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People v. Superior Court
Citations: 23 P.3d 563; 107 Cal. Rptr. 2d 323; 25 Cal. 4th 703; 2001 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 4211; 2001 Daily Journal DAR 5137; 2001 Cal. LEXIS 3245Docket: S063662
Court: California Supreme Court; May 24, 2001; California; State Supreme Court
Law enforcement seized documents from attorneys Gary Laff and Jerry Widawski under a warrant issued by the superior court, as they were suspected of criminal conduct related to possible automobile insurance fraud. The attorneys requested an in-camera hearing to determine the privilege status of the seized materials. The superior court sealed the documents but required the prosecution to share the cost of a special master to review them, which the district attorney's office contested. The Court of Appeal denied the prosecution's petition to compel the court to conduct the hearing without such cost-sharing, citing Code of Civil Procedure section 639, which allows for a compulsory reference in special proceedings. Upon review, the Supreme Court of California concluded that the superior court must evaluate claims of privilege for the seized materials, regardless of the attorneys' criminal status, and can hold a hearing to do so. However, it found that section 639 does not apply to such privilege determinations, yet the court has the inherent authority to appoint a special master for assistance. Importantly, the court ruled that it cannot require the parties to share the costs of the special master's services in this context. Consequently, the court determined that the superior court erred in conditioning the privilege determination on the prosecution's financial agreement and reversed the Court of Appeal's judgment. Attorneys claimed that materials seized during warrant executions contained information protected by attorney-client privilege and work-product doctrine, requesting a special master to supervise the search or that the materials be sealed. These requests were denied, leading to the examination and seizure of numerous documents by investigators. The superior court later ordered the Department of Insurance and the district attorney's office to stop inspecting the materials, allowing the attorneys to examine and copy them while keeping the files sealed until further court orders. The attorneys filed a motion for an in camera hearing to assess document privilege, without naming an opposing party, although the district attorney's office opposed the privilege claims. They requested the appointment of a special master to conduct the privilege review, citing the burden of examining approximately 220 privileged files. Although the attorneys agreed to cover half the special master's costs, the district attorney's office declined to contribute, prompting the court to question the viability of the proceeding given the estimated costs could reach $15,000. The district attorney's office later agreed that the court could appoint a special master, asserting that the costs should be borne by county general funds under specific Evidence Code provisions that allow for expert witnesses appointed by the court. The People argued that the costs of appointing a special master for determining the privilege of seized documents should be covered by the superior court's operating budget, as the hearing is a judicial function. However, the superior court determined that the proceeding relates to an ongoing investigation by the Department of Insurance, thus requiring costs to be borne by either the People or the Department. Anticipating an appeal, the court ordered the seized materials to remain sealed. In a motion for reconsideration, the People requested that the materials be unsealed and that the special master be treated as an expert witness or quasi-judicial officer, which would allow for cost coverage from county funds or the court's budget. This motion was denied. The People then sought a writ of mandate for the superior court to conduct a privilege hearing without requiring cost contributions from the parties. In the Court of Appeal, the People changed their primary argument, claiming there was no statutory authority for appointing a special master under Evidence Code sections 730 and 731, and insisted that the superior court must decide the privilege claims without cost conditions. The superior court defended its authority to appoint a referee and allocate costs under Code of Civil Procedure sections 639 and 645.1, a position the Court of Appeal upheld. The Supreme Court reviewed whether the superior court rightly sealed the seized materials and conditioned the hearing on the People’s financial contribution. The case arose from the attorneys' request for a hearing on the privilege of materials seized during a criminal investigation, with the People arguing that no privilege precluded disclosure and seeking to overturn the precedent set in People v. Superior Court (Bauman, Rose), affirming the right to such a hearing for attorneys under suspicion of criminal activity. The custodian of materials protected by evidentiary privileges has a duty to assert that privilege and take necessary actions to prevent improper disclosure, even when