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State v. Jackson
Citations: 280 Kan. 16; 118 P.3d 1238; 2005 Kan. LEXIS 456Docket: 89,620
Court: Supreme Court of Kansas; September 9, 2005; Kansas; State Supreme Court
Andrew Jackson's direct appeal arises from his jury convictions for first-degree premeditated murder, kidnapping, and conspiracy to commit murder. The case stems from a plan orchestrated by Jackson, along with Bovi Combs and Shecora Clanton, to kill Delesha Williams. Combs believed Williams was involved in his sister's death and enlisted Clanton's help. They initially intended to poison Williams with strychnine but could not obtain it. Clanton rented a U-Haul truck to transport stolen items post-murder. After contacting Jackson for assistance, they picked him up before proceeding to Williams' house. Upon arrival, they noticed a car in the driveway but returned after it left. Combs knocked on the door, and when Williams answered, he sent her cousin home with Clanton and Jackson. They then visited with Williams, who invited them to stay the night. Once she fell asleep, Jackson attacked her with a mallet and then attempted to strangle her. After breaking the syringe he provided, Jackson sought an extension cord, which he also broke. Ultimately, Combs stabbed Williams multiple times with a knife, culminating in her murder. The appeal includes allegations of various trial errors that will be reviewed separately. Combs attacked Williams, inflicting severe injuries, including slashes and blunt force trauma, leaving her unconscious in a hallway. Afterward, Combs and another individual loaded items into a U-Haul, including televisions and other electronics, while leaving Williams unattended. They eventually placed Williams in the back of the U-Haul. During transport, Williams screamed, prompting Combs to suggest disposing of her body. Combs subsequently assaulted Williams further and discarded her body in a wooded area. Both Combs and Clanton were arrested, and they implicated Jackson, who later turned himself in. At trial, Jackson was convicted of first-degree premeditated murder, kidnapping, and conspiracy, receiving a hard 50 life sentence. He is appealing, arguing that Kansas lacks jurisdiction and raising issues related to his right to a speedy trial, jury instructions, evidence admission, the fairness of the trial, and the sufficiency of evidence for his convictions. Additionally, he claims the hard 50 sentencing scheme is unconstitutional or unsupported by evidence. The jurisdictional question is assessed under K.S.A. 21-3104, which allows for prosecution if a crime occurs within Kansas or if a person outside the state aids or conspires in committing a crime in Kansas. An offense is considered committed in a state if a significant act or its proximate result occurs within that state. In homicide cases, if a victim's body is found within the state, it is presumed the death occurred there. Although the statute K.S.A. 21-3104 is interpreted broadly, there are recognized limitations, as established in case law. In State v. Palermo, the court ruled that Kansas lacks jurisdiction over an aiding and abetting claim if the defendant never entered the state and could not have foreseen that their actions would contribute to a crime occurring there. Applying this precedent, Jackson argues he could not have foreseen that his associates, Combs and Clanton, would transport and kill Williams in Kansas, asserting his involvement ended before their actions. However, the court must examine each charge individually to assess the foreseeability of Combs' and Clanton's actions to Jackson. Despite his claims, it was foreseeable that Combs and Clanton would complete the murder Jackson had initiated, especially given his prior statements and knowledge of the circumstances surrounding Williams' confinement and the ongoing violence she faced. Jackson's awareness of Williams being alive in the U-Haul and his failure to intervene—such as not attempting to rescue her or alert the authorities—demonstrated that he should have anticipated the continuation of her kidnapping and murder. His lack of participation in the final acts does not absolve him of culpability, as he was aware of the imminent threat to Williams' life and did not take any steps to prevent it. Jackson contends that while it was foreseeable Combs and Clanton would continue the kidnapping of Williams and complete the murder he initiated, it was not foreseeable they would do so in Kansas. This claim disregards the proximity of Jackson's residence and the U-Haul truck's mobility, as all locations involved are within 5 miles of the Kansas border, allowing Clanton to easily drive into Kansas. Jackson’s absence from the decision to travel to Kansas does not negate foreseeability. The State prosecuted Jackson under an aiding and abetting theory for first-degree premeditated murder and kidnapping, which allows for prosecution as if he were a principal. The legal