Fyffe v. Wright

Citations: 93 P.3d 444; 2004 Alas. LEXIS 79; 2004 WL 1418690Docket: S-10726

Court: Alaska Supreme Court; June 25, 2004; Alaska; State Supreme Court

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Diana L. Fyffe and Stephen R. Pierce, the appellants, appealed a judgment from the Supreme Court of Alaska concerning a landlord-tenant dispute with Pattie Wright and others. Fyffe sued Wright for multiple violations of Alaska's landlord-tenant laws, while Wright counterclaimed for property damage and unpaid rent. The superior court found both parties at fault, awarding damages to Fyffe that were offset by her debts to Wright. Fyffe argued that the court should have granted her greater compensation for her belongings, punitive damages, and for emotional distress, and contended that Wright's violations should have barred the offset. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's decision.

The facts reveal that Wright leased a home to Fyffe and Pierce in 1995, with specific terms regarding rent payments and property condition. Despite the house's disrepair, Fyffe and Pierce agreed to refurbish it for a rent reduction. Following their divorce, the couple maintained a cooperative financial relationship until Fyffe moved to South Carolina in 1998. Before vacating, Pierce and his children stored belongings in a shed and left some items on the property. Fyffe acknowledged owing five months' rent, while Wright claimed significant property damage, including unsanitary conditions and structural issues, were left behind after the family moved out.

Wright waived Fickle's first three months of rent, totaling $3,000, in return for cleaning and repairing the house. Following the departure of the Fyffe/Pierce family from the Chugiak house, Wright attempted to contact them regarding damages and unpaid rent, but Fyffe did not provide new contact information. On September 17, 1998, Wright wrote to Pierce about the damages and back rent, warning that personal items left on the property would be disposed of if not removed within fifteen days. Samantha, a family member, entered the property without permission to retrieve belongings shortly after the family moved out. Fyffe returned to Alaska in September 1998 and requested access to her items multiple times, but actual attempts to retrieve them did not occur until November 20, when Fickle denied her access. After being denied, Fyffe compiled lists of her personal property based on her memory and others' recollections. From September 20, 1998, to early 1999, Fyffe and Pierce attempted to contact Wright and her husband, Ken Gill, but were told that Fyffe needed to pay $10,000 in back rent and fees to reclaim her items. Gill later removed a shed and its contents from the property. After consulting a lawyer, Fyffe learned that Wright and Gill considered the remaining items abandoned and may have donated them. Fyffe unsuccessfully searched for her belongings at local thrift stores.

Fyffe filed a lawsuit against Wright in superior court, alleging violations of Alaska landlord-tenant laws and seeking compensation for the unreturned property, costs incurred while attempting to retrieve it, emotional damages, and legal fees. She aimed to submit itemized lists of her property, estimating their values based on comparisons from catalogs and thrift stores. The court allowed the lists for identification purposes but not as definitive proof of value due to concerns about Fyffe's estimation methods. Wright presented evidence of the rent, late fees, and repair costs; no objections were raised against this evidence. After a one-day bench trial, the court made preliminary findings and requested further legal briefs on whether Fyffe could claim emotional distress damages. Ultimately, the court determined that Ken Gill acted as Wright's agent regarding the Chugiak residence and that Wright was accountable for Gill's actions concerning Fyffe's property.

Wright, through Gill, unlawfully disposed of the plaintiffs' personal property without notifying Fyffe, violating AS 34.03.260, which mandates landlord notification of property disposition deemed abandoned. Fyffe sought $23,542.80 in damages, resulting in the superior court awarding her $9,461.30 in actual damages and $5,000 in punitive damages. The court, however, mandated offsets for amounts Fyffe owed to Wright: $5,250 in unpaid rent, $140 for bounced checks, $900 for late rent penalties reduced from $1,800, and $3,000 for property damages, totaling $9,390. After accounting for an $814 payment by Fyffe, the court determined that she owed Wright $8,476, subsequently reducing her total award. The court denied Fyffe's emotional distress claim due to insufficient evidence of severity and did not address her other relief claims. The final judgment awarded the plaintiffs $5,985.30. Fyffe’s subsequent post-trial motions were denied, leading to her appeal regarding the damage award and the motions' denial. The appellate review will apply a de novo standard for legal applications and a "clearly erroneous" standard for factual findings, emphasizing the superior court's role in assessing witness credibility. Furthermore, the court deemed the inclusion of Exhibit B, detailing Fyffe's debts to Wright, appropriate for calculating the offset against Fyffe's recovery.