under suspicion for a crime. This includes privileged materials seized under a search warrant, where the custodian must still protect the privilege holders' interests. The confidentiality of client files remains intact regardless of the attorney's criminal suspicion, and both suspect and nonsuspect attorneys can assert privilege on behalf of clients. Penal Code section 1536 allows superior courts to hold hearings regarding the disclosure of materials seized under a warrant, ensuring proper control over such property until a resolution is reached. Law enforcement acts on behalf of the court when seizing property, which has the authority to manage its disposition, stemming from both statutory permissions and the court's inherent powers. The court can examine seized documents, rule on privilege claims, and prevent privileged materials from being disclosed, particularly recognizing the urgency of a hearing when privileged documents are at risk of being lost through inaction. The People present three objections to the Bauman, Rose decision, all of which are deemed unmeritorious. The first objection revolves around the attorney-client privilege, which the People argue is only applicable in proceedings where testimony can be compelled. They base this on the definition of "proceeding" in the Evidence Code, which includes various legal contexts but excludes actions like search warrants and inspections during criminal investigations. However, this interpretation contradicts established statutes and case law. The Law Revision Commission highlighted that if the privilege were limited to judicial proceedings, it would inadequately protect confidential information from various investigative bodies. Furthermore, the privilege applies broadly, regardless of whether a formal proceeding is underway, as indicated by Evidence Code sections 901 and 910. The statutes emphasize that an attorney must claim the privilege whenever client communications are at risk of disclosure, underscoring the obligation to protect client confidentiality beyond formal proceedings. This protection is rooted in fundamental legal principles that ensure individuals can seek legal counsel freely, which is vital for justice. The attorney-client privilege is thus considered essential for the effective administration of justice, as affirmed by relevant case law. Unfettered access to attorney-client communications without a pending legal proceeding would breach the policies that uphold the attorney-client privilege and the ethical obligations of attorneys to safeguard client confidences. Penal Code section 1524 contradicts the notion that attorney-client privilege is relevant only in ongoing proceedings; it mandates specific procedures for obtaining search warrants for documents held by attorneys, physicians, psychotherapists, or clergymen who are not under suspicion of criminal activity. A court must appoint a special master to accompany the warrant server, allowing the professionals to assert that certain items are privileged. These items must be sealed and brought to court for a hearing where the individual can claim privilege under the Evidence Code, thus allowing them to contest the disclosure of such items to authorities. The argument that attorney-client privilege applies only during active criminal proceedings is without merit, as established authority supports the protection of privileged materials from disclosure under a search warrant, even in the absence of pending charges. The People also challenge the applicability of the work-product doctrine, asserting it only applies during discovery, not in the context of a search warrant. However, the work-product doctrine is applicable beyond formal discovery and is designed to protect attorneys' rights to prepare cases without fear of undue advantage from adversaries, as codified in section 2018. Under subdivision (c) of section 2018, writings reflecting an attorney's impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories are completely protected from discovery. This work-product doctrine is reinforced in criminal cases by Penal Code section 1054.6, which states that neither defendants nor prosecutors must disclose work product or privileged materials. Prior cases, including Izazaga v. Superior Court and People v. Collie, established that the work-product doctrine applies in criminal contexts even before the enactment of section 1054.6. The People’s reliance on Arnett, which interpreted a statute on hospital peer review committee records, is noted to argue that work-product protection applies only during formal discovery. However, the court in Arnett emphasized that "discovery" refers specifically to the formal exchange of evidence in ongoing actions. Unlike that statute, section 2018 reaffirms the common law on attorney work product. Several decisions have applied the work-product doctrine beyond formal discovery, such as in People v. Coddington, where the court found a prosecutor violated the doctrine by using information obtained informally. Other cases, like County of Los Angeles v. Superior Court and Rodriguez v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., support the application of the work-product doctrine during trials and pretrial