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People v. Navarette
Citations: 66 P.3d 1182; 133 Cal. Rptr. 2d 89; 30 Cal. 4th 458; 2003 Daily Journal DAR 4493; 2003 Cal. LEXIS 2638Docket: S022481
Court: California Supreme Court; April 28, 2003; California; State Supreme Court
Defendant Martin Anthony Navarette was convicted of first-degree murder for killing two neighbors, along with charges of burglary and robbery. The jury found that he committed both murders under special circumstances, including burglary-murder and robbery-murder, and that he personally used a deadly weapon. He was acquitted of attempted murder against a third victim but convicted of battery with serious bodily injury and second-degree robbery related to that victim. The jury also acquitted him of a separate burglary charge. At the penalty phase, a verdict of death was returned, and the trial court denied his motion for a new trial. The court sentenced him to death for the two murder counts, imposed an eight-year and four-month determinate sentence for the other counts, and stayed a personal-use enhancement. This appeal was automatic, and the judgment was affirmed. On the day of the crimes, December 5, 1989, Navarette consumed significant amounts of alcohol and cocaine after his girlfriend left for work. He had no key to his apartment and often used a window for entry. That evening, one of the victims discovered her apartment had been burglarized, and witnesses saw Navarette at the complex later that night. He inquired about selling a stolen videocassette recorder and clock radio. The police found that valuables had been left untouched in the burglarized apartment. At approximately 3:30 a.m., neighbors reported the sound of breaking glass and an angry voice coming from Alexandra Hickman's apartment, prompting one neighbor to call the police. He suspected someone was trying to escape from the apartment. A witness saw a man, later identified as the defendant, fleeing the scene in blue jeans and a white shirt. Police arrived shortly after and found a broken window at Hickman's apartment, with her body lying in a pool of blood on the floor, exhibiting 43 stab wounds and five slice wounds, as determined by an autopsy. Signs of a struggle were evident, with blood on the walls and overturned furniture. A broken wooden-handled steak knife was located beneath her body, and similar knives were found in the kitchen. Investigators noted no signs of theft or forced sexual assault in Hickman's apartment. They later discovered Deborah Converse's body in her apartment, bound with a dog leash and suffering from approximately 15 stab wounds, also showing signs of struggle. Converse was found naked from the waist down, with no evidence of sexual assault. A missing knife from the kitchen, a red telephone handset in the bathroom sink, and Converse's missing pickup truck and personal items were noted. Shoe prints were found in the mud near both apartments, and a clean knife was discovered on the carport roof, suspected to be the murder weapon. Around 6:50 a.m. the day after the murders, the defendant contacted his girlfriend Brigette Morales, claiming his truck had broken down and arranged to meet her. When they met, he appeared disheveled, with his shirt inside out and backwards, and had stains on his clothing, which he attributed to paint. Morales identified a truck belonging to the defendant, whose description aligned with a missing vehicle. At a gas station, Morales noticed blood stains on the defendant's clothes; he claimed he had been in a fight and implied she should not inquire further. He directed her to a residential area, where he assaulted her, breaking her nose, and attempted to restrain her. She managed to escape and sought help from a local resident who called the police. After the incident, the defendant was seen at his brother-in-law Benny Garcia's home, wearing stained jeans and asking to wash his clothes. Evidence linked the defendant to a murder investigation, as he had cuts and scratches on his body and was found with jeans matching the crime scene. Police discovered purses from a victim's apartment in his home, and forensic analysis confirmed blood on his clothing matched that of the victims, Hickman and Converse. The blood tests indicated a rare match for Hickman’s blood type, while other stains matched Converse's blood, and some were identified as the defendant's own. The defendant's palm print was found at crime scenes, further solidifying the evidence against him. The prosecution introduced photographic evidence highlighting the brutality of the murders alongside proof of the defendant's prior conviction for assault with intent to commit rape. The defense presented testimony from Frances C. and others to contextualize this earlier conviction, detailing an incident where the defendant, under the influence of alcohol and PCP, attempted to sexually assault Frances C. but was ultimately subdued when she managed to roll him off her after he passed out. The defendant's troubled upbringing was also presented as mitigating evidence, including his mother's alcoholism, abusive relationships, and neglect, as well as his early health issues and subsequent struggles with drugs. Regarding pretrial issues, the trial court denied the defendant's motion for a change of venue due to concerns about potential bias from media coverage. The court determined that the defendant did not meet the burden of proof necessary to demonstrate a 'reasonable likelihood' of an unfair trial, citing his reliance on limited newspaper articles and an unspecified television report rather than substantial evidence of extensive media influence. The court emphasized that the evaluation of such motions considers various factors, including the nature of the crime, publicity extent, community size, and the status of both victim and accused. Defendant failed to provide evidence to support claims regarding the television report and the impact of local newspaper articles on potential juror bias. The articles, published 15 months before the venue change motion, presented non-inflammatory information similar to later evidence. The court noted that such publicity is common in murder cases and not sufficient to incite community bias against the defendant. Although the nature of the crimes favored a venue change, this alone did not necessitate it. The defendant's argument regarding racial dynamics was undermined by the lack of race-related coverage in the media. Furthermore, only two jurors had heard of the case through news reports, and both could remain impartial. The defendant did not challenge these jurors with peremptory strikes. Consequently, the