Ek v. Boggs

Citations: 75 P.3d 1180; 102 Haw. 289; 2003 Haw. LEXIS 410Docket: 22798

Court: Hawaii Supreme Court; August 29, 2003; Hawaii; State Supreme Court

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The Supreme Court of Hawai'i upheld the Circuit Court's designation of William Ek as a vexatious litigant under HRS 634J-1 and affirmed the court's issuance of a prefiling order under HRS 634J-7(a), restricting Ek from initiating new litigation without prior approval from a judge. Ek, representing himself, had filed a complaint for specific performance and damages related to property owned by Steven Eugene Boggs and Sandy Boggs, claiming an interest based on repair work done and a promise from Sandy Burgard. However, Boggs was unaware of the complaint, as it had not been properly served. In response, Boggs filed multiple motions, including one to expunge a notice of pendency of action (NOPA), arguing that Ek lacked any legitimate claim of interest in the property and had engaged in frivolous litigation practices. The court found in favor of Boggs, citing the absence of evidence supporting Ek's claims and his failure to comply with procedural requirements, including improper service of documents. The court's order mandated Ek to release the NOPA and confirmed his status as a vexatious litigant due to his history of frivolous litigation and procedural missteps.

The court mandated that William Ek must obtain permission to file future pleadings and post a $25,000 security within 45 days of February 3, 1999, or risk dismissal of his complaint. The court specified that any party could request adjustments to the security amount based on changing circumstances. Ek failed to sign the necessary release or post the security, leading to the court granting Steven Eugene Boggs's motion to dismiss Ek's complaint with prejudice on May 4, 1999. Ek claimed he was not served with the final judgment and notice of entry, as there was no proof of service. On July 12, 1999, he attempted to file a motion to extend the time to appeal, arguing he was unaware of the final judgment, but the court denied this motion on August 6, 1999, citing non-receipt of his request. Ek subsequently filed a notice of appeal regarding the denial of his motion to extend. On appeal, he argued the prefiling order was improperly issued without statutory authority, was overly broad, lacked justification, and violated due process. He also contended the court abused its discretion in denying his motion to extend time. The opposing party, Boggs, noted that Ek's notice of appeal did not explicitly reference the March 5, 1999, prefiling order, although the order denying the motion to extend did reference it. The notice of appeal must designate the specific judgment or order being appealed, as per HRAP Rule 3(c).

A mistake in designating a judgment does not prevent an appeal if the intention to appeal from a specific judgment is evident from the notice and the appellee is not misled. Citing case law, it is established that a notice of appeal can infer intent from a composite of orders, provided there is no detriment to other parties. The court reasoned that Ek intended to appeal from the prefiling order, as demonstrated by the attached exhibit, and Boggs did not claim to have been misled by the notice. 

Regarding vexatious litigant determinations, the court has not previously established a specific standard but proposes using an abuse of discretion standard. Under HRS 634J-4, a court may label a plaintiff as a vexatious litigant only after a thorough investigation and decision-making process, indicating discretion in its judgment. This aligns with California’s interpretation of similar statutes. 

An abuse of discretion occurs when a court's decision clearly exceeds reasonable bounds or disregards legal principles, to the detriment of a party. The burden of proving abuse falls on the appellant, requiring a strong showing. The court determined that there was no abuse of discretion in imposing the prefiling order, despite Ek's contention regarding the lack of cited authority or grounds for the order, which stated that Ek qualifies as a vexatious litigant under HRS 634J-1.

HRS 634J-7(a) authorizes courts to impose orders on vexatious litigants, allowing the court to issue a prefiling order that prevents such litigants from initiating new litigation without prior approval from the presiding judge of the relevant court. This authority is grounded in statute, and the definition of "litigation" encompasses any civil action or proceeding, including motions within ongoing cases. The term "new" refers to the initiation or resumption of legal actions, which in this context applies to Ek's motion to extend his lawsuit. Precedent, notably from McColm v. Westwood Park Ass'n, supports the application of vexatious litigant statutes to both ongoing proceedings and appeals. Ek's assertion that the requirement to obtain the court's approval conflicts with the statute is rejected; the presiding judge refers to the judge overseeing the specific case. Ek also contends that the prefiling order is overly broad, citing De Long v. Hennessey, which identified criteria for narrowly tailored orders. However, unlike De Long, where the order was vacated due to procedural issues, the authority in this case is explicitly established by HRS 634J-7(a), affirming the court's power to regulate vexatious litigants effectively.

Disobedience of the court's order by a vexatious litigant can lead to contempt of court. The statute grants the court authority to label a party as a vexatious litigant and mandates that such individuals obtain court permission before initiating new litigation. This order specifically pertains to Ek's filings as a plaintiff representing himself. The statute, HRS 634J-7(a), restricts vexatious litigants from pursuing new cases without prior approval, as clarified in Standard Mgmt. Inc. v. Kekona.

