Terex Corp. v. Hough

Citations: 2002 WY 112; 50 P.3d 317; 2002 Wyo. LEXIS 118; 2002 WL 1577836Docket: 01-173

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court; July 18, 2002; Wyoming; State Supreme Court

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The Supreme Court of Wyoming reviewed an appeal concerning the dismissal of a wrongful death action due to alleged lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The court found that the district court did possess subject matter jurisdiction at the time of its ruling and subsequently reversed the dismissal, overruling a prior decision in Makinen v. PM P.C. Appellant Terex Corporation raised three key issues: whether the district court's findings were void due to lack of jurisdiction, whether the two-year filing requirement of the Wrongful Death Act barred the plaintiff from pursuing her claim, and the viability of the wrongful death claims given the plaintiff's failure to meet the two-year filing condition. Appellant Louis Lopez questioned the district court's legal conclusions made before addressing jurisdiction and the applicability of Wyoming's savings statute (W.S. 1-3-118) to the wrongful death claim. Appellee Betty A. Hough contended that the appellants had not presented sufficient issues to sustain an appeal and argued that the savings statute should allow her to refile a wrongful death case that was initiated within two years of her husband's death but dismissed without prejudice. The incident that led to the lawsuit occurred on July 2, 1998, when Lopez's coal haul truck struck the pickup truck driven by Roy Hough, who later died from his injuries. Hough's widow filed the wrongful death complaint on June 28, 2000, alleging willful acts against Lopez and products liability against Terex.

On January 16, 2001, Terex filed a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings and an Alternative Motion for Summary Judgment, arguing that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction due to the appellee's failure to serve the complaint on the Wyoming Attorney General and the Director of the Wyoming Worker’s Compensation Division, as mandated by Wyo. Stat. Ann. 27-14-105(b). This statute requires that both officials be served by certified mail with a copy of the complaint in any suit initiated under this section, making such service a jurisdictional prerequisite.

In response, the appellee served the Attorney General and the Director on January 18, 2001, and subsequently filed a Motion to Amend Complaint. The district court heard Terex’s motions on February 14, 2001, and later issued Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, along with an Order Dismissing the Case Without Prejudice and Denying Permission to Amend the Complaint on July 11, 2001. All parties, including Terex, Lopez, and the appellee, appealed.

Subject matter jurisdiction is defined as the authority of a court to hear and decide cases of a general class. The court emphasized that jurisdiction is essential for judicial power, and any ruling made without it is void. Unlike personal jurisdiction, which can be waived, subject matter jurisdiction cannot be waived and must exist for the court to proceed. The district court determined it lacked subject matter jurisdiction in this wrongful death case, citing binding precedent from previous cases, which highlighted the necessity of interpreting Wyo. Stat. Ann. 27-14-105 to ascertain jurisdiction. The court noted that a statute is unambiguous if its meaning is clear, and any ambiguity is a legal question for the court to resolve. If the statute's language is clear, the court applies its plain meaning without resorting to further construction.

The Makinens argue that the district court had jurisdiction because they served the complaint on the director and attorney general as required by statute. They claim that Wyo. Stat. Ann. 27-14-105 is ambiguous regarding the timing of this service and contend that service is not necessary for the district court to obtain jurisdiction. Conversely, PM P.C. and Mr. Larscheid assert that the statute is clear, requiring service before or at the same time as filing the action for jurisdiction to exist. They maintain that the district court lacked jurisdiction when they filed for summary judgment because service had not occurred. The excerpt references the Boyd case, which similarly addressed jurisdiction issues but involved different facts, noting that the court raised the subject matter jurisdiction issue on its own due to the absence of evidence that the required parties had been served.

Criticism of the Makinen decision includes the assertion that Wyo. Stat. Ann. 27-14-105(b) is ambiguous as it lacks a service deadline and does not clarify when service must occur. This differs from the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act, which mandates that claims be made and denied before filing. It is argued that the Makinen decision incorrectly ruled that jurisdiction was absent despite service occurring before the summary judgment hearing. The review also notes a failure to recognize the legislative intent behind the requirement for service, which aims to protect the state's lien rights in cases involving settlements or judgments for injured workers against third parties, emphasizing that the primary beneficiary of the statute is the State of Wyoming.

Chief Judge Johnson, in Streeter, 968 F.Supp. at 630, referenced Clark v. Pacificorp and Hattaway v. McMillian to assert that plaintiffs can remedy noncompliance with service requirements before trial if no prejudice to the State is demonstrated. He emphasized that dismissing the defendant's motion based on failure to comply with Wyo. Stat. 27-14-105's notice requirements would undermine the legislative intent, which is to empower the State of Wyoming to safeguard its reimbursement and lien rights in cases where an injured employee has received workers' compensation benefits. The decision highlights that the statute is not meant to protect third-party tortfeasors and indicates that allowing the lawsuit to proceed is essential for the State to effectively assert its lien rights.

The court determined that plaintiffs under Wyo. Stat. Ann. 27-14-104 and 27-14-105 should be afforded reasonable time to fulfill the requirements outlined in Wyo. Stat. Ann. 27-14-105(b). Although the statute lacks a specific time limit, a time constraint is necessary to avoid indefinite jurisdictional uncertainty. The court asserted its authority to impose procedural rules and established a sixty-day timeframe for service of the complaint on the attorney general and director, aligning it with the service period under W.R.C.P. 3(b).

The district court was affirmed to have had subject matter jurisdiction when it addressed Terex's motions, and the previous Makinen ruling was overruled. The court reversed and remanded for further proceedings, rendering other raised issues moot. Chief Justice Hill dissented, indicating that he would have supported the majority's decision if it had been a first impression case, but emphasized that the court had previously found the statute's language to be unambiguous and criticized the majority for treating it as ambiguous despite unchanged statutory language since the Makinen decision.

The author expresses skepticism regarding the legislature's intent behind the adoption of Wyo. Stat. Ann. 27-14-105, arguing that it supports the precedent established in Makinen. The absence of amendments to the statute over seven years suggests legislative acquiescence to the court's interpretation. Citing State Tax Commission v. BHP Petroleum Company, Inc., the author notes that Section 14 petitions are not time-constrained, emphasizing that any limitations should be legislated rather than judicially imposed. The court recognizes that the legislature has not amended statutes related to service requirements for jurisdiction, indicating a preference for legislative action over judicial reinterpretation. While the author does not adhere to the doctrine of stare decisis uncritically, they find no compelling reason to overturn the unanimous decision in Makinen. 

The discussion also touches on the fundamental nature of subject matter jurisdiction, which cannot be waived and must be considered by the court. The author references a previous case (Rodriguez v. Casey) to highlight the importance of legislative wording in determining the timeline for service requirements. Finally, it is clarified that Boyd, 909 P.2d 323 remains valid as it was predicated on a record showing the attorney general and the director were not served.