Thanks for visiting! Welcome to a new way to research case law. You are viewing a free summary from Descrybe.ai. For citation and good law / bad law checking, legal issue analysis, and other advanced tools, explore our Legal Research Toolkit — not free, but close.
Ritter v. Clinton House Restaurant
Citations: 64 F. Supp. 2d 374; 9 Am. Disabilities Cas. (BNA) 1743; 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14686; 1999 WL 756858Docket: Civil Action 96-3091(MLC)
Court: District Court, D. New Jersey; September 27, 1999; Federal District Court
Plaintiff Bennett Ritter filed a Complaint against The Clinton House Restaurant and related defendants on July 1, 1996, claiming discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) due to the restaurant’s architectural barriers. The defendants contended that the named entity did not exist and raised various affirmative defenses, including a Rule 11 violation related to the Complaint's filing. Following a lengthy period with minimal court activity, the parties reached a settlement regarding equitable relief in January 1998, prompting the plaintiff to request the cancellation of a scheduled Pretrial Conference, which was subsequently granted. In February 1998, the plaintiff filed a motion for attorneys' fees, asserting he was a prevailing party, while the defendant cross-moved for attorneys' fees under Rule 11. After hearing arguments on both motions, the Court issued an Order on April 7, 1998, denying the motions without prejudice and scheduling an evidentiary hearing to address factual disputes. Ultimately, the Court determined that Ritter was not a prevailing party under the applicable legal standards, leading to the denial of his application for counsel fees. The defendant’s motion for attorneys' fees was also denied. A hearing took place on December 4, 1998, February 25, 1999, and May 20, 1999, during which the parties agreed to submit written closing arguments, completed by July 1999. Testimony was provided by Bennett Ritter (plaintiff), attorney Anthony J. Brady, Jr. (plaintiff’s counsel), expert witness James V. Williams, and several witnesses for the defendant, including former architect Lewis Salamone and design consultant Chris Stegemann. Evidence included marked exhibits, affidavits, certifications, and briefs. The parties largely agree on historical facts but dispute whether Ritter qualifies as the prevailing party for fee and cost awards and whether Brady’s conduct warrants Rule 11 sanctions. The Clinton House property, a colonial-style building about 200 years old in Clinton, New Jersey, has been a restaurant since its purchase on October 30, 1995, for $875,000. The property, sold "as is," required significant improvements, particularly for handicap accessibility, which were inadequate at the time of sale. The building has four doors, with the central door serving as the main entrance, and its parking arrangements involve both town-owned spaces and additional parking nearby. Bennett Ritter, a paraplegic former Marine and licensed real estate broker, is a member of the Paralyzed Veterans of America and had frequented the restaurant before relocating to Florida in June 1997. Attorney Anthony J. Brady, Jr., admitted to the New Jersey bar in 1984, operates a law practice in Maple Shade, New Jersey, sharing office space with Advocates for Disabled Americans (AFDA), managed by William Caruso, a disabled veteran. Together, Brady and Caruso have handled numerous ADA cases, including a notable ruling regarding wheelchair access at a music pavilion. Brady specializes in civil rights law, primarily focusing on disability-related cases, with a pending lawsuit against Disney World. He met Ritter at the Abilities Expo in April 1995, where he represented Advocates for Disabled Americans. After their conversation, Ritter sought Brady's assistance regarding the Clinton House, leading to the current legal action. The Clinton House Restaurant operates without legal entity status, owned and managed by Pandelis "Pete" Gialias and his co-owners, who purchased it in October 1995. Gialias, who works approximately 90 hours a week as chef and manager, testified at a hearing, while his wife handles paperwork. Attorney Donald E. Souders, Jr. represents Gialias and co-owners in the case, having facilitated their acquisition of the restaurant and its assets. Chronologically, the litigation history is crucial for determining the prevailing party in cases where extrajudicial actions may moot legal claims. The current appeal addresses challenges to a fee award tied to this litigation history. The current owners of the Clinton House began significant renovations immediately upon acquisition, briefly closing to the public but reopening in early 1996 amid ongoing work. Ritter, a frequent patron under previous ownership, had previously complained about accessibility issues, which the former owners did not address. After the restaurant reopened under new ownership, Ritter noted that while some interior renovations improved accessibility, the entrance remained non-compliant, lacking a ramp and adequate disabled parking. He also found no submitted plans for exterior modifications at the Building Inspector's office in March 1996. Brady contacted Ritter regarding the situation after their prior