standard cites that aiding and abetting can lead to the same charges regardless of direct involvement in the jurisdiction. The foreseeability analysis applies to the murder and kidnapping charges; however, it does not apply to conspiracy charges, which can be prosecuted in any jurisdiction where an overt act occurred, irrespective of the defendant's physical presence. The court referenced State v. Campbell, where a conspiratorial agreement and overt acts were sufficient for jurisdiction despite the defendants not entering the charged area. The court concluded that since an overt act occurred in Kansas, the State has jurisdiction over Jackson regarding conspiracy to commit murder. Regarding the speedy trial claim, Jackson was arraigned on October 10, 2001, with a trial initially set for January 7, 2002, 89 days later, which is within the 90-day requirement under K.S.A. 22-3402(1). However, due to court continuances, the trial was delayed until May 1, 2002. Jackson asserts that these continuances were improperly granted and that the State did not adequately justify a 90-day continuance for evidence. The appellate court reviews this issue as a question of law using a de novo standard. K.S.A. 22-3402(1) stipulates that a defendant held in jail must be brought to trial within 90 days of arraignment, or they are entitled to discharge unless the delay is due to their actions or a court-ordered continuance. Under K.S.A. 22-3402(3)(d), a trial court can grant a single continuance of up to 30 days if it lacks sufficient time to commence the trial due to other pending cases. In this instance, the trial court issued a 30-day continuance for Jackson's trial on April 1, 2002, due to the extended trial of his co-defendant, Combs. Although Jackson did not object to this continuance, he contends it violated the statute as it was the second such continuance, referencing a note from November 28, 2001, which anticipated a 30-day continuance but was not an official court order. The court's note did not constitute an order, thus the trial court's actions complied with K.S.A. 22-3402(3)(d). Jackson also argues that the State did not meet the criteria for a 90-day evidentiary continuance to complete DNA testing. According to K.S.A. 22-3402(3)(c), such a continuance can be granted if material evidence is unavailable despite reasonable efforts to procure it, and it can be obtained within the next 90 days. Prior cases have upheld continuances of up to 120 days for DNA testing without specifically addressing the materiality of the evidence. Jackson contends the DNA evidence was immaterial since he did not dispute key factors such as the victim's identity, murder location, cause of death, or the murderer’s identity. However, these factors were indeed material because he was charged as an aider and abettor, requiring the State to prove a crime was committed by his codefendants. The DNA evidence showed Williams' blood on Combs' clothing and a knife, indirectly implicating Jackson's co-defendants and supporting Clanton's testimony. Jackson also claims the State did not make reasonable efforts to obtain the DNA evidence, which was initially collected in June 2001 but delayed due to a backlog of homicide cases. Although the prosecutor actively pursued the evidence, the crime lab indicated it could not expedite processing due to resource constraints and a backlog of cases. Jackson suggested transferring the evidence to another lab, but the State explained that the Kansas Bureau of Investigation also faced a backlog and logistical issues concerning chain of custody. The court found the State’s efforts reasonable, noting it cannot control crime lab schedules or workloads. Jackson failed to prove any trial commencement error, as the trial court only granted a single 30-day continuance aligned with statutory requirements. Regarding jury instructions, Jackson argues the court neglected to include instructions on his defenses of withdrawal and compulsion, improperly expanded aiding and abetting instructions, contested the jurisdiction instruction, and omitted felony murder as a lesser included offense of first-degree premeditated murder. A trial court must instruct the jury on the defendant's legal theories when supported by evidence, even if minimal and based on the defendant's testimony. An appellate court reviews evidence favorably towards the defendant if an instruction is requested. Jackson claimed entitlement to a jury instruction on his withdrawal defense related to a murder charge, but this would conflict with established Kansas law, which does not recognize withdrawal as a defense for aiding and abetting. Jackson failed to provide justification for overturning existing precedent, such as State v. Kaiser, which reaffirmed this principle. Consequently, the trial court was correct in denying the withdrawal instruction. Jackson also contended that he acted under compulsion due to fear of Combs. Under K.S.A. 21-3209, the compulsion defense