Shevlin v. Cheatham

Citations: 211 F. Supp. 2d 963; 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19625; 2002 WL 1583717Docket: 2:00-cv-01038

Court: District Court, S.D. Ohio; May 7, 2002; Federal District Court

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On May 26, 1997, Thomas and Amy Shevlin brought their daughter Chloe to the Children's Hospital Emergency Room due to breathing issues. After Chloe was admitted to the Pediatric Intensive Care Unit (PICU), the Shevlins sought a place to rest and found the Surgery waiting area available. Early on May 28, 1997, they were awakened by hospital security guard Martin Gray, who insisted they leave. A confrontation ensued between Mr. Shevlin and Mr. Gray, during which Mr. Shevlin admits to raising his voice and using profanity. Following this, nursing supervisor Ann Hoffman and Columbus Police Officer John Cheatham arrived. 

Disputes arise regarding the specifics of the incident. Mr. Shevlin claims he only raised his voice briefly to Mr. Gray and did not use obscenities in the presence of Ms. Hoffman or Officer Cheatham. He maintains that he was calm when he turned to go to the restroom and alleges that Officer Cheatham forcibly detained him by slamming his head against the wall and handcuffing him, despite Mr. Shevlin not resisting. The case addresses whether the confrontation escalated beyond Mr. Shevlin's version of events and the appropriateness of Officer Cheatham's actions. The Court granted in part and denied in part the Defendant's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment.

Defendant Officer Cheatham reports that upon his arrival in the hallway, he observed the nursing and security supervisors attempting to calm Mr. Shevlin, who was unresponsive and using profane language. Officer Cheatham specifically notes that Mr. Shevlin directed a vulgar remark at Mr. Gray, prompting Cheatham to instruct him to calm down. Mr. Shevlin then reportedly approached Officer Cheatham with a clenched fist, stating, "I don't give a f**k what you have to say, either." Despite being told to remain in place to avoid disturbing hospital patients, Mr. Shevlin allegedly walked past staff while continuing to yell and act disruptively. Officer Cheatham intervened by placing a hand on Mr. Shevlin, turning him towards the wall, and handcuffing him, despite Mr. Shevlin's resistance. He was escorted to a police vehicle and transported to jail, where he remained disruptive. Mr. Shevlin was charged with disorderly conduct under Ohio law, but those charges were later dismissed.

Following these events, the Plaintiffs filed a Complaint on May 27, 1998, against Officer Cheatham, the City of Columbus, and Children's Hospital. On January 24, 2000, the court granted summary judgment for Children's Hospital, removing it as a defendant. The Plaintiffs subsequently voluntarily dismissed their remaining claims, later re-filing on September 6, 2000, naming only Officer Cheatham and asserting four claims: 1) a 42 U.S.C. 1983 violation (First and Fourth Amendment rights), 2) assault and battery, 3) false imprisonment, and 4) intentional infliction of emotional distress (the last brought by both Mr. and Mrs. Shevlin). The Defendant has moved for partial summary judgment, seeking dismissal of all claims except for the excessive force claim related to the arrest. 

In considering summary judgment, the court will evaluate the evidence to determine if there are any genuine issues of material fact, focusing on whether the moving party has demonstrated that the nonmoving party lacks evidence for essential elements of their case.

In Celotex Corp. v. Catrett and related cases, it is established that the nonmoving party in a summary judgment motion must provide "significant probative evidence" to counter the motion, demonstrating that there are genuine disputes regarding material facts. Summary judgment is inappropriate if a reasonable jury could find in favor of the nonmoving party, which requires viewing evidence in the light most favorable to them. Mere allegations are insufficient; specific facts must be presented to show genuine issues for trial, and a scintilla of evidence is not enough for a jury to reasonably find for the nonmoving party.

Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a claim requires showing that a person acted under color of law and deprived an individual of constitutional rights. Officer Cheatham acknowledges acting under color of law, meaning he can succeed in his summary judgment only if the facts, favoring the plaintiff, indicate he did not violate Mr. Shevlin's constitutional rights. The Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable searches and seizures, and an arrest without probable cause violates this amendment and is actionable under § 1983. Probable cause requires sufficient facts and circumstances to warrant a reasonable belief that a suspect has committed or is about to commit an offense, necessitating more than mere suspicion but less than prima facie proof.

Officer Cheatham claims entitlement to summary judgment on Mr. Shevlin's Fourth Amendment claim, arguing a reasonable officer would have deemed Mr. Shevlin's arrest lawful due to him engaging in a loud and profane argument in a hospital near the surgical recovery room. Cheatham contends that this behavior constituted disorderly conduct under Ohio law, particularly citing Mr. Shevlin's failure to comply with hospital staff requests and his continued disruptive actions during his removal from the facility. Under Ohio Rev.Code 2917.11(A)(1), disorderly conduct includes causing alarm through turbulent behavior, characterized by violent disturbance. 

Despite Cheatham's assertions, the court finds that the facts, viewed favorably for Mr. Shevlin, do not establish probable cause for arrest. While Mr. Shevlin acknowledges his loud confrontation, the court determines that such an argument does not meet the threshold for "turbulent conduct." The officer's claims of further misconduct by Mr. Shevlin, including aggressive gestures and continued disruption, are disputed by Mr. Shevlin, who presents evidence suggesting that his behavior was reasonable and calm. Consequently, the court identifies a genuine issue of material fact regarding the probable cause for the arrest, leading to a denial of Cheatham's motion for summary judgment on the Fourth Amendment claim under 42 U.S.C. 1983.

Additionally, the document addresses First Amendment rights, stating that retaliatory actions by state officials, such as arrests in response to the exercise of free speech, can constitute valid claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983. Adverse actions motivated by the plaintiff's constitutional rights create a basis for retaliation claims, as established in case law.

Vindictive enforcement, a form of selective enforcement, requires a plaintiff to demonstrate: 1) the exercise of a protected right; 2) the officer's motivation to deter that exercise; 3) the unreasonableness of the officer's actions; and 4) that the enforcement was meant to punish the plaintiff for exercising the protected right. In Mr. Shevlin's case, the court determined he did not provide sufficient material facts to support his First Amendment claim. Even assuming Mr. Shevlin was engaging in a protected activity, there was no evidence showing Officer Cheatham's intent to deter that activity or to punish Mr. Shevlin through the arrest. Consequently, the court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant regarding the claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for First Amendment violations.

Additionally, the claims by Thomas and Amy Shevlin against Officer Cheatham for intentional infliction of emotional distress were barred by collateral estoppel. The court identified four necessary factors for applying issue preclusion, all of which were met: 1) the issue was raised and litigated previously; 2) the issue was essential to the prior case's outcome; 3) there was a final judgment on the merits; and 4) the party had a fair opportunity to litigate. Judge Sargus had previously ruled that Officer Cheatham could not be liable for intentional infliction of emotional distress, determining that the plaintiffs could not sustain a claim under Ohio law due to the lack of evidence showing the conduct was outrageous or extreme. This ruling was a critical foundation for the summary judgment granted against the hospital, confirming that neither Officer Cheatham nor the hospital staff acted in a manner that could be deemed extreme or outrageous.

