Kulko v. Superior Court

Citations: 564 P.2d 353; 19 Cal. 3d 514; 138 Cal. Rptr. 586Docket: S.F. 23574

Court: California Supreme Court; May 26, 1977; California; State Supreme Court

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Ezra Kulko petitioned the Supreme Court of California for a writ of mandate to vacate a superior court order that denied his motion to quash service of summons in a case seeking to establish a foreign divorce judgment and modify child custody and support. The court upheld the lower court's decision, concluding that the denial of the motion was correct. The relevant facts include that Sharon Kulko was granted a divorce from Ezra Kulko in Haiti after 13 years of marriage. They had two children, Darwin and Ilsa, with a custody arrangement detailed in a separation agreement executed in New York. The agreement stipulated that the children would live with Ezra during the school year and with Sharon during vacations, with Ezra providing $3,000 annually in child support. However, Ilsa expressed a desire to live permanently with her mother, which led to her moving to California. In early 1976, Darwin also requested to live with his mother, prompting Sharon to file for custody and support modification. Ezra, served by mail in New York, contested the jurisdiction, claiming insufficient contacts with California to meet due process standards. The court ultimately denied his motion, affirming the superior court's ruling.

Defendant's motion, supported by personal affidavits, was opposed by the plaintiff's affidavit and subsequently denied by the trial court. Following this, the defendant sought a writ of mandate. The court's jurisdiction to determine custody of the children, Darwin and Ilsa, was not contested. However, for the court to impose personal liability on the defendant for child support, it must establish personal jurisdiction over him. Under California Code of Civil Procedure section 410.10, jurisdiction can be exercised as long as it does not conflict with state or federal constitutional provisions. California courts may assert jurisdiction based on effects caused within the state by actions taken elsewhere. This principle has broad implications, potentially deterring nonresidents from engaging with California residents. 

In family law, allowing a minor child to reside in California is considered an act that invokes the benefits of California law, thus supporting personal jurisdiction over a nonresident parent for child support matters. This is based on the premise that such an act signifies a purposeful availment of California's legal protections. Recent appellate decisions emphasize public policies favoring the visitation and support of children by their parents, highlighting the importance of encouraging parental involvement and financial support rather than imposing burdens on nonresident parents.

The Court of Appeal determined that imposing personal jurisdiction in both Titus and Judd cases would be unreasonable based on strong public policies. In Titus, the father, who had custody under a Massachusetts decree, sent his children to California for a summer visit with their mother, adhering to a written agreement that required the children’s return. The mother breached this agreement, retaining the children and seeking custody and support in California. Although the father had sent the children there, his intention was solely for a brief visit, supported by public policy that discourages parental vulnerability to jurisdictional issues when facilitating parent-child visits.

In Judd, after a separation and a Mexican divorce, the mother moved to California with the children. The father, who had never resided in California, sent support payments and visited the children. The Court found that he did not purposely avail himself of California's laws since he did not send the children there or have custody. The Court quashed the jurisdiction over him for support matters, emphasizing the importance of encouraging parental support and communication.

In the present case, the defendant sent his daughter Ilsa to California for Christmas, in line with a separation agreement. However, he purchased a one-way ticket and allowed her to take all her clothing, indicating he may have intended to surrender custody to her mother. This act, combined with the father's awareness of Ilsa's desire to stay in California, suggested a shift in custody intentions, which diverged from the precedent set in Titus regarding jurisdiction.

Defendant purchased tickets for Ilsa to live with her mother in California during the school years of 1974 and 1975, indicating active consent for her permanent residence there. Unlike a temporary visit, this arrangement allowed defendant to benefit from California's legal protections for Ilsa, as he effectively shifted his financial responsibility for her support during the school year. His actions justify extending California's jurisdiction over him due to his role in facilitating Ilsa's residency.

In contrast, defendant did not take any affirmative steps regarding his other child, Darwin, who relocated to California independently at his mother's initiative, without defendant's prior knowledge. Although defendant later acquiesced to Darwin's permanent residence, he did not engage with California's legal system concerning Darwin, which would typically not confer jurisdiction.

However, the court concluded that it can still exercise personal jurisdiction over defendant for the support of both children because the issues involving both children are intertwined in the underlying action. The separation agreement requires annual support for both children, and thus, it is reasonable for defendant to be subject to jurisdiction regarding support obligations for both, given his actions concerning Ilsa. The court denied the motion to quash, maintaining jurisdiction for the support claim.

Richardson, J. dissents, arguing against subjecting the petitioner to California's jurisdiction due to minimal contacts with the state. The petitioner, a New York resident, has never lived in California and has only two brief interactions with it. After separating, the respondent wife obtained a divorce in Haiti and moved to California. Following an agreement, she visited the children during summer and holidays while the petitioner maintained custody in New York during the school year. The respondent claims that the daughter, Ilsa, expressed a desire to live with her mother, and the petitioner facilitated this by purchasing a one-way ticket to California. The son, Darwin, also moved to California after expressing a desire to live there, according to the respondent's affidavit. However, the petitioner alleges that the mother induced the children to leave New York without his consent. The dissent critiques the majority's view, which interprets the petitioner's actions as purposeful availment of California's laws, stating that merely allowing a child to live in California does not constitute sufficient grounds for personal jurisdiction. The dissent emphasizes that the petitioner’s actions were passive, lacking any evidence of purposefully invoking California's legal protections, and challenges the majority’s reasoning that parental permission equates to availing oneself of state laws.

Acquiescence in a child's decision to move does not equate to purposeful conduct that justifies in personam jurisdiction in California over a nonresident parent. The petitioner, who accepted their child's decision to move to California without any knowledge or involvement, did not engage in actions that would invoke California's laws or demonstrate intent to benefit from its resources. Consequently, the respondent's claims do not establish a basis for jurisdiction regarding the son, Darwin, who moved independently and without the petitioner's assistance. The majority's rationale for asserting jurisdiction may undermine California’s public policy, which promotes parental cooperation and visitation. This could lead nonresident parents to prevent their children from visiting California to avoid jurisdictional issues. Despite the lack of jurisdiction, the respondent retains the option to pursue legal action in New York, where the petitioner resides. The document emphasizes that appellate courts respect trial courts' implied findings of fact unless there is a significant conflict in evidence, and any inconsistencies with previous rulings, such as Starr v. Starr, are disapproved.