Thanks for visiting! Welcome to a new way to research case law. You are viewing a free summary from Descrybe.ai. For citation and good law / bad law checking, legal issue analysis, and other advanced tools, explore our Legal Research Toolkit — not free, but close.
Big Creek Lumber Co. v. County of Santa Cruz
Citations: 136 P.3d 821; 45 Cal. Rptr. 3d 21; 38 Cal. 4th 1139; 6 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 5802; 2006 Daily Journal DAR 8572; 36 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 20127; 2006 Cal. LEXIS 8227Docket: S123659
Court: California Supreme Court; June 29, 2006; California; State Supreme Court
The Supreme Court of California addressed the issue of whether two county zoning ordinances concerning the location of timber operations in Santa Cruz County were preempted by state forestry statutes. The court determined that the ordinances were not preempted, leading to the reversal of the Court of Appeal's judgment. The background involved the Santa Cruz County Board of Supervisors adopting ordinances in 1999 that regulated timber harvesting by designating specific zone districts and restricting operations near streams and residences. Additionally, these ordinances included limitations on helicopter operations related to timber harvesting. The County had also secured certification from the California Coastal Commission for the zone district ordinance as an amendment to its local coastal program. Plaintiffs, including Big Creek Lumber Company and the Central Coast Forest Association, challenged the ordinances and the Commission's certification through a petition for a writ of mandate. Plaintiffs alleged violations of the California Environmental Quality Act by the County and the California Coastal Commission, along with claims that the County's ordinances were preempted by state law. The trial court ruled largely in favor of the plaintiffs, except regarding the zone district ordinance. The Court of Appeal subsequently invalidated all of the County's ordinances. The County sought review of this decision, focusing on its helicopter and zone district ordinances. The zone district ordinance restricts timber harvesting to designated areas, while the helicopter ordinance mandates that associated facilities be located on or adjacent to timber-zoned parcels and within approved timber harvesting plans. Plaintiffs contended these ordinances were preempted by the Z'berg-Nejedly Forest Practice Act (FPA) of 1973 and the California Timberland Productivity Act (TPA) of 1982. The summary concludes that the County's ordinances are not preempted by these state laws. The FPA aims to regulate timber harvesting comprehensively, allowing counties to implement stricter regulations than those under the FPA until 1982, when it restricted counties from regulating timber operations except in specific areas, such as performance bonds for road protection. The FPA mandates a site-specific timber harvesting plan for operations, subject to state review for compliance. The TPA reinforces that timber operations consistent with adopted forest practice rules should not face restrictions based on land use in their vicinity. The Timberland Production Act (TPA) aims to designate qualifying timberland into timberland production zones (TPZs) to promote timber growth and harvesting. Timberland is defined as privately owned land or state-acquired land used for timber cultivation, capable of producing at least 15 cubic feet of wood fiber per acre annually. The TPA employs tax incentives and zoning regulations, restricting TPZ land use to timber-related activities in exchange for lower property tax valuations. The earlier legislation required "timberland preserve" zoning for designated parcels assessed for timber as the highest use, allowing exceptions only for non-timber use or where exclusion served public interest. Since 1978, property owners have been able to petition for additional zoning and rezoning under the TPA. On preemption principles, the burden of proving that state law overrides local ordinances rests with the claimant. California courts typically hesitate to presume legislative intent to preempt local regulations, especially when local interests are significant and vary by locality. Local government retains regulatory authority in areas traditionally under its control, such as land use, unless there is explicit legislative intent to preempt such regulations. The presumption against preemption aligns with the principle that legislative changes should not overturn established legal principles unless clearly stated. General principles of state statutory preemption of local land use regulation establish that the California Legislature defines minimum standards for local zoning while maintaining a strong intent to preserve local control. Local governments have the authority to create and enforce ordinances that do not conflict with state laws, as outlined in the California Constitution. Conflicts arise when local legislation duplicates, contradicts, or occupies areas fully governed by state law. The excerpt discusses a specific legal case regarding a zone district ordinance and its potential preemption by section 4516.5(d) of the Forest Practices Act (FPA), which prohibits counties from regulating timber operations. The court in Big Creek Lumber Co. v. County of San Mateo determined that while the conduct of timber operations is governed by state law, counties can still exercise zoning authority to regulate where timber operations occur. This ruling reinforces the idea that local governments retain significant zoning powers and that legislative intent supports their ability to regulate land use based on local conditions. The historical context emphasizes that local land use regulation derives from inherent police power, not solely from state delegation, allowing cities and counties to exercise broad control over