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Spitz v. Municipal Court of City of Phoenix
Citations: 621 P.2d 911; 127 Ariz. 405; 1980 Ariz. LEXIS 302Docket: 15096
Court: Arizona Supreme Court; December 16, 1980; Arizona; State Supreme Court
The case involves Harry B. Spitz, the owner of Empire Discount Liquors, who was charged with selling alcoholic beverages to a minor, in violation of A.R.S. 4-244(9). On May 26, 1978, a customer, Cindy Fitchner, presented a driver's license indicating she was 19, though she was actually underage. Fitchner later admitted to intentionally misleading Spitz and was granted immunity in exchange for her testimony against him. Spitz argued he relied on the identification, believing he was legally permitted to sell liquor to her. Initially, a city magistrate allowed Spitz a jury trial, but upon reassignment to another magistrate, this right was revoked. Spitz's request to present evidence of his ignorance regarding Fitchner's true age was denied, leading to his conviction and a two-year probation sentence. The Superior Court upheld the conviction, and an appeal to the Court of Appeals was dismissed due to lack of jurisdiction. Spitz subsequently filed a petition for special action, which the Supreme Court of Arizona accepted, addressing three critical questions regarding the nature of the offense, the right to a jury trial, and the jurisdiction of the magistrate in sentencing. Ignorance or lack of guilty knowledge is generally not a defense against the crime of selling liquor to a minor under A.R.S. 4-244, which prohibits such sales without requiring the seller to know the purchaser's age. The statute establishes that a seller can be guilty of this offense regardless of their belief regarding the purchaser's legal age. This principle aligns with the notion that certain acts, particularly those endangering minors, can be criminalized irrespective of intent. However, A.R.S. 4-241 introduces a layer of accountability by requiring sellers to verify the age of purchasers if they have reason to question it. If a seller fails to follow the identification verification procedures outlined in A.R.S. 4-241, they are deemed to have constructive knowledge of the purchaser's age. Thus, while ignorance may not absolve liability, adherence to the verification requirements could potentially provide a defense against charges of selling liquor to minors. Sellers must adhere to specific identification verification procedures to avoid liability for selling alcohol to minors; ignorance or lack of knowledge can be a defense if they comply with these procedures. The trial court erred by denying the defendant, Spitz, the opportunity to present ignorance as a defense. The classification of the offense as a serious or petty misdemeanor determines the right to a jury trial. A.R.S. 4-246 outlines that violations are misdemeanors punishable by fines of $100 to $300 and imprisonment of 30 days to 6 months. The U.S. Supreme Court mandates a jury trial if potential punishment exceeds 6 months, regardless of the actual sentence imposed. Since the offense in question does not involve moral turpitude and carries a maximum of 6 months imprisonment, a jury trial was not warranted. Additionally, the potential for administrative sanctions, like license suspension, does not necessitate a jury trial. The defendant's argument regarding excessive sentencing due to two years of probation, given the maximum possible sentence of six months, was rejected as permissible under A.R.S. 13-1657(A)(1). The conviction was set aside, and the case was remanded for further proceedings.