applies only if a person performs acts under imminent threat and cannot escape without serious harm. This defense is not applicable to murder or voluntary manslaughter. Jackson argued for its application to other charges but failed to demonstrate that he acted without reasonable opportunity to escape, as he had two chances to flee from Combs and did not contact law enforcement. Thus, the trial court did not err in denying the compulsion defense instruction. Additionally, Jackson argued that the trial court improperly modified the aiding and abetting jury instructions. He claimed the court expanded on the PIK Crim. instructions by adding language regarding criminal responsibility for aiding and abetting, which he found objectionable. A defendant is liable for any additional crimes committed in the pursuit of an intended crime if those consequences are reasonably foreseeable. All participants in a crime share equal culpability, but mere presence or association with the principal offenders does not establish guilt as an aider or abettor. To be guilty of aiding and abetting, a defendant must willfully and knowingly participate in the unlawful act. Appellate courts must evaluate jury instructions collectively; if they accurately reflect the law and facts of the case without misleading the jury, they are not considered reversible error, even if they contain some errors. Trial courts should generally use pattern jury instructions unless the case's unique facts necessitate modifications. In this instance, the defendant, Jackson, acknowledged the uniqueness of his case and conceded that the instruction reflected the law, yet he claimed there was insufficient evidence for a finding of mere presence and that the instruction misled the jury regarding his dissociation from co-defendants. The court found no merit in Jackson's argument, ruling that withdrawal was not a valid defense for him. Regarding jurisdiction, Jackson contested the jury instructions about Kansas's jurisdiction to prosecute him, arguing he did not commit any acts in the state. However, jurisdiction is a legal question for the court, not the jury, and prior rulings had already established jurisdiction against him. Jackson's objection to the instructions was deemed unfounded. Lastly, he argued that the court should have provided instructions on felony murder and attempted murder as lesser included offenses to first-degree premeditated murder, which must be assessed favorably to him due to his request for those instructions. A criminal defendant is entitled to an instruction on all lesser included offenses if (1) the evidence supports a jury verdict consistent with the defendant’s theory and (2) the evidence does not exclude the possibility of guilt for the lesser offense. A lesser included offense is defined under K.S.A. 2003 Supp. 21-3107(2) as a lesser degree of the same crime, a crime with identical elements to part of the charged crime, or an attempt to commit either the charged crime or a lesser crime. Felony murder and first-degree premeditated murder both comprise first-degree murder, with felony murder not qualifying as a lesser included offense since it requires proof of all elements of premeditated murder. Thus, the trial court correctly denied Jackson's request for a felony-murder instruction. In contrast, attempted murder qualifies as a lesser included offense, and the trial court must provide that instruction if supported by evidence. However, Jackson’s claim of withdrawal from the murder was ineffective since he was charged under an aiding or abetting theory, which he could not contest. There was no evidence that Jackson, Combs, and Clanton attempted murder but failed, leading to the trial court’s proper refusal to instruct on attempted murder. Regarding evidence admission, Jackson raised three issues, claiming the trial court wrongly admitted gruesome photographs, hearsay statements from Combs, and his confession. He argued that the gruesome images were irrelevant since he did not dispute the death or manner of killing. The trial court has broad discretion in admitting evidence, particularly in murder cases, and such decisions are generally upheld unless an abuse of discretion is demonstrated. The relevance of evidence is determined by its logical connection to material facts. Jackson’s argument missed the State's theory of guilt through aiding and abetting, necessitating proof of the actions of the principals, Combs and Clanton. The photographs were relevant to demonstrate the injuries inflicted on Williams and her cause of death, justifying their admission by the trial court. Jackson challenges the trial court's admission of hearsay statements made by Combs, who did not testify at trial. Clanton testified that she overheard Combs asking Jackson how he would go about killing someone, although she could not confirm what Jackson said. Jackson argues for a de novo review based on State v. Deines, but the case does not address hearsay