their zoning matters. Municipalities enacting zoning ordinances perform a legislative function, with a presumption in favor of their validity. Under the Forest Practice Act (FPA), the Legislature has instructed the Board to establish districts and create specific forest practice rules, mandating that timber operations require an approved timber harvesting plan. Although counties can recommend regulations, they lack authority to regulate the conduct of timber operations. The issue of express preemption hinges on whether the legislative provisions cover county zoning ordinances. Interpretation of statutes focuses on legislative intent, primarily derived from the statutory language. Section 4516.5(d) does not explicitly mention "zoning" nor prohibits localities from regulating the location of timber operations; it only restricts counties from regulating the operations themselves. The court in Big Creek v. San Mateo clarified that an ordinance addressing the location of operations does not constitute a regulation of how they are conducted. While zoning may limit logging locations, it does not equate to regulating the conduct of such operations. When a statute allows multiple interpretations, extrinsic aids such as legislative history and public policy help clarify intent. Evidence supports that local authority is preserved in state forestry law, particularly regarding timberland zoning, as local actions are required for designating Timberland Production Zones (TPZs). Local authorities have the power to rezone parcels that do not meet state standards, allowing them to designate new zones in conformity with county general plans. Local bodies have the authority to rezone Timberland Production Zone (TPZ) parcels or convert them to different uses under specific circumstances, as outlined in Government Code sections 51120 and 51133. The Legislature has delegated significant zoning decisions to local authorities, including the regulation of uses outside TPZ zones, as clarified in Big Creek v. San Mateo. There is no explicit prohibition against the use of zoning ordinances in the statutory framework. Section 4516.5(d) does not completely eliminate local authority over matters traditionally under municipal control, as seen in Waste Resource Technologies v. Dept. of Public Health. The phrase "regulate the conduct" in section 4516.5(d) is interpreted to limit local regulations only concerning the execution of timber operations, which include issues such as fire prevention, soil erosion control, and water quality. The legislative history of the Forest Practice Act (FPA) does not support an expansive interpretation of section 4516.5(d) that would undermine local zoning authority. The simultaneous enactment of the FPA and Timberland Production Act (TPA) suggests that the Legislature intended to maintain local zoning authority while also influencing how local agencies exercise this power. A TPZ designation alerts residents that timber operations can occur, aiming to prevent urban service expansion into timberlands. The County’s zoning ordinance promotes timber harvesting by requiring non-TPZ landowners to rezone their properties into designated zones suitable for such activities. The Legislature aims to include all qualifying timberland in timberland production zones, as indicated by section 51103. Interpreting section 4516.5(d) to cover every local regulation of timber operations disregards the specific phrase "the conduct of" within the express preemption provision of the Forest Practices Act (FPA). The Supreme Court has emphasized that every phrase in such provisions limits the scope of local actions that can be preempted. The plaintiffs’ interpretation would render the phrase "the conduct of" meaningless and violate the principle that statutes should be construed to give effect to all words. Their reading risks making the FPA's definition of "timberland" partially redundant. The FPA defines timberland as land capable of growing commercially viable trees, and plaintiffs' view would undermine local authorities' ability to designate which parcels are available for timbering. The Legislature has shown it can explicitly preempt all regulations when desired, as seen in the Timberland Production Act (TPA), which restricts timberland use to growing timber and states that timber operations on these parcels are solely regulated by state laws. Reading section 4516.5(d) as entirely preempting local zoning could lead to unreasonable outcomes, such as permitting logging in residential areas, which is not supported by the statute’s language or its legislative history. The Legislature has not amended section 4516.5(d) despite opportunities to clarify its interpretation following the Big Creek v. San Mateo decision, suggesting legislative approval of that judicial understanding. The continued reliance on Big Creek by courts further implies legislative acquiescence to its interpretation of the FPA. The Court of Appeal in Big Creek v. San Mateo determined that the conduct of timber harvesting operations is exclusively governed by state law. However, the term "conduct" lacks a specialized definition in the Forest Practice Act (FPA), and its ordinary meaning encompasses the execution of tasks or business activities. Consequently, local zoning ordinances that address the location of timber operations but not their execution are not expressly preempted by section 4516.5(d). Implied preemption is not supported when the Legislature has clearly expressed its intent to allow local regulations. The presence of explicit preemptive action in certain areas suggests that preemption by implication is not intended elsewhere. Specifically, since section 4516.5(d) explicitly preempts local regulations concerning the conduct of timber operations, it implicitly allows for local regulations regarding other aspects of timber operations. Additionally, general forestry