In Re bridgestone/firestone, Inc

Citations: 260 F. Supp. 2d 722; 2003 WL 21038918Docket: MDL No. 1373. Nos. IP00-9373-CBS, IP01-5488CBS, IP01-5524CBS, IP01-5487CBS, IP02-5624CBS

Court: District Court, S.D. Indiana; April 21, 2003; Federal District Court

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In the case In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. Tires Products Liability Litigation, several related lawsuits were originally filed in Mississippi state court and subsequently removed to federal court by Ford Motor Company, with Bridgestone/Firestone also joining the removal. The plaintiffs, primarily residents of Mississippi with some from neighboring states, allege that they suffered injuries in accidents involving Ford Explorers and Firestone tires, claiming these products were defective. The suits assert state law claims for strict liability, negligence, and breach of warranty against Ford, Bridgestone/Firestone, and various automobile and tire dealers.

The defendants contend that federal jurisdiction exists based on both federal question and diversity jurisdiction. They argue that diversity jurisdiction is appropriate due to the fraudulent joinder of dealer defendants, aimed at circumventing diversity, and claim federal question jurisdiction because the plaintiffs’ negligence claims involve potential violations of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act. 

The court ultimately granted the plaintiffs' motions to remand, determining that the cases should return to Mississippi state court, where they were initially filed.

Plaintiffs' claims arise under state law, despite defendants' assertions of federal question jurisdiction, which have been previously rejected by the Court in Nisbett v. Bridgestone Corp. The plaintiffs explicitly disavow federal claims in their Complaints, focusing solely on state law. Although the state law claims reference the Safety Act regarding defective tire recalls, this does not create federal jurisdiction since the Safety Act does not provide a private right of action. The Court reiterated that allegations related to federal statutes do not suffice for federal question jurisdiction if Congress has ruled out a private cause of action.

Regarding diversity jurisdiction, the defendants argue for removal based on claims of fraudulent joinder of dealer-defendants and fraudulent misjoinder of plaintiffs. However, complete diversity is absent as some plaintiffs and defendants are citizens of Mississippi. The defendants must prove that the dealer-defendants were fraudulently joined, which requires showing no reasonable possibility of recovery against them under Mississippi law. The defendants contend that the Complaints do not adequately specify claims against the dealer-defendants, as they fail to identify which dealer sold products to which plaintiff. Overall, the arguments for both federal question and diversity jurisdiction have been rejected, emphasizing that the plaintiffs' claims do not support federal removal.

Complaints meet the minimal notice pleading standards of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a), despite not being exemplary. The defendants argue that the plaintiffs targeted the dealer-defendants solely to maintain jurisdiction in Mississippi, perceived as a favorable forum, potentially to defeat diversity jurisdiction. However, the key issue is whether the plaintiffs have valid claims against the dealer-defendants, not their motives for including them. Defendants reference Parker v. Ford Motor Co. to claim dealers cannot be liable for latent defects in products. This interpretation is flawed, as it disregards the Mississippi Products Liability Act of 1993, which allows product liability claims against both manufacturers and sellers, effectively overruling the precedent set by Sam Shainberg Co. of Jackson v. Barlow. Consequently, claims against the dealer-defendants are viable under Mississippi law, and their inclusion is not fraudulent.

Additionally, defendants contend that the claims of unrelated plaintiffs were improperly joined to avoid diversity jurisdiction and propose severing these claims. However, under Seventh Circuit law, plaintiffs can include or exclude parties to determine the forum, and defendants cannot eliminate plaintiffs to facilitate removal. Thus, as long as the claims are legitimate and not nominal, the court cannot sever them to maintain jurisdiction over some.

Joinder of plaintiffs' claims may be disregarded for removal purposes under the doctrine of fraudulent misjoinder if the claims lack a sufficient factual nexus to meet permissive joinder standards. This principle stems from the Eleventh Circuit's ruling in *Tapscott v. MS Dealer Service Corp.*, which indicated that egregious misjoinder could be considered fraudulent. However, *Tapscott* did not equate mere misjoinder with fraudulent misjoinder, leaving the criteria for determining the latter somewhat ambiguous.