acquaintance. His first visit to the Clinton House occurred on June 15, 1996, during which he noted the absence of a wheelchair ramp. On June 27, 1996, Brady reviewed the Building Inspector’s office files and found no ramp plans. The Complaint was filed by the Clerk on July 1, 1996, although it was received on June 25, 1996. Before filing, Brady did not communicate with the Clinton House owners or inspect public documents to identify them. Ritter's agreement to have Brady file on his behalf was oral, and he requested to see the Complaint prior to filing. Brady covered all case-related expenses, with Ritter incurring no costs until he traveled from Florida to testify at an evidentiary hearing. A written retainer agreement was not established until April 1998, after a motion for attorneys’ fees was denied. Ritter was unaware of how expert witnesses would be compensated, and no bills for fees were ever sent to him. Brady orally indicated he would receive his fees upon the case's successful conclusion. The Complaint named "The Clinton House Restaurant" as the sole defendant and alleged various accessibility violations, seeking a declaration of civil rights violations, an injunction for ADA compliance, damages, and attorneys' fees. Ritter testified that the restaurant’s interior was accessible at the time the Complaint was filed, while Brady stated the lawsuit focused on external issues. The defendant's Answer, filed on August 2, 1996, contested the existence of the entity sued and compliance with Rule 11. The initial scheduling order was issued on August 7, 1996, with a conference scheduled for October 8, 1996. On August 20, 1996, the defendant's counsel informed Brady that the property owners were renovating to achieve ADA compliance and requested the dismissal of the Complaint without prejudice. Souders requested a response from Brady regarding the scheduling of their Rule 26(f) meeting before the October 8, 1996 court date; however, he received no reply. On October 4, 1996, Souders sent a fax reiterating his request. In a letter dated October 6, 1996, Brady dismissed Souders' request to dismiss the case without prejudice as "laughable," insisting that the plaintiff would not dismiss the complaint without assurance of compliance regarding damages, attorney fees, and costs. On October 8, 1996, Souders made initial Rule 26(a) disclosures to Brady, listing potential witnesses and relevant documents, but Brady did not reciprocate these disclosures, aside from later providing an expert report by Mr. Williams. The October 8, 1996 scheduling conference was the only court appearance by both parties throughout the discovery and pretrial period, leading to various scheduling orders and status conferences with the Magistrate Judge. Following the conference, Souders sent renovation plans to Brady on October 28, 1996, which included detailed drawings for accessibility ramps but received no response from Brady. Notably, Brady did not share these plans with his expert, Mr. Williams, until a year later, when Williams testified he had never seen them prior to the evidentiary hearing on December 4, 1998. Williams acknowledged that the drawings adequately addressed barrier removal but lacked specific details. There was no further correspondence or discovery between the parties from October 1996 until May 1997, except for scheduled telephone conferences. During this period, renovations of the Clinton House were ongoing. On May 2, 1997, following a conference with the Magistrate Judge, Brady proposed a settlement to Souders, offering to construct a permanent ramp after township approval, install a temporary ramp in the interim, and pay $2,165 in attorney fees and costs. On May 5, 1997, Souders confirmed that the owners would start constructing a permanent ramp within thirty days, with a temporary ramp as a fallback if construction did not begin. A monetary settlement proposal was declined, and there was no response from Brady. The plaintiff's deposition took place on May 27, 1997, accompanied by attorney Warren E. Smith. Following the plaintiff's relocation to Florida in June 1997, Brady reviewed the Clinton House file on July 27, 1997, discovering a relevant letter from Mr. Salamone. Subsequently, Brady informed Souders on July 31, 1997, that he would not object to a side ramp but insisted on accessibility at the front entrance. On August 19, 1997, Brady sent Souders an expert report from Mr. Williams. Souders objected to the expert report, citing the expiration of the discovery period, prompting the Court to extend discovery to November 30, 1997, and reschedule the Pretrial Conference to January 28, 1998. Souders suggested a meeting to discuss ramp construction on September 8, 1997, and Brady requested to depose Gialias on September 12, 1997. After some back and forth, a meeting was set for November 4, 1997, but Brady canceled it last minute, prompting Souders to seek rescheduling. A meeting was finally arranged for December 16, 1997, which Brady failed to attend, providing late cancellation notice. Souders notified Brady on January 4, 1998, that architect Rochelle would be the defendant's expert at trial and requested comments on the ramp plans. With no response from Brady, Souders sent the expert report from Rochelle on January 15, 1998. The Pretrial