court found no error in denying the venue change motion. Regarding voir dire, the court limited certain questions from the defendant’s proposed juror questionnaire, which he claimed were necessary to identify bias. These questions related to jurors’ job preferences and beliefs about authority. The trial court has broad discretion in voir dire, and an abuse of that discretion is only recognized if it results in a miscarriage of justice. The defendant did not demonstrate that excluding these questions compromised the fairness of the trial. Defendant's claim that his proposed questions would have revealed hidden juror bias lacks merit. The trial court allowed defense counsel to ask any questions beyond those in the juror questionnaire, providing ample opportunity to explore the same topics the defendant later argued were restricted. A comprehensive 31-page juror questionnaire adequately addressed the areas of concern, including employment backgrounds that could indicate potential biases. One of the defendant's suggested questions, regarding belief maintenance, was deemed nonsensical as it inherently implied that if a belief is felt to be right, it is maintained. The trial court's alternative question more effectively addressed jurors' ability to follow the law in conflict with personal beliefs. Another proposed question about managing workers was also excluded for confusion; the defendant could have clarified or rephrased it to better assess jurors' personalities. Regarding voir dire procedures, the defendant contended that the court's questioning favored pro-death-penalty jurors due to an imbalance in the number of questions asked. However, his argument was based solely on a numerical comparison, failing to demonstrate a constitutional violation. He did not indicate how the questioning failed to identify pro-death-penalty biases or suggest additional questions. The juror questionnaire also included inquiries about jurors' views on the death penalty and their potential impact on deliberations. The court's individual questioning of a juror was not rushed or coercive, and the process allowed for sufficient exploration of biases. The record shows that Juror Jack C. articulated that his stance on the death penalty would depend on the case's facts. Overall, no errors were found in the trial court's procedures during voir dire. The court engaged in additional questioning of Juror Jack C. based on written inquiries from defense counsel, without imposing limits on the number of questions. The defendant did not specify any unanswered questions, leading to a conclusion of no error. The defendant claimed bias among jurors, particularly regarding alternate Juror Patricia F., who allegedly held prejudiced views against drug users and considered drug use an aggravating factor. However, since she did not participate in deliberations, her views could not have influenced the verdict. Juror Julanne B. was also accused of bias for having seen a headline about the case and for ambiguous responses on her juror questionnaire. The court found no basis for bias in her statements, which reflected a willingness to adhere to the law rather than a predisposition against the defendant. Furthermore, her husband's former role as a police officer was not a valid reason for disqualification. Defense counsel did not challenge Juror Julanne B. for cause or utilize peremptory challenges against her, forfeiting any objections. The defendant expressed concerns regarding the ability to examine jurors for racial bias or biases related to the nature of the crimes. However, he failed to provide evidence of obstruction from the court regarding these inquiries. The court referenced a previous ruling indicating that juror questioning should center on general attitudes toward the death penalty rather than on specific case details, maintaining that sufficient procedures were in place to address bias concerns. In Pinholster, the court upheld the trial court's inquiry into whether jurors could impose the death penalty in a burglary-murder case, citing legislative intent that this crime qualifies for capital punishment. Jurors who categorically refused to impose the death penalty were deemed unable to follow the law. The defendant argued that this created an imbalance, as he was restricted from asking jurors about their automatic imposition of the death penalty in double-murder cases, potentially resulting in a jury biased in favor of the death penalty, violating his federal rights. However, the court noted that the defendant had the opportunity to ask such questions. The defendant also claimed the trial court improperly limited his ability to question jurors individually and in seclusion regarding their death penalty views, referencing Hovey v. Superior Court. However, this rule was abrogated by Code of Civil Procedure section 223, and the court deferred to the trial court's discretion in voir dire procedures. The trial court permitted some sequestered questioning and required questioning in front of other jurors initially, stating it needed to assess jurors' responses first. The defendant did not specify any questions he was unable to ask or demonstrate how the questioning method affected his ability to identify juror bias, failing to establish prejudice. Additionally, the trial court did not err in excusing Juror Norma K. for cause. Her conflicting statements about her ability to impose the death penalty, despite strong personal beliefs, justified her removal. The court affirmed the trial court's discretion in evaluating juror impartiality based on these inconsistencies. Juror Norma K. was properly removed for cause based on her remarks, supporting the trial court's decision. In contrast, the trial court did not err in failing to remove Juror Sam F. for cause despite his concerns about a hearing problem. The defendant's failure to motion for Juror Sam F.'s removal during trial forfeited this issue. The court allowed Juror Sam F. to sit closer to the witness box, and there was no evidence that this accommodation was inadequate. Regarding the defendant's motion to exclude evidence found in a carport, the trial court denied this motion without prejudice, as the defendant failed to provide sufficient context for evaluating the evidence's relevance and did not renew the motion during trial. The items included a shirt, baby blanket, black telephone, and a wristband, with the court noting that the evidence could potentially link the defendant to the crime. Notably, the black telephone was significant as it originated from the defendant’s apartment and was linked to a sale offer made before the murders. The trial court's ruling on the