In the current case, the court concludes that allowing the joinder does not constitute an abuse of discretion, thus failing to meet the criteria for fraudulent misjoinder, whatever those may be. The discussion also involves whether Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 20 or Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 20 applies, with the defendants advocating for the former based on *Coleman v. Conseco, Inc.*, which deemed the joinder provisions procedural. However, the court finds Judge Hamilton's reasoning in *Conk* more compelling, asserting that the Federal Rules do not govern in the context of this case.

To evaluate claims against a non-diverse defendant alongside claims against diverse defendants, the court considers whether a state court would likely find proper joinder under Mississippi law. Although the text of both federal and state rules is similar, the application of these rules in this context remains critical to determining whether misjoinder occurred under Mississippi law.

Mississippi Rule 20 allows broader joinder of claims compared to Federal Rule 20, endorsing a liberal approach on a case-by-case basis. The Mississippi Supreme Court emphasizes that the rule supports virtually unlimited joinder at the pleading stage, granting the court discretion to tailor trials to specific cases. In the Norman case, sixty-eight plaintiffs sued Prestage Farms, alleging public and private nuisances from individual farms operated by contract hog farmers. The court upheld the trial court's decision to deny severance, citing common legal and factual questions arising from the farms' operations, despite each plaintiff needing to prove distinct claims related to individual farms. The dissent highlighted the complexities related to the numerous factors affecting each plaintiff's claim, such as proximity and exposure levels. The similarities between Norman and the current case against Ford and Firestone are noted, as both involve claims stemming from the design and manufacture of defective products, requiring individual proof of circumstances surrounding each incident. Additionally, in Travis, nearly one hundred plaintiffs successfully joined their claims based on asbestos exposure, despite working at different times and locations, further illustrating the court's support for joinder under Rule 20.

Joinder of individual plaintiffs' claims was deemed proper under Mississippi law, despite the necessity for each plaintiff to demonstrate personal exposure and injury. The court referenced prior Mississippi Supreme Court decisions, indicating that the claims in the cases of Norman and Travis were similarly permitted. Although the court expressed skepticism about the appropriateness of joinder under Federal Rule 20, it found no support for a claim of fraudulent misjoinder under Mississippi law.

Regarding supplemental jurisdiction, the defendants' argument for exercising jurisdiction over certain claims based on diversity was rejected. The court clarified that removal was improper under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) due to the presence of properly joined, in-state defendants, specifically dealer-defendants from Mississippi. Consequently, the plaintiffs' motions to remand were granted, with specific cases remanded to the respective circuit courts in Jones, Jefferson, Hinds, and Washington Counties in Mississippi. Additionally, the court awarded the plaintiffs fees and costs incurred due to the removal, instructing them to submit their petitions within fourteen days and allowing the defendants an equal period to respond.

The cases had undergone various amendments, and the complaints did not identify which dealer sold to which plaintiff; this information was later provided through supplemental briefing. Notably, not all defendants consented to removal, although this issue was deemed unnecessary to resolve given the court's other findings.

Plaintiffs in Nisbett brought a state-law RICO claim related to defendants' failure to recall defective tires. The Court acknowledges that multiple plaintiffs were involved in the same accident and does not see any argument against their joint claims. Seventh Circuit law governs the relevant removal and remand issues. Significant changes to Mississippi law effective January 1, 2003, under the Mississippi Civil Justice Reform Act, allow for dismissal of a defendant in a products liability case if their liability is solely based on their status as a seller in the stream of commerce, provided another liable party, such as the manufacturer, is before the court. This does not apply to Plaintiff Mindy Hunter in the King case due to shared Tennessee citizenship with Firestone. The defendants referenced an unpublished ruling in Adkins v. Ametek, where Federal Rule 20 was applied without elaboration. The Tapscott court also used Federal Rule 20 without addressing the applicability of state rules, highlighting the Mississippi trial courts' broad discretion under Rule 20. In previous cases, the Mississippi Supreme Court upheld trial courts' decisions to deny motions to sever, indicating they would not have abused discretion had they granted such motions. Therefore, while there is no finding of fraudulent misjoinder, state courts could potentially grant motions to sever if filed post-remand.