law, particularly the Timber Harvesting Act (TPA), acknowledges local zoning authority. The analysis of implied preemption requires examining the legislative intent and scope of the overall scheme. Implied preemption may occur when: 1) state law fully covers a subject, indicating exclusive state concern; 2) state law partially covers a subject and shows a paramount state concern that does not allow for local action; or 3) the local ordinance adversely affects transient citizens more than it benefits the municipality. Plaintiffs argue that the Legislature's intent to create a comprehensive regulatory system for timberlands indicates a desire to preempt local restrictions. They reference section 4513's statement of intent as evidence. However, the County counters that the Legislature concurrently enacted provisions allowing counties to adopt stricter timber harvest regulations, indicating that local authority is not fully preempted. Plaintiffs' "expressio unius" argument presumes that state preemption of local timber operation regulations includes geographic zoning restrictions. However, Section 4516.5(d) does not support such a broad interpretation, indicating the Legislature did not need to exempt county zoning powers from preemption. General forestry law preempts local regulation of timber operation conduct but allows localities to maintain zoning authority. Local governments are required to designate Timber Production Zones (TPZs) for timber growth and harvesting, where logging cannot be prohibited. For other lands with timber, the Timber Production Act (TPA) reaffirms local zoning authority, allowing counties to exclude parcels from TPZs in the public interest and to determine the zoning of these excluded parcels. California's Planning and Zoning Law recognizes local authority over zoning related to timber resources, emphasizing maximum control over local zoning matters. It mandates that counties include timberland production in their general plans, suggesting the possibility of land use categories that do not support timber production. The case does not reflect a complete occupation of the field by general law, which would indicate an exclusive state concern. While plaintiffs argue that the state has a paramount interest in regulating timber operation locations, citing various requirements from the Forest Practice Act (FPA), the argument does not diminish local authority to designate permissible zoning for non-TPZ locations. Logging activities, even when compliant with state regulations, may still be subject to local zoning authority oversight. State efforts to regulate logging do not negate local zoning control, similar to how state and federal air pollution regulations do not prevent local authorities from restricting industrial plants in residential areas. The California Attorney General previously determined that local zoning ordinances, like the one in Marin County that aimed to prohibit commercial logging, are not preempted by state laws governing these activities. While state regulations exist for forestry practices, they do not invalidate reasonable local zoning ordinances that restrict logging. Concerns raised by plaintiffs about localities potentially banning timber harvesting are addressed by clarifying that the existing ordinance allows timber harvesting in designated zones, such as timberland production and mineral extraction areas. The requirement for timber harvesting to occur in specific zones does not constitute a ban on such activities. The county acknowledges that landowners can seek rezoning for timber harvesting, which the county cannot deny if the parcels qualify. A local ordinance is not considered preempted by state law unless it directly conflicts with state mandates. In this case, the county's ordinances do not conflict with state forestry laws, allowing compliance with both. The zone district ordinance does not conflict with general forestry law, as it does not mandate actions that forestry laws prohibit or vice versa. While forestry laws promote the sustained production of timber, they do not require the harvesting of every tree. Therefore, the County's zoning ordinance may restrict logging of certain trees without violating state law. Plaintiffs have not demonstrated a legislative intent in the Forest Practices Act (FPA) to preempt local zoning authority regarding timber operation locations. This aligns with the Court of Appeal's decision in Big Creek v. San Mateo, which affirmed that counties retain zoning power to restrict timber cutting outside Timber Production Zones (TPZs). Similarly, the County's helicopter ordinance regulates the location of facilities involved in timber operations rather than the operations themselves. It does not restrict timber removal by helicopters or how it is conducted, as the County recognizes it cannot prohibit such removal. The ordinance mandates that helicopter staging and servicing occur on designated timber harvesting-zoned land or adjacent parcels, within an approved timber harvesting plan. It is not preempted by state forestry law, as both the FPA and Timber Harvesting Act (TPA) allow localities to address public health and safety concerns, thereby supporting the helicopter ordinance's intent to mitigate community concerns over noise and safety from aerial timber transport. The judgment of the Court of Appeal is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings. A dissenting opinion contends that the majority's interpretation of section 4516.5(d) is inconsistent with its language and intent, arguing that it should preempt local restrictions on timber operation locations as well. The majority's distinction between county resolutions, rules, and ordinances regulating logging practices versus those controlling the locations of logging is flawed and could allow for manipulation of the Forest Practices Act (FPA). The Court of Appeal rightly