State v. City Court of City of Tucson

Citations: 722 P.2d 267; 150 Ariz. 99; 1986 Ariz. LEXIS 245Docket: 18205

Court: Arizona Supreme Court; June 30, 1986; Arizona; State Supreme Court

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The Supreme Court of Arizona reviewed a case involving the Tucson City Court and Chief Magistrate Ann Bowen, who challenged a ruling from the Pima County Superior Court regarding the Chief City Prosecutor's policy. This policy mandated that Deputy City Prosecutors disqualify Magistrate Fernando Fajardo in all DUI cases. The court identified two key issues: (1) whether the Chief City Prosecutor's policy constituted an abuse of Rule 10.2 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, and (2) whether Chief Magistrate Bowen overstepped her authority by requiring Deputy City Prosecutors to affirm they acted independently before filing a disqualification motion. 

The facts established that in September 1984, the Chief City Prosecutor initiated this disqualification policy, leading to a significant increase in Notices of Change of Judge against Magistrate Fajardo compared to prior instances in the Pima County Superior Court. In response, Bowen issued an order denying future requests for change of judge unless Deputy City Prosecutors could prove their independent judgment in filing such requests, countering what she perceived as a discriminatory pattern in the policy. The Chief City Prosecutor subsequently contested this order in superior court, stating that the policy was implemented due to Fajardo's perceived bias against the State in judicial decisions. The case highlights tensions between prosecutorial discretion and judicial independence.

The notices of change of judge were intended to 're-educate' the Magistrate, indicating that the City Prosecutor would not allow them to hear cases unless there was a change in their legal approach. Initial notices were deemed insufficient to achieve this goal, prompting further filings against the Magistrate in DWI cases as part of office policy. Officials conveyed that these notices would not be perpetual and that reinstatement would depend on the Magistrate's ruling style. Following an evidentiary hearing, Judge Lillian Fisher ruled to vacate the Chief City Magistrate's order, and the case was transferred to a higher court for appeal.

The Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure allow for judge disqualification through two routes: for cause under Rule 10.1, requiring a verified motion alleging bias, or peremptorily under Rule 10.2, which allows for a change without cause by simply filing a notice. Rule 10.2 mandates an automatic transfer to a new judge upon timely filing. Although originally applicable only to superior courts, its scope has been extended to non-record courts like Tucson City Court. The right to a peremptory change of judge is strongly upheld to ensure fairness. The City Prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges against Magistrate Fajardo is characterized as an abuse of these procedural rules for specific reasons that are yet to be detailed.

The procedure mandated by the Tucson City Prosecutor required Deputy City Prosecutors to uniformly challenge Magistrate Fajardo, undermining their obligation to use individual professional judgment on a case-by-case basis. This policy was deemed an abuse of discretion, as it imposed a fixed action without regard for the unique circumstances of each case, as highlighted by the Washington Supreme Court in State v. Pettitt. Moreover, the policy was seen as an improper attempt to influence judicial decisions, exerting pressure on Magistrate Fajardo and jeopardizing judicial independence. The dissenting opinion from Justice Tobriner emphasized that such blanket challenges threaten the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.

Furthermore, the court ruled that the Chief Magistrate lacked the authority to impose a requirement for city prosecutors to declare good faith when filing a Notice of Change of Judge, as this effectively created an unapproved local rule. The Arizona Constitution grants exclusive rule-making power to the court, which cannot be overridden by municipal courts. Consequently, the Chief Magistrate's order was invalid due to lack of Supreme Court approval. Lastly, allegations of unethical conduct from both the city prosecutor and the city magistrate were noted but considered to detract from the main case rather than contribute substantively.

Ethical violations, if present, should be addressed in appropriate forums rather than in this case. The court refrains from commenting on the allegations of ethical misconduct except to clarify its stance against the City Prosecutor's interpretation of judicial misconduct. The City Prosecutor claims that the City Magistrate's order unfairly targets only the prosecution, violating ethical standards of impartiality. The court disagrees, asserting that fairness does not necessitate identical application of rules to both prosecution and defense, highlighting the distinct roles of prosecutors and defense attorneys under A.B.A. Standards for Criminal Justice. The court provides examples, such as the differing rights to peremptory challenges, noting that some states permit such challenges solely for defendants. The court sees no ethical issues in denying the prosecution the right to peremptory challenge while granting it to the defense, especially in light of potential abuse by the prosecution.

The Supreme Court holds the rule-making authority for all state courts and can suspend the application of rules to serve justice. Consequently, all peremptory challenges against Judge Fajardo by the City Prosecutor or deputies are dismissed. The court warns that if the City Prosecutor continues to challenge Judge Fajardo in DWI cases, the availability of Rule 10.2 for future cases may be suspended until the court is assured of no abuse of the rule.

Chief Justice Holohan dissents, emphasizing that the right to disqualify a judge in criminal cases without showing actual bias has been established since the 1913 Penal Code. The right to peremptory challenges was later extended to both the State and the defendant, ensuring fairness in court proceedings. This principle underscores the necessity for both parties to have equal rights to an impartial judiciary.

The peremptory disqualification rule allows parties to disqualify a judge without proving actual bias or prejudice, acknowledging the difficulty of demonstrating such bias. Although there are concerns about potential misuse of this rule—for instance, to delay proceedings without genuine belief in bias—courts have historically favored upholding the right to peremptory challenges over scrutinizing the grounds for such challenges. This stance is supported by case law, including a California Supreme Court decision affirming that any abuses in the use of peremptory challenges do not significantly undermine the jurisdiction of trial courts and serve as a minor cost for maintaining efficient judicial procedures.

In the context of Magistrate Fajardo, there is dissent regarding the dismissal of peremptory challenges against him, with the argument that his impartiality is compromised due to prior discussions with city prosecutors about judicial disqualification in DWI cases. This engagement raises concerns over potential violations of judicial conduct standards, as judges must remain impartial and avoid discussions that could influence their decisions. The prosecutors are also criticized for possibly attempting to improperly influence the magistrate, which could contravene professional conduct rules.

Overall, the peremptory challenge serves as a tool for disqualifying judges perceived to have a pattern of bias, allowing for removal based on the belief of partiality without requiring extensive proof of actual bias. This mechanism is justified particularly when a judge has consistently ruled against the state’s interests, enabling the prosecutor to seek a different judge for future cases.

A prosecutorial office can establish a policy to disqualify judges perceived as biased in favor of the defense. The basis of the supervisor's perception does not matter; ensuring the State's case is heard fairly and impartially is paramount. Allowing a judge to continue presiding over cases when the prosecutor believes the judge is biased constitutes a dereliction of duty. There should be no limits on a chief prosecuting officer directing their attorneys to challenge judges viewed as unfair to the State. The court would not object if a defense attorney or senior partner disqualified a judge based on perceived bias, viewing it as effective advocacy. However, similar actions by a prosecutor are deemed unjust. The dissent argues that the majority opinion implies the State is not entitled to the same fair trial protections guaranteed to defendants.