Lewis County v. W. WA. GMHB

Citation: 53 P.3d 44Docket: 26861-2-II, 26868-0-II

Court: Court of Appeals of Washington; August 23, 2002; Washington; State Appellate Court

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Lewis County appealed to the Washington Court of Appeals after the superior court dismissed its appeals from decisions made by the Western Washington Growth Management Hearings Board (GMHB). The central issue was whether the superior court had jurisdiction to hear the appeals, given that Lewis County failed to pay the required filing fees within 30 days of the GMHB's final orders. The county filed notices of appeal for two cases on July 17 and July 18, 2000, but did not submit the filing fees until September 1 and November 3, 2000, respectively. The superior court, questioning its jurisdiction, ultimately ruled it lacked jurisdiction due to the late payment of fees, leading to dismissal of the appeals. The court's decision hinged on several statutes: RCW 36.70A.300(5) mandates that an aggrieved party must appeal within 30 days, while RCW 34.05.514(1) and RCW 36.01.050(1) outline the requirement for payment of filing fees when initiating proceedings in superior court. The appellate court considered whether the filing fee was required, whether it needed to be paid within the specified timeframe, and the implications of failing to do so regarding jurisdiction.

Each statute analyzed outlines the procedures for appealing decisions made by a Growth Management Hearings Board (GMHB). RCW 36.70A.300(5) allows parties to appeal within 30 days and references the procedures in RCW 34.05.514 and RCW 36.01.050. RCW 34.05.514(1) specifies that an appeal is initiated by filing a petition and paying a fee in one of three designated venues, while RCW 36.01.050(1) permits counties to appeal in similar or potentially different venues.

The interpretation of the legislature’s intent regarding these statutes is contested. Lewis County argues that compliance with RCW 36.01.050(1) serves as a complete alternative to RCW 34.05.514(1), meaning a county could appeal without adhering to the petition and fee requirements of RCW 34.05.514(1). Conversely, respondents argue that compliance with RCW 36.01.050(1) only partially substitutes for RCW 34.05.514(1), allowing for a venue choice but still requiring adherence to the petition and fee provisions.

The analysis concludes that the legislature intended compliance with RCW 36.01.050(1) to be a partial alternative, necessitating that all appellants file a petition for judicial review under RCW 34.05.546 and pay the relevant filing fee under RCW 36.18.020(2)(c), regardless of the venue selected. This interpretation avoids an impractical and inconsistent scheme of varying petition and fee requirements based on venue choice, aligning with the legislature's intent for the Administrative Procedures Act (APA) to govern GMHB appeals.

Lewis County is entitled to appeal under either RCW 34.05.514(1) or RCW 36.01.050(1), but must file a petition for judicial review and pay the required filing fee as mandated by RCW 34.05.514(1) and RCW 36.18.020(2)(c). To commence a GMHB appeal, a county must file within 30 days of the final order and pay the filing fee; failure to do so means the appeal is not properly instituted. Lewis County contends that RCW 36.18.060 allows it to file without immediate payment of the fee, arguing that this provision overrides the requirements of RCW 36.70A.300(5) and RCW 34.05.514(1). The statutes must be harmonized, allowing for the interpretation that a county may delay fee payment until within the 30 days following the order. However, the legislature's amendment of RCW 34.05.514(1) to specify payment of the fee under RCW 36.18.020 suggests an intention to require payment within that timeframe. Lewis County's arguments that historical practices and legislative intent support a no-fee-at-filing position are countered by the interpretation that any fee exemption applies only to the timing of payment, not the obligation to pay within the specified period.

The argument rejects the notion that a county could file a GMHB appeal without a filing fee prior to 1995, citing unclear legal precedent. The 1995 amendment to RCW 34.05.514(1) indicates a legislative intent to subject GMHB appeals to the APA, thereby requiring a filing fee per RCW 36.18.020. It concludes that while Lewis County was not required to pay a fee upon initial filing, it was obligated to do so within 30 days of the GMHB's final order. The failure to pay within this timeframe results in a jurisdictional defect, as both RCW 36.70A.300(5) and RCW 34.05.514(1) stipulate that a petition must be filed along with the fee for a GMHB appeal to be properly instituted.