dismissed this distinction, determining that state law preempts the relevant county regulations. The contested Santa Cruz County resolutions and ordinances, adopted in 1999, include two that restrict timber harvesting to specific zoning districts and another that limits helicopter operations to designated areas. The central issue is whether these local measures are preempted by the FPA, particularly section 4516.5, subdivision (d), which prohibits counties from regulating timber operations beyond the authority granted by the State Board of Forestry, except for specific bonding requirements for road protection. The interpretation of this language involves understanding the legislative intent and adhering to the plain meaning of the statute. Historically, the FPA allowed counties to impose stricter regulations; however, by the early 1980s, it became evident that such local ordinances hindered timber harvesting contrary to the FPA's objectives. This led to the 1982 revision of the FPA, which eliminated direct local control and instead permitted counties to recommend regulations to the Board of Forestry. The Board must adopt these recommendations if they align with state law and the needs of the proposing county. Thus, except for the limited authority to require surety for road protection, local regulations on timber operations are preempted by state law under the current framework established by the FPA. The FPA explicitly prohibits counties from regulating timber operations, stating that they cannot impose permits or licenses for these activities. The preemption provision is interpreted broadly, aiming to eliminate any local regulations regarding timber operations, not just those affecting the methods of operation. The term "conduct" encompasses the entire process of timber operations, indicating that local measures restricting logging locations fundamentally regulate the conduct of these operations. The legislature did not differentiate between "where" and "how" regulations, as such distinctions are impractical; local ordinances that restrict practices like clear-cutting or the use of heavy machinery inherently impact both the location and method of logging. Overall, section 4516.5, subdivision (d) is intended to apply to all aspects of county regulation concerning timber operations, addressing both procedural and substantive concerns. The Legislature did not intend for counties to effectively prohibit timber harvesting through local ordinances that limit where such operations can occur. Section 4516.5, subdivision (d), suggests that both the zoning ordinance and the helicopter ordinance regulate the conduct of timber operations by restricting how these operations are carried out. The intent behind section 4516.5 was likely to eliminate local ordinances that interfere with timber operations, as evidenced by its sunset provision, which nullified existing county regulations effective July 1, 1983. This provision explicitly renders local ordinances regulating timber operations null and void, contradicting any notion that the Legislature only aimed to restrict local authority over the manner of timber harvesting. The FPA’s savings clause allows counties to maintain their power to declare nuisances but does not mention zoning ordinances, indicating a deliberate omission. Thus, local zoning ordinances aimed at limiting timber operations fall under the preemptive scope of section 4516.5, subdivision (d). Legislation 856 significantly curtailed local regulatory authority over timber operations by introducing section 4516.5 to the Forest Practice Act (FPA). The intent of the Legislature, as articulated in the Conference Committee report, was to preempt counties like Santa Cruz, Santa Clara, and others from enforcing stricter forest practice rules than those established under the Z'berg-Nejedly Forest Practice Act. The Legislative Analyst noted that the bill repealed existing laws allowing counties to impose more stringent regulations, while creating a process for counties to propose new rules to the Board of Forestry. The Department of Forestry emphasized that the law eliminates counties' ability to regulate timber harvesting and instead delegates authority to the Board of Forestry to address local concerns. Importantly, the Legislature did not indicate an intent to allow counties to control the location of timber harvesting while limiting their authority over operational procedures. Section 4516.5 was enacted in response to local ordinances that hindered timber harvesting, which was contrary to the FPA's objectives. Specifically, section 4516.5, subdivision (d) prohibits local regulation of the "conduct" of timber operations, which encompasses both the actions involved and the manner in which they are performed. Furthermore, the legislation nullified all existing local rules regarding timber growing and harvesting. These provisions collectively restrict counties from regulating timber harvesting directly, challenging the majority's view that only operational regulations were affected, thereby allowing counties to effectively prevent timber harvesting. A county can regulate the location of timber harvesting without determining the methods of harvesting. The majority opinion in this case argues for a presumption against state preemption when local interests vary significantly, adapting the Fisher decision's presumption into a "clear indication" rule. This rule suggests that local regulations are presumed valid unless the Legislature explicitly indicates a preemptive intent. However, the majority's interpretation lacks support in existing case law, as it improperly extends a principle from federal preemption to state-local relations without assessing its applicability. The majority's conclusion that the Legislature did not express clear preemptive intent in section 4516.5, subdivision (d) due to the absence of specific terms