Conference was set for January 28, 1998, with pretrial memoranda due beforehand. On January 22, 1998, Souders received a letter from Brady's office, which he responded to on January 23, 1998. Palmer communicated on the same day regarding the settlement status, indicating that the only unresolved issue was attorneys' fees and requested the cancellation of the Pretrial Conference. Brady testified that the upcoming pretrial memo and conference increased settlement efforts, as settling was preferable to preparing for trial. Following this, cross-motions for attorneys' fees were filed. Ritter testified at a December 1998 hearing that, despite retaining his New Jersey realtor's license after moving to Florida, he had only visited Clinton a few times, noting the absence of a ramp and handicap parking. By February 1999, expert testimony indicated that the ramp and parking were completed and compliant, aside from a temporary rail. Gialias confirmed in May 1999 that a permanent railing had been installed. Ritter believed he was testifying at trial regarding the ramp compliance and expected compensation for travel and attorney fees, but he was unaware of prior settlement offers or discussions with Brady about settling for $2,500 in fees. He did not know of any agreement obligating the defendant to ensure property compliance and confirmed that the defendant had not offered to pay any fees, arguing that the plaintiff was not the prevailing party. The plaintiff's motion for attorneys' fees, initially seeking $10,231.52, increased to approximately $28,152.43 after the hearings. Under the ADA, the court may award reasonable attorney's fees to the prevailing party, necessitating a determination of whether the plaintiff qualifies as such before considering any factors that might make fee awards unjust. Determining whether the plaintiff qualifies for an award involves assessing the reasonableness of the requested amount within the context of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) as a remedial statute aimed at eradicating discrimination against individuals with disabilities. The Third Circuit has yet to define the standard for "prevailing party" status under the ADA, but it aligns with the standards under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, which requires plaintiffs to demonstrate that they are prevailing parties to recover attorneys' fees. The burden of proof lies with the party claiming this status. The prevailing party test, established in Disabled in Action, consists of a two-part inquiry: (1) whether the plaintiff achieved some of the benefits sought in the lawsuit, and (2) whether the litigation was a material contributing factor in obtaining the desired relief. The plaintiff asserts that they meet both criteria due to a settlement concerning the ramp and parking design. To evaluate the first criterion, the court compares the relief sought with what was ultimately obtained, acknowledging that prevailing parties can receive relief that is not identical to what they originally demanded, provided it is of the same general type. Notably, extrajudicial relief can also render legal claims moot. In this case, the plaintiff's complaints alleged violations in four areas: telephone height, bathrooms, entrance, and parking. However, the evidence indicates that issues regarding telephone height and bathrooms were resolved prior to the lawsuit, negating any potential relief in those areas. The plaintiff sought several forms of relief, including declaratory judgment, injunction, damages, and attorneys' fees, but it is undisputed that no judicial relief was granted. Therefore, any achievement of objectives must relate solely to the entrance and parking issues as per the agreements exchanged in letters between the parties. The first prong of the prevailing party inquiry is satisfied, as some objectives of the lawsuit were accomplished. The second prong requires the plaintiff to establish causation, demonstrating that the litigation was a material contributing factor to the relief obtained. While the lawsuit does not need to be the sole cause, there must be a causal relationship. Causation can be shown through a judgment, consent decree, or settlement that alters the legal relations of the parties, or through the catalyst theory, where the lawsuit pressures the defendant to provide extrajudicial relief without a favorable judgment. In this case, the parties settled before trial, and no judgment was rendered, so the plaintiff must rely on the catalyst theory. To prove they are a prevailing party under this theory, the plaintiff must show that the lawsuit achieved its original objectives. The plaintiff argues that original renovation plans lacked accessibility features, and that no construction commenced before the lawsuit was filed. They assert that despite the defendant's claims of timely completion, modifications took approximately two and a half years and were delayed. The defendant counters that the renovations were already planned prior to the lawsuit and that the complexity of the project justified the timeline. Defendant contended that the lawsuit's filing and pendency did not influence the owners' decisions regarding exterior improvements. An evidentiary hearing was ordered due to conflicting claims that raised credibility