relevance and admission of the evidence did not violate the defendant's rights under the Fourth Amendment, as there was no undue prejudice established, particularly concerning the wristband that was not introduced at trial. Overall, the court did not abuse its discretion in denying the defendant's motion to exclude the evidence, and the defendant was not excluded from proceedings that significantly related to his defense. Defendant appeals the judgment, asserting he was denied his right to be present at in-chambers conferences, which he claims impacted his defense. To succeed in such a claim, he must demonstrate that his absence had a significant bearing on his ability to defend himself, as established in *People v. Ochoa*. Specifically, he highlights a conference on April 10, 1991, where his attorney discussed difficulties in locating a witness and sought a bench warrant for that individual. Although the court agreed to issue the warrant, the issue became moot when the witness appeared voluntarily. The record does not clarify why the attorney preferred to hold this discussion without the defendant, but it suggests the attorney wanted to avoid influencing the defendant’s feelings toward the witness, who was a drinking companion prior to the murders. Defendant argues that the proceedings reflect deceit intended to conceal conflicts between him and his counsel, but he fails to show how his absence, particularly in a moot context, affected his defense. Defendant further claims his exclusion from other unspecified conferences violated his rights, asserting that had he been present, the outcomes might have differed. However, this assertion lacks concrete evidence and is deemed speculative, failing to establish any breach of statutory or constitutional rights. Additionally, regarding the trial court's exclusion of certain defense evidence, the defendant contends he should have been allowed to present testimonies from Grace Ignacio and Elizabeth Gerencser about his appearance of drug intoxication before the murders. The prosecution objected to this testimony due to lack of foundation, but lay opinion on drug intoxication can be admissible if properly substantiated. In the case involving Grace Ignacio, the trial court correctly barred her from testifying about the defendant's appearance as someone who might be on drugs, as she lacked personal experience with drug users. Similarly, witness Gerencser, who only had limited exposure to cocaine through hearsay, was also prevented from offering her opinion on the defendant's drug use due to insufficient knowledge. The court sustained a relevancy objection during the cross-examination of victim Bridgett Morales regarding her comfort around drug users, as the defendant did not clarify its relevance to the case, nor did he establish how it impacted Morales' credibility. Additionally, the defendant mistakenly argued that witness Elizabeth Gerencser's testimony about her handicapped child was relevant to the penalty phase, while it was actually presented during the guilt phase without justification for its relevance. Regarding the admission of photographic evidence, the defendant contended that the trial court allowed overly prejudicial images of the crime scene and victims that could inflame juror emotions. Specifically, he challenged the admission of three photographs, including one of a victim alive, one showing stab wounds, and another depicting the victim's body as found. The trial court evaluated the photographs, admitted some as relevant and not overly prejudicial, and excluded others as cumulative. The court's discretion in admitting the photographs was upheld, particularly since one photograph was relevant to establishing a motive by showing a missing camera from the victim's apartment. The appellate review confirmed that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in these decisions. At the defendant's request, a photograph of the victim, Converse, with her face blacked out, was admitted without objection. The court found that this photograph, which showed numerous stab wounds to her heart area, was relevant to establishing the intentionality of the murder. The jury was not misled regarding the victim’s clothing, as testimony confirmed she was clothed when found. Despite the photograph's gruesome nature, the court ruled that the defendant cannot prevent the jury from viewing relevant evidence of the victim’s injuries. Additionally, another photograph showing Converse with her pants and underwear around her ankles, and her limbs tied, was relevant to demonstrate the victim's immobilization prior to the murder, further supporting the inference of intent. The defendant's claim that less prejudicial means could have been used to establish these facts was dismissed, as previous cases have rejected similar arguments. The court also addressed concerns about the 'sexually suggestive nature' of the images, asserting that the nature of the crime justified their admission. The defendant's argument regarding potential prejudice stemming from a visible tattoo on his arm was also rejected, as the tattoo was relevant to show fresh scratches on his body post-arrest, with no evidence of jury bias against tattoos presented. Regarding the testimony of Sergeant Charles Rosales, who described the condition of the murder scene and commented on the number of stab wounds, the defendant objected, and the court struck the statement, instructing the jury to disregard it. The defendant sought a mistrial, arguing the comment unduly influenced the jury's perception of the case’s severity. The court denied this request but reinforced its instruction to the jury. On appeal, the court concluded that the trial judge handled the situation appropriately, mitigating any potential prejudice arising from the officer's comment. The court instructed the jury to ignore a particular statement twice, emphasizing that the autopsy evidence—showing Hickman was stabbed nearly 50 times—was sufficient for the jury to deem the murder especially brutal. Sergeant Rosales's statement was not likely to have influenced the jury's perception. The court found no "irreparable damage" to the defendant's right to a fair trial. The defendant contested the testimony of Sergeant Robert Perry, who described a button missing from jeans found at Benny Garcia's home, arguing it suggested a connection to an unlawful sexual encounter, despite the prosecution having dropped sexual assault charges. The court ruled that the button's removal was relevant to the crime's circumstances, and Perry's qualifications allowed him to opine on its removal. Regarding forensic evidence, the defendant challenged the