Halton v. Great Clips, Inc.

Citations: 94 F. Supp. 2d 856; 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5907; 2000 WL 544019Docket: 1:99 CV 706

Court: District Court, N.D. Ohio; April 20, 2000; Federal District Court

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The case involves Plaintiffs Tracey Halton and thirteen others suing Defendants Great Clips, Inc., Cleveland Clips, Inc., and Warren Wright for alleged violations of civil rights statutes, specifically 42 U.S.C. 1981, 1982, and 2000a. The Plaintiffs assert that Cleveland Clips engaged in racial discrimination by refusing services or instructing stylists to deny services based on race, thereby inhibiting African-American customers' rights to equal treatment and service. Specific discriminatory practices cited include the refusal to offer certain hairstyles to African-American clients, increased prices for services typically used by them, inadequate training on African-American hair, and lack of appropriate styling products.

In Count Two, the Plaintiffs claim that Cleveland Clips operates as a public accommodation affecting interstate commerce and that Defendants have deprived them of equal enjoyment of services based on race, violating both federal and Ohio statutes. Additionally, Plaintiffs allege state law claims of negligence and emotional distress. They seek compensatory and punitive damages, injunctive relief, attorney's fees, and costs.

The court is currently considering Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, which is fully briefed. The standard for summary judgment allows for a ruling when there are no genuine issues of material fact, placing the burden on the moving party to demonstrate this absence of issues through evidence such as pleadings and affidavits. The court has granted the motion in part and denied it in part, indicating that some claims may proceed.

In Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, the Supreme Court established that a fact is "material" if its resolution impacts the lawsuit's outcome, and a factual issue is "genuine" based on applicable evidentiary standards. The court must view summary judgment motions favorably toward the opposing party. Summary judgment is warranted if the party with the burden of proof fails to establish an essential case element, where mere evidence supporting the plaintiff is insufficient; there must be substantial evidence for a jury to find in the plaintiff's favor. Evidence that is "merely colorable" or not "significantly probative" allows the court to decide the legal issue, potentially granting summary judgment. In civil cases, the court assesses whether reasonable jurors could rule in favor of the non-moving party by a preponderance of evidence. If the non-moving party has a heightened burden of proof, it must provide evidence that meets this higher standard. Upon satisfying its burden, the moving party shifts the burden to the non-moving party, which cannot rely solely on pleadings but must present evidence creating a material factual conflict for a jury. Under FED. R. CIV. P. 56(e), the non-moving party must not merely deny allegations but must provide specific facts showing a genuine trial issue. Failure to respond appropriately can lead to automatic summary judgment. Only admissible evidence is considered in summary judgment motions, and affidavits must be based on personal knowledge, contain admissible evidence, and demonstrate the affiant's competence. Hearsay evidence is not permissible unless the opposing party does not object to the evidence's admissibility, in which case objections may be waived unless they prevent a gross miscarriage of justice.

In evaluating a motion for summary judgment, a district judge focuses solely on factual disputes relevant to the case's outcome, as established in Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. The court does not consider non-material facts or weigh evidence but determines whether genuine issues of material fact exist for trial. The Defendants argue that the Plaintiffs' federal public accommodation claim under 42 U.S.C. § 2000a should be dismissed for three reasons: 1) failure to meet jurisdictional prerequisites; 2) Cleveland Clips is not classified as a public accommodation; and 3) failure to establish a prima facie case of discrimination. While the Plaintiffs acknowledge the need to satisfy jurisdictional prerequisites, they assert compliance. The relevant statute requires that before pursuing a civil action under § 2000a, Plaintiffs must provide written notice of the alleged discriminatory act to the appropriate State or local authority, allowing thirty days for response. Ohio law contains provisions against discrimination in public accommodations and requires exhaustion of state administrative remedies before federal court action. Although one Plaintiff, Tracey Halton, filed a claim with the Ohio Civil Rights Commission, the other Plaintiffs did not, resulting in their inability to proceed in federal court under Title II. Even if all Plaintiffs had fulfilled the prerequisite, the Defendants argue Cleveland Clips does not qualify as a public accommodation under § 2000a(b), which defines such establishments based on their public service and impact on commerce.