issues not resolvable from the documents alone. The court evaluated witness testimony and documentary evidence, concluding that the new owners of Clinton House always intended for the property to be fully accessible and compliant with codes, independent of the lawsuit. The court found no evidence that the litigation affected the design or timing of the exterior improvements, stating that the lawsuit did not serve as a catalyst for any relief obtained. Consequently, the plaintiff failed to meet the second prong of the prevailing party test, which assesses whether the lawsuit exerted material pressure leading to changes in the defendant's conduct. The court noted both the objective aspect (whether the defendant's behavior changed) and the subjective aspect (defendant's intentions at the lawsuit's filing). The case was initiated on July 1, 1996, after eight months of ownership during which significant renovations had already been completed. Mr. Gialias, co-owner and decision-maker for the renovations, was central to the hearing's focus. Ultimately, the court ruled that the plaintiff was not entitled to attorneys' fees and costs due to insufficient evidence linking the lawsuit to the improvements. Gialias acknowledged prior complaints regarding handicap accessibility at the property, which dated back to when the Zierers owned it. He was aware that the building needed to comply with ADA and New Jersey Barrier-Free Code requirements before purchasing it and intended to undertake a comprehensive renovation to achieve compliance. His plans included the installation of an entrance ramp. Gialias maintained that his renovation plans were unaffected by ongoing litigation. The property's purchase price was $575,000, and total renovation costs reached approximately $400,000. Gialias relied on experienced restaurant designer Chris Stegemann and engaged architects Lewis Salamone and later Susan Rochelle for construction plans. By May 20, 1999, Gialias testified that the renovations were completed, including the installation of a permanent galvanized steel rail for the ramp, and he received no complaints regarding the renovations from handicapped individuals. Architect Lewis Salamone, a licensed professional since 1968, was introduced to the project by Stegemann and provided a written proposal for his services, which Gialias accepted in late 1995. Salamone was familiar with ADA accessibility requirements and confirmed that the restaurant was to undergo a 90% redesign, including a new entrance, hallways, bar, bathrooms, and a new kitchen. Gialias emphasized the desire for the renovation to be visually appealing and fully functional. The permitting process for the renovations was conducted in three phases, requiring separate building permits for different stages, with plans needing to be filed only when applying for a permit. Testimony revealed that design work for a project began before permit applications were submitted, with architect Salamone involved in all three project phases. He completed detailed plans for the first two phases, while the original conceptual design for the ramp was also his responsibility. The first phase was finished before the restaurant opened in early 1996, and the second phase concluded in late 1997, after which Salamone shifted focus to other projects, leading to the engagement of architect Susan Rochelle for the entrance ramp plans. Salamone's testimony included the production of three design plans dated 1996, which outlined interior renovations to include ADA-compliant bathrooms and hallways. The initial "Demolition Plan" dated January 22, 1996, served as the first detailed drawing. Subsequent "First Floor Plans" from August and October 1996 elaborated on the interior layout and preliminary ramp design, all reflecting a commitment to ADA compliance and recognition of the need for handicapped parking. Salamone clarified that improvements to the interior occurred prior to finalizing the ramp design, stating Gialias's involvement from the outset in the ramp's design process. He emphasized the importance of ensuring both interior and exterior compliance, asserting that his ramp plans were unaffected by any lawsuit or subsequent requests for changes. Challenges in ramp design stemmed from concerns about preserving the historic appearance of the building and uncertainty about the main entrance's location, with two potential sites being considered. Salamone created drawings for both options, which were presented to Construction Official Mr. Leonard, who would need to approve the preferred design for permit application submission. A letter from Salamone to Leonard dated March 20, 1997, discussed these alternate plans. Salamone presented a drawing dated June 9, 1997, which he discussed with town officials, to the hearing. His March 20, 1997 letter indicated that the design finalization in 1997 was hindered by various issues, including the main entrance location, contractor changes, ongoing inspections, and problems with a masonry wall in the kitchen under construction. Construction was temporarily halted due to a stairway issue that required its removal. Salamone stated that discussions with townspeople, led by Gialias, concluded with the decision to keep the main entrance's existing location for the ramp, with no