Bailey v. Sanford

Citations: 86 P.3d 458; 139 Idaho 744; 2004 Ida. LEXIS 20Docket: 27735

Court: Idaho Supreme Court; February 25, 2004; Idaho; State Supreme Court

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In the personal injury case Virginia and Jack Bailey v. Shalyn Sanford, the Baileys sought damages following an auto accident involving Sanford and Ralph Southwick on November 2, 1998, in Twin Falls, Idaho. The Baileys alleged negligence against both Sanford and Southwick, with Jack Bailey claiming loss of consortium. A traffic citation was issued to Southwick for failing to yield, and the Baileys filed their complaint on April 23, 1999. 

During proceedings, Sanford refused to settle and the trial court dismissed Southwick after he and the Baileys reached a settlement. A jury trial on Sanford's liability commenced on May 30, 2001, resulting in the jury finding her 10% responsible and awarding the Baileys $912,000 in total damages. As a result, Sanford was liable for $91,200. 

Post-trial, the Baileys requested attorney fees and costs, which Sanford contested. The court awarded the Baileys $64,971 in attorney fees based on Sanford's failure to admit negligence under I.C.R.P. 37(c), along with $7,412.23 in discretionary costs. Sanford subsequently appealed. 

Key procedural issues arose regarding the testimony of Officer Quilantin, who had moved to California. Sanford's attempt to take a video deposition was blocked by a protective order granted to the Baileys, and the court excluded Quilantin from testifying at trial. The appellate court will review these rulings under an abuse of discretion standard, assessing whether the trial court acted within its discretion and adhered to legal standards.

In Sun Valley Shopping Center, Inc. v. Idaho Power Co., the trial court exercised its discretion appropriately by granting the Baileys’ motion for a protective order against Sanford's attempt to take Quilantin's video deposition. The court found that Quilantin was not an eyewitness, could not provide additional helpful testimony, and that Sanford had unreasonably delayed in scheduling the deposition. Sanford argued that Quilantin's testimony was relevant and that his police experience distinguished him from a layperson, asserting that he had notified the Baileys of the deposition within the discovery deadline. However, the court upheld the protective order, emphasizing that the control of discovery is within its discretion and that requiring the Baileys to travel to California just before trial would be unduly burdensome.

Additionally, while the trial court did err by excluding Quilantin's testimony during the trial, this was deemed a harmless error. The Baileys had raised concerns about unfair surprise when Sanford announced his intention to call Quilantin on the last day of trial, despite previously not mentioning it after the initial witness list. Sanford's counsel argued there was no obligation to inform the Baileys further, as Quilantin had been listed as a potential witness. Ultimately, the court’s initial decision on the protective order was upheld, but the exclusion of Quilantin's testimony was recognized as a mistake without substantial impact on the trial's outcome.

Walther properly listed Quilantin as a witness, but the trial court excluded him from testifying, believing Walther had engaged in improper trial tactics by not informing the Baileys of his intention to call Quilantin. The appellate court found this exclusion to be an abuse of discretion, given that Sanford had also disclosed Quilantin and indicated her right to call any listed witness. The court noted that the Baileys should have anticipated Quilantin’s potential testimony, especially since Sanford was denied the opportunity to take his video deposition at their request. Although the court disapproved of Walther's tactics, it concluded that the exclusion of Quilantin's testimony constituted a harmless error, as outlined in I.R.C.P. 61. The court emphasized that an error must affect the substantial rights of the parties to warrant a new trial. In this case, the exclusion did not impact Sanford's rights, as she had sufficient other evidence and Quilantin’s testimony was deemed cumulative and partially inadmissible. The court cited precedent indicating that even relevant evidence could be excluded if other sufficient evidence is presented. Additionally, Sanford did not provide an offer of proof for what Quilantin would testify, and an affidavit indicated Quilantin had no personal knowledge of the accident. Ultimately, the court concluded that the exclusion did not affect Sanford's substantial rights, rendering it harmless. The excerpt also addresses the standard for jury instructions, stating that instructions should reflect every reasonable claim supported by the evidence presented at trial.