Establishments that provide lodging to transient guests, food for on-premises consumption, entertainment venues, and those physically located within the premises of a covered establishment are defined under the statute. The Plaintiffs assert that Cleveland Clips operates within University Corners Shopping Plaza, where covered establishments, including restaurants, are located, and argue that Cleveland Clips serves patrons of these establishments. They cite promotional activities, such as distributing flyers at restaurants, to support their claim. However, the Plaintiffs do not claim that Cleveland Clips itself qualifies as a covered establishment. 

Cleveland Clips does not meet the definition of a covered establishment under the statute. Case law has identified covered establishments, such as health spas and golf clubs, but excluded retail stores and food markets due to the lack of discrimination in their operations. Importantly, no precedent has classified a hair salon as a covered establishment. Previous cases, like Rousseve v. Shape Spa, involved facilities that provided recreational and therapeutic services, which are not analogous to the services offered by Cleveland Clips. The court emphasizes that "entertainment" does not encompass hair salons, as their services do not meet the statutory definition. Additionally, Congress has not amended Title II to include service establishments like hair salons, despite having ample opportunity to do so.

Congress's inaction regarding the broad interpretation of "public accommodation" in the context of the Americans with Disabilities Act indicates an intention to limit the definition of such establishments. The plaintiffs’ interpretation that a shopping plaza housing covered establishments qualifies as a public accommodation is flawed. This interpretation would erroneously encompass all tenants of any mall or shopping center under the statute. The Court clarifies that the statute applies only to the physical boundaries of an individual establishment, not to the entirety of a shopping center where control over other tenants is absent. A scenario where an establishment's status could change daily based on the presence of other tenants is inconsistent with Congressional intent. 

The case cited, United States v. Beach Associates Inc., differs significantly from the current action. In Beach Associates, the Bay Carry-Out Shop was linked to the Beach Club through factors such as ownership and customer flow, which are not present here. In the current case, the defendants do not own the shopping center, have no control over other tenants, and there is no evidence that their business relies on neighboring establishments. Therefore, the defendants’ business cannot be classified as a public accommodation under 42 U.S.C. 2000a, leading to the conclusion that the plaintiffs' claims fail, and the defendants are entitled to summary judgment. The Court does not need to consider the defendants' additional argument regarding the lack of a prima facie case of discrimination.

Plaintiffs allege four violations of federal law by the Defendants: (1) failure to offer "fades" and "relaxers" to African-American customers, (2) significant price increases for services predominantly used by African-American customers, (3) inadequate training in African-American hair styles, and (4) lack of styling products for African-Americans. However, it is determined that the Plaintiffs, based on deposition evidence, cannot substantiate claims under state and federal laws for these instances. 

Defendants concede that Plaintiffs have met the initial prima facie case elements, but upon review, this concession is found to be incorrect. Specifically, former employees Tracey Halton and Karna Summerall lack evidence supporting their claims of denied services, as there is no indication they requested specific styles or were denied services. Moreover, they were not charged for the services, negating claims related to price increases under 42 U.S.C. 1981. While the former employees may have potential claims regarding inadequate training, customers and potential customers might have valid claims concerning the alleged service denials and price increases, but not regarding training.

The legal standard under 42 U.S.C. 1981 requires Plaintiffs to demonstrate membership in a protected class, an attempt to contract for services, denial of that right, and that services were available to others outside the protected class. Defendants agree that the first two elements are satisfied but argue the latter two are not. The statute ensures equal rights to make and enforce contracts, with the burden of proof for discrimination following a burden-shifting approach when direct evidence is absent.

In Hollins v. Atlantic Co., the court outlines a burden-shifting framework for racial discrimination claims, requiring the plaintiff to establish a prima facie case, the employer to provide a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for their actions, and the plaintiff to demonstrate that this reason is pretextual. The prima facie elements may vary based on specific case facts but are similarly applicable under Ohio law. Plaintiffs Tracey Halton and Karna Summerall assert claims of inadequate training and lack of certain hair products, alleging that they did not receive training on African-American hair care, specifically for relaxers and fades. Both plaintiffs are licensed cosmetologists and have not shown they requested additional training or that any such request was denied based on race. Their depositions reveal they are familiar with applying relaxers and performing fades, undermining their claims. The court finds no legal obligation for the employer to train employees in services not provided by the salon. Furthermore, the plaintiffs cannot claim discrimination based on the training of other employees since they are the only plaintiffs in this case and lack standing to assert claims on behalf of others. Consequently, the court grants summary judgment for the defendants regarding the plaintiffs' claims under § 1981 and related Ohio laws. Additionally, other plaintiffs claim discrimination in service areas and pricing but the specifics of these claims are not detailed in this section.

