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Robertson v. United States
Citations: 843 F. Supp. 705; 73 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 490; 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19182; 1993 WL 581510Docket: 93-14081-CIV
Court: District Court, S.D. Florida; October 15, 1993; Federal District Court
The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida, in the case of Diane C. Robertson v. United States, denied the government's motion to dismiss Robertson's petition to quash IRS summonses issued to Riverside National Bank. These summonses, served by IRS Revenue Officer Laura Thayer on March 24, 1993, sought records related to Robertson's accounts and property in connection with the tax liabilities of T.L. and JoAnn R. Sloan for the 1986 tax year. The IRS claimed that the summonses were intended to assist in collecting the Sloans' unpaid tax liabilities and did not pertain to Robertson's tax situation. Robertson, however, asserted via affidavit that she had no ties to the Sloans and that they had no interest in her accounts or property. The IRS contended that Robertson lacked standing to challenge the summonses under Section 7609(h)(1) of the Internal Revenue Code, arguing that the notice requirement did not apply since the summonses were issued in aid of collection for the Sloans' liabilities. The court determined that the general notice requirement was applicable, as the summonses were directed at a third-party recordkeeper and sought records specifically relating to Robertson, thereby granting her standing to file the petition to quash. The motion to dismiss was ultimately denied, allowing Robertson's challenge to proceed. The court rejects a broad interpretation of the "in aid of collection" exception in 26 U.S.C. 7609(c)(2)(B), emphasizing that legislative intent and context dictate a narrow application. The House Committee articulated that summonses for collection purposes must still notify the taxpayer when their interests are involved. The court interprets the exception as applicable only to summonses directed at third-party recordkeepers where the taxpayer has a clear interest in the records. Accepting the respondent's broader interpretation would undermine the intended protections against infringing on taxpayers' civil rights, including the right to privacy. The court concludes that the "in aid of collection" exception does not apply to the summonses issued to the petitioner, affirming the petitioner's standing to challenge the summonses and the court's jurisdiction over the matter. The respondent's reliance on C.I.R. v. Hayes is deemed misplaced, as that case involved a taxpayer seeking to quash a summons on a third party, which aligned with the exception's intent, unlike the current case, which is more akin to Barnhart v. United Penn Bank, where notice was required.