State v. Kinslow

Citations: 799 P.2d 844; 165 Ariz. 503; 71 Ariz. Adv. Rep. 9; 1990 Ariz. LEXIS 242Docket: CR-88-0134-AP

Court: Arizona Supreme Court; October 9, 1990; Arizona; State Supreme Court

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Jimmy N. Kinslow, also known as James N. Coscoe, appealed his convictions and sentences for 16 felonies committed after escaping from the New Mexico State Penitentiary, where he was serving two life sentences for raping and murdering a woman and her daughters. The Arizona Supreme Court affirmed his convictions, rejecting his argument that the trial court erred by disallowing his duress defense. The court noted sentencing errors but declined to modify the sentences due to the absence of a cross-appeal from the state.

The events began on July 4, 1987, when Kinslow escaped with six others from prison. A shoot-to-kill order was issued for their apprehension. After hiding for three weeks, Kinslow attempted to steal vehicles and burglarize homes in Flagstaff, Arizona. He ultimately took a family hostage, demanding to be driven to Barstow, California, where he continued his criminal activities before being arrested shortly after releasing one child.

Kinslow faced 19 felony counts, including armed burglary, robbery, and kidnapping. The state moved to block evidence of his proposed defense of "necessity," which the trial court interpreted as "duress." Following this ruling, Kinslow and the state entered a stipulation to waive his right to a jury trial, agreeing to submit the case based on existing records. The court accepted the agreement, leading to Kinslow's conviction on 16 counts, with findings of dangerousness and prior convictions, and the acknowledgment that the offenses occurred while he was an escapee.

Defendant was sentenced to 14 life sentences without the possibility of parole for 25 years, alongside a 6-year and a 4.5-year sentence, with some sentences imposed concurrently and others consecutively. On appeal, he challenges the trial court's refusal to allow his duress defense. The duress defense, as defined in A.R.S. 13-412(A), requires that a reasonable person would feel compelled to act due to immediate threats of harm. The defendant argued he feared for his safety due to a 'shoot to kill' order, claiming it forced him to take hostages. However, the court found no evidence that the harm was imminent or that defendant had a reasonable apprehension of serious injury. Notably, three weeks elapsed between his escape and the crimes, and he had seen at least one inmate captured nonviolently. Furthermore, he encountered a police officer without incident after his escape. The defendant's own statements indicated his intent to commit burglary for personal gain, undermining his claim of duress. The court emphasized that a duress defense is unavailable if a person intentionally placed themselves in a situation likely to lead to duress, as was the case with defendant's prison escape. The court also referenced the principle that if a reasonable legal alternative exists to avoid the threatened harm, the duress defense fails. The court deemed it implausible that the defendant had no reasonable opportunity to escape danger without committing his crimes, as he had access to communication to notify authorities of his intent to surrender.

Two significant sentencing errors were identified in the case. First, due to the defendant's New Mexico convictions and his convictions for aggravated assault and kidnapping involving three children, certain sentences should have mandated life imprisonment without eligibility for parole until after 35 years, as stipulated in A.R.S. 13-604.01(F). However, the trial judge mistakenly informed the defendant that he would be eligible for parole after 25 years, which was reflected in the judgment and sentence. 

Second, the Stipulation and Agreement between the state and the defendant incorrectly allowed concurrent sentences for offenses against the same victim, while Arizona statutes require those sentences to run consecutively (A.R.S. 13-604.01(J) and A.R.S. 13-1304(B)). The court emphasized that adherence to mandatory sentencing laws is essential and cannot be bypassed through agreements between the parties. 

Despite these errors, the court noted that the defendant had received a total of seven consecutive life sentences, making the technical nature of the sentencing issues less impactful. The defendant's potential release date was projected to be his 105th birthday, indicating he is unlikely to be released during his lifetime, regardless of parole eligibility. 

The dissent argued for overturning the stipulation and reinstating the original felony counts, but the court rejected this approach, citing the emotional harm it could cause the victims, who had already suffered greatly due to the defendant’s actions. The court stressed the importance of protecting victims from further trauma, disapproving of the parties' agreement to sentences below the legally required minimums and the trial court's acceptance of it.

The state has an obligation to ensure that sentences fall within the statutory range, and the trial court must impose such sentences regardless of the state's actions. A search for fundamental error, as mandated by A.R.S. 13-4035, found that the defendant's waiver of the right to a jury trial was made knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently. Although the defendant received incorrect advice about parole eligibility, this was deemed a harmless error due to the receipt of an unlawfully lenient sentence. The trial court did not err in rejecting the defendant's duress defense, and the court affirmed the convictions and sentences, noting a lack of jurisdiction to correct any sentencing errors absent a cross-appeal from the state.

Justice Cameron concurred with the majority regarding the duress issue but dissented on the refusal to address sentencing discrepancies. He argued that allowing an unlawfully lenient sentence to become final due to the trial judge's inaction and the state's failure to appeal is problematic. Cameron contended that an illegal sentence constitutes fundamental error, granting the court jurisdiction to correct it even without a party raising the issue. He would set aside the stipulation, reverse the convictions and sentences, and allow for a new agreement or trial, ensuring that a legally sufficient sentence is imposed as required by law.