admissibility or the appropriate review standard. Recent clarifications in State v. Elnicki and State v. Carter establish that the relevance of evidence is the initial consideration, followed by the application of evidentiary rules regarding admission and exclusion. The State contends that Combs' statements are admissible under K.S.A. 2003 Supp. 60-460, which allows hearsay statements if they are vicarious admissions relevant to a conspiracy in progress. Jackson presents two arguments against this: first, that Combs' statements occurred before he entered into the conspiracy, and second, that Clanton's testimony lacked reliability. However, the evidence supports the conclusion that Jackson was involved in the conspiracy during his conversation with Combs. Clanton's testimony indicates that Jackson had prepared a syringe with a substance and provided instructions on how to harm a person, suggesting his involvement in a plan to kill Williams prior to the arrival of Combs and Clanton. The context implies that Combs expected Jackson to participate in the plan. Clanton reported that Combs asked Jackson if he would accompany them, to which Jackson declined, citing it was too late. This suggests Jackson had initially intended to join but changed his mind. Jackson's actions, such as preparing a syringe and referring to the victim as "she," imply his involvement in a conspiracy when Combs posed the question about killing someone. The conspiracy exception to the hearsay rule applies here. Jackson argues that Clanton's testimony fails to meet the reliability requirements of the Confrontation Clause under the Sixth Amendment, referencing Crawford v. Washington, which established that testimonial statements require the declarant to be unavailable for admission without prior cross-examination. Non-testimonial statements, including those from coconspirators, can be evaluated under applicable hearsay law. The court in Swafford confirmed that the coconspirator exception to hearsay is reliable and does not require additional proof. Thus, Combs' statement is admissible under this exception. Jackson further contends that his confession was involuntary due to heroin withdrawal and coercive police interrogation. The appellate review of confession suppression involves substantial evidence for factual findings and de novo review for legal conclusions. The appellate court respects the trial court's factual determinations and considers all supporting evidence. To assess the voluntariness of a confession, courts evaluate the totality of circumstances, including interrogation duration and manner, the accused's ability to communicate with the outside world, their age, intellect, background, and the fairness of the officers involved. The central concern is whether the confession stems from the accused's free will. In Jackson's case, the interrogation began around 9:30 a.m., with Miranda warnings given at approximately 9:45 a.m. He was moved to a separate room for a videotaped statement completed by 12:13 p.m. During the interrogation, Jackson was not handcuffed, was permitted breaks for cigarettes and bathroom use, and did not request food or drinks. The interrogation was calm and orderly, without coercive tactics evident. Jackson's argument, claiming that the lack of a complete videotape signifies coercion, is unsupported by legal precedent, and the available testimony provided sufficient context for evaluating the interrogation's nature. Jackson did not seek to contact an attorney or anyone else during the process, negating claims of coercion based on lack of communication access. At 42 years old, with four prior convictions, Jackson contended that he was undergoing heroin withdrawal during the interrogation. He stated that he had used heroin five days prior and would experience withdrawal symptoms without it. Despite feeling tired and cold, he maintained that he was coherent. The interrogating officer observed no signs of drug influence, and Jackson himself did not recall mentioning withdrawal symptoms during the session. Overall, there was no substantial evidence indicating that the manner and duration of Jackson's interrogation coerced his confession. Jackson's claim that his confession was involuntary due to heroin withdrawal lacks support from the record. The trial court's admission of the confession suggests a finding that withdrawal symptoms did not influence him, a determination backed by evidence and not subject to appeal reversal, as established in Hill v. Farm Bur. Mut. Ins. Co. Jackson also contends that police coercion led to his confession, asserting that officers pressured him and suggested what to say. Initially denying involvement in the murder of Williams, Jackson changed his story after an officer implied that others had blamed him. The officer encouraged Jackson to clarify his involvement and suggested how the homicide may have occurred based on physical evidence. Citing State v. Kornstett and State v. Harris, the