like "zoning" is criticized. There is no precedent for requiring explicit language for legislative intent, and such a "magic words" approach undermines the Legislature's authority by imposing unnecessary linguistic requirements for judicial recognition of its intentions. Courts should not impose arbitrary standards on legislative expression. The majority opinion lacks clarity regarding the authority of courts to dictate the specific wording legislative drafters must use to convey legislative intent. It asserts that the Legislature must articulate its intent clearly enough for courts to interpret it effectively. The majority's criticism highlights an arbitrary selection of required "terms," arguing that the Legislature's wording in Section 4516.5, subdivision (d), which relates to the regulation of timber operations, should suffice. However, the majority finds this wording inadequate, claiming that the Legislature should have explicitly addressed zoning and locational ordinances, focusing on the manner of regulation rather than the substance. The majority's interpretation suggests that the phrase "the conduct of" in Section 4516.5, subdivision (d) implies a limitation of the preemption provision solely to the processes of logging, which the dissent argues is an overreach. This interpretation risks allowing evasion through creative statutory drafting and contradicts the principle that unnecessary terms should not undermine the Legislature's intent. The dissent emphasizes that the same phrasing used in various sections of the law should carry consistent meanings, indicating that the term in question does not restrict the Board of Forestry’s authority to regulate both the methods and locations of timber harvesting. Additionally, the dissent challenges the majority's reliance on the California Timberland Productivity Act of 1982 for support, asserting that such an interpretation is flawed. The Timber Production Act (TPA) aims to discourage the premature conversion of timberland to urban uses and promote investment in timberlands based on expected harvests. To address concerns that conventional taxation hampers timber operations, the TPA modifies and reaffirms a system where timberlands are classified as "Timberland Production Zones" (TPZs), allowing for tax assessments based on their value for timber production and compatible uses, thereby providing tax relief to timber growers. The majority opinion notes that the TPA's provisions regarding TPZs reference local zoning authority, but this does not indicate that the Legislature intended for counties to regulate timber operations directly. The specific language of Government Code section 51115 mandates that TPZ parcels be limited to timber growing and harvesting, regulated exclusively by state statutes. This reflects a clear legislative intent to restrict local regulation of timber operations. Furthermore, the language in section 4516.5, enacted alongside the TPA, reinforces this intent by indicating that counties cannot regulate timber operations. The majority interprets this as implying that timber harvesting on non-TPZ parcels does not have to adhere to state-only regulations, suggesting alternative interpretations. This legislative action may have aimed to reaffirm principles from section 4516.5, even if unnecessary, and the majority’s reading of section 4516.5 creates redundancy, as the specification regarding compliance for fire-prevention timber harvesting implies local zoning authority is still relevant. The majority's argument against timber harvesting near residential areas, citing the absurdity doctrine, is criticized as flawed. Despite section 4516.5, subdivision (d) potentially limiting local control over timber operations, counties retain the authority to designate certain timber activities as nuisances. The Department of Forestry oversees timber harvesting through the review of plans that must comply with the Forest Practice Act (FPA). The central issue is whether localities can restrict timber operations on parcels over three acres near residences, especially when the Board of Forestry has not implemented adequate regulations and the timber harvesting plan fails to address local concerns. The Legislature has already determined that local regulation of timber harvesting on TPZ-zoned parcels is prohibited, implying confidence in the Board of Forestry's safeguards. Additionally, the majority's reliance on perceived legislative acquiescence regarding the Big Creek I decision is challenged; the author argues that there is no obligation to adhere to earlier rulings simply because they were first published. The text highlights that the court often upholds more recent decisions, emphasizing that legislative acquiescence should not heavily influence the current case. The excerpt addresses the issue of legislative acquiescence regarding the interpretation of section 4516.5 of the Forest Practices Act (FPA) in light of judicial decisions, specifically referencing the case of Big Creek I. It highlights that the Legislature has amended the FPA multiple times since the Big Creek I decision without revisiting section 4516.5, which raises questions about whether the subject of state preemption of local authority over timber operations was considered during these amendments. The last amendment to section 4516.5 occurred in 1984, prior to Big Creek I's ruling, and the amendments to other sections of the FPA do not demonstrate legislative acceptance of the interpretation advanced in Big Creek I. The analysis draws parallels to Ventura County Deputy Sheriffs' Assn. v. Board of Retirement, where the Supreme Court determined that amendments addressing different aspects of pension law did not imply acquiescence in prior interpretations, as the general subject was not revisited by the Legislature. The excerpt concludes by asserting that, similarly, the lack of evidence indicating