testimonies of criminalists Lynne Herold and Elizabeth Kornblum as unduly prejudicial but failed to object during trial, thus forfeiting the issue. Herold linked fibers from a button found near Hickman's body to the defendant's jeans, supporting the conclusion of the defendant's presence at the crime scene. Kornblum testified that blood on the jeans matched Hickman's and was from a rare blood type not matching the defendant, which was prejudicial but not improperly influential on the jury's decision. The defendant also objected to Deputy Sheriff Dale Falicon's testimony concerning comparisons of prints found at the murder scene with the defendant's prints from a card dated shortly before the murders. The defendant asserted that alternative fingerprint cards existed and that the Covina Police Department card implied prior arrests, potentially prejudicing the jury. However, the court did not find any error in these matters. Defense counsel objected at trial regarding the introduction of the Covina Police Department's fingerprint card, which the prosecution argued was relevant to demonstrate that the police identified the defendant as the primary suspect without bias. The court allowed the evidence but prohibited details about the timing or reasons for obtaining the prints. The court found it unlikely the jury speculated on those details since the mention of the prints was brief and not emphasized. The prosecution's argument that the evidence was pertinent to the investigation's focus on the defendant was upheld. The defendant contended that his intoxication at the time of the crimes negated the necessary mental state for the charges. However, the court noted that evidence of intoxication is generally inadmissible to prove a lack of mental state. Assuming the defendant argued that his intoxication indicated a lack of the necessary mental state, the court examined the entire record favorably toward the prosecution. Evidence indicated that the defendant had consumed alcohol and cocaine prior to the murders but lacked direct proof of his intoxication level during the crimes. The defendant's actions—gaining entry to victims' homes, binding them, and committing murder—suggested that his mental functions were not significantly impaired. Additionally, the defendant argued insufficient evidence to prove he entered the victims' apartments with intent to steal or that he could commit robbery against deceased victims. The court found substantial evidence supporting convictions for burglary, robbery, and attempted robbery, citing that the defendant sought money before the murders and took property from the victims after killing them, alongside creating a disturbance during the struggle with one victim. The jury could infer from the evidence that the defendant intended to steal from the victims, murdered them to take their property, and fled Hickman's apartment without stealing anything due to a noisy struggle. The court clarified that while one cannot rob a deceased person upon arrival, it is possible to rob a living person by killing them first. The defendant's arguments regarding this point were deemed without merit. Concerns were raised about Juror Todd R., who expressed fear for his property and family safety, suggesting potential bias against the defendant. After a witness described a gruesome crime scene, Juror Todd R. requested that his question not be answered publicly, prompting discussions about his impartiality. Despite these concerns, the court assured jurors of the confidentiality of their questionnaires and encouraged them to report if they felt unable to be fair. Juror Todd R. did not pursue the matter further, indicating satisfaction with the court's assurances. The trial court's discretion in deciding whether to remove a juror for cause was upheld, with no abuse of discretion found. The defendant’s claim that the court's response validated juror fears and led to a premature conclusion of guilt was rejected, as the court had not drawn undue attention to Juror Todd R.'s concerns. Additionally, the defendant did not raise these arguments during the trial, and the court's actions were deemed appropriate in addressing juror confidentiality without exacerbating fears. Jurors were encouraged to report any inability to remain impartial and reminded not to prejudge the case. The court found no error regarding Juror Todd R.'s private note, which he requested to be handled confidentially, and determined that disclosing the juror's fears to the defendant might have worsened the situation. The court's measures to expedite the trial were deemed appropriate, despite the defendant's claims that time-saving decisions led to biased jurors, as he did not provide supporting authority or demonstrate how these measures impeded his defense. The defendant's concerns about time pressure affecting evidentiary objections were also unsubstantiated, as he failed to identify any erroneous rulings or improperly admitted evidence. Regarding jury instructions, the trial court properly instructed the jury according to CALJIC No. 2.02 concerning the evaluation of mental state evidence. The defendant argued this instruction compromised the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt but acknowledged the court's prior rulings upheld this instruction. Similarly, the court instructed the jury in accordance with CALJIC No. 2.52 about the implications of a defendant's flight from the crime scene, to which the defendant objected, claiming the jury should consider alternative explanations for flight. The court reaffirms its previous decisions rejecting the defendant's arguments regarding the use of evidence of flight in establishing consciousness of guilt. It clarifies that it is the jury's role to determine the relevance of flight to specific charged offenses, as established in *People v. Mendoza*. The court also disputes the defendant's claim that flight with stolen property should not be considered as evidence of guilt, stating that slight movement suffices to fulfill the asportation requirement for robbery. The argument that intoxication might negate consciousness of guilt is also dismissed, emphasizing that evidence of flight is meant to indicate guilty knowledge, not to require prior proof of a guilty conscience. Furthermore, regarding jury instructions, the court asserts that it was not necessary to define "immediate presence" in the robbery instruction, as the term is commonly understood. Finally, the court correctly instructed the jury on the differing mental states required for various offenses, confirming that voluntary intoxication does not lessen the criminality of the act. Voluntary intoxication is