Yes on Prop 200 v. Napolitano

Citations: 160 P.3d 1216; 215 Ariz. 458; 507 Ariz. Adv. Rep. 14; 2007 Ariz. App. LEXIS 114Docket: 1 CA-CV 05-235

Court: Court of Appeals of Arizona; June 28, 2007; Arizona; State Appellate Court

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Plaintiffs, including the political committee "Yes on Prop 200," challenged the dismissal of their First Amended Verified Special Action Complaint and the denial of their motion to file a Second Amended Verified Special Action Complaint regarding Arizona's Proposition 200. The Court of Appeals of Arizona affirmed the dismissal of the statutory special action mandamus claims in the First Amended Complaint and determined that amending the Second Amended Complaint to seek mandamus relief against state officials would be futile. However, the court reversed the dismissal of the declaratory judgment action involving the Governor and allowed the addition of four public officials as defendants related to government benefit programs impacted by Proposition 200, remanding for further proceedings.

Proposition 200, adopted on November 2, 2004, mandates that state and local agencies verify the immigration status of applicants for non-federally mandated public benefits. Following its passage, the Arizona Attorney General issued an opinion that limited the application of Proposition 200 to specific state programs under Title 46 of the Arizona Revised Statutes. Plaintiffs contended this interpretation was too narrow. Concurrently, a federal court had temporarily restrained the implementation of Proposition 200, but this order was lifted on December 22, 2004, allowing the Governor to issue an executive order for the full implementation of the law.

In response to the Defendants' motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, Plaintiffs submitted their First Amended Complaint, which the Defendants moved to dismiss again on the same grounds. The trial court dismissed the First Amended Complaint with prejudice and denied the Plaintiffs' request to file a Second Amended Complaint. The Plaintiffs appealed the decision. The court has jurisdiction under A.R.S. 12-2101(B) (2003).

When reviewing a dismissal for failure to state a claim, the court accepts the facts in the complaint as true, reviews legal questions de novo, and favors reasonable inferences for the Plaintiffs. A dismissal is affirmed only if no interpretation of the facts would allow for relief.

The Plaintiffs may seek both declaratory judgment and mandamus relief against the Defendants. Mandamus is a remedy compelling a public officer to perform a legally required duty. However, it does not apply if the law does not specifically require the officer to act. The Plaintiffs argue that Proposition 200 allows them to bring mandamus actions for violations. 

Regarding the Secretary of State, the First Amended Complaint lacks allegations of a specific failure to perform a required act, justifying the trial court's dismissal of the claim against her. Concerning the Attorney General, the Plaintiffs contend he violated a duty by issuing an opinion (I04-010). However, this opinion was a duty performed under A.R.S. 41-193(A)(7), which mandates the Attorney General to provide legal opinions to public officials upon request. The Plaintiffs' assertion that the opinion was legally erroneous does not constitute a breach of duty.

Plaintiffs recognize that the Attorney General has discretion in issuing opinions to public officials and that generally, a mandamus action cannot compel a government employee to act in a specific manner when discretion is involved. Mandamus can require proper action only if there is an abuse of that discretion. Plaintiffs allege that the Attorney General abused his discretion by issuing an incorrect opinion, which they argue constitutes a claim for mandamus due to legal error. However, the argument is rejected, as the court's role is to declare existing law, while the Attorney General's role is to advise on it. This distinction is rooted in the principle of separation of powers, which prevents the judiciary from usurping the Attorney General's responsibilities. Allowing mandamus actions to challenge the Attorney General's opinions would improperly transfer judicial authority to determine legal questions that fall within the Attorney General's advisory role. Thus, the court declines to evaluate whether the Attorney General's opinion, I04-010, correctly interprets the law.

Plaintiffs contend that Attorney General Opinion I04-010 represents an abuse of discretion, asserting that it is unreasonable, lacks a substantial basis, and fails to adhere to fixed standards. They argue it signifies a complete failure of the Attorney General to fulfill the statutory duty to issue an opinion. However, the review concludes that the Attorney General has met this obligation, precluding any mandamus action to compel a duty that has already been satisfied. 

