Grimes v. Norfolk Southern Ry. Co.

Citations: 116 F. Supp. 2d 995; 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14988; 2000 WL 1511752Docket: 3:99CV0429 AS

Court: District Court, N.D. Indiana; September 18, 2000; Federal District Court

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Vernon Grimes filed a lawsuit against Norfolk Southern Railway Company (NSRC) and Douglas A. Drewery following a collision between Drewery's car and an NSRC train, which occurred on August 15, 1997. Grimes, employed as a conductor for NSRC since 1967, was injured while conducting a post-accident inspection after the incident. He claims against NSRC under the Federal Employer's Liability Act (FELA), and separately against Drewery under Indiana common law for negligence, alleging Drewery parked his car on the tracks. NSRC also cross-claimed against Drewery for damages related to Grimes' medical expenses.

The court has jurisdiction over the FELA claim under 28 U.S.C. 1331 and supplemental jurisdiction over the negligence claim under 28 U.S.C. 1367(a), as both claims arise from the same incident. Extensive discovery has been conducted, and the case involves issues of negligence, intoxication, and the responsibilities of both the train crew and Drewery at the time of the accident. The collision was exacerbated by Drewery's alleged intoxication, which he denies. Grimes and a student conductor attempted to inspect the train for damage and assist Drewery after the crash, navigating along the tracks in the dark.

Grimes faced difficulties walking near the train track due to steep grades and rolling ballast stones, prompting him to choose the edge of the ballast, approximately ten to twelve feet from the ties, for his inspection. This area was still hazardous, containing a mix of grass, weeds, dirt, and loose ballast stones, along with a large hole resembling a basketball that Grimes accidentally stepped into, leading to his injuries.

Summary judgment may be granted if there are no genuine issues of material fact, as established under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The moving party bears the initial burden to demonstrate the absence of material fact issues, after which the opposing party must present specific facts to show such issues exist, rather than relying solely on pleadings or conclusory statements. The court must view facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party during this analysis.

The document addresses motions for summary judgment filed by two defendants. Norfolk Southern Railway Corporation (NSRC) argues it was not negligent and claims that the Federal Railroad Safety Act (FRSA) regulations supersede the Federal Employers Liability Act (FELA) claims, referencing a Seventh Circuit ruling. Drewery contends that an intervening cause absolves him of liability for Grimes' injuries. The analysis begins with NSRC's argument about the preclusion of Grimes' FELA claims by FRSA regulations, as resolving this issue would render the negligence question moot. FELA has been in effect since the early 20th century, aiming to reduce injuries and fatalities on interstate railroads.

In Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Gottshall, the U.S. Supreme Court emphasized the inherent physical dangers of railroad operations, leading to the enactment of the Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA), which provides a broad remedial framework holding railroads liable for employee injuries due to negligence. FELA aims to enhance worker safety by transferring some business risks from employees to employers. In 1970, Congress introduced the Federal Railroad Safety Act (FRSA) to promote uniform railroad safety standards. The FRSA grants the Secretary of Transportation the authority to regulate railroad safety, including a preemption clause that limits state regulation when federal standards are established. The Supreme Court has ruled that federal regulations can preempt state laws in specific areas, such as train speed and warning signs at crossings.

In the case of Waymire v. Norfolk, Western Railway Company, the Seventh Circuit applied the Supreme Court's precedent by ruling that an employee's FELA claim concerning unsafe train speed and inadequate warning devices was preempted by FRSA regulations. The court noted that applying different standards for negligence claims under FELA compared to state law would contradict the goal of national uniformity in railroad safety regulation. The Seventh Circuit concluded that the same standards should apply to all negligence claims against railroads, regardless of whether they arise under state law or FELA.

The Court is tasked with determining if the Waymire case alters the standards of care and liability for the FELA claim involving Grimes and Norfolk. The decisions from both the district court and the Seventh Circuit in Waymire are pivotal. The Plaintiff asserts two key claims against NSRC: first, that NSRC was negligent for not discovering and correcting a hazardous hole due to inadequate inspections, implying constructive notice of the defect; second, that NSRC failed to ensure a safe working environment, specifically a safe walkway for conductors during visual inspections, as mandated by company policy. 