The document further addresses whether to waive this jurisdictional defect, concluding against it for several reasons: jurisdictional defects should be waived sparingly; statutory requirements are less amenable to waiver than court rules; the relevant statutes were established prior to Lewis County's petitions; and Lewis County was not misled, having prior legal representation and experience with filing fees. The cases cited by Lewis County to support a waiver are deemed distinguishable based on these factors.

Myers, Scannell, and Ashbaugh involved provisions that were recently established, contrasting with the jurisdictional issue here, which pertains to a five-year-old provision. Scannell included elements of misleading circumstances for the appellant. The Supreme Court's reluctance to grant jurisdictional waivers influences the decision against granting a waiver in this case. Lewis County refers to RCW 4.36.240, which allows courts to overlook errors that do not affect substantial rights at any stage of an action, but this does not apply to jurisdictional defects. The court determined that it lacked jurisdiction and did not err in this conclusion. The ruling is affirmed by both ARMSTRONG, J. and HUNT, C.J.

Additionally, a clerk's affidavit explains that a Civil Deputy Prosecutor requested a deferral of filing fees for the County, which was permitted based on the belief that such a request was within the County's rights. The clerk intended to ensure that filing fees would still be paid in full later in the process to comply with statutory obligations. Relevant statutes regarding filing fees for petitions and the necessary components of a petition for judicial review are referenced, emphasizing the court's role in interpreting statutes according to legislative intent and avoiding absurd interpretations.

RCW 36.70A.300(5) stipulates that a party aggrieved by a Growth Management Hearings Board (GMHB) final order may appeal to Thurston County Superior Court within thirty days. The Washington Supreme Court in Cossel v. Skagit County clarified that the terms "commence" and "institute" are synonymous in a legal context. Legislative reports indicate a general intent not to impose new fees, but specific amendments related to GMHB appeals override this, mandating that such appeals fall under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and require a filing fee. Although Lewis County acknowledges the necessity of a filing fee, it does not specify the timing of payment. Prior to 1995, appeals had to be filed in Thurston County, leading to potential confusion regarding fee collection based on county jurisdiction. The 1995 amendments explicitly brought GMHB appeals under the APA, allowing petitioners to file in Thurston County, their residence, or where the contested property is located, in accordance with RCW 34.05.510, which establishes the APA as the exclusive means for judicial review of administrative orders.

The amendments indicating an intent to impose a filing fee for Administrative Procedure Act (APA) appeals are found in Laws of 1995, chapter 292, sections 9(1) and 10(2)(c). Section 9(1) states that review proceedings require a fee payment under RCW 36.18.020 and the filing of a petition in a superior court, with options for the location based on the petitioner's residence or the property's location. Section 10(2)(c) mandates that clerks of superior courts collect a $110 filing fee for petitions for judicial review as required by RCW 34.05.514.

Various case law is referenced to clarify how jurisdiction is established in relation to filing fees. For instance, in Seattle Seahawks v. King County, it is noted that civil actions commence when a complaint is filed or served. Historical cases indicate that certain appellate rules required payment of a filing fee as a jurisdictional prerequisite, while others did not. Specifically, cases like Myers v. Harris and Graham Thrift Group emphasize that failure to pay the filing fee may act as a jurisdictional barrier to appeals. The document also discusses the significance of the wording in relevant statutes, asserting that the specific phrasing in RCW 36.70A.300(5) and RCW 34.05.514(1) underpins the requirement for fee payment and petition filing to institute an appeal, and this interpretation does not extend to statutes or rules with different language.

The excerpt examines the treatment of filing fees and jurisdictional issues in Washington case law. It highlights that in **Graham Thrift Group**, the lack of timely filing fee payment was deemed a jurisdictional barrier to appeal, contrasting this with **Ashbaugh**, where the waiver of a filing fee was permissible, indicating that non-payment did not constitute a jurisdictional issue. Similarly, in **Griffith v. City of Bellevue**, the court allowed a waiver of verification, affirming that jurisdiction was established upon timely filing despite defects. Additional cases like **Myers** and **Scannell** show that courts have waived court rules rather than statutes, with relevant timelines noted regarding appeals in light of rule changes. Notably, on May 5, 1999, a separate case involved the county filing a petition and paying the fee, denoting procedural adherence. This analysis underscores the nuanced distinctions in jurisdictional requirements related to filing fees and procedural rules across various Washington cases.