The prior legal proceeding resulted in a final decision on the merits, and the Plaintiffs had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue before Judge Sargus. Even if the claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress is not barred by collateral estoppel, Officer Cheatham is entitled to summary judgment because the Plaintiffs failed to provide evidence supporting the essential elements of their claim. To establish such a claim, Plaintiffs must demonstrate that the defendant's conduct was extreme and outrageous, intentionally or recklessly causing serious emotional distress. The behavior must exceed merely tortious or criminal actions and be so extreme as to be intolerable in a civilized society. Furthermore, the emotional distress must be serious. In this case, Mrs. Shevlin's claim, based on witnessing her husband’s arrest while she was left alone at the hospital, does not meet the legal standard. The evidence presented does not show that Officer Cheatham's actions caused her severe emotional distress or that such actions constituted extreme conduct. Additionally, her testimony about having a "hard time" coping does not raise a genuine issue of material fact regarding the severity of the emotional distress suffered. Consequently, the Court grants summary judgment in favor of Officer Cheatham on the emotional distress claim. Regarding qualified immunity, Officer Cheatham asserts entitlement to this defense against Mr. Shevlin's claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for an alleged Fourth Amendment violation concerning an arrest without probable cause, as government officials in individual capacities may seek qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity protects individuals performing discretionary functions unless they violate "clearly established statutory or constitutional rights" known to a reasonable person. The Sixth Circuit employs a three-part test for determining entitlement to qualified immunity: 1) whether facts favoring the plaintiff could indicate a constitutional violation; 2) whether the right was "clearly established" and known to reasonable officers; and 3) whether the official's actions were objectively unreasonable based on that right. A right is deemed "clearly established" if a reasonable official would recognize their actions as violative. Although qualified immunity is a legal issue, summary judgment is inappropriate when conflicting evidence necessitates resolution by a fact finder. 

In this case, Officer Cheatham is found not entitled to qualified immunity. First, when viewing the evidence favorably for Mr. Shevlin, there appears to be a violation of his Fourth Amendment rights due to an arrest lacking probable cause. Second, it was clearly established at the time that such an arrest violated the Fourth Amendment. Third, the Court finds Officer Cheatham’s actions were not objectively reasonable; evidence suggests that Mr. Shevlin behaved reasonably, while Cheatham claims otherwise, indicating a factual dispute. Thus, qualified immunity is denied, and the Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is rejected.

Regarding Ohio statutory immunity, the Defendant seeks immunity from state law claims of assault, battery, and false imprisonment under Ohio Rev.Code 2744.03(A)(6). This statute grants immunity to employees of political subdivisions for acts related to governmental functions unless: a) their conduct was outside their employment scope; b) their actions were malicious, in bad faith, or reckless; or c) liability is expressly imposed by law.

A police officer, as an employee of a political subdivision, is typically protected by statutory immunity from personal liability for negligence, except in specific statutory exceptions. To act with a "malicious purpose" means to intentionally harm another through unlawful conduct. "Bad faith" involves dishonesty or intent to deceive, while "wanton" misconduct refers to a complete lack of care. "Recklessness" entails acting while aware of facts indicating a substantial risk of harm. The defendant must assert the immunity defense, but the plaintiff must prove the conduct falls within an exception to immunity. The presumption of immunity favors the officer unless the plaintiff can demonstrate otherwise. In this case, Officer Cheatham's entitlement to immunity is challenged by claims that his arrest of Mr. Shevlin was malicious, in bad faith, or reckless. Determining the nature of the officer's actions is typically a question for the jury. Summary judgment on immunity grounds is often inappropriate if there are genuine factual disputes regarding probable cause and the nature of the officer's conduct. Here, the facts suggest that Officer Cheatham may have lacked probable cause to arrest Mr. Shevlin for disorderly conduct.

A genuine issue of fact exists regarding the circumstances of Mr. Shevlin's arrest, where it may be demonstrated that he was only briefly loud, remained otherwise calm, and was far from patients. If the jury accepts this evidence, they might conclude that Officer Cheatham acted with knowledge or should have known that his arrest actions posed an unreasonable risk of harm, indicating conduct beyond mere negligence. This necessitates a determination of whether the officer acted with malicious intent, bad faith, or recklessness, potentially stripping him of statutory immunity. Consequently, the Court denies the Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment regarding the state law claims of assault and battery and false imprisonment. However, the Court grants the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on the claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress and the 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim for violation of Mr. Shevlin's First Amendment rights. The Court also denies the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment concerning the Fourth Amendment rights and dismisses Amy Shevlin from the case. The facts are considered in favor of the Plaintiff, with the specific basis for the emotional distress claim not clearly outlined by the Plaintiffs. It is noted that Officer Cheatham was acting as a police officer during the arrest.