Peabody v. City of Phoenix

Citations: 485 P.2d 565; 14 Ariz. App. 576; 1971 Ariz. App. LEXIS 645Docket: 1 CA-CIV 1384

Court: Court of Appeals of Arizona; June 3, 1971; Arizona; State Appellate Court

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The case concerns the appeal by Celia R. Peabody and other surrounding property owners against the City of Phoenix regarding the City Council's adoption of a Planned Area Development (P.A.D. 5-69) ordinance, which allowed for the construction of 44 residences on a 36.312-acre tract of land classified within the RE-35 zoning district. The appellants contended that the maximum number of residences permitted under this zoning classification should be 36, while the appellees, including Modern Builders, Inc., argued that the approved density of 44 residences complied with the amended zoning ordinance. The Maricopa County Superior Court ultimately ruled that the adoption of P.A.D. 5-69 was invalid and determined that only 40 residences could be built. All parties have appealed this decision, primarily questioning whether the City Council exceeded its authority by increasing the allowable density for the site beyond what was permissible under the existing zoning regulations.

Modern Builders acknowledges that some of the 44 planned residences on the tract would have lot sizes smaller than 35,000 square feet. However, they argue that the individual lot size restrictions of the RE-35 zoning do not apply when considered alongside the P.A.D. zoning, which allows for flexibility as long as the average lot size exceeds 35,000 square feet. This understanding aligns with the intention of the P.A.D. ordinance to regulate density based on the total number of residences relative to the net development area.

Section 426 of the Planned Area Development ordinance articulates that the purpose of P.A.D. is to create a harmonious and stable environment while allowing flexibility in design and land use, provided that the overall population density and area coverage remain consistent with the zoning district. The ordinance specifies that the number of dwelling units permitted is determined by dividing the net development area by the minimum lot area required in the respective zoning district, excluding space designated for non-residential uses.

The RE-35 zoning aims to maintain the character of single-family homes on lots of at least 35,000 square feet with a single dwelling unit per lot. A key point of contention arises from differing calculations between the trial court and the City Council regarding the maximum number of residences allowed on the 36.312-acre tract, particularly concerning whether internal streets should be classified as public (reducing the net development area) or private (allowing inclusion in the net development area). This classification significantly impacts the allowable number of lots under the RE-35 zoning, with the ultimate determination hinging on how to interpret the P.A.D. ordinance's density calculation method.

The trial judge determined that the RE-35 standard, which mandates a minimum lot size of 35,000 square feet (excluding contiguous roads), is the conventional zoning practice in the district. While the accuracy of this finding is acknowledged, the propriety of the trial court's legal conclusion, which overrides the City Council's interpretation of the density restrictions in the Planned Area Development (P.A.D.) ordinance, is questioned. Conclusion of Law No. 12 asserts that a P.A.D. cannot allow more homes than would be permitted under conventional zoning, which is established at 40 homes for this site.

The P.A.D. ordinance aims to provide flexibility in land development while maintaining similar population density and allows the Council discretion to vary features in response to unique property conditions. The critical issue is whether the Council has the authority to include non-dedicated internal streets in the "net development area," potentially increasing allowable residences despite the density restriction. The ruling concludes that the Council does possess this authority, as appellants failed to present any opposing legal authority.

Testimony confirmed that there are existing subdivisions in Phoenix with non-dedicated internal streets, supporting the Council's decision. The court finds it persuasive that those interpreting the ordinance are also responsible for its enforcement. Lastly, the trial court's decision to set aside the ordinance must demonstrate an abuse of discretion, noting that zoning ordinances carry a presumption of validity.

In Mueller v. City of Phoenix, the court affirmed that legislative determinations regarding public health, safety, morals, and general welfare are to be upheld unless found to be clearly erroneous or arbitrary. The trial court's conclusion that P.A.D. 5-69 was unreasonable was deemed an abuse of discretion, as it lacked a basis for such a finding. Appellants argued that the P.A.D. application was a subterfuge by Modern Builders, Inc. to increase housing density beyond zoning limits. Evidence indicated that Modern Builders initially sought to rezone the property from RE-35 to RE-24 for 47 houses but withdrew after facing opposition, subsequently applying for a P.A.D. The court maintained that unless the ordinance's reasonableness was indisputable, it must be upheld, emphasizing that the decision of procedure and reasonableness rests with the legislative branch, not the judiciary.

Furthermore, the trial court found that Modern Builders’ application lacked a required explanatory statement detailing project purposes and features. However, city officials argued that the statement was only necessary if the zoning map was deemed insufficient, which they believed it was not. The court referenced precedents affirming discretion in city officials' actions, stating that without evidence of fraud or bad faith, such actions are valid. Notably, despite claims of a jurisdictional defect due to lack of notice regarding the proceedings, no evidence was presented showing that the appellants lacked notice of the proposed development plan.

Proceedings before the Planning and Zoning Commission and the City Council were contested timely throughout the rezoning process. The trial court's finding regarding the absence of an explanatory statement did not conclude that such a statement was necessary. It was determined that the application was properly filed and all requisite notices, hearings, reports, and actions complied with Arizona statutes and Phoenix ordinances. The appellants' argument linking the lack of an explanatory statement to a jurisdictional failure of notice was rejected. Their reliance on Hart v. Bayless Investment Trading Co. was deemed inappropriate, as that case involved a failure to publish a zoning ordinance as mandated, unlike the current situation where notice requirements were met (ARS 9-462, 9-463; City of Phoenix Code 108). The explanatory statement is viewed as an administrative requirement to inform city officials of project purposes that cannot be inferred from the site map, categorizing its omission as procedural rather than substantive. Consequently, this procedural omission does not invalidate the legislative enactment. The trial court's judgment is reversed, and the validity of P.A.D. 5-69 is to be reinstated. Modern Builders, Inc. is acquiring the tract through a trust agreement with Transamerica Title Insurance Company as trustee, indicating that references to Modern Builders, Inc. also pertain to Transamerica.