NSRC argues that certain regulations under the Federal Railroad Safety Act (FRSA) pertain to these claims, asserting that compliance with these regulations should exempt it from liability under FELA for accidents occurring when employees navigate the railroad right-of-way. The cited regulations outline requirements concerning roadbed construction, ballast placement, track structure, vegetation control, and inspection protocols. Specifically, they detail safety standards for railroad tracks, including the need for proper drainage, alignment, and frequency of inspections, emphasizing that inspections must be thorough and conducted by designated personnel.

Class 4 track inspections must occur twice weekly, with at least a one-day interval between inspections. If any deviations from the regulatory requirements are found, immediate remedial action is required. NSRC claims compliance with these regulations, asserting it cannot be liable for negligent track inspection or unsafe walkways. However, the Plaintiff questions NSRC's compliance, noting that inspections are conducted using high rail vehicles at speeds of 20 to 25 mph, potentially causing inspectors to overlook hazardous conditions. The regulation addresses inspection speeds for crossings but does not specify speeds for inspections between crossings, allowing the Plaintiff's claim regarding inadequate inspection to proceed without being precluded by the Federal Railroad Safety Act (FRSA).

Additionally, the Plaintiff alleges NSRC's negligence for failing to provide safe walkways for employees inspecting train cars. The Plaintiff contends that conductors frequently need to walk alongside trains for inspections, establishing NSRC’s duty to ensure a safe walking surface. NSRC counters that its compliance with track construction and ballasting regulations precludes this claim. The legal landscape is divided, with some Circuit Courts of Appeal ruling that compliance with federal regulations does not necessarily preempt state laws regarding walkway safety, while others have found preemption in cases where state regulations conflict with federal ones. Several cases illustrate this divide, with varying conclusions on the preemption of state walkway regulations by FRSA standards.

Every circuit that has addressed the issue of walkways has determined that the Federal Railroad Safety Act (FRSA) does not address the safety of walkways for railroad employees. The FRSA regulations focus on ensuring a safe roadbed for trains rather than safe walkways for employees conducting trackside inspections. This court finds no basis in the cited regulations that would prevent the plaintiff from claiming the railroad was negligent for not providing a safe walkway.

There is no evidence in the FRSA’s language or legislative history suggesting an intent to undermine the Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA) or its objectives. The Supreme Court and Circuit Courts have not shown hostility toward FELA's legislative purpose, and the Supreme Court has never ruled on the interplay between FRSA and FELA negligence claims. Circuit courts are divided on this issue, as noted in the Waymire case.

The court also rejects the defendant's request to extend Waymire to block any FELA negligence claims related to conduct covered by FRSA regulations. Regarding the plaintiff's claim for negligent inspection, the court emphasizes a straightforward application of FELA to a railroad employee's injury occurring while engaged in proper conduct. Although comparative fault may reduce damage awards, this does not need to be addressed at this stage.

To fulfill FELA's remedial purpose, the Supreme Court has applied a relaxed causation standard, allowing claims to proceed if employer negligence played any role, even minimally, in the incident. However, FELA remains a negligence statute, not a workers' compensation scheme, requiring evidence of the railroad's negligence causing the plaintiff's injuries. The Seventh Circuit mandates that a FELA plaintiff establish common law negligence elements—duty, breach, foreseeability, and causation—under a prudent person standard. The plaintiff must demonstrate circumstances that a reasonable person would foresee as hazardous. In this context, the plaintiff asserts that proper track inspection would have revealed a hole that caused his injuries.

Grimes contends that the inspections conducted by NSRC were inadequate for two primary reasons: first, the high rail cars were inspected at an excessive speed which hindered effective evaluation; second, he asserts that foot inspections should periodically occur, which would have detected the hole that caused his injury. Grimes argues NSRC had notice of the hazardous condition, citing an employee who mowed the area at a slow enough speed to notice and report the hole. Testimony indicates that high rail inspections were typically conducted at 25 miles per hour, raising questions about their adequacy in identifying hazards for employees who must inspect the tracks on foot. 