not a defense for general intent crimes charged against the defendant, even if he was intoxicated at the time of the offenses. The defendant contends that the CALJIC No. 4.20 instruction was improper because some charges were specific intent crimes. However, the court clarified that the instruction applied only to general intent crimes and did not create jury confusion, as it was given after discussing specific intent crimes where intoxication was relevant. The written instructions also clearly labeled the distinction between the two. The defendant's argument that the court should have explained the relationship between CALJIC No. 4.20 and CALJIC No. 4.21 was deemed unnecessary, as the court effectively communicated that the two instructions operated distinctly. Additionally, the trial court instructed the jury on CALJIC Nos. 4.31 and 8.47, addressing the concepts of consciousness and voluntary intoxication. The defendant argued for a definition of "unconscious," asserting that a person can act while legally unconscious. This argument was previously rejected in People v. Clark, as the existing instructions adequately conveyed this concept. The defendant did not convincingly argue how CALJIC No. 4.20 would alter the jury's understanding of "unconscious." The court found no error in its instructions. To establish the special circumstance of murder occurring during a robbery or burglary, it must be demonstrated that the murder was committed while the defendant engaged in these crimes. The defendant contends that the jury should have been instructed, as per CALJIC No. 8.81.17, that the prosecution needed to prove the murder was committed "to carry out or advance" the robbery or burglary, or to facilitate escape or avoid detection. If the robbery or burglary was "merely incidental" to the murder, the special circumstance would not apply. The instruction is relevant when evidence suggests the defendant may have intended to kill without an independent intent to commit a felony. If the felony serves as a secondary purpose to the murder, the special circumstance is not met; however, if the murder advances an independent felonious goal, the special circumstance is applicable. The record indicates no substantial motive for the murders beyond robbery or burglary. The defendant speculated that the brutality of the murders might indicate an "unconscious hatred for women," but no evidence supported this claim, and it was not adequately developed during the trial. The primary defense presented was that the defendant was too intoxicated to have intent. Consequently, the second paragraph of CALJIC No. 8.81.17 was not necessary in this case. Regarding jury instructions, the defendant argued that the jury should have been told he only needed to raise a reasonable doubt concerning the foundational facts to negate elements of the charged offense. The jury was instructed that each essential fact must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt for a conviction, which addressed this concern. The defendant also speculates about possible flawed legal conclusions from alleged instructional errors, but the court found no such errors, rendering the speculation unfounded. Lastly, claims of prosecutorial misconduct were raised by the defendant, but there was no evidence that prejudicial misconduct occurred, nor was there a forfeiture of these claims. Intemperate behavior constitutes a violation of the federal Constitution if it creates a pattern of conduct that renders a trial fundamentally unfair, thereby denying due process. Prosecutorial misconduct under state law occurs only if the prosecutor employs deceptive or reprehensible methods to influence the court or jury. In the examination of witness Elizabeth Gerencser, the prosecutor's questioning implied that the defendant's girlfriend made Gerencser fearful. Although the defendant claimed this created a false impression of threat, he did not object during the trial, forfeiting the issue. The prosecutor maintained that he had the right to explore the witness's credibility, and he did not further assert that the defendant threatened her, leading to a conclusion of no misconduct. The prosecution suggested a sexual assault despite the charges not alleging such. The defendant argued that testimony regarding blood found near his jeans and the condition of the jeans implied a sexual assault. However, he did not object at trial, resulting in forfeiture of the claim. The use of "fly" in reference to the jeans was not inherently suggestive of sexual assault, and the testimony about the ripped button was relevant to a struggle rather than an assault. Additionally, when cross-examined by his own counsel, the medical examiner's use of the term "forceful" did not imply misconduct, as the defendant did not provide reasoning as to how this constituted prosecutorial misconduct. Overall, no misconduct was found. Defendant claims prosecutorial misconduct regarding testimony about a "yellow foreign substance" on a shard of glass found in Hickman's bedroom, which he argues implied it was semen. However, he did not object during the trial, resulting in forfeiture of this issue. Deputy Sheriff Dale Falicon clarified that he found the defendant's palm print on the inside of the glass, noting that the yellow substance was on the dirtier side, suggesting it originated from the outside environment, not semen. Additionally, the defendant challenges the prosecutor's questioning about Hickman's stab wounds, specifically those near the rectum, but again failed to object at trial, leading to forfeiture. Sergeant Charles Rosales testified to the condition of Hickman's body, mentioning stab wounds without prompting, while the medical examiner’s report corroborated these details. The defendant also objected to photographs of Converse's naked body, asserting prosecutorial misconduct in their presentation. The court found no misconduct, reasoning that the nature of the crime justified the evidence's portrayal. Lastly, the defendant contests the medical examiner's testimony regarding the absence of trauma to the victims' genital organs, which was not objected to at trial and thus also forfeited. In *People v. Williams*, 16 Cal.4th 208-209, the court addressed several key points regarding the trial proceedings. Defense counsel initially introduced sexual assault as an issue, extensively questioning a witness about evidence of sexual assault, which ultimately revealed a lack of corroborating evidence. Although the prosecution could have objected on relevance grounds, it chose not to. Following the defense's presentation of this evidence, the prosecutor sought to clarify that the medical