State Ex Rel. City of Powers v. Coos County Airport District

Citations: 119 P.3d 225; 201 Or. App. 222; 2005 Ore. App. LEXIS 1068Docket: 03-CV0119; A122358

Court: Court of Appeals of Oregon; August 17, 2005; Oregon; State Appellate Court

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Plaintiffs, consisting of three cities and several taxpayers in Coos County, appealed the dismissal of their claims against the Coos County Airport District and its elected officials for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The plaintiffs challenged the validity of the district's formation, which was initiated by a resolution from the city of North Bend and approved by voters in a November 2002 election. Their amended complaint included three claims: (1) the district's formation was invalid due to the absence of resolutions from the plaintiff cities, as required by ORS 198.720; (2) the elected officials were unlawfully holding office because the district was not lawfully formed; and (3) the formation violated the Oregon Constitution. The plaintiffs invoked ORS 30.510, which allows for statutory quo warranto actions. Defendants moved to dismiss, arguing that such actions must be initiated by the district attorney, who had not done so, thus depriving the trial court of jurisdiction over the first two claims. They also contended that the declaratory judgment claim failed because a writ of review was the exclusive remedy for challenging the district's formation and that it was untimely, being filed more than 60 days after the formation order. The trial court agreed with the defendants, granting the motion to dismiss with prejudice.

The statutes governing the formation of airport districts in Oregon are outlined in ORS 838.005 to 838.075. ORS 838.010(1)(b) allows for the initiation of an airport district's formation by a city’s governing body through a resolution filed with the principal county's governing body, which then petitions for an election. Once initiated, the District Boundary Procedure Act (ORS 198.705 to 198.955) applies, with ORS 198.785 allowing for judicial review of the formation efforts. 

On appeal, plaintiffs challenge the trial court's ruling that actions under ORS 30.510 must be initiated and prosecuted by the district attorney of the relevant district. A recent ruling in Mabon v. Wilson established that this requirement is jurisdictional. The Coos County district attorney did not participate, prompting plaintiffs to argue that the city attorney acted as a functional equivalent to the district attorney, citing various statutes. However, these statutes do not support their claim, as they do not equate the roles under ORS 30.610. Consequently, the trial court correctly concluded that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the plaintiffs' initial claims.

Regarding the plaintiffs' declaratory judgment claim, the court's jurisdiction hinges on whether an exclusive remedy exists. ORS 198.785(2) states that validity of a formation can also be challenged under ORS 33.710, 33.720, or 34.010 to 34.100, indicating that judicial review of the airport district's formation is possible through these alternative methods, which must be considered before determining the trial court's jurisdiction.

ORS 33.710 and ORS 33.720 outline the process for local governmental entities to seek judicial review regarding their establishment or actions. Specifically, such proceedings can only be initiated by the governing body of the entity, which means that plaintiffs cannot use these statutes to challenge the formation of an airport district. However, plaintiffs can utilize the writ of review under ORS 198.785 to contest the district's formation. The writ of review serves as the exclusive remedy for such challenges, precluding declaratory judgment actions related to governmental decisions subject to this writ, as established in case law (e.g., Pangle v. Bend-Lapine School District and Shipp v. Multnomah County). 

ORS 34.020 allows parties involved in proceedings before inferior courts or tribunals to seek review for errors, but this does not extend to actions seeking declaratory judgments when a writ of review is available. Notably, prior cases affirming that ORS 34.020 limits jurisdiction over declaratory judgment actions have focused on judicial or quasi-judicial governmental actions and not on legislative actions. In this context, the formation of airport districts may be considered legislative rather than quasi-judicial. The applicability of the writ of review to the formation of airport districts raises questions about whether the exclusivity provision of ORS 34.020 applies in this case. While the legislature's intent regarding the exclusivity of the writ in this context is unclear, it is established that the writ is the exclusive means to challenge quasi-judicial and judicial actions. Thus, a careful examination using the framework from Strawberry Hill 4 Wheelers v. Benton Co. Bd. of Comm. is warranted to determine whether the airport district's formation is a legislative or quasi-judicial act.

The formation of the airport district is deemed a quasi-judicial act subject to review by writ of review. The court refrains from determining whether the legislature intended ORS 198.785 to allow exclusive review by writ if the decision were legislative. Criticisms from the concurrence assert that the analysis should start with a thorough examination of ORS 198.785's text, context, and legislative history, suggesting the legislature aimed for uniformity in review procedures for special districts. The concurrence interprets ORS 198.785 as providing an exclusive mechanism for judicial review of airport district formation, thereby concluding that declaratory relief is unavailable to the plaintiff. However, the court disputes this interpretation, arguing that the absence of exclusivity language in ORS 198.785 is significant, as established in prior case law. The court notes that the legislature has explicitly stated exclusivity in other statutes, indicating it is aware of how to draft exclusivity when desired. Since no such language exists in ORS 198.785, the court infers that the legislature did not intend for this statute to limit judicial remedies exclusively.