Fyffe raises three primary arguments regarding the admission and reliance on Exhibit B in her case. First, she claims her right to object to Exhibit B was preserved despite not objecting during the trial. However, it is established that failing to object results in a waiver of that right, as indicated by Alaska Rule of Evidence 103(a)(1). Fyffe did not move to compel disclosure of Exhibit B during discovery, which further weakens her position. Second, the superior court's admission of Exhibit B is deemed appropriate since Fyffe did not demonstrate any "plain error" that would necessitate the court excluding the evidence sua sponte. The burden of proving plain error lies with the appellant, and Fyffe has not met this burden. Third, Fyffe contends that even if Exhibit B was admitted, it was erroneous for the court to rely on it when determining damages. She argues that Wright's alleged violations of landlord-tenant law should disqualify her from using Exhibit B to offset damages owed. However, this argument conflicts with fundamental principles of fairness and due process, as a defendant's legal violations do not prevent them from presenting evidence or counterclaims. Additionally, Fyffe suggests that Exhibit B is inadmissible under AS 34.03.070(b), asserting that this statute dictates the procedures for a landlord to recover damages from a tenant.

Fyffe contends that a landlord's recovery for property damages must be itemized and communicated to the tenant within a legally mandated timeframe. Fyffe argues that since no such itemized list was provided within 30 days, Wright should not be entitled to any damages under AS 34.03.070(b). However, Fyffe's interpretation of the statute is overly broad, as it pertains solely to a landlord's deductions from a tenant's security deposit and does not dictate how damages should be assessed between parties. The superior court was not required to demand an itemized list from Wright regarding property damages or restrict its damage award based on Wright's notice inadequacies.

On appeal, Fyffe claims the superior court made significant errors in evaluating her property, citing issues with fact-finding, evidence admission, and misinterpretation of the relief sought in the complaint. However, these claims primarily challenge the court's credibility assessments and evidence evaluations, which are reviewed under a clear error standard.

Regarding Exhibit 1, which contained personal belongings of Samantha and Timothy Fyffe, the court found that Fyffe did not demonstrate, by a preponderance of the evidence, that specific items had been destroyed or removed by Wright. Testimony indicated that Samantha had retrieved items from the car, leading the court to deny Fyffe any damages for these items.

Exhibit 2 detailed furnishings and appliances with an estimated value of $5,400. The court determined that Fyffe and Pierce failed to prove these items had been removed or even stored in the shed, citing witness testimony about the shed's contents and size. Consequently, the court awarded no damages for the items listed in Exhibit 2. Both findings were affirmed, as they did not exhibit clear error.

Fyffe contests the superior court's assessment of conflicting testimonies, arguing that the court erroneously evaluated witness credibility and its finding that the furnishings listed in Exhibit 2 could not fit in the shed. The court's skepticism about the shed's capacity is deemed appropriate, as determining its volume and the size of Fyffe's property involves fact-intensive analysis better suited for the superior court. The court noted that the lists of items were created months after the shed was packed by Fyffe, who was not present during that time, and even she expressed uncertainty about whether all items were stored there.

Fyffe claims the court did not compensate her for certain losses because she mentioned collectibles rather than furnishings in her complaint. However, the court balanced the complaint's wording with the evidence and the credibility of the testimonies presented. 

Regarding Exhibit 3, which listed various personal items valued at $6,800, the court found them converted or disposed of by Wright and Gill but rejected her claim of $600 for tax records, labeling it speculative. The court awarded her $6,200 for the remaining items based on their claimed values.

Exhibit 5 detailed Fyffe's doll collection, valued at $5,325. For some dolls, the court adopted the lowest estimated value provided by Fyffe. Although it acknowledged Gill and Wright’s responsibility for the collection's loss, the court reduced the award to $1,987.50, citing Fyffe's unnecessary delay in retrieving the dolls, which resulted in damage. Evidence indicated she had the opportunity to collect her belongings earlier but did not act until November. The court's findings were upheld as not clearly erroneous.

Exhibit 6 included a book and encyclopedia collection valued at $2,550 and a Bradford Exchange plate collection valued at $544.80. The superior court determined that Fyffe did not establish that her book collection was in the shed or disposed of by Wright or Gill, but it did find that the plate collection was packed in the shed and subsequently disposed of. Consequently, the court awarded Fyffe only the value of the plates, $544.80. On appeal, Fyffe contended that the court's written decision contradicted its oral summary at trial, where the existence of the books was acknowledged. However, the court clarified that its oral remarks were preliminary and that it would review its conclusions more thoroughly. It also noted that even if the books had been in the shed, Fyffe had overvalued them. The appellate court upheld the written decision, stating that inconsistencies between oral and written findings favor the written findings unless they are severely contradictory.

Regarding Fyffe's claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED), the court found no error in its denial. To win an IIED claim, the plaintiff must demonstrate extreme conduct, intentionality or recklessness, and severe emotional distress. Although Fyffe discussed the requirements for IIED under Alaskan law and linked it to the awarded penal damages, the court denied her claim based on her failure to prove the severity of her emotional distress. The court emphasized that a claim for IIED requires evidence of severe emotional distress, which is characterized as distress that no reasonable person should endure, unlike temporary feelings such as fright or disappointment. The court's ruling affirmed that penal damages and IIED claims are distinct and not automatically correlated.

