City of Pasco v. Public Employment Relations Commission

Citations: 833 P.2d 381; 119 Wash. 2d 504; 1992 Wash. LEXIS 206Docket: 58286-6

Court: Washington Supreme Court; July 30, 1992; Washington; State Supreme Court

SummaryOriginalCytator Case TreatmentBackward CitatorAnalysis

EnglishEspañolSimplified EnglishEspañol Fácil

The Supreme Court of Washington addressed whether an optional grievance procedure for disciplinary action review constitutes a mandatory subject of collective bargaining between the City of Pasco and the Pasco Police Officers Association. The Union's proposal aimed to provide employees the choice of appealing disciplinary actions through a grievance procedure instead of the Civil Service Commission. The Public Employment Relations Commission (PERC) became involved when the City filed an unfair labor practice complaint against the Union, which PERC dismissed. The Superior Court later reversed PERC's decision, but this ruling was itself reversed by the Supreme Court.

The court examined the standards for reviewing PERC's decisions, noting that such decisions are subject to review under the Administrative Procedure Act. The review of PERC's dismissal, based on a failure to state a claim, follows an error of law standard, requiring a de novo review of statutory interpretation. The court emphasized that refusing to bargain on mandatory subjects or pursuing nonmandatory subjects to impasse constitutes an unfair labor practice according to RCW 41.56.140. The case illustrates the complexities of labor law regarding grievance procedures and the interpretation of collective bargaining obligations.

The City asserts that statutory interpretation is a legal question for the court, citing case law that underscores this principle. However, the interpretation provided by an agency tasked with administering a statute is given significant weight when the statute is ambiguous, as established in Cowiche Canyon Conservancy v. Bosley. The court identifies ambiguity in the definition of 'collective bargaining' within RCW 41.56.030(4), particularly regarding the phrase 'which may be peculiar to an appropriate bargaining unit.' The City argues that the grievance procedure proposed by the Union is a nonmandatory subject of collective bargaining because it does not pertain specifically to an appropriate bargaining unit, referencing statewide provisions governing police officer discipline. The City interprets the 'peculiar to' language as a limitation affecting all subjects of mandatory bargaining, suggesting that grievance procedures, personnel matters, wages, hours, and working conditions must all be specific to a bargaining unit to qualify for mandatory status. Conversely, the Union argues that 'peculiar to an appropriate bargaining unit' only modifies 'working conditions,' not 'grievance procedures.' The core issue is whether grievance procedures must be peculiar to a bargaining unit to be mandatory, with the statute's ambiguity leaving room for differing interpretations. The City’s narrow reading could significantly limit collective bargaining rights, and the court does not believe legislative intent supports such a restriction.

PERC argues that the phrase 'peculiar to' does not alter the interpretation of 'grievance procedures,' asserting that access to these procedures is a mandatory subject for collective bargaining. The agency's interpretation is given significant weight due to statutory ambiguity, as supported by case law. The Union's view that 'peculiar to' pertains solely to 'working conditions' aligns with the 'last antecedent rule' in statutory interpretation, indicating that modifying phrases refer to the nearest preceding noun. The conclusion reached is that 'peculiar to' does not apply to 'grievance procedures.' Additional provisions of RCW 41.56 reinforce the interpretation that RCW 41.56.030(4) should favor collective bargaining. RCW 41.56.905 emphasizes that its provisions are supplemental and should be liberally construed to fulfill the Public Employees' Collective Bargaining Act (PECBA) objectives, which aim to enhance relations between public employers and employees. This section also establishes the dominance of PECBA over conflicting statutes or regulations. The historical context of RCW 41.56.905 indicates it was initially limited to uniformed personnel but was broadened in 1983 to encompass all PECBA provisions. Recent court rulings underscore the necessity of a liberal interpretation of RCW 41.56 and prioritize its provisions in conflicts, as demonstrated in cases involving sheriff's civil service statutes and exceptions to collective bargaining rights, which the courts have advised should be narrowly construed. The City's interpretation, which restricts mandatory bargaining topics, contradicts the broader intent and policies of RCW 41.56.

The City relies on the precedent set in Seattle v. Auto Sheet Metal Workers Local 387, which interpreted RCW 41.56.030(4) narrowly in the context of a declaratory judgment about a city charter amendment and a civil service system ordinance, without PERC's involvement. This prior case did not address the current issues, particularly the implications of RCW 41.56.905 and subsequent cases exploring legislative intent under the PECBA. The court overrules Auto Sheet Metal Workers to the extent it conflicts with this analysis, affirming that the Union's proposed contract term allowing employees to use grievance procedures for disciplinary reviews is a mandatory topic for collective bargaining. The Superior Court's ruling is reversed, and PERC's dismissal of the City's unfair labor practices claim is reinstated. The grievance procedure defined in Article V specifies that grievances involve disputes over the Agreement's provisions, excluding matters governed by civil service rules or statutory provisions, including disciplinary actions appealable to the Civil Service Commission. The decision is supported by a consensus among the justices.