Ek contends that a substantive finding of vexatious behavior is necessary according to De Long, asserting that such orders should be rare. However, the court determined that De Long is not relevant, as it dealt with implied powers under federal law, while HRS chapter 634J explicitly delineates the grounds for declaring someone a vexatious litigant. The court found sufficient evidence of Ek’s vexatious behavior, including improper service of documents and filing meritless motions, which justified the designation.

Ek argues that the prefiling order violates his due process rights, impacting his ability to present future cases. Both the Fourteenth Amendment and the Hawaii Constitution protect against deprivation of life, liberty, or property without due process. However, Ek did not assert that his right to file cases without prior permission is fundamental, so this argument was not considered. Procedural due process is described as adaptable, requiring specific protections based on the situation. The analysis of procedural due process involves determining whether a state interference with a "liberty" or "property" interest occurred and identifying the necessary procedures to ensure due process is upheld.

Procedural due process requires notice and an opportunity to be heard before a government deprives an individual of a significant liberty interest. In this case, it is determined that Ek was not denied due process when a prefiling order was issued, as a hearing was conducted on February 3, 1999, to address Ek's objections. The statute allows vexatious litigants to file legal actions only with court permission, ensuring that actions are not frivolous. Similar statutes in California support the notion that such prefiling orders do not infringe upon due process rights, as they only restrict the filing of meritless lawsuits without denying access to the courts. Ek's claim that the court abused its discretion by denying his motion to extend the time to appeal is unsubstantiated, as he did not demonstrate compliance with the prefiling order or provide evidence that he filed a request for an extension. The court's discretion in denying the extension is upheld due to Ek's failure to comply with the order.

The court reviewed Ek's motion to extend the time for filing a notice of appeal, discussing the discretion afforded to trial courts in imposing sanctions. Ek argued for a less severe sanction than outright denial, referencing the precedent set in Enos II and Enos I, which highlight that sanctions are typically reviewed for abuse of discretion. The court determined it had not received Ek's request for an extension, thus justifying denial based on discretion. Even if the request had been transmitted, Ek lacked permission to file the motion. The court noted the potential for Ek to be held in contempt under HRS 634J-7 for disobeying a prefiling order. 

Ek's appeal also included the claim of not being informed of the final judgment entry, which he argued led to his need for an extension. HRCP Rule 77(d) mandates that the clerk serve notice of judgment entry, and such mailing suffices for notification purposes. However, the court clarified that lack of notice does not relieve a party from the obligation to appeal within the prescribed timeframe, except as stated in HRAP Rule 4(a). The court reiterated that a failure to be aware of the judgment's entry does not constitute "excusable neglect," as established in Enos II. Consequently, the court affirmed the order denying Ek's motion to extend the time to file an appeal. 

Additionally, HRS 634J-1 defines a "vexatious litigant" based on specific criteria related to prior civil actions.

A plaintiff is deemed a vexatious litigant under HRS 634J-1 if they relitigate cases in bad faith after a final determination or file unmeritorious motions while representing themselves. The court has the authority to issue a prefiling order under HRS 634J-7(a), which mandates that a vexatious litigant must seek permission from a judge before initiating new litigation. Disobedience of this order can result in contempt of court. In the case of William Ek, the court identified him as a vexatious litigant due to his irresponsible litigation practices, including failure to serve documents properly and filing meritless motions. Although Ek did not specifically cite the prefiling order in his appeal, the court upheld the validity of the order, stating it conformed to HRS 634J-7(a) requirements. The court noted that it would not address arguments concerning the lack of evidence for the prefiling order due to Ek's failure to provide necessary transcripts from prior hearings, although it could address legal questions not dependent on trial findings.

Plaintiff William Ek's Motion to Extend the Time to File a Notice of Appeal was denied because his letter, claimed to be "Hand Delivered," was not received by the court, and he lacked permission to file the motion as required by a prior court order. The legislative intent behind HRS chapter 634J is to reduce frivolous lawsuits while ensuring access to justice for legitimate litigants. The chapter is modeled after a California law aimed at preventing misuse of the court system by vexatious litigants who repeatedly file groundless actions, particularly against judicial officers. California courts have clarified that the vexatious litigant statute applies only to self-represented litigants, not to attorneys representing clients, who are subject to professional conduct regulations. HRS chapter 634J defines "litigation," "plaintiff," and "defendant" similarly to existing legal definitions. If a vexatious litigant has no pending matters, the presiding judge of the relevant division would oversee new actions. "In forma pauperis" status refers to individuals permitted to proceed without court fees due to indigence. The court will not assess the sufficiency of evidence related to Ek's case since he did not request a transcript, but it confirmed that sufficient grounds were stated to apply HRS 634J-1(3). Ek retains the right to contest any future denial of his requests.