consideration for alternative accessible entrances. Salamone reviewed the final ramp design from the Rochelle plan dated December 1, 1997, which served as the basis for the building permit issued on March 16, 1998. He noted that the constructed design closely resembled his original 1996 entrance design, with the addition of an air-lock vestibule. Chris Stegemann, a prospective witness, testified that he was involved in the Clinton House renovation and recommended Salamone as the architect. He confirmed that Salamone included handicap accessibility in his initial plans, specifically noting that the ramp was ordered by Gialias from the start. Stegemann was not involved in ADA modifications after Salamone's departure from the project. Gialias corroborated Salamone’s account, explaining the challenges of designing the ramp to meet accessibility requirements while securing town approval, considering the input from the Chamber of Commerce, the nearby museum, and local residents. Gialias, who was not a community resident, faced difficulties with the Planning Board regarding the Clinton House's front exterior, collaborating with both Salamone and later Rochelle during meetings with the Construction Official, Mr. Leonard. Gialias reported extensive discussions with Leonard regarding issues related to the ramp and handicapped parking, asserting these were significant obstacles in negotiations with officials. An alternate plan was created in 1997 to facilitate these discussions, which would have been executed had it received conceptual approval from the Construction Official. However, the design required further revisions, and upon final approval, the ramp construction cost $7,000, while a custom-fabricated rail was $5,700—significantly more than standard costs due to its specialized features. Gialias successfully negotiated for two van-accessible spaces in the public parking area, which were made accessible through a sidewalk curb cut in January 1999. Throughout the lawsuit, Gialias maintained that Clinton House acted appropriately and opposed any fee settlement, arguing the lawsuit did not influence his actions towards ADA compliance. The findings support that Clinton House had the intention to enhance accessibility from its acquisition and acted promptly despite the complexity and expense of the work. The court concluded that the lawsuit did not expedite completion of the ramp and parking access, which were finished between January and May 1999, well after the lawsuit's settlement. The plaintiff's arguments claiming the lawsuit influenced outcomes were found unsubstantiated, leading to the determination that he did not establish causation to qualify as a prevailing party for attorney's fees under the ADA and 42 U.S.C. 1988. The court also indicated that even if minimal causation existed, it would choose not to award fees based on the overall circumstances. Attorney Souders reported that Brady indicated he intended to use the case to extract attorneys' fees from Souders's clients, despite requests to dismiss the case to prevent unnecessary costs, a claim that Brady denied. The court found Souders's allegation credible, bolstered by Brady's behavior and the evidence of his questionable tactics. The Eighth Circuit describes nuisance settlements as potentially warranting the denial of attorneys' fees, particularly in cases deemed frivolous or extortionate. Consequently, the court denied Brady's motion for attorneys' fees based on these findings. Brady's motion, initially requesting $5,257.00 in fees and costs for alleged violations of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 and local rules, increased to $11,963.70 by the hearing's end. Rule 11 allows for sanctions against parties or attorneys for non-compliant representations made in court filings, enabling the court to award reasonable attorneys' fees to the movant. Other avenues for sanctioning inappropriate litigation conduct exist under various rules and statutes, including the court's inherent powers. Sanctions serve as deterrents for unprofessional behavior and are meant to be applied in exceptional cases where claims are clearly unmeritorious. The standard for Rule 11 violations emphasizes reasonableness under the circumstances, requiring that pleadings be grounded in fact and law following proper inquiry. Reasonableness in legal claims is defined as an objective belief at the time of filing that the claim is well-grounded in law and fact, without hindsight analysis. In this case, the defendant seeks to recover attorneys' fees from Mr. Brady, asserting violations of Rule 11(b) due to the filing of a baseless Complaint and the failure to name the correct defendants. The defendant contends that Brady did not conduct a reasonable inquiry into the ownership and operational status of Clinton House before filing the suit. Had he investigated, he would have discovered the owners' proactive steps toward ADA compliance, which would have negated the need for the lawsuit and subsequent amendments to the pleadings. The defendant also notes that there was no admission of liability by any party involved. The court agrees that Brady's actions were unreasonable and unprofessional, particularly his failure to contact the owners prior to filing, which would have clarified the situation and mitigated unnecessary litigation. However, the court cannot determine if the Complaint was frivolous under Rule 11 due to insufficient record evidence regarding the underlying merits of the claim or whether the failure to name proper parties alone warrants sanctions. Egregious conduct by Mr. Brady towards both his adversary and client was identified during the proceedings. The Court considered imposing sua sponte sanctions under 28 U.S.C. § 1927 or its inherent powers but ultimately decided against it, citing due process requirements for notice and further proceedings. The court referenced *In re Tutu Wells Contamination Litig.