Despite these arguments, Grimes admitted during his deposition that the hole was difficult to see due to the dead grass blending with the surrounding dirt, a point corroborated by NSRC employees who searched the track without finding the hole. Consequently, Grimes failed to provide sufficient evidence beyond his own testimony to support his claim of inadequate inspection, leading to the conclusion that NSRC did not have notice of the hole that contributed to his injuries. The court emphasized that while the threshold for establishing negligence under the Federal Railroad Safety Act (FRSA) is lower, the plaintiff must still present evidence linking NSRC's negligence to his injuries to survive summary judgment. As a result, NSRC's Motion for Summary Judgment regarding the negligent inspection claim was granted.

Additionally, Grimes alleges NSRC's negligence in failing to maintain a safe walkway for employees required to inspect trains along the tracks. He notes that the grade and ballast conditions were unsafe, forcing him to walk in a hazardous area filled with weeds, dead grass, and other obstacles. Grimes claims NSRC did not adhere to its own safety standards for track beds in this area. NSRC referenced Judge Learned Hand's negligence formula in its defense, asserting it was not negligent.

Judge Hand's liability formula, articulated in United States v. Carroll Towing Co., establishes that liability hinges on whether the burden of taking adequate precautions is less than the product of the gravity of injury and the probability of injury. The Seventh Circuit has applied this formula in cases involving claims under the Federal Employers Liability Act (FELA). A conclusion that the cost of precautions significantly outweighs the potential loss they could prevent negates the possibility of recovery. The railroad contends that the burden of ensuring safe walkways across its extensive rail network exceeds the calculated risks of employee injuries. Testimony from NSRC's Trainmaster, William Banta, indicated that it is uncommon for crew members to walk near the tracks in question. However, the Plaintiff has presented affidavits from conductors and an engineer asserting that such incidents occur frequently, particularly due to a 'hot box' detector that necessitates stops and inspections. The court deems the matters of walkway safety, frequency of use, costs, and the cost-benefit analysis as factual issues unsuitable for summary judgment, thus denying NSRC's motion.

In Claim II, the Plaintiff alleges negligence against Drewery for leaving his vehicle on the tracks, which purportedly caused a train-auto collision that led to injuries. Under Indiana law, to prove negligence, the Plaintiff must establish that Drewery owed a duty of care, breached that duty, and that the breach was the proximate cause of the injuries. Drewery argues for summary judgment, claiming the Plaintiff did not demonstrate that his actions were a proximate cause of the injuries, as the Plaintiff was injured after the collision while inspecting the train. Drewery contends that it was not foreseeable that conditions along the railroad would lead to the Plaintiff's injury post-collision, asserting that the railroad's and the Plaintiff’s own negligence were intervening causes that would absolve him of liability.

To establish proximate cause for the Plaintiff's injuries, Drewery's negligent act must initiate a chain of circumstances leading to the injury, as outlined in Indiana case law. The injury must be a natural and probable consequence that the defendant could reasonably foresee. While exact foreseeability of the harm's manner is not required, a general anticipation of injurious outcomes is necessary.

Drewery's interpretation of intervening, superceding cause is flawed; previous cases demonstrate that such a defense applies only to negligence by third parties, not parties in the suit. Examples include cases where injuries resulted from third-party negligence following an original wrongful act by the defendant. Drewery's cited cases illustrate that an original negligent act must be linked to a third-party act to cut off liability.

In this instance, there is no third-party negligence between Drewery's actions and Grimes' injuries. Any potential negligence by NSRC would have occurred before the accident, making Drewery's appropriate claim one of comparative fault under Indiana law. If Drewery suggests Grimes' negligence caused the injuries, liability could only be severed if Grimes is found more than fifty percent at fault.

The court concludes that parking a car on railroad tracks at night logically leads to a collision with a train, which includes foreseeable subsequent actions by railroad employees that could result in injury. Thus, the Plaintiff's injuries are directly linked to Drewery's negligence. Consequently, Drewery's Motion for Summary Judgment is denied, while NSRC's Motion for Summary Judgment is partially granted and partially denied, with the case set for expedited trial.