A requested jury instruction must be given if reasonable evidence supports it, as established in Lubcke v. Boise City/Ada County Housing Authority. The review standard for jury instructions focuses on whether the instructions collectively present the issues and law accurately. An erroneous instruction does not lead to reversible error if it does not mislead or prejudice a party, per Silver Creek Computers, Inc. v. Petra, Inc. During a jury instruction conference, Sanford objected to including future medical expenses and wage losses in Instruction No. 20. The trial court determined sufficient evidence allowed the jury to consider these future costs, contingent on their reasonable certainty. Instruction No. 20 required the jury to evaluate the present cash value of future pain, suffering, and necessary medical care for Virginia Bailey.

Sanford contended that the Baileys did not prove the actual damages resulting from the defendant's actions, citing Black Canyon Racquetball Club, Inc. v. Idaho First National Bank. Evidence presented included Virginia Bailey’s prior medical history, specifically scoliosis surgery performed in 1995, and subsequent surgery after the collision, which her physician attributed to the accident. Testimonies indicated she would endure chronic, worsening pain and require ongoing treatment. Sanford's argument overlooked detailed medical bills submitted to the jury, which reflected Virginia Bailey's post-accident treatments. A reasonable interpretation of the evidence supported the trial court's decision to instruct the jury on future medical expenses.

Regarding future wage losses, Sanford argued that the evidence did not meet the threshold of reasonable certainty needed in Idaho for such claims, as highlighted in Warren v. Furniss. Speculative evidence is inadmissible for establishing future lost earnings, and the claimant must demonstrate how her earning capacity was impaired, per Long v. Hendricks.

Sanford compares the current case to Long v. Hendricks, highlighting that, similar to that case, the plaintiff must prove future earning impairment. In Long, the court found insufficient evidence of future income loss because the plaintiff could still earn a comparable income despite being unable to continue in his previous job. Sanford contends that Virginia Bailey, who has no work restrictions from Dr. Widell, similarly failed to show she cannot earn a comparable income, leading to jury speculation on future lost earnings. However, the Baileys provided substantial evidence, including Virginia Bailey's testimony regarding her salary, the necessity of her continued work due to financial constraints, and the aggravation of her condition from her job as a court reporter. Additionally, testimonies from her husband, friend, and supervisor supported claims of her injury's impact on daily activities. The Baileys also presented evidence regarding Virginia's age, life expectancy, and daily wage, justifying the trial court's decision to submit future wage loss to the jury. Instruction No. 20 allowed the jury to award future wage losses based on reasonable certainty, which they did after evaluating the evidence.

Regarding closing arguments, Sanford claims the Baileys' attorney made an improper statement implying insurance involvement, which could constitute reversible error. The court reviews such claims by examining objections and curative instructions. Traditionally, attorneys enjoy considerable latitude during closing arguments to discuss evidence and draw inferences. The Baileys' closing argument, which emphasized Virginia Bailey's permanent condition and the potential for no recovery, did not violate I.R.E. 411 and was not deemed reversible error, especially as corrective instructions were given.

Sanford objected to a statement made by the Baileys' counsel, who asserted that Virginia Bailey could only recover damages from Sanford, which Sanford argued misrepresented the law and prejudiced the jury. Sanford's attorney countered this by stating that Virginia could pursue a claim against Mr. Southwick, ensuring she had a remedy. The trial court noted the objection and reminded the jury of the law it had been instructed on. The court ultimately found no reversible error, as Sanford had successfully countered the Baileys' claim in closing arguments and the trial court had instructed the jury correctly.

Sanford further contended that the Baileys' statement violated I.R.E. 411 by implying Sanford had insurance, which could not be used to prove negligence. However, the Baileys' counsel did not mention insurance, and Sanford herself acknowledged that Virginia could recover from Southwick, countering any implications regarding insurance coverage.