discovery. Additionally, PSC Geothermal Services Co. v. Superior Court asserts that privileged materials sought through search warrants should remain protected, reinforcing that the privileges should not be forfeited simply due to the method of discovery. Federal decisions affirm the application of attorney-client privilege and work-product doctrine to IRS summonses and search warrants issued during tax investigations and grand jury proceedings. The court agrees with these precedents and rejects the argument that the work-product doctrine cannot prevent the disclosure of materials seized via search warrants in criminal investigations. It argues that limiting these privileges to pending proceedings or formal discovery would defeat their purpose, allowing law enforcement to exploit privileged information by delaying charges. The mere disclosure of such information to third parties would violate these privileges, with no legislative intent found to support such outcomes. Additionally, the People contest the ruling in Bauman, Rose, asserting that the superior court lacks authority to conduct hearings on the protection of materials seized from attorneys suspected of criminal activity, based on Penal Code section 1524, subdivision (c), which permits hearings only for non-suspects. However, the court maintains that the statute does not limit privilege hearings to non-suspects, as it outlines provisions for the appointment of a special master to supervise searches and conduct privilege hearings. This includes responsibilities for sealing items and presenting them to the court, allowing the served party to raise issues typically reserved for defendants, ensuring adequate time for legal representation and motions, and mandating expedited hearings unless impractical. Penal Code section 1524 does not imply that a superior court lacks the authority to conduct hearings on privilege issues. The statute provides additional rights and procedures for hearings involving individuals not suspected of criminal activity and does not restrict a court’s authority to address privilege claims from attorneys who are suspects. The court in Bauman, Rose correctly determined that the superior court must assess claims that materials seized from attorneys suspected of criminal activity are protected by attorney-client privilege or work-product doctrine, thereby preventing disclosure to law enforcement. The authority of a superior court to refer the review of seized materials and privilege claims to a special master without party consent is governed by California's constitutional limitations on nonjudicial officers exercising judicial powers. The California Constitution assigns judicial power to specific courts and requires parties' agreement for a trial to be referred to a referee, resulting in a binding determination. Additionally, the Constitution permits trial courts to appoint officials for subordinate judicial duties, enabling the appointment of masters and referees for advisory roles, whose findings require court adoption. The referral of specific judicial proceedings to a special master may occur with or without party consent, termed a special reference. Neither the Bauman, Rose decision nor Penal Code section 1524 clarifies if trial courts can appoint a special master to review documents with asserted privilege claims. The attorneys and the superior court argue that such a special reference is permitted under Code of Civil Procedure section 639, while the People argue that no statute authorizes mandatory reference in this situation, requiring further examination of these arguments. The Court of Appeal affirmed that the superior court has the authority to compel a special reference in a Bauman, Rose hearing under section 639, subdivision (a)(4), which allows for the appointment of a referee when necessary for the court's information in a special proceeding, provided there is no party consent. The Court clarified that a Bauman, Rose hearing does not qualify as either a criminal or civil action as defined by the Code of Civil Procedure, and thus fits the definition of a special proceeding. The Code delineates judicial remedies into actions—ordinary court proceedings for rights declaration or enforcement—and special proceedings, which encompass all other remedies. Civil actions involve one party prosecuting another for rights enforcement, while criminal actions involve the state prosecuting an individual for public offenses. The People conceded that no criminal action, as defined, had been initiated against the attorneys, thereby confirming that the Bauman, Rose hearing cannot be classified as a criminal action. Past cases, such as Bravo v. Cabell and Avelar v. Superior Court, illustrate that special proceedings are not deemed part of criminal actions unless related to an ongoing case. The mere potential for future criminal action does not suffice to categorize the Bauman, Rose hearing as a criminal action or as part of such an action, with the decision in People v. Superior Court (Memorial Medical Center) not providing support for a different outcome. The case addresses the privilege related to hospital peer review committee records under Evidence Code section 1157. The Court of Appeal concluded