* and clarified that the party facing sanctions must be informed of the applicable legal rules, the reasons for the sanctions, and the potential forms they could take, as noted in *Prosser*. The Court concluded that extending the case would not serve judicial economy. Consequently, the cross-motions for attorneys' fees and expenses were denied, and the action was dismissed with prejudice. An accompanying Order will follow this Memorandum Opinion. Additionally, the document includes notes about previous court orders, the status of the First Amended Complaint naming additional parties, and the lack of response from those parties. The only defendant actively participating in the case is identified as Clinton House, which denied its legal existence. The Court also reviewed various briefs and evidence related to the motions. Finally, it noted the ownership of the property in question and the operational status of the restaurant under Sidirounda, L.L.C., without needing to resolve discrepancies surrounding ownership interests. Upper floors of the premises are not pertinent to the current issues, and no evidence was presented concerning them. In February 1996, Ritter arranged for a letter to be sent via registered mail by the Eastern Paralyzed Veterans Association to Mr. and Mrs. Gialias, urging compliance with the ADA by addressing accessibility barriers related to bathrooms, parking, and entrance. The letter did not mention Ritter or any individuals and did not threaten legal action. The only return receipt in evidence was from the Gialias' home, signed by their son, Nick, although Gialias claimed he never received the letter. Ritter clarified that Brady was not involved in this letter, as it was sent before Ritter engaged Brady's legal representation. Ritter requested to review the Complaint prior to its filing to ensure his name would be included appropriately. In a sworn certification dated April 25, 1998, Ritter indicated that he hired attorney Anthony Brady at a rate of $200 per hour, contingent on success under the ADA’s fee-shifting provisions, which he was unaware of at the time of hiring. Ritter learned about these provisions only upon signing the certification. During the evidentiary hearing, Brady appeared with attorney Pasquale Picariello, who represented the plaintiff. Ritter acknowledged awareness of Picariello's per diem arrangement but was not informed about the payment specifics, which would be coordinated by Brady. New Jersey's Rules of Professional Conduct govern attorney behavior, requiring written communication regarding fees when a lawyer has not previously represented a client, and stipulating that contingent fee agreements must be in writing. Additionally, lawyers may only advance costs related to litigation under specific conditions. The Complaint seeks a declaration that the defendants operate a discriminatory business against the disabled and requests a permanent injunction to compel compliance with the ADA and relevant New Jersey laws. The plaintiff has repeatedly attempted to dine at the defendant's restaurant and specifically visited on June 4, 1996, only to discover that the establishment was not accessible for individuals with disabilities. Key accessibility issues include the absence of disabled parking, a step at the entrance, an illegally high telephone, and inadequate bathroom facilities. The plaintiff asserts that proposed renovations in 1996 will not remedy the existing barriers, which he claims result in discrimination against disabled individuals, violating the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (NJLAD), and the New Jersey Barrier Free Code. Consequently, the plaintiff has experienced mental distress, anger, and anxiety due to this discrimination. In correspondence, the plaintiff's attorney indicated that the client purchased the restaurant in an "AS IS" condition and has invested significantly in renovations to comply with ADA and related laws. The attorney requested the dismissal of the complaint, noting that the restaurant would achieve compliance within 60 days, allowing the plaintiff to re-file if the representations were inaccurate. In response, the defendant's attorney acknowledged the defendant's delayed compliance but expressed a need to review the renovation plans to ensure they meet legal standards. The client finds the demand for dismissal of his lawsuit absurd, citing the opposing party's repeated disregard for legal compliance, particularly concerning the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). The defendant, claiming ignorance of the legal requirements, suggests pursuing claims against Design Services, the architect, and any