Ordinarily, if the legislature includes a provision in one statute but omits it in another, this omission is presumed deliberate. However, a concurrence attempts to create ambiguity in ORS 198.785 by misapplying a construction canon. It relies on the principle that when a statute prescribes a specific form, it inherently excludes other forms—an interpretation of the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius. Despite being labeled as a 'rule,' both the court and the Supreme Court advise that this maxim serves only as a guide to legislative intent, requiring careful application. The concurrence incorrectly assumes that ORS 198.785 restricts the judicial review mechanisms to itself, disregarding ORS 28.010, which grants courts broader powers to declare legal rights. The legislature has the ability to limit judicial remedies explicitly, as shown in other statutes, but did not do so for ORS 198.785. The concurrence asserts ORS 198.785 as ambiguous and examines legislative history, concluding without specific evidence that the writ of review procedure was intended as the exclusive means for citizens to challenge special district formations. This inference is based on the repeal of various statutes related to district review, yet it fails to account for two statutes that were not repealed during the enactment of ORS 198.785.

Two statutes raise significant questions with broader implications beyond the specific case at hand. ORS 198.785(2) allows actions to determine the validity of district formation or organizational changes, referencing ORS 33.710, 33.720, and ORS 34.010 to 34.100. 'Formation' is defined in ORS 198.705(9) to include the incorporation or creation of a district, while 'district' is defined by ORS 198.010(2)-(4), (6)-(14), and (17)-(23). This definition excludes certain districts, notably people's utility districts, which are defined in ORS 198.010(1) but excluded from ORS 198.785 by ORS 198.710. The powers of people's utility districts are outlined in ORS chapter 261, which includes procedures for challenging their creation (ORS 261.605 to 261.635).

ORS 261.630 allows electors to bring such challenges, and despite the enactment of ORS 198.785, the legislature did not repeal these provisions, indicating they remain applicable. Conversely, ORS 198.785 does apply to sanitary authorities, as defined in ORS 198.010(12), and ORS 198.710 confirms this applicability. Therefore, a challenge to the formation of a sanitary authority can be made under ORS 198.785. However, ORS 450.980, established in 1955, states that provisions concerning people's utility districts also apply to sanitary authorities, and this was not repealed when ORS 198.785 was enacted.

The key issue raised is whether the legislature intended to implicitly repeal ORS 450.980 through the enactment of ORS 198.785. The concurrence's view that ORS 198.785 provides the exclusive mechanisms for judicial review implies such a repeal, a conclusion that is typically disfavored unless there is clear conflict between the statutes. The lack of established repugnancy and the parties' failure to address this issue suggests it is unwise to adopt the concurrence's approach. Ultimately, the case can be resolved without determining the exclusivity of ORS 198.785 by focusing on whether the formation of the airport district was a quasi-judicial act or a legislative act, with procedural elements such as notice and public hearings serving as indicators but not definitive factors in that determination.

A quasi-judicial process is characterized by three criteria: it results in a decision, applies preexisting criteria to specific facts, and is focused on a limited factual situation or group of individuals. However, these criteria do not create a strict test, as established in the Strawberry Hill 4 Wheelers case, which emphasizes a balancing of factors rather than an all-or-nothing approach. The purpose of these criteria is to ensure accurate factual determinations and fair consideration for affected individuals. In this instance, relevant statutes (ORS 198.800; ORS 198.805) mandate notice and public hearings, which the county conducted twice regarding the airport district. Despite this, the presence of such procedural safeguards alone does not confirm a quasi-judicial process over a legislative one. 

A key factor favoring a quasi-judicial classification is that the county had to make a decision upon receiving a resolution from the City of North Bend, as ORS 198.785(1) permits any affected citizen to compel the county to call an election for district formation if the county board refuses. This legal mechanism is not available for legislative actions, as confirmed by Cordill v. City of Estacada. The statutes require the county board to act on formation petitions, indicating that it lacks the option to remain inactive. Specifically, ORS 198.800(1) obligates the board to either file the petition with the boundary commission or schedule a hearing. ORS 198.805(1) mandates a determination of the potential benefits of forming the district, while ORS 198.810 requires further actions to ensure the district’s formation if the petition is approved. Finally, ORS 198.820 necessitates an order for district formation upon majority approval in the election. Collectively, these statutes demonstrate that the county board is required to take definitive action regarding the district formation request.