that the preemption of local timber regulation was addressed by the Legislature undermines the majority's reliance on legislative acquiescence. Finally, it questions whether the Legislature endorsed a broad application of the reasoning in Big Creek I, particularly regarding local ordinances affecting logging near dwellings. The court upheld the validity of the ordinance regulating logging locations, distinguishing it from regulations that dictate the methods of logging. The author expresses skepticism regarding the Legislature's silence on section 4516.5, subdivision (d) for a decade, suggesting it does not imply support for all ordinances framed as "where" regulations. The Santa Cruz helicopter ordinance, enacted after the Board of Forestry rejected a similar regulation, exemplifies this concern as it limits the locations for helicopter operations, thereby indirectly controlling logging methods within the county. The majority's support for this ordinance suggests that the distinction between “where” and “how” regulations is misleading, allowing local regulations on timber operations to circumvent section 4516.5, subdivision (d). While the County may argue a nuisance defense for its helicopter ordinance, this issue remains unaddressed. The author believes that the County's resolutions violate the intent of section 4516.5, subdivision (d) and dissents from the majority opinion. The excerpt also includes references to notes on related legal definitions and legislative intents concerning timber operations and land use. The state policy affirms that timber operations adhering to forest practice rules set by the State Board of Forestry and Fire Protection should not face restrictions or prohibitions based on local land use. The designation of "timberland preserve" was changed to "timberland production" in 1984. In federal law, the burden of proving that a state statute is preempted lies with the party claiming preemption. The U.S. Supreme Court has established a presumption against preemption, particularly in areas traditionally governed by states, indicating that federal legislation must clearly express an intent to supersede state authority. Article XI, section 7 of the California Constitution permits local governments to enact regulations that do not conflict with general laws, while Government Code section 65800 emphasizes the intention for counties and cities to maintain control over local zoning matters. Timber operation regulations encompass various environmental protections and management practices, including fire prevention, soil erosion control, and water quality management. Local governments have been recognized in case law as having the authority to implement comprehensive zoning and buffer zones for community planning. Furthermore, the Timberland Productivity Act mandates that cities and counties designate certain timberlands as "timberland production zones." The Legislature previously declared all county ordinances related to timber operations null and void in section 4516.5, subdivision (e), while only aiming to limit local authority over timber harvesting in an earlier subdivision. The dissent's interpretation of the sunset provision's effects on the legal landscape is acknowledged but not speculated upon regarding the Legislature's policy goals amid competing interests at the time. The sunset provision was repealed in 1984, meaning it does not apply to ordinances adopted in 1999. Current provisions allow counties to regulate timber operations on small parcels, require performance bonds for road protection, and ensure compliance with implementing ordinances. Notably, since the Big Creek v. San Mateo decision upheld a local zoning ordinance, no counties have sought to prohibit timber harvesting entirely, and the County has rezoned over 800 acres for timber production. The interpretation of statutory provisions aimed at achieving multiple objectives emphasizes the need to harmonize these goals. The FPA contains a savings clause affirming local government authority to manage nuisances and allows for local regulations on certain timber operations to remain unaffected by the preemption clause. After the sunset period expired, the Legislature amended section 4516.5 to remove the sunset provision, indicating intent not to preserve local zoning authority, as evidenced by the absence of explicit language in the FPA that would protect local zoning prerogatives, unlike other statutes. The majority's response to the sunset provision is limited to stating that it is irrelevant since it is no longer part of the FPA. Assessing a statute requires understanding the Legislature's intent during its enactment. The sunset provision in section 4516.5 reveals significant legislative intent regarding limiting local authority over timber operations. Its subsequent removal does not diminish its relevance for interpreting the original intent. Legislative actions after the provision’s passage do not clarify the intent at that time. A prior case, Morehart v. County of Santa Barbara, affirmed established principles regarding state preemption of local land use regulations without referencing a presumption against preemption. The predecessor statute, Z'berg-Warren-Keene-Collier Forest Taxation Reform Act, replaced an ad valorem tax with a yield tax on harvested timber, thereby discouraging premature harvesting. The interpretation of section 4516.5, subdivision (d) does not make the definition of "timberland" in section 4526 surplusage, as land may be capable of timber harvesting yet not available for operations under state regulations. The Board of Forestry has actively engaged in drafting rules, including those specific to Santa Cruz County. Moreover, the Legislature's preemption of local regulations regarding timber operations does not eliminate counties' ability to enforce regulations for aesthetic purposes or other local interests.