Ottaway v. Smith

Citations: 113 P.3d 1247; 210 Ariz. 490; 455 Ariz. Adv. Rep. 22; 2005 Ariz. App. LEXIS 82Docket: 1 CA-CV 04-0815

Court: Court of Appeals of Arizona; June 30, 2005; Arizona; State Appellate Court

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Richard Ottaway was charged by the Phoenix City Prosecutor's Office with interfering with a judicial proceeding under Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) § 13-2810(A)(2). He requested a jury trial for this charge, which was classified as a class 1 misdemeanor, but the municipal court denied his motion. The superior court also denied his special-action relief petition, determining that the charge did not involve moral turpitude, the penalties were not severe, and there were no grave consequences associated with a potential conviction. This led Ottaway to appeal the superior court's decision. The court of appeals reviewed the case, noting that while it typically assesses whether the superior court abused its discretion in special-action petitions, the question of jury trial eligibility is a legal matter warranting independent review.

Ottaway seeks a jury trial, claiming unequal treatment under A.R.S. 13-2810 compared to other legal provisions for contempt, specifically A.R.S. 12-861 and Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure Rule 33. He argues that A.R.S. 13-2810, which addresses knowingly disobeying court orders, should afford a jury trial like A.R.S. 12-863, which allows one at the defendant's request for criminal contempt. Ottaway maintains that the definition of criminal contempt in the Arizona Rules aligns with his situation, as both A.R.S. 12-861 and the Rules require a jury trial in certain cases, unlike A.R.S. 13-2810.

The court refutes Ottaway's claims, stating that A.R.S. 12-861 and A.R.S. 13-2810 do not apply to the same conduct. A.R.S. 12-861 necessitates that the contemptuous act also constitutes a crime, which is not a requirement under A.R.S. 13-2810. Thus, A.R.S. 12-861 is limited to criminal contempts that are also classified as crimes.

Furthermore, while A.R.S. 13-2810 aligns more closely with Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure Rule 33, the rule only mandates a jury trial if the punishment exceeds six months or a fine over $300. Since a violation of A.R.S. 13-2810 is a class 1 misdemeanor with a maximum six-month incarceration, the circumstances under which Rule 33 allows a jury trial exceed those of A.R.S. 13-2810 only if the fine exceeds $300. 

Additionally, even if Rule 33 offered greater jury trial rights, this disparity does not violate the Arizona Constitution. The situation is likened to cases where charges are re-designated from a felony to a misdemeanor, which does not entitle the defendant to a new jury trial. The court thus upholds the absence of a jury trial under A.R.S. 13-2810 as constitutional.

Ottaway's separation-of-powers argument is dismissed based on established case law, which fails to show any improper exercise of power by the legislative or executive branches. His reference to Schriro v. Summerlin to argue that the right to a jury trial is merely "procedural" is deemed irrelevant, as the right is rooted in common law. The legislature has the exclusive authority to define laws and crimes, while the executive decides on criminal charges. The concept of blending powers among government branches is recognized, making absolute separation impractical.

Ottaway's vagueness argument is also rejected due to his lack of standing, as his actions clearly fall within the statute's scope and do not constitute protected expression. The court then examines whether a defendant charged under A.R.S. 13-2810(A)(2) is entitled to a jury trial, referencing prior cases that discuss the moral implications of offenses. Following the Arizona Supreme Court's decision in Derendal v. Griffith, which discarded the moral quality analysis, a new two-step process is established for determining jury trial eligibility for misdemeanors. This involves evaluating if the statutory offense has a common law counterpart that guaranteed a jury trial at Arizona's statehood, focusing on the similarity of elements between the common law offense and the charged offense.

The elements of A.R.S. 13-2810(A)(2) align with the common-law offense of contempt, which historically did not entitle defendants to a jury trial. The Arizona Supreme Court, in Ex parte Quan, established that "constructive contempt," occurring outside the court's presence, should be addressed according to common-law standards, which do not involve jury trials. The court referenced precedent and other jurisdictions to affirm that contempt cases do not present factual issues for a jury. 

The analysis then shifts to whether Arizona's Constitution or the Sixth Amendment requires a jury trial for judicial-interference charges, particularly given that such charges are classified as class 1 misdemeanors, punishable by up to six months in jail. This classification leads to the presumption that violations of A.R.S. 13-2810(A)(2) are not jury-eligible offenses. To challenge this presumption, Ottaway needed to demonstrate significant, commonly applicable consequences resulting from a conviction under this statute, which he failed to do, admitting he could not identify any severe consequences. The court concluded that the statutory language does not imply collateral consequences severe enough to warrant a jury trial. 

As a result, the court upheld the municipal court's denial of Ottaway’s request for a jury trial and the superior court's denial of special-action relief, remanding the case back to the municipal court for further proceedings.

Any individual who willfully disobeys a court's lawful writ, process, order, or judgment, or who engages in conduct that obstructs justice or undermines the court's authority, may be held in contempt of court under Ariz. R.Crim. P. 33.1. The claim made by Ottaway regarding potential surcharges on fines exceeding $300 lacks relevance, as penalties for misdemeanor offenses in Arizona generally do not warrant a jury trial. The maximum fine for a misdemeanor is $2,500, and federal law also defines certain penalties as "petty offenses," which do not require jury trials. The right to a jury trial, as protected by the U.S. and Arizona Constitutions, is primarily derived from common law, although the legislature can extend or rescind this right. Ottaway's reference to the 1901 Penal Code is deemed irrelevant since it does not establish the right to a jury trial for contempt of court, and the determination of whether a statutory offense has a common law counterpart that guaranteed a trial by jury at Arizona's statehood is critical. Historical practices regarding jury trials for misdemeanors, as well as any pre-1910 statutes, do not impact current jurisprudence. The only relevant consideration is whether a common law analog exists that provided the right to trial. Even if there was a historical right to a jury trial for specific offenses, it would not be preserved under the current constitutional framework.