that a proceeding under Penal Code section 1524, subdivision (c), aimed at determining the privilege's applicability before any criminal charges against a physician, qualifies as a "criminal action" per Evidence Code section 1157, subdivision (e). This statute indicates that peer review records' privilege does not apply in criminal actions. Although a strict interpretation of the term "criminal action" could exclude uncharged criminal proceedings, the court ruled that excluding such proceedings would undermine the legislative intent to prevent peer review privilege from obstructing the discovery and prosecution of criminal negligence by physicians. The court noted that its interpretation of "criminal action" in this context is specific to Evidence Code section 1157 and does not rely on the definitions provided in the Evidence Code, which include "criminal proceedings." Consequently, the term encompasses special proceedings. However, the current case’s resolution does not hinge on the interpretation of "criminal action" as defined in the Evidence Code, and thus the Memorial Medical Center's construction is deemed unhelpful. The Bauman, Rose hearing is classified as either a civil action or a special proceeding, with civil actions defined as prosecutions for rights enforcement or wrongs redress, and special proceedings being statutory and distinct from underlying litigation. The attorneys' motion for a hearing to assess the applicability of claimed privileges to seized documents lacks an explicit request for a declaration on the privileged status of specific documents or for an order to enforce and protect them. The motion seeks a hearing to determine the applicability of attorney-client privilege and work-product doctrine, referencing the Bauman, Rose decision which outlines such a hearing's purpose. If the superior court finds certain documents privileged, it may order them sealed or returned to the attorneys, effectively affirming their rights. This motion resembles a civil action for declaratory or injunctive relief against the People, akin to cases involving injunctions and restraining orders. However, it differs from typical actions under common law or equity, as it arises from a criminal investigation into the attorneys, who are not yet charged but are acting defensively. The motion is titled "In the Matter of the Search Warrant for the Premises of the attorneys and others," indicating no formal defendant status for the People, who oppose the privilege claims. The deputy district attorney is designated as plaintiff's counsel due to the potential for future criminal charges against the attorneys. The nature of the Bauman, Rose hearing parallels a privilege hearing under Penal Code section 1524, subdivision (c), and is classified as a special proceeding of a criminal nature. Additionally, this motion is likened to a request by a nondefendant for the return of unlawfully seized property, which is also treated as a special proceeding when no criminal charges are pending. The core purpose of a Bauman, Rose hearing is to evaluate whether property seized via warrant from an uncharged individual should be returned or remain with law enforcement. A Bauman, Rose hearing is recognized as a special proceeding under the Penal Code, distinct from ordinary civil actions aimed at enforcing individual rights, even though it serves to protect private rights of individuals not implicated in criminal activity. The People acknowledge this classification but argue that Code of Civil Procedure section 639 does not permit a reference in such hearings, as it only applies to civil special proceedings, while Bauman, Rose hearings are deemed criminal special proceedings. The distinction is reinforced by the location of section 639 within the Code of Civil Procedure, which pertains to civil actions, in contrast to the Penal Code, which outlines criminal procedure. Specifically, relevant statutes concerning search warrants (Penal Code sections 1524 and 1536) are categorized under criminal special proceedings. This classification aligns with case law, such as Memorial Medical Center, which identified proceedings under Penal Code section 1524 as criminal, emphasizing that they are integral to criminal investigations, and not intended for civil actions. Additionally, precedents like Gonzales v. Superior Court highlight that certain procedural provisions in the Code of Civil Procedure do not apply to criminal actions unless explicitly stated in the Penal Code. Thus, it is concluded that section 639 does not authorize references in criminal special proceedings like those arising from Bauman, Rose hearings. Section 473 of the Code of Civil Procedure is situated within part 2, which addresses civil actions and pleadings. The interpretation of legislative intent is influenced by the headings of chapters and sections, which should be treated as integral to the law. Historical cases, including Gonzales, show that the framers did not cite criminal cases in their interpretation of section 473, although its remedial nature is acknowledged as more relevant to criminal matters. However, any arguments for such applicability should be directed to the legislature, not the courts. Recent rulings have reinforced