Plaintiffs also seek a court directive for the Attorney General to withdraw I04-010. Although a court could potentially invalidate the opinion, mandamus cannot compel the Attorney General to act unless legally required to do so. The Attorney General may withdraw an opinion voluntarily, but there is no legal obligation to do so in this instance. The plaintiffs’ claims imply a duty, but such legal assertions are not accepted as true when evaluating a motion to dismiss. The Attorney General’s responsibilities are defined by the state constitution or statutes, and there is no common law authority that allows for the creation of a mandatory obligation enforceable through mandamus.

Additionally, Plaintiffs argue that A.R.S. 38-446 (2006) offers public employees immunity from personal liability for actions taken in good faith reliance on Attorney General opinions unless those opinions are withdrawn. They express concern that public employees could evade criminal liability by claiming reliance on I04-010. However, immunity only applies when actions are taken in good faith, making it unlikely for employees to justifiably rely on an opinion that has been rejected by a court. If a court interprets Proposition 200 differently than the Attorney General, that court's interpretation prevails regardless of whether I04-010 is withdrawn. Lastly, the immunity statute does not prevent Plaintiffs from seeking a judicial determination regarding Proposition 200’s applicability, as it only concerns personal liability and does not hinder claims for declaratory relief related to the obligations imposed by the statute on public employees.

Members of the State Board of Equalization are personally immune from monetary claims but not from declaratory relief claims, as established in *Maricopa County v. TWC Chandler*. Declaratory judgments can determine life insurance beneficiaries even if probate actions are unavailable, as noted in *Estate of Jones v. Sailes*. Plaintiffs seek a writ of mandamus to compel the Arizona Attorney General to advise the Governor and other state officials on eligibility verification for benefits, but there is no established obligation for the Attorney General to provide such advice without a request from the officials. The Attorney General's duties, regulated by A.R.S. 41-193(A)(7), only require advice upon demand from designated officials. The court emphasized that the Attorney General cannot compel other state agencies to make rules or regulations nor decide actions for public officers. Without clear statutory authority, mandamus actions against the Attorney General are not permissible, leading to the dismissal of such claims by the trial court. Regarding the Governor, allegations that he adopted the Attorney General's interpretation of Proposition 200 do not suffice for mandamus relief. The court referenced *Sears*, indicating that mere disagreement with a public officer's interpretation of law does not provide grounds for mandamus, as this would allow any citizen to challenge public officers' actions based on their interpretations of laws.

Mandamus is deemed inappropriate for defining disputed duties, leading to the conclusion that plaintiffs lack a viable mandamus claim against the Governor in their First Amended Complaint. The proposed Second Amended Complaint seeks a writ of mandamus to compel the Governor to withdraw portions of Executive Order 2004-030, which designates the Arizona Attorney General as the authority on the interpretation of Proposition 200 for state agencies. This request is not viable for mandamus relief since the Governor cannot be compelled to alter her executive orders, as the power to issue such orders is exclusively vested in her, supported by A.R.S. 41-101(A) and case law indicating that a Governor's order binds lower officials. While the court may review executive orders for legal compliance, it cannot draft them for the Governor.

Additionally, plaintiffs argue the Governor violated the Arizona Constitution by not fully proclaiming A.R.S. 46-140.01 as law when she acknowledged the federal court's restraining order on Proposition 200. However, the Governor did proclaim the proposition to be law, albeit subject to the restraining order, and her recognition of the court’s limits was mandated by the supremacy clause. Once the restraining order was lifted, the law was effectively proclaimed, and her subsequent executive order on implementation did not alter this proclamation. Consequently, the trial court's dismissal of the mandamus claims against the Governor is upheld.

Regarding the Declaratory Judgments Act, it allows individuals affected by a statute to seek declarations about their legal rights. Despite its remedial nature, a complaint must present sufficient facts to demonstrate a justiciable controversy. A controversy is not justiciable if the defendant lacks the power to address the plaintiff's claims, and the court will assess the adequacy of claims in the context of the named defendants.

