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State v. Durant
Citations: 7 P.3d 495; 129 N.M. 345Docket: 20,564, 20,660
Court: New Mexico Court of Appeals; June 30, 2000; New Mexico; State Appellate Court
The court consolidates two appeals regarding the appealability of conditional discharge orders in criminal cases. It determines that a conditional discharge order in a felony case is appealable, while such an order in a contempt case is not, unless it mandates specific actions beyond mere compliance with the law. Consequently, Vernon O.M. Henning's appeal is dismissed, and the focus shifts to Karen Durant's appeal following her jury convictions for armed robbery and criminal damage to property. Durant raises four issues: insufficient evidence of robbery, insufficient evidence of criminal damage, hearsay admission error, and non-unanimous jury verdict. The court finds insufficient evidence for the robbery conviction but upholds the criminal damage conviction. The procedural background indicates that Henning was found in contempt for not appearing at a pretrial conference, with the court deferring adjudication for six months contingent upon his future compliance. For Durant, her conditional discharge order allows for probation and mandatory treatment without an adjudication of guilt, following the jury's findings. The document emphasizes the necessity for a formal written order to be appealable in criminal cases and outlines the requirements for final judgments in such proceedings. Appeals are statutorily permitted from judgments of civil contempt or convictions of criminal contempt, as established in Henderson v. Henderson. However, in Henderson, the court ruled that because no sentence was imposed on Ms. Henderson, an appeal was not available. A finding of contempt alone is not appealable. The finality rule states that an order or judgment is not considered final until all issues have been resolved and the case has been fully disposed of. This principle, termed the 'last act' rationale, is not absolute and allows for exceptions. The term 'finality' should be interpreted practically; one exception arises when the consequences of a non-final order are severe enough to warrant immediate appeal to prevent undue hardship. For instance, in criminal cases, adult defendants must wait for sentencing to appeal diagnostic evaluations, while similar orders for juveniles can be immediately appealed due to legislative intent to keep the child with their family, deeming them sufficiently aggrieved. Other jurisdictions address the appealability of conditional discharge orders by balancing general rules and exceptions. Courts like in Rash v. State and State v. Ryback ruled that conditional discharge orders were non-final due to the absence of a sentence and because the choice to accept such an order rested with the defendant. In contrast, cases like Warren v. State and State v. Bikle emphasized both the lack of a sentence and minimal consequences of the conditional discharge, leading to similar conclusions regarding their non-finality. Warren emphasizes the importance of an actual judgment upon a finding of guilt, which the defendant aims to avoid, particularly in the context of a suspended sentence. This distinction is crucial in differentiating between Durant's felony case and Henning's contempt case. In Durant's situation, she argues that the conditional discharge language in the habitual offender statute constitutes a collateral consequence that justifies her appeal from the conditional discharge order. The statute indicates that prior felony convictions or conditional discharges can enhance a defendant's sentence. Conversely, Henning's contempt case lacks such collateral consequences, allowing for the application of the finality rule, resulting in the dismissal of Henning's appeal. Durant faced multiple charges, including armed robbery and aggravated battery, stemming from an incident where she confronted victims at their home to collect debts and ultimately stabbed them. The evidence presented favored the State, indicating that Durant's actions constituted robbery. However, she claimed self-defense, asserting that the victims' actions caused her to stab them. The court found insufficient evidence to support the armed robbery charge, noting that Durant took the victims' dog after leaving the property, which did not align with the legal standards for robbery. Consequently, the court reversed the armed robbery conviction based on a lack of evidence linking her threats or force directly to the taking of the dog. Durant argued that the evidence was insufficient to support her conviction for criminal damage to property, asserting she intended only to wake the victims by knocking on the window, not to break it. The State acknowledged a lack of evidence in its case to explain how the window was broken. However, it is established that a defendant's testimony can provide necessary proof for conviction. The court highlighted that a jury is entitled to disbelieve a defendant's claims, and intent can often be inferred from circumstantial evidence. Key circumstantial evidence included Durant's early morning visit to the victims, her existing dispute with one of them, her actions of knocking loudly and breaking the window, and her possession of a knife, which suggested readiness for conflict. This evidence allowed a rational jury to infer her intent to damage property. Regarding hearsay, Durant contested the admission of a victim's statement made shortly after the incident. The trial court admitted it based on the victim's visible injuries and distress, paralleling a precedent case that justified its admission, and the court found no abuse of discretion. Durant also claimed a mistrial was warranted after a juror expressed that he did not vote in accordance with the verdict. However, the court found this issue harmless, as the juror's comments pertained to counts from which Durant was acquitted or were reversed, and the juror clarified that all voted independently. The court ultimately dismissed Henning's appeal, reversed Durant's armed robbery conviction, and affirmed the criminal damage verdict, ordering her discharge on the robbery count.