that certain sections of the Code of Civil Procedure, including section 630 on directed verdicts and section 1008 on reconsideration of rulings, apply exclusively to civil actions, as they do not reference criminal actions. The Court of Appeal in Castello ruled that inherent powers in criminal cases are not constrained by section 1008, affirming that only procedural provisions expressly applicable to criminal cases are enforceable. Furthermore, provisions like sections 639, 630, 1008, and 1011 are not included in the Penal Code's procedural rules and do not apply to criminal special proceedings, as indicated by Penal Code section 690, which states that part 2 applies to all criminal actions and proceedings unless explicitly stated otherwise. Section 639's origins trace back to California's first statutes in 1850, initially appearing in legislation regarding civil case procedures. An amendment in 1851 expanded the statute to include references in special proceedings, which was recodified in the same year. The current iteration of section 639 remains situated within the Code of Civil Procedure, specifically addressing civil cases. Historical notes from the Code Commissioners in 1872 indicate that the cases they referenced under section 639 were exclusively civil in nature. Notably, there is no documented instance of a trial court using section 639 to compel a reference in criminal proceedings; all relevant cases have pertained to civil matters. Significant cases, such as In re Reed and Estate of Johnston, have confirmed that section 639 applies solely to civil proceedings. Additionally, the case of Holt v. Kelly does not support the notion that a court can appoint a referee in criminal cases under section 639, as it involved a petition for the return of seized property post-criminal charges. The Court of Appeal's appointment of a referee in that case was justified on the grounds of necessity for factual determination in a special proceeding. The opinion in Holt distinguishes between general references under section 638 and special references under section 639, noting that findings from a special referee are not binding on the appellate court but carry significant weight. It clarifies that the Holt case's considerations regarding sections 638 and 639 do not apply to appellate proceedings since it involved a civil mandate proceeding rather than a criminal one. The petitioner sought to enforce a public officer's ministerial duty to return a prisoner's money upon release, as mandated by Government Code section 26640. This led to the characterization of the proceeding as civil, particularly since the goal was to recover the value of lost or destroyed property—a typical civil remedy. The document critiques the attorneys' failure to address Gonzales, which establishes that certain sections of the Code of Civil Procedure do not apply to criminal proceedings unless explicitly stated. While the attorneys assert that a Bauman-Rose proceeding is civil, this is deemed incorrect, and the superior court's argument that section 639 applies to both civil and criminal proceedings is rejected. Section 639 authorizes a trial court to compel parties to submit parts of a judicial proceeding to a referee, but it is limited to civil matters and does not extend to criminal proceedings. Consequently, the court finds that section 639 does not confer power to compel a reference in a Bauman-Rose hearing, as it is criminal in nature, and no other statute authorizes the appointment of a special master for such proceedings. The People argue that the superior court lacks the authority to appoint a special master without explicit statutory authorization and without the parties' consent. In contrast, the superior court asserts the need for flexibility to implement reasonable procedures necessary for fulfilling its responsibilities, particularly in Bauman. Rose proceedings and similar hearings. Although the People’s position is supported by case law on compulsory references in civil cases, it is concluded that, absent specific statutes governing the appointment of referees or special masters in criminal cases, the superior court has the inherent authority to appoint a special master for Bauman. Rose hearings. Historical precedent, as noted in People v. Hayne, indicates that courts have inherent powers to use assistants like referees and commissioners, particularly in habeas corpus proceedings where appellate courts appoint referees to evaluate evidence and recommend outcomes. While the California Constitution allows the Legislature to enable appellate courts to gather evidence and make factual findings, it does not explicitly grant the power to appoint referees. Nonetheless, this appointment authority has been recognized through court rules. The power of trial courts to appoint such officers is constitutionally defined, with the Legislature permitted to authorize the appointment of commissioners for specific duties. The historical context reveals that earlier constitutional provisions were amended to ensure that the separation of powers doctrine would not restrict the Legislature from allowing judges to appoint assistants to manage judicial responsibilities. The California Constitution Revision