examiner's findings did not exclude the possibility of sexual assault, and this line of questioning was deemed appropriate and not erroneous. Additionally, the court noted that the defendant forfeited his right to contest the prosecutor's closing argument statements describing the victim, Converse, in graphic terms, by failing to object during the trial. The prosecutor's comments were found to be relevant to establishing the mental state of the alleged killer, as they illustrated the nature of the crime. Furthermore, testimony from Brigette Morales indicated that the defendant exhibited symptoms consistent with cocaine intoxication after the murder. The prosecution attempted to explore whether the defendant's demeanor could also stem from fear of apprehension, but the trial court limited this line of questioning. The defendant argued this was prosecutorial misconduct, but the court found no basis for this claim since the prosecutor's inquiries were aimed at exploring all reasonable explanations for Morales's observations, thus casting doubt on her conclusions about the defendant's state. Finally, the prosecutor's assertion that the defendant was "acting like a murderer" was part of a broader argument emphasizing the defendant's behavior in the aftermath of the crimes, which was also not objected to at trial, leading to a forfeiture of that argument. Overall, the court upheld the prosecutor's conduct during the trial as appropriate and within legal bounds. Morales's opinion suggested that the defendant exhibited symptoms consistent with late-stage cocaine intoxication following the murders, which the prosecution argued mirrored the signs of someone attempting to evade responsibility for a brutal crime. The defendant did not object to this argument during the trial, leading to forfeiture of the issue. The prosecution is permitted to argue its theory supported by evidence, as established in *People v. Bemore*. The defendant raised allegations of prosecutorial misconduct related to Sergeant Charles Rosales's testimony, which he claimed was emotional and inflammatory. Notably, Rosales stated he had never seen someone stabbed so many times in his 22 years of police work; this statement was struck from the record, and the jury was instructed to disregard it. The defendant forfeited other misconduct claims due to lack of objection at trial. Specific concerns included Rosales's comments about the numerous stab wounds on Hickman, which were substantiated by evidence showing nearly 50 stab wounds, making the description reasonable. The prosecution's inquiries regarding the blood at the crime scene and signs of struggle were relevant to establishing intent and aligned with the prosecution's narrative. Claims regarding Rosales insinuating dismemberment were dismissed as the jury could discern from photographs that dismemberment did not occur. The defendant contended that Rosales lacked the expertise to determine the timing of the wounds, but the prosecution sufficiently established his familiarity with knife wounds and blood loss. Ultimately, the court found no prosecutorial misconduct in relation to Rosales's testimony about Hickman's stab wounds. Defendant claims prosecutorial misconduct occurred during the cross-examination of defense witness Ernest Ramos. During direct examination, Ramos initially stated that the defendant did not appear to have smoked cocaine when last seen at 11:30 p.m. before the murders, but later contradicted himself. The prosecution highlighted this inconsistency during cross-examination by implying Ramos might be lying to protect the defendant. However, the defendant did not object at trial, forfeiting the issue. Furthermore, any potential misconduct did not prejudice the defendant, as the jury had ample evidence to reject his intoxication defense, including Ramos's testimony. The prosecution also questioned Ramos about the defendant selling a videocassette recorder to buy cocaine and whether the defendant had mentioned guns in Converse's apartment. Ramos answered he did not know or denied the claims. The defendant argues these questions lacked evidentiary support and suggested unsubstantiated ideas to the jury. The court found no misconduct, asserting that the prosecution was entitled to explore the matter further, as Ramos had previously testified about the sale of cocaine. Additionally, the defendant contends the prosecutor misrepresented the relevance of intoxication, claiming it must rise to unconsciousness to be considered. However, the prosecutor did not make such a claim, and the trial court properly instructed the jury that involuntary manslaughter applies when a killing occurs while the defendant is unconscious due to voluntary intoxication. The prosecutor's explanation of the jury instructions was consistent with the court's guidance. The legal excerpt addresses several key points regarding the prosecutor's conduct during the trial and the defendant's claims of error. 1. **Unconsciousness Requirement**: The prosecutor's remarks concerning unconsciousness were relevant to the lesser included offense of involuntary manslaughter. The jury was instructed to consider intoxication when assessing the defendant's specific intent regarding robbery, burglary, murder, and great bodily injury allegations. 2. **Defendant's Objections**: The defendant did not object at trial to the prosecutor's argument that he acted consciously, resulting in forfeiture of the issue. The prosecutor's assertions about the defendant's actions indicating intent and planning were deemed acceptable interpretations of the evidence with no prosecutorial misconduct found. 3. **Cumulative Error Argument**: The defendant contended that the cumulative effect of alleged errors warranted a reversal of judgment. However, the court found no prejudicial errors, rendering this argument without merit. 4. **Penalty Phase Issues**: The defendant attempted to reintroduce claims of prosecutorial misconduct from the guilt phase during the penalty phase, asserting that the prosecutor made inappropriate implications about threats, sexual assaults, and actions taken by the defendant post-murder. The court rejected these claims, noting that the evidence presented was relevant to the nature of the crimes and the defendant's character. 