To establish their claims of discrimination regarding the denial of fades and relaxers, each Plaintiff must demonstrate four elements: 1) membership in a protected class, 2) a request for services from the Defendants, 3) denial of those services, and 4) that non-members of the protected class were provided those services. Regarding pricing, similar elements apply. The Defendants concede that the Plaintiffs meet the first two requirements but dispute the third, arguing that as a limited-service salon, they do not offer relaxers to any customers, regardless of race. The Plaintiffs argue that the lack of relaxers offered to African-American customers, while perms are available to Caucasians, indicates discrimination, asserting that relaxers are similar in skill and cost to perms. However, the Court notes that there is no legal obligation for a business to provide specific services based on racial demand. Comparisons are made to hypothetical discrimination claims based on service offerings not aligned with customer demographics. The Court cites case law emphasizing that Section 1981 requires proof of purposeful discrimination, not merely disparate impact, which cannot independently support a claim. While some stylists may have offered relaxers informally, these instances were unauthorized and not reflective of the salon’s official services. Therefore, even if the Plaintiffs could establish the third element of their case, they fail to provide evidence for the fourth element, which requires showing that non-members of the protected class received the service in question.

Caucasian customers were not provided relaxers by the Defendants, and Tracey Halton testified she never offered this service. Plaintiffs did not establish a discrimination case regarding relaxers, but Mia Allmond presented a prima facie case concerning her request for a perm. As a member of a protected class, Allmond made two requests for a perm, receiving responses that indicated a refusal based on her race. One employee stated "we don't do perms for black hair," while another did not clarify the type of chemical treatment she sought, suggesting potential racial bias in service denial. Evidence indicated that Warren Wright instructed employees to screen calls to ascertain the race of potential customers, aimed at preventing misunderstandings about services offered. This situation raises the possibility that Allmond was denied service due to her race, supporting her discrimination claim. Defendants did not provide a non-discriminatory rationale for their actions, allowing Allmond to proceed with her 1981 and related state law claims.

Regarding the "fade" hairstyle, only Brenda Lightning has a viable claim under 1981 and Ohio law. While other Plaintiffs did not report seeking a fade haircut, Lightning claimed she was told by Halton to go elsewhere for this service. Additionally, Michelle Van Belleghem provided a bald fade to a Caucasian customer. This evidence supports Lightning's prima facie case of discrimination, as she, a member of a protected class, was denied a service that was available to non-members. Again, the Defendants failed to provide a non-discriminatory explanation, making summary judgment inappropriate for her claim as well.

Brenda Lightning is the sole plaintiff who has established a prima facie case regarding her service claims under 1981 and related state law. Of the fourteen plaintiffs, eight, including Lightning, provided evidence of being affected by a price increase at Cleveland Clips, while four plaintiffs did not demonstrate any impact from the increase. The plaintiffs allege that the defendants charged African-American customers higher prices based on the services they requested, while Caucasian customers were charged less. The evidence supports a discrimination claim, as the affected plaintiffs are members of a protected class and experienced price increases not faced by others.

The defendants assert a non-discriminatory rationale for the price increase, claiming that initial prices were set low to attract customers, and that the prices were adjusted to reflect the time required for specific services. They argued that the time-intensive services requested by African-American clients warranted higher prices. However, the plaintiffs may contest the defendants' justification, as there is evidence suggesting that the price increase was motivated by the volume of African-American customers, as indicated by testimony from Tracey Halton and her affidavit regarding statements made by a defendant representative. Consequently, the defendants are not entitled to summary judgment regarding the claims under 1981 and related state law, as the plaintiffs have presented sufficient evidence to challenge the defendants' stated reasons for the price increase.

All U.S. citizens have the equal right to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property under 42 U.S.C. § 1982. Plaintiffs argue that the hair products used by the Defendants' salon were unsuitable for African-American customers, asserting that it is unreasonable for the salon to primarily stock products designed for Caucasian hair given its customer base. They further claim a right to have their hair styled and to purchase products, alleging that the Defendants' refusal to allow returns and to continue providing services interfered with these rights.

However, there is no evidence that the Defendants denied any Plaintiff the opportunity to purchase any product available in the salon. The mere absence of preferred products or the Defendants' choice to stock primarily Caucasian-oriented products does not constitute a violation of § 1982 or related state laws. Additionally, the Plaintiffs have not demonstrated that they were denied the right to return for services already rendered, and they lack sufficient factual support for their claims under § 1982 and Ohio law, leading to a conclusion that summary judgment for the Defendants is warranted.