The Secretary of State is dismissed from the case as the complaint fails to allege any involvement in administering state or local public benefit programs or any deprivation of rights under Proposition 200. The Attorney General is also not found to administer public benefit programs, but the complaint claims he is responsible for enforcing Proposition 200 through state agencies. While the Attorney General's opinions are typically followed by state agencies, they are advisory and do not compel action. Relevant case law indicates the Attorney General lacks the executive authority claimed, which is reserved for the Governor under the Arizona Constitution. Additionally, no statutory authority allows the Attorney General to be a party in a declaratory judgment action unless the constitutionality of a statute is challenged. Since the Plaintiffs are not contesting the constitutionality of Proposition 200 and have not adhered to the statutory requirements for such a challenge, the Attorney General's involvement is not warranted.

Opinions issued by the Attorney General are advisory and not legally binding, as established in Green v. Osborne. Courts and governmental agencies are not obligated to accept these opinions, despite the plaintiffs' claims that they are commonly followed and intended to be binding. Therefore, the plaintiffs' allegations are insufficient to make the Attorney General a defendant in this declaratory judgment action, leading to the affirmation of the trial court's dismissal of the Attorney General.

In contrast, the Governor has a constitutional duty to ensure the faithful execution of laws and supervise executive officers. Plaintiffs must name an official capable of controlling the implementation of Proposition 200 to succeed in their declaratory judgment action. Naming the Governor is appropriate, as she directed state agencies to implement Proposition 200 according to its legal requirements and the Attorney General's opinions. The Executive Order effectively enforced actions that the Attorney General could not compel on his own. Additionally, the Governor's role as chief executive enables her to direct how executive branch statutes are implemented, making it standard practice to name the Governor in legal challenges regarding new propositions or statutes. Examples include cases involving the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act and actions declaring constitutional amendments.

Governor Napolitano is alleged to be responsible for implementing Proposition 200 across Arizona's executive agencies. The First Amended Complaint claims that state and local agencies have consistently interpreted the Proposition's eligibility verification requirements incorrectly, as stated in an Attorney General's opinion, and seeks a declaratory judgment that the term "state and local public benefits not mandated by federal law" in A.R.S. 46-140.1 applies universally to benefits outlined in a specific federal statute, irrespective of agency administration. 

Arizona's notice-pleading standard mandates only a statement of jurisdiction, a claim for relief, and a demand for judgment. The allegations in the complaint establish a genuine dispute between the Plaintiffs and the Governor, justifying the court's jurisdiction under the Declaratory Judgments Act, thus the trial court erred in dismissing this aspect.

The Plaintiffs sought to amend their complaint to include additional defendants—directors from the Arizona Department of Housing and the Arizona Department of Health Services, among others—claiming these agencies did not properly apply Proposition 200. The trial court initially denied the motion for leave to amend, deeming it futile. However, while the proposed amendment was found futile regarding claims against the Secretary of State and Attorney General, the court recognized that adding the additional defendants and continuing the declaratory claim against the Governor was not futile. The Plaintiffs requested a declaratory judgment affirming Proposition 200’s applicability to the programs administered by the new defendants and sought injunctive relief for compliance.

Allegations presented by the Plaintiffs establish a legitimate dispute, justifying the addition of claims against specific state officials, which the trial court erroneously denied. The appellate court reverses this denial, allowing the Plaintiffs to amend their complaint to include claims against the Directors of the Arizona Department of Health (ADOH), Arizona Department of Economic Security (ADES), and the Arizona Department of Health Services (ADHS), as well as a declaratory judgment claim against the Governor. 

Regarding attorneys' fees, the Plaintiffs sought fees under A.R.S. 12-348(A)(4) and the private attorney general doctrine. Fees under A.R.S. 12-348(A)(4) are awarded when a party prevails in a special action against the state. The private attorney general doctrine allows for discretionary fee awards if a party vindicates a significant public right. However, since the merits of the case have not been adjudicated, the court declines to award fees at this time, permitting the Plaintiffs to request fees in the superior court if they succeed on the merits.

In conclusion, the trial court's dismissal of the Plaintiffs' mandamus claims is affirmed, while the dismissal of the declaratory judgment action against the Governor and the denial of leave to amend the complaint are reversed. The case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this ruling. All complaints are filed against the Defendants in their official capacities, and the State concedes the Plaintiffs' standing to sue, although it argues the claims lack merit.