Vandenover, was convicted in Canadian County, Oklahoma, of two counts of First Degree Murder and two counts of Shooting with Intent to Kill, resulting in death sentences for each murder and a five-hundred-year prison term for each shooting. The crimes occurred on October 15, 1979, when Ake and accomplice Steven Keith Hatch targeted the home of Reverend and Mrs. Richard Douglass. Ake entered the home under false pretenses, then he and Hatch bound the family and attempted to rape their twelve-year-old daughter, Leslie. After failing, Ake shot Reverend Douglass and Leslie twice, and Mrs. Douglass and Brooks Douglass once, killing Mrs. Douglass immediately and causing Reverend Douglass' death through gunshot and strangulation. Leslie and Brooks escaped and reported the incident, leading to Ake's and Hatch's capture after a month-long crime spree across several states. Ake's appeal included a claim that the trial court improperly denied his request for a change of venue due to prejudicial pre-trial publicity. However, the court found that Ake did not follow the proper statutory procedure for such a request, as it was not verified by affidavit nor supported by affidavits from credible local residents, rendering the motion invalid. The trial court's decision to deny the change of venue was upheld.

The appellant contends that the trial court erred by denying a second preliminary hearing, arguing he could not assist his attorneys during the initial hearing due to incompetency. However, the appellant was found competent to stand trial after a psychiatric evaluation and did not raise his competency issue during the preliminary hearing or subsequent proceedings, indicating he was ready to proceed. The court noted that the appellant's counsel effectively cross-examined witnesses and presented evidence, demonstrating the appellant benefited from the hearing. The appeal on this point was ultimately waived due to lack of preservation in the motion for a new trial.

In a separate assignment of error, the appellant claimed a prospective juror was improperly dismissed under Witherspoon v. Illinois. The court found no error, as the juror's responses met legal standards, and the appellant failed to object during jury selection, thus waiving the issue.

The appellant also argued that as an indigent defendant, he was entitled to a court-appointed psychiatrist and investigator for effective counsel. The court reiterated that the state is not obligated to provide these services to indigent defendants in capital cases and noted the issue was also not preserved in the motion for a new trial, resulting in waiver.

Finally, the appellant raised concerns about being administered 600 milligrams of Thorazine during the trial, as prescribed by doctors at Eastern State Hospital. The treating physician confirmed the appellant's competence to assist his counsel while on medication, further supporting the trial court's decision.

The appellant did not engage during the trial, remaining silent and unresponsive to his attorneys. He argues that the effects of Thorazine impaired his ability to understand the proceedings and assist in his defense, thereby violating his rights. He also contends that the trial court should have paused the proceedings to assess his sanity. The core issue revolves around whether Thorazine affected his competency. Dr. Garcia diagnosed the appellant with paranoid schizophrenia, indicating that while the medication sedates a normal person, it effectively manages the appellant's symptoms, enabling him to stand trial. The appellant was on his prescribed medication, and there was no evidence of any change in his competency prior to the trial.

The appellant asserts that the trial court should have cited him for contempt and restrained him before administering the medication. However, the court found that the medication was not solely for calming him but was necessary for his mental health due to his previous disruptive behavior. The use of medication to restore competency is considered acceptable, and the pursuit of a speedy trial is favored.

Regarding the trial court's decision not to impanel a jury for a sanity evaluation, the appellant's attorneys had previously withdrawn such a motion after he was certified as competent post-treatment at Vinita. Given this certification and his ongoing medication, the court had no obligation to address the sanity issue sua sponte. The trial judge was aware of the appellant's non-communication and demeanor but was not required to conclude that a further hearing on his competency was necessary.

A doubt regarding a defendant's sanity must arise in the trial court's mind based on substantial facts and circumstances, as per 22 O.S. 1981. 1162. This doubt should not stem from simulations intended to delay justice. In this case, the appellant's demeanor was considered, but the judge did not abuse discretion in declining to order a trial on present sanity. The appellant claimed his confession to police was involuntary due to insanity; however, no doubt was established regarding his sanity at the time of the crime. Testimony indicated he understood his rights and voluntarily waived them, as evidenced by a detailed confession he reviewed and corrected. Although the appellant was later deemed incompetent to stand trial, psychologists could not assess his mental state prior to their evaluations. The confession was ruled knowingly and voluntarily given. Regarding the confession's admissibility, parts were deleted due to references to other crimes, and this issue was not preserved for appeal. The appellant also contended that photographs admitted into evidence were prejudicial; however, most were excluded, and the one admitted illustrated the victim's helplessness and was not unduly gruesome. Lastly, testimony from surviving victims concerning attempted rape was allowed, but the appellant failed to object to this testimony during the trial or include it in the motion for a new trial.