Under Ohio law, public accommodations must not deny anyone full enjoyment of their facilities based on race or other protected characteristics (Ohio Rev. Code § 4112.02(G)). The Defendants' establishment qualifies as a public accommodation. Federal case law interpreting Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is relevant for Ohio law cases involving alleged violations of R.C. Chapter 4112, as established by the Supreme Court of Ohio.

In Weiner v. Cuyahoga Community College District, the court applied a burden-shifting approach to determine that some plaintiffs presented sufficient facts to survive summary judgment regarding violations of § 1981. The same facts supporting the § 1981 claims also supported the plaintiffs' Ohio public accommodation claim, allowing those claims to survive the defendants' motion for summary judgment for the same reasons.

The court then addressed the claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress, emphasizing that this tort does not require an underlying tort for recovery. To succeed, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant's conduct was outrageous and extreme, going beyond all bounds of decency and evoking community outrage. The court clarified that mere insults or petty annoyances do not meet this threshold. Although plaintiffs alleged feelings of humiliation and emotional distress, the court found no evidence of conduct by the defendants that was sufficiently outrageous to warrant legal intervention. Consequently, the court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants on the emotional distress claims.

Plaintiffs' claims for negligent infliction of emotional distress are dismissed due to a lack of evidence that they witnessed or experienced a dangerous accident or physical peril. The Ohio Supreme Court has established that such claims require either severe and debilitating emotional distress or direct experience of peril, neither of which is present in this case. Consequently, Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on this issue.

Regarding negligence, Plaintiffs assert that Defendants had a duty to provide equal services to all customers regardless of race and breached this duty, resulting in injury. Defendants counter that Plaintiffs have not cited a common law duty owed to them and assert that any alleged actions must be intentional, aligning with statutory requirements. Defendants' obligation to maintain safe premises does not extend to providing services without regard to race, which is governed by statute. Thus, Plaintiffs' negligence claim is also dismissed, granting Defendants summary judgment here.

In conclusion, Defendants' motion for summary judgment is granted in part and denied in part. It is granted concerning claims under 42 U.S.C. 1982 and related state law, as well as under 42 U.S.C. 2000a. It is granted for most claims under 42 U.S.C. 1981, except for specific claims involving Plaintiffs Mia Allmond and Brenda Lightning, and certain price increase claims from other Plaintiffs. Defendants' motion is also granted for the Ohio public accommodation claim, except for the claims involving the same two Plaintiffs, Mia Allmond and Brenda Lightning.

Plaintiffs' claims concerning price increases were addressed, with summary judgment granted in favor of the defendants regarding claims of negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress, as well as negligence. A list of individuals involved includes Patricia Smith, Janet Mosley, Geraldine Stewart, and others. Relevant legal statutes from the Ohio Revised Code were cited, specifically R.C. 4112.02(G), which prohibits discrimination in public accommodations, and R.C. 4112.05(B)(1), which outlines the process for filing charges against unlawful discriminatory practices, including time limits for filing. Additional references include various case law and the definition of public accommodations under 42 U.S.C. 12181(7), which enumerates types of establishments considered public accommodations that impact commerce.

Key points include definitions of various public and recreational spaces such as transportation terminals, museums, parks, schools, social service centers, and exercise facilities. The document addresses the Plaintiffs' failure to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 despite their claims related to racial discrimination. The Defendants argue that the Plaintiffs have abandoned their § 1981 claims due to lack of discussion in their brief, although the same facts support both § 1981 and § 2000a claims. The case references Hollins v. Atlantic Co., indicating that the court considers claims together when arising from the same circumstances. A specific claim regarding the sale of products for African-American hair is noted to be discussed later, with a distinction made between "perm" and "relaxer" treatments. The Defendants assert that African-American customers often refer to relaxers as perms. Evidence concerning Plaintiff Monica Lloyd indicates no proof of discriminatory practices against her, leading to a summary judgment for the Defendants. Testimonies from other Plaintiffs suggest discussions about requested services, with the Court inferring requests for relaxers. Services predominantly sought by African-American customers include shampoo, blow dry, and thermal curls. Plaintiff Tracey Halton claims severe emotional distress linked to her experience, but the Court previously determined she did not experience discrimination, attributing her distress more to employment-related issues.