Boston's Children First v. City of Boston

Citations: 98 F. Supp. 2d 111; 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7368; 2000 WL 694199Docket: C.A. 99-11330-NG

Court: District Court, D. Massachusetts; May 19, 2000; Federal District Court

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Plaintiffs, including Boston's Children FIRST and ten white minors, allege they were denied their preferred school assignments in the Boston Public Schools due to race, in violation of federal and state law. They seek compensatory or nominal damages, along with declaratory and injunctive relief, and aim to represent a class of similarly affected white students. The defendants—City of Boston, the Boston School Committee, the mayor, and individual committee members—have moved to dismiss the case, asserting that the plaintiffs lack a viable claim. Notably, the School Committee voted on July 14, 1999, to abolish racial/ethnic guidelines for school assignments starting in the 2000-2001 school year, although the future assignment process remains uncertain. During oral arguments, the City of Boston's counsel assured that current school assignments would be maintained. The defendants supported their motion to dismiss with affidavits from Hagop N. Yessayan, who oversees the implementation of the Controlled Choice Student Assignment Plan and manages related data.

Yessayan's affidavits outline the school assignment process, which considers factors such as sibling assignments, residence in the walk zone, student preference rankings, enrollment priority, available seats within a racial composition range, and randomly assigned lottery numbers. Both parties acknowledge that race is a factor in this process. The defendants argue that some plaintiffs were not denied their preferred assignments due to race but because of the operation of other race-neutral factors, claiming that these plaintiffs lack standing. They assert that even those denied based on race cannot maintain claims for declaratory and injunctive relief, and that claims for nominal damages alone are insufficient to sustain the case.

Conversely, the plaintiffs contend that their race was a decisive factor in the denial of their preferred assignments and argue against relying solely on Yessayan's affidavits. They seek to access assignment records through discovery and challenge the defendants' standing argument, asserting that not being able to compete equally for seats constitutes a sufficient injury for standing.

The court agrees that plaintiffs should be allowed to conduct discovery before addressing arguments based on Yessayan's affidavits. The motion to dismiss is denied, except for five plaintiffs who did not apply to change schools in the 1999-2000 school year, thus lacking grounds for injunctive relief but potentially having claims for damages. Specific allegations from plaintiffs John Feeney and Jamie Lee Higgins are noted, detailing their race-based denials of school assignments in 1998 and 1999.

Kayleigh Barry-Meltzer claims she was denied her first three choices for 'K2' kindergarten in 1997 and subsequently for first grade due to her race, despite an empty seat being available that was not awarded to her in the standard assignment process. Andrew Sharaffa asserts similar discrimination regarding his kindergarten choices in 1998 and 1999. Sean Stoddard alleges he was denied multiple school choices from 1994 to first grade because of his race, while Thomas Stoddard claims he was denied any public school seat in 1998 and 1999 due to race. Boston's Children FIRST alleges that the defendants' practices have necessitated significant advocacy efforts on their part regarding equality in school assignments. 

The court addresses the defendants' motion to dismiss, clarifying that to survive, a complaint must state a legally sufficient claim, with all factual allegations taken as true. It emphasizes that dismissal is only appropriate if the plaintiff cannot prove any set of facts supporting their claim. The court also highlights that it can convert a motion to dismiss into a summary judgment if external matters are presented, but opts not to consider the submitted affidavits due to the lack of discovery opportunities for the defendants and the affidavits' insufficient explanation of the school assignment process.

The Court will evaluate the plaintiffs' claims based solely on the pleadings, disregarding Yessayan's affidavits. The defendants' motion to dismiss the claims for compensatory and nominal damages is denied as the plaintiffs’ allegations of being denied preferred assignments due to race are sufficient to establish a claim for relief.

Regarding the claims for declaratory and injunctive relief, the defendants argue that the School Committee's July 14, 1999, vote to eliminate race as a factor in school assignments has rendered the claims moot. They reference legal precedent indicating that a case is moot when there is no reasonable expectation of recurrence of the violation and when interim actions have completely eradicated its effects. The Court rejects this argument, asserting that the defendants have not demonstrated with certainty that the alleged violations will not recur. The vote alone does not meet the high burden of proof required to establish mootness, especially since the voluntary cessation of unlawful conduct typically does not moot a case.

Additionally, the Court notes that current school assignments affect the availability of seats for future assignments, and the defendants acknowledge that the racially-drawn school zones will remain in use. The plaintiffs argue that the defendants must create race-neutral zones and that they do not need to propose specific alternatives. The plaintiffs assert that the continuation of these zones may still cause them harm in future assignments, although they have yet to clearly articulate how the racial basis for the zones will affect them once race is removed as a factor in school assignments.

Plaintiffs have presented a legally sufficient claim regarding the impact of school assignment zones on their educational opportunities, warranting the opportunity for discovery to gather necessary information. The court will not dismiss claims based on standing as some plaintiffs did not seek assignments in the 1999-2000 school year and have no intention to seek them in the 2000-2001 school year, making injunctive relief unnecessary for them. These plaintiffs include Gattozzi, McCoy, Anderson, Barry-Meltzer, and Stoddard. Consequently, the defendants' motion to dismiss their claims for injunctive relief is granted. However, other plaintiffs claim that their assignments were racially affected in the previous school year, necessitating injunctive relief should these claims be substantiated. Therefore, the motion to dismiss these claims is denied. The conclusion outlines that the motion to dismiss is granted for specific plaintiffs while denied for others. The claims challenge the Boston school assignment plan on constitutional and statutory grounds, asserting racial discrimination in the assignment process. The clarity of the relationship between assignment guidelines and school zones remains uncertain, but there are adequate allegations of racial discrimination in the zone delineation.