attorneys involved with the Clinton planning board. As a result of the opposing party's response, significant legal research was required, and the plaintiff will not withdraw his complaint without assurance of ADA compliance, compensation for damages, attorney fees, and costs. The defendant's Rule 26 disclosures from October 8, 1996, identified four individuals associated with Clinton House, while the limited liability company, Sidirounda L.L.C., was only brought to light when the plaintiff sought to add individual defendants in 1998. A letter dated October 10, 1996, indicates that Brady recognized the need to amend the complaint to correctly name the owners. There is a factual dispute regarding Mr. Gialias's intentions to comply with the ADA, with conflicting statements about the existence of plans prior to the lawsuit. The defendant rejected a monetary settlement, disagreeing with the claims made by the plaintiff. Following a court-ordered extension for discovery, Brady sent interrogatories that went unanswered. A conversation on January 22, 1998, suggested that a settlement could be reached if the defendants made necessary improvements for ADA compliance, with only attorney fees remaining as a point of contention. Souders acknowledged receipt of Brady's communication, interpreting it as agreement to the proposed improvements. The only remaining legal issue concerns the obligation of the client to pay the plaintiff's attorney's fees, following an agreement to complete the entrance ramp. It is suggested that the attorney's fee issue be addressed through a Motion after receiving a summary of the time spent by the plaintiff's legal team, which appears minimal based on Mr. Brady’s observations of the proceedings. Mr. Brady has confirmed that modifications will adhere to the New Jersey Barrier Free Code and has expressed satisfaction with the settlement regarding equitable relief. He requests a response to confirm the settlement status to avoid a pretrial conference. Testimony indicates that Mr. Brady received authorization from his client to drop the damages claim and negotiate the settlement, although this was not documented in writing. The plaintiff's documentation of claimed fees and expenses is deemed insufficient by the defense, and they will not comment on the reasonableness of the claimed amounts due to the motion's outcome. The plaintiff's argument regarding the necessity of modifications since the ADA's 1992 enactment is countered by the fact that the current owners acquired the property in 1995. Additionally, the regulation cited by the plaintiff is inapplicable, as it pertains only to situations where accessibility costs exceed a specified percentage of other renovations, which is not the case here. Both arguments presented are dismissed for reasons similar to those outlined previously. Ritter last observed the premises in July 1998, before the installation of the ramp, while photos from January 1999 confirm its presence with a temporary wooden rail. The timeframe from acquisition in October 1995 to completion in Spring 1999 spanned approximately 3.5 years. Prior to the ramp's completion, wheelchair users were assisted by restaurant staff to navigate a step into the restaurant, a procedure in place before the current owners acquired Clinton House. Testimony was inconclusive regarding the ADA compliance of this assistance when provided exclusively by staff. Plaintiff's expert, Mr. Williams, evaluated 1996 floor plans and deemed them sufficient for removing barriers at the building's front. He noted that modifications to the curb and parking would require town approval, likely contingent on prior approval of the building plans for the ramp. There was no evidence that the owners did not intend to make the entrance accessible. Ritter recounted a tense phone conversation with owner Gialias about access issues, where Gialias was evasive and dismissive regarding permits for accessibility modifications. Mr. Gialias indicated that although there were no immediate plans to fix the front entrance of The Clinton House, as of June 6, 1996, the architect was working on it. In March 1996, Gialias showed Ritter the ongoing renovations, including accessible features, and mentioned discussions with the Construction Official about the ramp's design and appearance. An expert report by Mr. Williams from August 15, 1997, merely referenced ADA requirements for ramps and accessible parking without providing new insights, as the architects were already aware of these requirements. The court noted that causation might have been viewed differently if the plaintiff had accepted previous offers for compliance or if a temporary ramp had been provided, which did not occur. Testimony varied on the feasibility of a temporary ramp, but the absence of such a ramp meant the plaintiff could not claim victory on that issue. Rule 11 imposes substantive obligations on attorneys certifying that pleadings are not for improper purposes and have legal merit or evidentiary support. The record indicated that claims regarding non-compliance of bathrooms and telephones were frivolous when filed; however, since no attorney time was spent defending those claims apart from the ramp and parking issues, no sanctions under Rule 11 could be applied for those allegations.