Riley v. Robey

Citations: 122 F. Supp. 2d 684; 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17426; 2000 WL 1770603Docket: CIV. A. 5:00CV00001

Court: District Court, W.D. Virginia; November 28, 2000; Federal District Court

SummaryOriginalCytator Case TreatmentBackward CitatorAnalysis

EnglishEspañolSimplified EnglishEspañol Fácil

In the case of Peter Paul Riley and Jane C. Riley v. W.T. Robey, III, the United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia addressed motions from the defendant to dismiss the case and for summary judgment, both dated January 21, 2000. The magistrate judge recommended dismissing the case on April 17, 2000. The court, after reviewing the Report and Recommendation as well as the parties' pleadings and evidence, granted the defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment.

The plaintiffs sought to have a foreclosure sale conducted on December 2, 1999, declared null and void, alleging three violations of the Virginia Code related to the foreclosure process. Although the plaintiffs contested certain factual findings, such as the amount of their debt, the court found these disputes immaterial to the legal grounds for relief. The court focused on undisputed material facts, including the language of the deeds of trust and the notice of sale, and decided to proceed with adjudicating the claims based on the merits.

In their first claim, the plaintiffs argued that the defendant violated Virginia Code § 55-59(7), which outlines the trustee's obligations upon default. They contended that the trustee did not declare all debts due as required, thereby rendering the foreclosure sale invalid. The defendant countered that the deed of trust specified different requirements that superseded the statute. The court noted that the statute's provisions apply unless the deed of trust stipulates otherwise.

Section (7) outlines the procedures for auctioning property in the event of default on a secured debt. The court must assess whether the deed of trust allows for an auction sale upon default. Paragraph 18 of the deed states that if a default occurs, the government may, without notice, declare the debt immediately due and authorize the Trustee to foreclose and sell the property. The court needs to determine if the government’s declaration operates in conjunction with the trustee's obligations under statute 55-59(7) or if it allows the government to act independently. The plaintiff argues that the deed's language requires the trustee to declare the debt before a sale, as stipulated in section 55-59(7), which mandates that the trustee must declare the debt payable unless the deed specifies otherwise. The deed permits the government to make this declaration, thus rendering the statutory requirements inapplicable, and therefore, the defendant did not violate Virginia Code section 55-59(7).

The plaintiffs' second claim alleges that the defendant breached Virginia Code section 55-59.3 by not including the property's street address in the notice of sale. This section mandates that sale advertisements must describe the property, including its street address or general location. There is contention regarding which of two notices was published; both omitted the street address of '1977 Salem Church Road,' but included the mailing address. One notice had a detailed legal description, while the other provided a general description and referenced official records for more details. The Virginia Supreme Court has ruled that substantial compliance with section 55-59.3 is adequate, provided the parties' rights are not materially affected (Virginia Housing Development Authority v. Fox Run Ltd. Partnership). The plaintiffs cite Deep v. Rose for the necessity of adhering to mandatory provisions, but the court's ruling in that case was limited to section 55-59.2, while the current dispute involves section 55-59.3, which the Fox Run case clarified requires only substantial compliance.

The court determined that referencing the deed of trust in the notice of sale adequately met the notice requirements under section 55-59.3. The description of the property, along with its address and a reference to the Deed Book, demonstrated substantial compliance with the relevant statute, rendering any differences in the two notices filed immaterial. The plaintiffs’ claim that the defendant failed to collect a required ten percent bidder's deposit prior to bids was found to be incorrect; the statute permits the deposit to be collected after the sale price is established, which aligns with the notice of sale. The court confirmed that the trustee collected the deposit from the successful bidder on the sale date, fulfilling the notice requirements. Consequently, the magistrate judge's Report and Recommendation was adopted in part but rejected the recommendation to grant the defendant’s motion to dismiss. The defendant's motion to dismiss was denied, while the motion for summary judgment was granted on all counts of the plaintiffs’ complaint, and the case was stricken from the active docket. The court ordered the Clerk to send certified copies of the order and accompanying memorandum to all counsel of record.