State v. Viramontes

Citations: 27 P.3d 809; 200 Ariz. 452; 350 Ariz. Adv. Rep. 3; 2001 Ariz. App. LEXIS 99Docket: 2 CA-CR 00-0227

Court: Court of Appeals of Arizona; June 19, 2001; Arizona; State Appellate Court

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Samuel Phillip Viramontes was convicted of first-degree murder after a jury trial and sentenced to natural life in prison. On appeal, he contended that the trial court erred by not applying the specific sentencing procedures outlined in A.R.S. 13-703, which would determine whether to impose natural life or a life sentence with a possibility of release after twenty-five years. He also challenged the court's classification of natural life as the presumptive sentence for first-degree murder.

The appellate court found no reversible error in the trial court's actions but noted the improper characterization of natural life as "presumptive" and thus remanded for further proceedings regarding the sentence. The court considered the evidence in favor of sustaining the conviction, describing the events leading to the murder, where Viramontes and his brother attacked the victim after a party.

Viramontes raised several arguments regarding the trial court's failure to follow sentencing procedures and the burden of proof related to aggravating factors, but he had not raised these issues during the trial, thereby waiving all but fundamental error claims. The court also highlighted that the trial judge was not required to explain the decision between natural life and a lesser sentence if a full hearing was conducted under A.R.S. 13-703.

Historical context was provided, noting that prior to 1973, sentencing discretion for first-degree murder was entirely at the judge's or jury's discretion, but this changed due to Supreme Court rulings on standards for sentencing, which addressed concerns of arbitrary enforcement.

The excerpt addresses the requirements for the imposition of the death penalty under Arizona law, specifically referencing A.R.S. 13-703. It mandates that death penalty laws must be applied evenly and nonarbitrarily, ensuring that judges do not apply laws selectively against unpopular groups. In response to a prior ruling, the legislature amended the law in 1973 to include a special sentencing procedure in A.R.S. 13-703(A), which dictates that decisions regarding the death penalty must follow specified procedures. Further amendments in 1973 modified life sentences, changing them from natural life to life with the possibility of release after 25 years, with an additional option for natural life introduced in 1993. 

A.R.S. 13-703(A) now stipulates that a person convicted of first-degree murder may be sentenced to death or life imprisonment, with the possibility of no release for those sentenced to natural life. For those not sentenced to natural life, release is contingent upon serving a minimum of 25 years if the victim was 15 or older, or 35 years if the victim was under 15. Notably, the statute emphasizes that the special sentencing procedures apply only to the determination between death and life imprisonment, and not to the decision regarding natural life. The text also clarifies that the statutory aggravators in Arizona’s death penalty framework are intended to constitutionally narrow the pool of death-eligible murderers. Lastly, it states that no special procedures are required for consecutive sentences that effectively result in a natural life sentence, and reasons do not need to be provided for imposing presumptive sentences. Viramontes’ argument for the necessity of special procedures and aggravating factors under A.R.S. 13-703 is also mentioned but is not supported by the text.

Section 13-702 serves as the general sentencing statute and does not include special sentencing options outlined in subsection F, indicating the legislature's intention to preserve existing specific sentencing provisions. When subsection F was introduced in 1982, the provision for a natural life sentence in A.R.S. 13-703 was not yet established. Subsection F does not address the distinction between natural life and life with the possibility of release after 25 years, thus allowing trial courts to consider aggravating and mitigating factors from A.R.S. 13-702 in determining appropriate sentences. The special sentencing procedures of A.R.S. 13-703 were inapplicable since the death penalty was not sought, leading to the conclusion that the court correctly used the factors from A.R.S. 13-702, which are broader than those in A.R.S. 13-703. Viramontes failed to demonstrate any limitations on the trial court's discretion in this regard and the court did not err in its standard of proof for aggravating factors, as that standard is specific to death penalty cases.

Viramontes contended that the trial court incorrectly labeled natural life in prison as the "presumptive" sentence under A.R.S. 13-703. While he was correct that the court referred to the sentence as "presumptive," the term originates from a different sentencing scheme applicable to most cases involving first offenders. For first-degree murder, there are three sentencing options—death, natural life, or life without release for 25 or 35 years—but no presumptive term is defined for these alternatives. Therefore, the presumptive sentencing concept from A.R.S. 13-701 through 13-702.02 does not apply to A.R.S. 13-703. In sentencing Viramontes, the trial court noted that the murder was committed for pleasure and deemed him a danger to society, which could justify a natural life sentence, despite the minute entry indicating the term was considered presumptive.

The court's oral sentence did not explicitly use the term "presumptive," but it implied that a natural life term might be standard in most cases unless mitigating factors outweigh aggravating ones. This raises concerns about potential misuse of sentencing discretion. The trial court needs to clarify its intent regarding the ambiguity of "presumptive" in the sentencing documentation and may need to correct the record or resentence Viramontes without considering the natural life term as presumptive. The conviction and sentence are affirmed, but the case is remanded for the trial court to address this ambiguity within fourteen days. Additionally, Viramontes's other claims of error are dismissed without merit for publication. The superior court clerk is instructed to send any clarifying minute entry or resentencing documentation to the appellate court.