5. **Victim-Impact Testimony**: Testimony from the defendant's mother about his difficult upbringing and her beliefs regarding divine punishment was presented. During cross-examination, the prosecutor questioned her about her emotional response to the possibility of her son facing death due to his crimes. Overall, the court upheld the prosecutor's conduct as appropriate and found no basis to support claims of errors that would necessitate a reversal of the verdict. Gallegos was questioned by the prosecutor about her thoughts on the feelings of the murder victims' parents, to which she responded that she had prayed for them. The prosecutor further inquired if Gallegos believed it might be God's will for the defendant to pay for his actions. The defendant objected to the question regarding the victims' parents' feelings, claiming it elicited inadmissible victim-impact evidence. The court agreed that this questioning was improper per *Booth v. Maryland* but denied the request for a mistrial, instead striking the question and instructing the jury to disregard the impact of the crimes on the victims' families. The defendant later alleged prosecutorial misconduct and argued that the trial court erred by not granting a mistrial. However, the legal foundation for the defendant’s claims is weak, as *Payne v. Tennessee* significantly overruled *Booth*, allowing for victim-impact evidence in capital trials under California law. The prosecutor's inquiries were deemed relevant for assessing Gallegos's emotional sincerity. Additionally, the defendant forfeited his objection regarding the prosecutor's appeal to religious authority because he did not raise it at trial. The defendant had previously brought up Gallegos's religious beliefs, which allowed the prosecutor to explore this line of questioning. Though the prosecutor's question was considered argumentative, the court found no reasonable likelihood that the jury would have reached a different verdict had the misconduct not occurred. Defendant's demeanor was highlighted during trial when the prosecutor noted a gesture made by the defendant, which involved pointing and mouthing words, perceived as angry. The court acknowledged this incident and advised defense counsel to address the defendant's behavior to avoid further restrictions. In closing arguments, the prosecutor argued that the defendant's demeanor, particularly this gesture, supported a death penalty verdict. The defendant contended that referencing the gesture amounted to prosecutorial misconduct, claiming the record lacked detail about the gesture, which could lead the jury to speculate. However, the defendant had not objected to this at trial, resulting in a forfeiture of the issue. Relevant case law indicated that a defendant's demeanor can be pertinent during sentencing, and prosecutors are permitted to comment on such demeanor in closing arguments. The court found no misconduct. In a separate matter, the cross-examination of the defendant's sister, Sandra Farfan, focused on her credibility regarding attempts to conceal the defendant's actions. The prosecutor inquired about a recent break-in at a neighbor's house, insinuating the defendant's involvement. Farfan did not respond due to an objection from the defendant. Following a sidebar, the prosecutor sought to establish whether Farfan attempted to cover up her brother's potential involvement. The court allowed questioning outside the jury's presence, but without evidence linking the defendant to the break-in, the questioning lacked foundation, leading to the denial of the defendant's mistrial motion. The court instructed the jury to disregard any irrelevant information that may have been mentioned. The defendant challenged the court's decision on the mistrial motion, arguing that the questioning constituted misconduct. The prosecutor's questioning of witness Farfan was limited to confirming knowledge of a break-in and whether the intruder attacked a neighbor, with no direct connection made to the defendant, and the jury was instructed to disregard this testimony. Any potential impropriety in this questioning was deemed non-prejudicial. The court found the admonishment to the jury clear enough, stating that a more detailed instruction could inadvertently emphasize the testimony. Regarding defendant's incarceration, the prosecutor attempted to show that defendant was in jail from December 3 to December 5, 1989, to counter claims of cocaine use prior to the murders. The court allowed only that Valles had not seen defendant during those days, and since the defense had previously acknowledged defendant's history of incarceration, this limited reference would not significantly change the jury's perception. The court concluded there was no misconduct or prejudice. In closing arguments, the defendant objected to several statements made by the prosecutor, including descriptions of the murders and the emotional impact on a testifying sergeant. Since these objections were not raised during the trial, they were forfeited. The court found the prosecutor's comments appropriate given the case's severity, affirming that such statements fell within acceptable boundaries of argumentation. Defendant argues that the prosecutor improperly referenced Sergeant Rosales's stricken testimony regarding the severity of the stabbing, but the prosecutor focused on Rosales's credibility without mentioning the stricken statement, which was deemed acceptable. The prosecutor's comments on the defendant's future dangerousness were supported by evidence and did not rely on expert opinion, thus permissible. The prosecutor also discussed the circumstances surrounding the murders, including potential sexual motivation linked to the defendant's criminal history, which was appropriate even without specific sex-crime charges. Defendant contends that the prosecutor's remarks about his lack of remorse and a callous demeanor were improper, but these were in response to the defendant's plea for sympathy and did not present lack of remorse as an aggravating factor for the death penalty. Additionally, the prosecutor's characterization of the defendant's post-murder behavior as a "rejoicing celebration" was hyperbolic but not misleading, fitting within permissible argument boundaries. Lastly, the defendant objected to the prosecutor's assertion that he stabbed the victims "long after they had already been dead," though the objection to the term "long" is noted without further elaboration. The excerpt addresses several points regarding the defense's arguments against perceived prosecutorial misconduct and jury instructions during a trial. It asserts that the stab wounds were likely inflicted simultaneously, and even if some were postmortem, there was insufficient evidence to prove the defendant knew the victims were dead. The court finds no misconduct in the prosecutor's comments, stating that a reasonable inference can be drawn that a victim would plead for their life. The defendant's claim of cumulative prosecutorial misconduct is rejected due to a