Commission proposed article VI, section 22 to clarify the separation of powers doctrine, allowing the Legislature to appoint officers, including court commissioners, to assist judges without infringing on judicial authority. The term "subordinate judicial duties" underscores the limited responsibilities these officers can undertake. The Commission aimed to avoid restricting appointments solely to commissioners, hence the broader language used. The provision permits the Legislature to authorize trial courts to appoint such officers once authorized. Judicial interpretations confirm that this section applies to both regular court commissioners and private referees appointed for specific cases, establishing the Legislature's authority rather than limiting the courts' inherent power to appoint subordinate judicial officers. However, court decisions indicate that the ability to compel parties to submit issues to these officers is primarily statutory and limited to issues explicitly described in the relevant statutes. This statutory limitation primarily pertains to civil proceedings and does not extend to criminal proceedings, where no such legislative descriptions exist, allowing trial courts broader discretion in appointing referees for various issues. The judicial branch has the inherent authority to appoint assistants, such as referees, for subordinate judicial duties, but the Legislature can regulate this authority as long as it does not impair the court's constitutional powers. The judiciary respects statutory limitations imposed by the Legislature on trial courts' power to compel special references in civil proceedings, as outlined in section 639. However, in the absence of legislation, courts retain the power of self-preservation, including the ability to hire staff and appoint special masters for subordinate judicial duties. The superior court is authorized to appoint a special master in a Bauman. Rose proceeding. The appointment is deemed appropriate as contested privilege claims related to materials seized under a search warrant are similar to discovery disputes referred to referees. Section 639 allows for special references when necessary for resolving discovery motions and disputes, particularly when document volume complicates review. The superior court's intention to appoint a special master is justified given the complexity of reviewing approximately 220 seized files, with claims of privilege asserted over 179 client files, which the court estimates could require 80 to 100 hours of review time. The review and categorization of extensive case files related to privilege disputes are complex and time-consuming tasks better suited for a special master rather than a superior court judge, allowing the judge to focus on other duties. Although a special master’s recommendations would not be binding and would require independent review by the trial judge, their involvement would significantly reduce the judge's workload. Notably, both the People and the attorneys did not object to this appointment, with the People only seeking to avoid liability for the special master's fees. The court's appointment of a special master is deemed appropriate under its inherent authority. However, regarding the financial responsibility for the special master’s fees, the Court of Appeal concluded that the People cannot be required to pay these costs under section 645.1, which pertains to referees appointed under section 639. Since section 639 does not apply to Bauman. Rose proceedings, there is no statutory authority to impose these costs on the parties involved. The court emphasized the tradition of public funding for judicial operations, particularly in criminal cases, where neither the People nor the defendant can be mandated to cover court-related expenses, unlike civil cases where such costs may be shifted to litigants. In civil actions, the superior court can require parties to pay fees for court-appointed expert witnesses, which may then be taxed as costs. However, in criminal cases, these fees must be paid from public funds, as established in Evidence Code section 731 and Code of Civil Procedure section 1033.5. The court's costs associated with expert witnesses and other professional services are funded by the state under Government Code section 77200. The Legislature has made a clear distinction between civil and criminal proceedings regarding the funding of court operations, with criminal cases primarily funded by public resources. Consequently, the superior court lacks the authority to impose costs on parties in criminal actions without explicit statutory permission. This principle is supported by case law, which emphasizes the statutory framework governing fees and costs, such as in Hogoboom v. Superior Court and Gardiana v. Small Claims Court. The superior court's assertion that Government Code section 29601 allows for charging special master's fees to the People is incorrect, as this statute pertains to district attorney expenses in crime detection and prosecution, not judicial functions. The appointment of a special master in a Bauman-Rose proceeding is part of the court's judicial responsibilities and should be funded from public sources unless otherwise directed by the