The formation of an airport district is characterized as a quasi-judicial process rather than a legislative one, requiring the county board to apply established criteria to specific facts. The board must assess whether the proposed district can benefit the area and may adjust boundaries accordingly, ensuring that no land that could benefit is excluded and that no land deemed unbeneficial is included. ORS 198.805 mandates consideration of criteria from ORS 199.462, reinforcing the adjudicative nature of the process. The assessment of whether land can benefit from the district formation parallels the adjudication of property benefits related to assessments. The size of the district, encompassing all of Coos County, does not diminish the quasi-judicial classification, as the statutory requirement for decision-making based on existing criteria remains paramount.

Consequently, the trial court lacked jurisdiction over the plaintiffs' declaratory judgment claim, as the exclusive judicial recourse for challenging the district formation was a writ of review. The plaintiffs argued that they were not parties to the formation hearings and thus could not seek a writ of review, allowing for a declaratory judgment instead. However, the cited case, Heritage Square Development v. City of Sandy, was deemed irrelevant as it did not address the ability of property owners to challenge district formation through a writ of review. According to the Strawberry Hill 4 Wheelers criteria, plaintiffs must demonstrate an identifiable injury and either participation in the county proceedings or a valid reason for their absence from participation.

ORS 198.735 mandates that interested parties must present written statements regarding the formation or change of a district by a specified date before a hearing. These statements must detail any objections and be filed according to ORS 198.705 to 198.955; failure to do so results in a waiver of objections. The statute emphasizes the necessity for interested parties to engage in formation hearings to preserve their rights to contest the decision. Plaintiffs neglected to participate in these hearings, preventing them from using a writ of review to challenge the formation and instead attempting to seek a declaratory judgment, which is not permissible under these circumstances.

Plaintiffs argue that their challenge focuses on the voters' approval rather than the county's formation decision, claiming that ORS 198.785, which governs writs of review, does not apply. They also contend that the final order of formation was merely ministerial since ORS 198.820 obligates the county to form the district post-approval. Their declaratory relief claim asserts the unconstitutionality of the airport district's formation, which officially occurred on December 4, 2002, upon the issuance of the formation order, not immediately upon voter approval.

The court clarified that the formation process is deemed complete with the issuance of the formation order, which is triggered by majority voter support. Consequently, the plaintiffs' claim inherently challenges the formation order, not the election results. The court reiterated that a writ of review could have addressed any preliminary orders impacting the final decision. Given that a writ of review was the only available remedy, the trial court lacked jurisdiction over the plaintiffs' declaratory judgment claim, leading to affirmation of the lower court's ruling. Judge Edmonds concurred but expressed disagreement with the majority's analysis regarding the availability of a declaratory judgment under ORS chapter 28.

Disagreement is expressed with the majority's reasoning regarding the challenge to airport district formation under ORS 198.785. This statute allows citizens to seek a writ of mandamus if a county clerk or board refuses to act on a petition for district formation or organizational change. Additionally, actions to determine validity can be initiated under ORS 33.710, 33.720, or 34.010 to 34.100. However, plaintiffs pursued a declaratory judgment under ORS 30.510 and ORS 28.010, which are not included in the actions permitted by ORS 198.785. Agreement is found with the majority that ORS chapter 30 does not provide a basis for challenging airport district formation, as such actions must be initiated by the district attorney. The key issue is whether challenges can be made under ORS chapter 28, despite its absence in ORS 198.785.

The majority references Strawberry Hill 4 Wheelers v. Benton County to assess the legislative intent concerning ORS 838.010 and ORS 198.785, focusing on whether the formation challenge is quasi-judicial or legislative. They conclude that since ORS 34.020 limits judicial review of quasi-judicial decisions to the writ of review procedure, a declaratory judgment under ORS chapter 28 is not available if the decision is deemed quasi-judicial. The majority analyzes the Coos County Board's hearings, determining they were quasi-judicial as they applied established criteria to specific facts, despite the broad impact of the airport district on the population. They emphasize that the size of the affected area is less critical than other factors outlined in the Strawberry Hill case. Ultimately, the majority concludes that the formation process of the airport district is quasi-judicial, asserting that legislative intent should be evaluated based on the enactment's context rather than subsequent developments, noting that ORS 198.785(2) was enacted in 1971.