Additionally, the trial court's Instruction No. 35 was given without following the procedural requirements of Rule 51(a)(1), which mandates that proposed instructions be presented to the parties for objections. Despite this procedural misstep, the court deemed the error harmless since the instruction correctly stated the law and did not prejudice Sanford's rights. The standard for reviewing jury instructions is whether, as a whole, they accurately present the issues and the law without misleading or prejudicing any party.

Sanford contends that Instruction No. 35 biased the jury against her by referencing the potential for Mr. and Mrs. Bailey to pursue a claim against Mr. Southwick, which she argues directly addressed her closing statements. She asserts that her counsel's remarks were aimed at correcting misrepresentations made by the Baileys' counsel, leading to jury prejudice against her. The court maintains that jury instructions must be assessed collectively, not individually. It concludes that the trial court properly instructed the jury to evaluate the negligence of both Sanford and Southwick, and clarified that the Baileys' ability to recover elsewhere was irrelevant, thereby finding no misleading statements or prejudice against Sanford that would warrant a new trial.

Regarding attorney fees, the court examines the trial court's discretionary power under I.R.C.P. 37(c), which governs requests for admissions. The trial court had indicated that Sanford did not participate in good faith during a settlement conference and planned to impose sanctions in the form of attorney fees against her if the Baileys prevailed. However, Idaho law prohibits awarding fees based on failed settlement negotiations, as established in prior cases. The court points out that the trial court's award of fees did not reference the settlement conference, implying reliance on Rule 37(c) instead. Nonetheless, it concludes that the trial court did not appropriately apply Rule 37(c) in this instance, rendering the fee award erroneous.

A party that fails to admit the truth of a matter requested under Rule 36 may be ordered to pay the requesting party's reasonable expenses, including attorney fees, if the requesting party proves the matter true. The trial court must issue this order unless specific exceptions apply: 1) the request was objected to under Rule 36(a), 2) the admission sought was not substantially important, 3) the party had reasonable grounds to believe they might prevail, or 4) there was another valid reason for the failure to admit. In Ruge v. Posey, the Court of Appeals established that trial courts are required to award these expenses unless one of the exceptions is met.

In the case at hand, Sanford denied requests to admit her negligence regarding an incident that resulted in injuries to the Baileys. The trial court awarded attorney fees based on the jury's finding of Sanford's negligence but attempted to justify this by suggesting that Sanford could not reasonably believe she would prevail since the jury had ruled against her. However, the court's reasoning was flawed; Sanford had valid grounds to believe she might not be found liable, as she was not cited for traffic violations and had expert testimony supporting her case. The jury ultimately found her only 10% negligent, indicating a relatively small level of fault. The court concluded that penalizing parties for not admitting liability under these circumstances could deter good faith responses to requests for admission.

Additionally, the trial court failed to provide the necessary findings to support its award of discretionary costs under I.R.C.P. 54(d)(1)(D), which requires express justification for any additional costs assessed against the adverse party. The failure to meet these procedural requirements led to the conclusion that the trial court abused its discretion in both awarding attorney fees and discretionary costs.

A trial court's general findings on requested costs, even without itemized evaluation, satisfy I.R.C.P. 54(d)(1)(D). Additional expert witness fees may be assessed under this rule. The Baileys claimed additional costs totaling $3,089.50 for expert witness fees and consulting, arguing these costs were exceptional due to Sanford's failure to admit negligence. The trial court awarded these fees, deeming them "necessary and exceptional," but stated that the maximum allowed for expert witness fees was inadequate. However, this reasoning was insufficient to support the award of discretionary costs, leading the Court to find an abuse of discretion and reverse the award. The Baileys' request for attorney fees on appeal was denied, as the Court found Sanford's appeal was not frivolous or unreasonable. Ultimately, the trial court’s denial of Sanford's motion for a new trial was upheld, but its award of attorney fees and discretionary costs to the Baileys was reversed, with each party bearing their own costs on appeal. Justices SCHROEDER, KIDWELL, EISMANN, and SCHILLING concurred.