court noted that mere encouragement to tell the truth or sharing investigative theories does not render a confession inadmissible. Jackson failed to differentiate his situation from these precedents and did not provide case law prohibiting officers from suggesting how a crime occurred based on available evidence. Considering the totality of circumstances, including the four White factors, the court found no indication that Jackson's confession was coerced due to the absence of a complete videotape of his interrogation, his withdrawal symptoms, or the police's suggestions about the crime. Additionally, Jackson's assertion of being denied a fair trial due to cumulative errors is evaluated based on whether these errors substantially prejudiced him. The court concluded that, given the overwhelming evidence against him, no prejudicial errors were present, leading to the dismissal of his claim of cumulative errors. The standard for reviewing sufficiency of evidence in a criminal case requires appellate courts to determine whether a rational factfinder, viewing the evidence favorably for the prosecution, could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson presents five arguments against the sufficiency of evidence for his convictions, primarily challenging the credibility of Clanton's testimony. However, the jury has the exclusive role of weighing evidence and assessing witness credibility, and appellate courts do not reweigh evidence. Jackson's claims regarding his intent to murder Williams, his involvement in her murder, and his participation in her kidnapping have been previously addressed and rejected. Consequently, the court affirms Jackson's convictions for first-degree premeditated murder, kidnapping, and conspiracy to commit murder without finding trial errors. Regarding the hard 50 sentencing scheme, Jackson argues its unconstitutionality due to its effect on parole ineligibility. The court maintains that previous rulings have upheld the constitutionality of this statute, and Jackson's request to overturn established precedents lacks supporting authority. Therefore, the hard 50 sentencing provisions are deemed constitutional. Jackson also contends there is insufficient evidence for the hard 50 sentence, asserting that the trial court improperly considered actions of his co-defendants and that his conduct was not especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel. Jackson contends that the court improperly relied on unreliable evidence to conclude that the murder was committed for monetary gain. He argues that K.S.A. 2003 Supp. 21-4636(f) requires that especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel actions, which he admits occurred, must be committed by him rather than his co-defendants for the aggravating factor to apply. The statute specifies that a finding of the victim's awareness or suffering is unnecessary for establishing heinousness. Evidence presented included testimony that Jackson planned and attempted to murder Williams through violent means, including hitting her with a mallet, attempting to strangle her, and engaging in prolonged physical struggle, which inflicted mental anguish and constituted continuous acts of violence. The court found that Jackson's actions fulfilled the statutory criteria for especially heinous conduct, thus rejecting his arguments regarding the application of the statute and the nature of his actions. The determination of aggravating circumstances in sentencing relies on whether a rational factfinder, viewing evidence favorably to the prosecution, could find such circumstances established by a preponderance of the evidence. Jackson claimed he tried to assist Williams by telling her to play dead and promised to call an ambulance, but he never did so. Evidence, primarily from Clanton's testimony, indicated Jackson's actions caused Williams both mental anguish and physical abuse, constituting continuous violence. Jackson's failure to help left Williams vulnerable to being harmed by Combs and Clanton. His conduct was deemed especially heinous, fitting the definition under K.S.A. 2003 Supp. 21-4636(f)(3) and (5). Jackson's challenge to the trial court's reliance on Clanton's testimony, which he argued was inherently unreliable, was dismissed as the jury found Clanton credible. The court emphasized it does not reevaluate evidence or witness credibility, following State v. Moore, 269 Kan. 27, 30, 4 P.3d 1141 (2000). Clanton's account of Jackson loading Williams' belongings into a U-Haul and taking a television supported the finding that he committed the crime for monetary gain. The trial court's conclusions on aggravating circumstances were backed by the record, and Jackson did not contest the weighing of these against mitigating factors. According to K.S.A. 2003 Supp. 21-4635(c), a hard 50 sentence is mandated if aggravating factors outweigh mitigations. The court affirmed Jackson's hard 50 life sentence, finding no errors in the proceedings.