Oregon Laws 1975, chapter 281 established the framework for forming airport districts, designating these districts under ORS chapter 198. This law was later renumbered as ORS chapter 838 in 1989. The case law from Strawberry Hill 4 Wheelers (1979) and 1000 Friends of Oregon (1986) is noted to not reflect the legislature's intentions in 1975 concerning airport districts and ORS 198.785(2). The majority opinion claims a longstanding distinction between quasi-judicial and legislative acts in Oregon judicial review, but this does not address the core issue. The historical focus on county decision review is highlighted, emphasizing the legislature's authority to dictate the review process through statutory enactments. By establishing the writ of review, the legislature has preemptively determined the review mechanism without necessitating court analysis of whether a county's decision was legislative or adjudicative. The inquiry now centers on whether the writ of review is the exclusive method for challenging airport district formation. Legislative intent is to be discerned through the statute's text and context. ORS 198.785 allows any affected citizen to seek a writ of mandamus against a county clerk's refusal to act, while providing distinct remedies for citizens and government entities. Notably, ORS 198.785 does not contain exclusivity language, which would indicate that the writ of review is the only recourse available. The majority must recognize that when the legislature intends to establish exclusivity, it does so explicitly, as evidenced in the Administrative Procedures Act.

The absence of an exclusivity provision in ORS 198.785 suggests that the remedies listed are not intended to be exclusive, as established by precedent in Oregonians for Sound Economic Policy. However, statutory interpretation principles indicate that when a statute specifies a procedure, it implies the exclusion of others. This principle, upheld in Oregon jurisprudence, supports the inference that the writ of review may be the exclusive means for citizens to challenge the formation of airport districts. Yet, the lack of explicit language declaring it as such leaves room for multiple interpretations regarding legislative intent. Legislative history reveals no definitive indication that the writ of review was meant to be exclusive, but it does suggest a legislative aim for uniformity in procedures for reviewing decisions about special districts. ORS 198.785 originated from House Bill 1022, which had a long history of attempts to standardize review processes, culminating in the repeal of various statutes and the adoption of the writ of review procedure.

The legislative history indicates that ORS 198.785(2)'s writ of review remedy was intended to standardize review processes for special districts, including airport districts established in 1975 under former ORS chapter 494. The legislature likely aimed for challenges to airport district formation to follow the same procedures as those for other special districts, reinforcing uniformity in judicial review remedies. The concurrence agrees with the majority that a declaratory judgment proceeding was not available for the plaintiffs to contest the district's formation, albeit based on differing reasoning. 

Key statutory references include ORS 838.010, which outlines the initiation of airport district formation; ORS 198.720(1), requiring city approval for petitions involving city territory; and ORS 30.510, detailing the conditions under which legal action can be taken against individuals unlawfully holding public office or franchises. The plaintiffs' claims are clarified, with their argument framed as an as-applied challenge rather than a facial challenge to the constitutionality of the statutes under which the airport district was formed. Additionally, ORS 30.610 specifies the procedural requirements for actions initiated by private parties in relation to the district attorney's involvement.

Leave to commence an action under ORS 30.580 is granted upon affidavit confirming that the actions or omissions specified have occurred. A private person with a vested interest who initiates an action is considered a coplaintiff with the state. The issue of whether the Coos County Airport District's formation constitutes a land use decision, which would limit remedies to the Land Use Board of Appeals (LUBA), remains undecided. Even if it were deemed a land use decision, the trial court still lacked jurisdiction for a declaratory judgment due to the existence of an exclusive remedy via writ of review or LUBA appeal. A "land use decision" involves final actions by local governments affecting statewide planning goals or comprehensive plans, as outlined in ORS 197.015(10)(a)(A). Various statutes imply that statewide planning goals or comprehensive plan provisions might apply in district formation decisions, yet neither party has clarified the applicability of these provisions in this case. Consequently, the court cannot determine if the district's formation was a land use decision subject to LUBA review. The excerpt also highlights that multiple statutes limit judicial review to specific provisions, emphasizing the need for uniformity in reviewing district formation decisions established by ORS 198.785, while noting that the availability of declaratory relief does not contradict this uniformity.

Declaratory relief is available to address district formation decisions under ORS 198.785, as long as it does not conflict with this statute. All districts governed by ORS 198.785 are treated uniformly in accessing declaratory relief for formation decisions, supporting the intent of the 1971 legislation to ensure consistent review processes. The concurrence raises questions about how the case of Strawberry Hill 4 Wheelers relates to distinguishing between quasi-judicial and legislative acts, noting that the relevant statutes predate this case. The concurrence suggests that the legislature did not specifically consider the distinction when enacting the statutes, although Strawberry Hill 4 Wheelers clarified this distinction, which has been recognized in Oregon law for nearly a century. The writ of review is the exclusive means by which plaintiffs can challenge district formation, despite ORS 198.785 providing an alternative method that is limited to the airport district or the county. ORS 34.020 allows parties involved in proceedings before inferior courts or tribunals to seek review for errors, indicating legislative intent to restrict available challenges. Further cases, such as Owens v. MVD and Pendell v. Dept. of Rev., illustrate that legislative specificity can imply the exclusion of other forms of challenges or claims.