Legislature. The Rose hearing is characterized as a minor aspect of a broader criminal investigation, primarily funded by the insurance industry, suggesting that the court should not incur costs for the hearing. The Court of Appeal previously indicated that expenses for a special master should be considered part of the criminal investigation's costs. However, this view is contested, emphasizing that the responsibility to conduct the hearing and adjudicate privilege claims is a judicial duty, rendering the insurance investigation funding irrelevant to the court's authority in this matter. The superior court references Government Code section 29602, which states that expenses related to criminal proceedings are county charges. Even if special master services in a Bauman. Rose proceeding are deemed related to criminal proceedings, this does not necessitate that the People (represented by the district attorney) must initially cover these expenses and then seek reimbursement from the county. The statute allows the court to mandate county payment for such services but does not authorize requiring payment from the People or their counsel, despite the district attorney's involvement. The document cites Corenevsky v. Superior Court, affirming that the county auditor can be ordered to pay for court-ordered defense services. It argues that when a court lacks the necessary funds for its constitutional duties, it should not impose financial burdens on parties involved but should seek additional public funding from appropriate sources. An example is provided from Wilson v. Eu, where special appropriations were requested from the Governor and Legislature for necessary expenses, rather than requiring parties to use their allocated funds. The superior court's assertion that its independence would be compromised if the People are not made to share costs is also mentioned, alongside the acknowledgment of the People's role in crime investigation. The People executed a search warrant, seizing various items under their unilateral control, and now seek to impose the consequences of their actions on the Superior Court, including extensive document review. This could lead to reluctance from courts to grant warrants due to budget constraints. The Superior Court recognized probable cause for the search of attorneys' offices and homes, resulting in a warrant for specified materials. The attorneys claim some seized documents are privileged and have requested a judicial determination of these claims. The People have not asked the court to review privilege claims for documents outside the warrant's scope, indicating they do not wish to transfer their responsibilities to the court. The Superior Court's sealing of the documents reflects its understanding that the People should not access them until privilege claims are resolved. Despite concerns about judicial workload and budgetary limits, it is expected that judges will appropriately issue search warrants when warranted. If funding for a special master to review privilege claims is lacking, the court should explore alternatives like appointing a commissioner or using court resources. The services of a special master for such reviews should be funded by the court from public funds, as per its inherent authority. Statutory provisions such as Code of Civil Procedure sections 645.1 and 1032, which allow courts to impose certain costs upon parties, do not apply to criminal proceedings. Consequently, there is no statutory or common law foundation for requiring parties to cover the expenses of court operations in these contexts. Therefore, the superior court lacks both statutory and inherent authority to mandate that parties pay for the costs associated with a private special master in a Bauman. Rose proceeding. The judgment of the Court of Appeal is reversed, directing it to vacate its order that denied the petition and to issue a writ of mandate requiring the superior court to address the attorneys' claims of privilege consistent with the outlined views. The concurring justices include MOSK, KENNARD, BAXTER, WERDEGAR, CHIN, and BROWN. Further statutory references are to the amended version of the Code of Civil Procedure effective January 1, 2001. Section 645.1 permits the court to order parties to pay referee fees, but this does not apply to the context of criminal proceedings. The court also addresses the issue of whether it has the authority to compel a reference in a Bauman. Rose hearing, emphasizing that this power does not exist if the court cannot conduct such a hearing. Additionally, Penal Code section 1524 outlines specific procedures for search warrants concerning privileged documents, including the appointment of a special master to oversee the execution of the warrant and to facilitate the protection of privileged items during the search. In Lockyer v. Superior Court (Pfingst, 2000), the Court of Appeal shifted its stance from the earlier PSC Geothermal Services Co. case, establishing that attorney work product protection is only applicable to prevent disclosure once a case is underway. It clarified that this protection does not hinder the Attorney General's initial review of evidence obtained through a valid search warrant. The court