The appellant failed to raise any errors related to the trial court's admission of evidence concerning other crimes, which could result in waiving any claims of error. The admission of such evidence and the lack of a limiting instruction were deemed harmless due to the overwhelming evidence against the appellant, suggesting that the jury would have reached the same verdict regardless. The appellant's claims regarding improper arguments made by the prosecutor were addressed; the prosecutor's statements, including assertions of the appellant's guilt and implications about potential outcomes if found insane, were permissible interpretations of the evidence. Although some remarks could have been avoided, they did not warrant modification or reversal of the verdict, as the jury was correctly instructed on the implications of an insanity verdict. 

Additionally, the appellant's complaint regarding a jury note requesting testimony from a defense psychologist was also noted. The trial court's decision not to bring jurors into open court for this discussion and to decline reading the testimony was found to be harmless, as the appellant did not object during the proceedings or preserve the issue for appeal. The court's written response to the jury's request was considered appropriate, and the decision to grant or deny the request for testimony was within the trial court's discretion.

In Jones v. State, 456 P.2d 610 (Okl.Cr. 1969), the appellant challenged the jury's understanding of Dr. Garcia's testimony, claiming difficulties due to a 'choppy record'. The court found no evidence that the jury struggled to comprehend the testimony, thus ruling that the trial court did not abuse its discretion. The appellant also argued that the lack of air conditioning during the trial impaired proper jury deliberation. However, the court noted the jury was given the option to recess but chose to continue deliberating, indicating they acted diligently despite discomfort.

The appellant's claim that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence was rejected, as the presumption of sanity remained unchallenged; the burden of proof lay with the State only if reasonable doubt was established by the defense. The three doctors who testified did not provide opinions on the appellant's sanity during the crime but noted mental illness developed afterward. The jury was appropriately instructed on the standard of sanity, and the court found no error in their verdict.

The appellant's subsequent argument regarding the accumulation of errors was dismissed since all prior claims were deemed meritless. Additionally, the court ruled that the challenge to the felony-murder doctrine was not preserved for review, and thus not properly before the court. Finally, the appellant's assertion that the statutory burden-shifting in capital cases was unconstitutional was also found not properly preserved, though the court considered it and concluded that the cited authorities did not support the appellant's position.

A criminal defendant cannot be constitutionally compelled to produce evidence to negate or mitigate the charge against him, as established in Mullaney v. Wilbur. In the current case, the relevant statute pertains to sentencing after guilt is established, making prior guilt determination considerations irrelevant. The appellant was not obligated to provide mitigating evidence; however, since he chose to present mitigating factors, he was required to substantiate their existence. Defendants are typically in the best position to present such evidence. Holding a defendant accountable for proving mitigating circumstances during the sentencing phase of a bifurcated trial does not violate Due Process principles, which require the State to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

The review of the appellant's sentences, as per 21 O.S. 1981. 701.13, indicates they were not influenced by passion or prejudice. The evidence against the appellant was compelling, supporting the jury's findings of aggravating circumstances justifying the death penalty, which included: the murder being especially heinous, the murders committed to avoid arrest, and the likelihood of the appellant posing a continuing threat to society. The appellant's actions, including invading the victims' home and executing them despite pleas for mercy, corroborated these aggravating factors. The court concluded that the death sentences were not excessive or disproportionate compared to similar cases and affirmed the jury's decision, with Judges Cornish and Brett concurring. Additionally, the case received substantial media coverage, which the appellant argued may have influenced juror perceptions, as evidenced by a pre-trial poll indicating a significant belief in his guilt.

Quality law enforcement requires a dedicated professional, advocating for Lynn Stedman as Sheriff. A juror does not need to be entirely unaware of the case details; they must be able to set aside personal opinions to render a verdict based on evidence, as established in Irvin v. Dowd and Russell v. State. Following thorough voir dire, jurors indicated their ability to remain impartial. The trial court deferred ruling on the venue change motion until after voir dire, allowing the appellant to effectively challenge biased jurors, ultimately waiving two peremptory challenges, which limits his ability to contest juror bias on appeal, per Carpitcher v. State.

The judge's comments regarding the preliminary hearing not serving as a discovery mechanism for the defendant were noted, but deemed inconsequential as the hearing functioned as a discovery tool. Although the appellant raised a valid point, it did not significantly affect the case outcome. A specific dialogue highlighted a juror's inability to impose the death penalty due to personal convictions, which the court assessed but concluded did not disqualify her from serving.

Despite the appellant's claims of insanity, the jury observed his behavior throughout the trial and determined him sane. The appeal references a contrasting case, State v. Maryott, but the jury's decision stands based on their assessment of the appellant's demeanor and mental state during the proceedings.

A defendant was found to have been improperly tried while on medication that included multiple strong depressants, leading to a state of vacant attention during the trial. This case mirrors the situation of the appellant, who also exhibited similar behavior. The referenced case, along with a series of Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals cases, highlights the significance of a defendant's mental state and medication effects in relation to fair trial standards. The implications of these findings suggest a need for careful consideration of a defendant's competency when under the influence of such medications during legal proceedings.