lack of prejudicial misconduct. The excerpt also discusses the trial court's jury instructions regarding aggravating factors, specifically that the prosecution was not required to prove these factors beyond a reasonable doubt or that they outweighed mitigating factors. The court reiterates previous decisions rejecting the defendant's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel related to these instructions. Furthermore, the defendant's argument for an instruction against drawing adverse inferences from his decision not to testify at the penalty phase is dismissed, as courts have previously ruled against such requirements. Defense counsel may have tactical reasons for not wanting to include the defendant's proposed jury instruction during the penalty phase, and the court is not in error for failing to provide it sua sponte. The defendant contends that the jury should have been instructed to reach a unanimous agreement on any aggravating factor before considering it. However, the court has ruled that such instruction is unnecessary due to existing instructions that ensure the reliability of the death verdict. The defendant also claims error for the court's refusal to clarify that "life without the possibility of parole" truly means life without parole. This argument has been consistently rejected, as the proposed clarification could confuse jurors about the meaning of other instructions. The conclusion reached is that there is no instructional error at the penalty phase and no ineffective assistance of counsel. Regarding the constitutionality of California's death penalty law, the defendant argues it is unconstitutional on several grounds, including the lack of requirement for specific written jury findings on aggravating and mitigating factors, unfettered prosecutorial discretion, absence of proportionality review, failure to narrow the class of eligible offenders, unclear definitions of aggravating and mitigating circumstances, reliance on evidence of unadjudicated criminal activity, and restrictive terminology preventing consideration of certain mitigating factors. The court has previously rejected these claims and does so again here. Defendant’s appeal for intracase proportionality review under the California Constitution is denied, as the evidence supports the death penalty for the defendant, who brutally robbed and murdered two women and assaulted a third. The court finds the punishment not grossly disproportionate to his culpability. Claims of impermissible racial bias affecting the death penalty decision and trial proceedings are rejected; factors cited, such as the defendant's ethnicity and the jury composition, are insufficient to substantiate the claim. The argument regarding cumulative error in guilt and penalty phases is also dismissed due to the absence of prejudicial errors. In post-verdict issues, the trial court’s denial of the verdict modification application is upheld. The court independently reviewed the evidence in light of aggravating and mitigating factors per section 190.3. The defendant's assertion that disparate sentence review from section 1170 should apply in capital cases is consistently rejected. The trial court found insufficient evidence to mitigate the sentence based on the defendant’s intoxication at the time of the offenses, noting his calculated actions post-crime. Additionally, claims regarding the weight given to his troubled upbringing and addiction struggles were addressed, with the court affirming it had considered his life history and found no grounds for mitigation. The court determined that the defendant's difficult childhood does not justify his conduct, which demonstrated conscious indifference to human life and a lack of true remorse. The court assessed the mitigating evidence but found it insufficient relative to the severity of the defendant's crimes. While the defendant was 24 years old at the time of the offenses and had prior criminal justice experience, the court concluded that his age and any alleged emotional disturbance did not mitigate his actions. The defendant's claims of mental or emotional disturbance were unsupported by evidence, as his history and the nature of the crimes did not substantiate such a disturbance. The court characterized the crimes as a "blood bath," "callous and inhumane," and "uncommonly cruel," which were deemed accurate descriptions based on the evidence presented. The court clarified that it did not improperly weigh mitigating factors, as it recognized the defendant's age as mitigating but determined it did not outweigh the aggravating factors. The lack of remorse was noted in the context of assessing the defendant's life history and was not treated as an aggravating factor itself. The defendant's failure to testify was also not used as a basis for aggravation, as the court did not adopt the prosecutor's argument regarding the absence of an explanation for his actions. Lastly, while the defendant contended that the court improperly weighed mitigating factors individually rather than holistically, some comments taken out of context could support this claim. Overall, the court found no error in its evaluation of both mitigating and aggravating circumstances. The court determined that the defendant's age was not a mitigating factor when considering the specifics of the case, although it acknowledged the cumulative impact of mitigating factors. The defendant argued that the trial court used an improper standard of review, but the court clarified it employed an "independent evaluation," consistent with legal standards. The defendant claimed the court showed undue deference to the jury's decision, yet the court maintained its independent findings while noting the jury acted reasonably. The defendant also contended that the trial court improperly considered information from a probation report not presented to the jury when ruling on a modification of the verdict. However, the court's review occurred on the same day as the sentencing, without evidence that it relied on the probation report in its decision, leading to a finding of no error. The cumulative effect of alleged trial court errors was argued by the defendant to necessitate a reversal, but since no errors were found, this argument was dismissed. Regarding the motion for a new trial, the defendant claimed insufficiency of evidence and juror bias, but the court reviewed these claims under a deferential standard and reiterated that the arguments had been previously rejected. The judgment was affirmed, with justices noting their concurrence. The defendant's claims of constitutional violations were considered but deemed insufficient for reversal.