BUCK BY BUCK v. Greyhound Lines, Inc.

Citations: 783 P.2d 437; 105 Nev. 756; 1989 Nev. LEXIS 300Docket: 16799

Court: Nevada Supreme Court; November 27, 1989; Nevada; State Supreme Court

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The case involves Tina Buck and Heather Buck, minors represented by their guardians, against Greyhound Lines, Inc., LTR Stage Lines, Inc., KTNV Channel 13, and Joseph Reighley. The Supreme Court of Nevada addressed key issues regarding the interpretation of Nevada's "Good Samaritan" statute, the application of an amendment to the comparative negligence statute, and the potential for damages related to emotional distress.

The incident occurred in 1978 when Debra Buck and her daughters were traveling in a car driven by Marsha Buck. They became lost and decided to return to their campsite. While attempting a U-turn, the car stalled in a northbound lane of U.S. Highway 95. Debra exited the vehicle to seek help while her daughters remained asleep inside. Joseph Reighley, a former highway patrol officer driving a KTNV pickup truck, stopped to assist. He advised Debra to turn off the car lights and used his truck's headlights for visibility. Despite his warnings, a northbound Greyhound bus, unable to stop in time due to being blinded by Reighley’s headlights, collided with the stalled car, resulting in severe injuries, including paraplegia for Tina.

The jury found both Marsha and Debra Buck twenty percent negligent, with Greyhound deemed seventy-five percent at fault and Reighley twenty-five percent. However, the jury concluded that Reighley was not grossly negligent and was acting in an emergency, thereby exempting him and KTNV from liability under NRS 41.500. The court predominantly sided with the appellants on the key legal issues presented.

Appellants argue that the trial court incorrectly instructed the jury on Nevada's "Good Samaritan" statute, NRS 41.500. Although the appellants' objection to the instruction lacked specificity, the trial court was sufficiently alerted to the statute's relevance to the case, preserving the issue for appeal. The appellants assert that an emergency did not exist when Reighley intervened. Citing Dahl v. Turner, emergencies are defined as unforeseen circumstances necessitating immediate action, characterized by suddenness and pressing necessity. In this case, Reighley arrived at the scene without any injured parties, traffic hazards, or urgent conditions, thus allowing for careful consideration of options. Instead of pushing the disabled vehicle to safety, Reighley exacerbated the situation by instructing the occupants to conserve battery power, which left the Mustang unlit and more difficult to see. His actions ultimately created a hazardous environment that led to a bus driver being temporarily blinded and unable to avoid a collision with the Mustang. Despite the jury's finding that Reighley provided "emergency assistance in an emergency," he acknowledged there was no emergency when he stopped. The court concluded that there was no legal emergency, making it erroneous to present the issue to the jury, as the emergency doctrine does not protect those who contribute to the emergency. Furthermore, NRS 41.500(1) is designed to shield individuals from ordinary negligence liability only when they provide emergency assistance in an actual emergency to injured persons.

The statute encourages bystanders to assist injured individuals in emergencies by providing liability protection for "Good Samaritans" against ordinary negligence. It specifically identifies injured persons as the sole beneficiaries of this protection. Expanding this to include healthy individuals would render parts of the statute redundant and indicate legislative ineptitude. The court determined that the "Good Samaritan" statute did not apply in Reighley's case, making the jury's instruction on this topic a prejudicial error. The jury found Reighley 25% negligent for a collision, eliminating the need for a retrial on his liability or that of his employer, KTNV, since their liability is linked. The appellants argued for joint and several liability against all defendants, which the court agreed with regarding the injured infants, Tina and Heather. Under common law, joint and several liability applies when multiple tortfeasors contribute to an injury. However, Nevada law limits this to cases where the plaintiff's contributory negligence can be asserted as a defense. The statute was determined not to apply to the infants, who could not be held partially responsible, thus requiring judgments in their favor to be joint and several against all defendants.

The entry of joint and several judgments against all defendants may lead to significant inequities, a risk inherent in the common law rule which prioritizes full compensation for innocent victims over proportional liability among defendants. Any change to this general rule should be determined by the Legislature. The court dismisses the appellants' argument that the amended version of NRS 41.141 should apply retroactively, reaffirming that statutes typically have prospective effect unless the Legislature explicitly states otherwise. The court emphasizes that altering the liability framework from several to joint and several is a substantive change, not merely procedural, thus rejecting retroactive application that would affect existing liabilities.

The court agrees with appellants that the district court erred by not instructing the jury on Debra's entitlement to damages for emotional distress after witnessing the imminent harm to her twin daughters. Citing *State v. Eaton*, the court acknowledges Nevada's recognition of emotional distress claims by witnesses to injury or death of loved ones, rejecting both the traditional "impact rule" and the "zone of danger" rule. Debra's heightened anxiety as the bus approached was significant, and her claim for emotional distress should have been presented to the jury. Consequently, a new trial is warranted on this specific issue. The court does not address the appropriateness of attorney's fees awarded to Reighley by the district court.

A joint and several judgment is to be entered against Reighley and KTNV for the benefit of infants Tina and Heather, alongside a several judgment against both parties for the adult plaintiffs. The award of attorney's fees is vacated. Greyhound/LTR's cross-appeal regarding the interest rate and amount is not considered, as trial counsel agreed to these terms at trial and raised the issue for the first time on appeal. Other cross-appeal claims are deemed premature or without merit. The case is remanded to the district court for a joint and several judgment for Tina and Heather and a several judgment for the adult plaintiffs. The judgment against Greyhound/LTR will also be modified to be joint and several concerning Tina and Heather. A new trial is ordered for Debra Buck, limited to emotional distress damages, while the affirmations of the original judgment remain intact. Justice Mowbray dissents, asserting that the district judge properly applied the Good Samaritan Rule, as the jury found Reighley to be a "Good Samaritan" who acted with ordinary, not gross, negligence, thus assessing no damages against him. Mowbray emphasizes the importance of the Good Samaritan Statute in encouraging aid to those in emergencies, particularly on Nevada's isolated highways.

A person may choose to disregard those in distress while traveling, which contradicts the values of the West, particularly in Nevada. According to NRS 41.500, individuals in Nevada who provide emergency care or assistance in good faith and without compensation are generally shielded from civil liability for acts or omissions that do not amount to gross negligence. This protection extends to ambulance drivers, attendants, and volunteer members of ambulance services, as well as members of search and rescue organizations acting under a county sheriff's supervision, as long as their actions are performed in good faith and pertain to emergency care. The term "Good Samaritans" used to describe beneficiaries of such statutes is derived from a biblical parable. Notably, Justice Robert E. Rose did not participate in the appeal decision.