Fyffe expressed significant emotional distress due to the theft of her belongings, claiming it was a point of agreement between the parties. However, the court found no such consensus and noted that her emotional distress claims lacked the egregious behavior typically associated with intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED) claims. The court determined that the severity of emotional distress is to be assessed by the fact-finder, and Fyffe's evidence, primarily based on her own and her family members' testimonies, was deemed insufficient. Consequently, the superior court did not err in denying her IIED claim.

Regarding penal damages, Fyffe argued that they should equal her actual damages and contended that the superior court awarded too little. However, under Alaska Statute 34.03.260(d), penal damages may not exceed actual damages, and Fyffe's interpretation to mean they should equal actual damages was rejected as unsupported and contrary to the statute's language. The court found no abuse of discretion in awarding $5,000 in punitive damages, as there is no mandated ratio between compensatory and punitive damages.

Lastly, Fyffe's appeal concerning the denial of attorney's fees and costs was also dismissed. Although she requested fees in her complaint, she did not substantiate a claim for her trial attorney's fees during her Motion to Reconsider or on appeal. As a pro se litigant, she is not entitled to recover legal fees for her own work in Alaska, further weakening her position.

Fyffe, not being an attorney, is ineligible to recover costs for her time spent on the litigation. The court denied her motion for reimbursement of costs and expenses, citing Alaska Rule of Civil Procedure 79(b) for untimeliness. Civil Rule 79(a) permits a prevailing party to recover litigation costs, but Rule 79(b) mandates that such a party must file an itemized and verified cost bill within 10 days of final judgment. Since Fyffe did not submit a cost bill following the superior court's April 22, 2002 Memorandum Decision, her request for costs was correctly denied. 

Fyffe contended that the superior court's decision lacked the clarity required by Alaska Civil Rule 52(a), which necessitates findings of fact and conclusions of law for cases tried without a jury. However, Rule 52(a) specifies that such findings are unnecessary for motions under Rules 12 or 56. As costs can only be awarded after a trial, the superior court was not obliged to address the cost request in Fyffe's complaint. Hence, the court's denial of both attorney's fees and costs was deemed appropriate, leading to the affirmation of the superior court's decision in all respects. 

Additionally, the excerpt notes a few points of clarification regarding related property claims against Fickle and minor mathematical errors in calculating damages, which do not affect the overall outcomes of the case.

AS 34.03.070(b) stipulates that upon tenancy termination, landlords may apply prepaid rent or security deposits to cover accrued rent and damages resulting from tenant noncompliance, requiring itemization in a written notice to the tenant's last known address. Fyffe claims certain items, including Barbie dolls worth $750 and sports memorabilia valued at $1,500, were left behind, while Pierce mentioned some belongings were left in a shed but did not verify all items or list them. The shed's contents allegedly included various furnishings and appliances, such as a washing machine, love seat, and kitchen supplies. Fyffe argues that the court applied inconsistent standards in awarding damages to Wright, who allegedly failed to state a claim. However, the court's judgment was based on the credibility of trial evidence rather than pleadings, and any objections regarding Wright's pleadings were waived since they were not raised during the trial. Fyffe does not appeal the total amount awarded to her as per Exhibit 4. Additionally, Fyffe's interpretation of case law regarding intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED) is incorrect; previous cases allowed recovery for personal property loss but required proof of IIED elements, which Fyffe could not establish.

Plaintiff experienced severe emotional distress due to the defendant's forcible entry and confiscation of property following the sudden death of her daughter. The superior court denied the plaintiff's claim not due to the loss of property, but because she failed to demonstrate the severity of her emotional distress. References to case law indicate that terms like "serious" and "severe emotional distress" are interchangeable, and emotional responses such as being "aggravated" or "upset" do not meet the threshold for severe distress. The court also highlighted that in jury trials, it must determine whether the emotional distress and the defendant's conduct warrant a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED). 

Additionally, the plaintiff argued that the superior court violated Alaska Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a) by not clearly explaining its findings regarding the refusal to award IIED. The court's findings must resolve critical disputes and allow for meaningful appellate review. The discussion referenced specific case law outlining that a claim for IIED requires proof of both severe emotional distress and bad conduct by the defendant. 

Furthermore, the superior court's denial of attorney's fees was based on a misapplication of Civil Rule 82, which has a ten-day filing requirement. However, since the plaintiff's claims arose under Alaska's Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act (URLTA), which does not impose such a time limit for attorney's fees, the court's reliance on Rule 82 was found to be harmless, as pro se litigants are not entitled to fees for their own legal work.