Estate of Cabelka Ex Rel. Cabelka v. Comanche County Hospital

Citations: 2004 OK CIV APP 27; 87 P.3d 1101; 75 O.B.A.J. 1212; 2003 Okla. Civ. App. LEXIS 130Docket: 99,072, 99,703

Court: Court of Civil Appeals of Oklahoma; October 17, 2003; Oklahoma; State Appellate Court

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The case involves the Estate of L. Merle Cabelka and his children as plaintiffs/appellants against Comanche County Hospital and Dr. David Behm as defendants/appellees, concerning the alleged wrongful death of L. Merle Cabelka in January 1997. The Court of Civil Appeals of Oklahoma addressed an appeal from a summary judgment favoring the Hospital. Previously, in Cabelka I (May 25, 1999), the court upheld the summary judgment based on the appellants' failure to comply with the notice provisions of the Governmental Tort Claims Act (GTCA). The appellants did not contest their failure to provide notice or the Hospital's status as a public trust but argued that the Hospital was not entitled to GTCA protections because Comanche County, its beneficiary, lacked sufficient control over its operations.

The court referenced the definition of 'political subdivision' under the GTCA, which includes a public trust operated for public benefit by a governing board appointed by a municipality or county. In Cabelka I, the court found ambiguities in the Declaration of Trust concerning the county's control over the Hospital, which prevented the granting of summary judgment on the Hospital's qualification for GTCA protections. The matter was remanded for further fact development regarding the extent of the County's authority.

The appeal also considered control factors from Roberts v. South Community Hospital while noting that subsequent amendments to the GTCA only required a finding of 'approval' authority over the Hospital. Additionally, the court raised a constitutional question regarding whether the GTCA's provisions might improperly grant governmental immunity to a private or hybrid entity, although this issue was not fully briefed by the parties.

A potential constitutional conflict was raised regarding the granting of exclusive rights to a nonpublic enterprise, potentially violating Article V, § 51 of the Oklahoma Constitution. The court referenced Justice Opala's opinion in Roberts v. South Community Hospital, which stated that nonpublic enterprises should not have governmental immunity if they do not generate or receive public funds; the Cabelka I Court noted the absence of evidence showing public fund exchanges between the Hospital and the county. After remand and further discovery, Appellants filed motions for summary judgment questioning the constitutionality of certain statutes and asserting either insufficient governmental control over the Hospital or that the Hospital waived its immunity by competing with private entities. The Hospital and Dr. Behm responded with their own motions, with the Hospital claiming its status under the GTCA was constitutional and asserting that Appellants failed to provide necessary notice, while Dr. Behm claimed he was entitled to immunity as an employee acting within his employment scope. The trial court granted summary judgment for the Hospital, affirming its status as a public trust political subdivision and noting Appellants' failure to file required notice. Claims against Dr. Behm were also dismissed, leading to the Appellants' appeal. The appellate review of the summary judgment is conducted de novo, focusing on whether the Hospital is a true public trust and considering the Appellants’ challenge to the definition of public trust hospitals under the GTCA. The Appellants did not dispute the Hospital's designation as a public trust but argued that the Legislature unconstitutionally classified such hospitals as political subdivisions when privately funded. They also raised issues related to governmental control, which they ultimately abandoned during trial arguments.

Appellants argue that the Hospital was created and funded privately, claiming that the Legislature cannot grant sovereign immunity to a private entity. However, their arguments lack evidentiary support, as a strong presumption favors the constitutionality of legislative acts. The trial court must uphold a statute unless it is clearly inconsistent with fundamental law. Appellants assert that the Hospital's trust was established by a private individual, but there is no evidence in the record to clarify the Trustor's capacity or contribution to the trust. The Declaration of Trust explicitly states it should not be construed as a public trust by Comanche County or its governing body. Evidence indicates that the Hospital was established and operated as a county hospital prior to the 1971 creation of the public trust, with no private funding contributed. Comanche County transferred hospital property to the Trust Authority solely for public functions, without financial consideration. 

Appellants’ constitutional claims hinge on distinguishing between public and private public trusts regarding sovereign immunity. They concede that the Hospital is a properly created public trust but have not fulfilled their burden to provide supporting facts. Parties cannot rely on mere allegations to counter a motion for summary judgment; the trial court must base its ruling on the presented record. Although Appellants acknowledge that the Roberts criteria for control of public trusts by governing authorities are no longer applicable, they reference "approval" authority in their appellate issues. The Court of Civil Appeals previously ruled that the Roberts analysis did not apply in similar cases, noting legislative amendments in 1987 that specifically included hospitals operated by public trusts in the definition of political subdivisions, indicating a legislative intent to modify the law post-Roberts.

In Elledge v. Stillwater Medical Center, the Court of Civil Appeals determined that the Roberts factors were no longer applicable following the 1987 amendment to 152(8). The plaintiff argued that the hospital trust was an 'illusory trust' due to the city's lack of claims, authority, and control over the trust's operations. The court emphasized the requirement for separateness and independence between the public trust and its beneficiary as stated in 60 O.S.2001, 176.1(D). It interpreted the statutes to conclude that the Legislature aimed to include public trust hospitals under the Governmental Tort Claims Act (GTCA) if they managed their own budgets and functions. The critical question was whether the trustees' control was 'subject to the approval' of the city's governing body, as stipulated in 152(8)(d). The definition of 'political subdivision' does not necessitate complete accountability or control by the beneficiary but allows for general oversight to ensure compliance with the trust documents and statutes.

The court found that the plaintiff did not demonstrate that the city failed to approve any specific actions that required approval according to the trust document or statutes. Consequently, the arguments by the appellants regarding the hospital's status under the GTCA were deemed without merit. Additionally, the appellants claimed the trial court erred in not compelling the hospital to cooperate in discovery and in not delaying the hospital's summary judgment motions pending further discovery, but these claims were also rejected. The court noted that the hospital had adequately responded to discovery requests and that the appellants' supplementary requests pertained to non-dispositive issues. Thus, the court affirmed that there were no material facts in dispute, granting the hospital summary judgment as a matter of law.