relied on the interpretation of "discovery" from Arnett but noted that the work-product doctrine extends beyond formal discovery. Any inconsistency with Pfingst is disapproved. The court also highlighted that the crime/fraud exception to attorney-client privilege allows for the disclosure of materials obtained via search warrants, but the existence of probable cause does not automatically imply that clients sought legal assistance for criminal activity. A Bauman/Rose hearing is intended to assess whether such exceptions apply. Under Penal Code section 1524, subdivision (c), courts can require in-camera disclosure of claimed privileged materials if no other means exist to evaluate the privilege claim. The attorneys did not contest the superior court's authority to review seized materials. The People argued against sealing the documents, suggesting a nondisclosure order instead; however, allowing access before resolving privilege claims would undermine the privilege. The superior court's decision to keep the documents sealed was upheld. Although the People initially agreed to the appointment of a special master in the trial court, they appeared to expect nonbinding recommendations from that master. The People's agreement to a special master was contingent upon not being liable for the associated costs, a condition rejected by the superior court, leading to no stipulation for a general reference. The court determined that the People waived their argument regarding the superior court's authority to appoint a special master, as they had previously consented to this authority both inherently and statutorily. This waiver prevents the People from claiming procedural error on appeal. However, since the issue involves a legal question fully briefed and resolved by the Court of Appeal, the court chose to review whether this legal determination was correct. Section 639, subdivision (a), outlines situations in which a court may appoint a referee without party consent, including cases requiring examination of long accounts or necessary account-taking for court information before judgment. Additionally, the opinion in Castello pertains specifically to section 1008, which governs civil proceedings, while provisions in part 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure apply to both civil and criminal cases, as established in previous rulings. Penal Code section 1524, subdivision (c) permits the superior court to appoint a special master to conduct searches and handle allegedly privileged materials during a hearing. However, it does not allow for the appointment of a special master to perform subordinate judicial duties related to such hearings. Outside regular civil proceedings, the Legislature has limited the authorization of commissioners and referees to specific duties under various codes, such as allowing court commissioners to conduct arraignments and issue bench warrants in infraction cases, and juvenile court referees to hear juvenile cases with potential rehearings by a judge. The Court of Appeal has determined that fees for court-appointed assistants involved in civil litigation are considered statutory costs for the prevailing party under Code of Civil Procedure section 1032. However, this section does not apply to criminal proceedings, which lack a comparable provision in the Penal Code. Although the Penal Code mandates convicted defendants to pay restitution and certain costs related to probation and incarceration, it does not allow for recovery of litigation costs as in civil cases. In criminal matters, courts can impose monetary sanctions on parties or their attorneys for violating lawful court orders, as stipulated in Code of Civil Procedure section 177.5. Additionally, appellate courts can impose sanctions in criminal appeals to reimburse the court for resources spent on frivolous appeals. Government Code section 29601 designates specific expenses incurred by the district attorney in criminal cases, including travel and other necessary expenses related to crime detection, as county charges. Government Code section 29602 states that expenses related to the support and rehabilitation of individuals charged with or convicted of crimes in county detention facilities are considered county charges. This includes costs for training, employment, recreation, and prerelease activities, as well as other services not specifically compensated by law. The term "criminal proceedings" within this context is limited to activities following the filing of criminal charges, as clarified by case law (Gibson v. County of Sacramento). Furthermore, while section 645.1, subdivision (b) might allow a trial court to impose costs on "the parties" in a specific legal proceeding, it explicitly excludes the parties' counsel from this definition. Therefore, the district attorney, representing the People, cannot be ordered to pay for a special master or referee's services under this statute. The superior court lacks both statutory and inherent authority to require parties to cover these costs, making it unnecessary to address whether a special master not employed by the court qualifies as an "official service" exempting the district attorney from payment under Government Code section 6103.