Runkle v. Potter

Citations: 271 F. Supp. 2d 951; 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12090; 2003 WL 21673446Docket: 2:02-cv-70418

Court: District Court, E.D. Michigan; June 23, 2003; Federal District Court

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Ronald P. Runkle, the plaintiff, filed a Rehabilitation Act disability discrimination action against John E. Potter, Postmaster General of the United States Postal Service, which is currently under review by the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan. Runkle began his employment with the Postal Service in 1990 and received a career appointment in 1995 as a part-time flexible clerk at the Detroit Bulk Mail Center. He disclosed his epilepsy and seizure disorder, which began after a head injury in 1976, to the Postal Service upon hiring. Although Runkle experienced severe seizures in the past, his condition has been managed with medication since 1984, resulting in only occasional minor episodes. His doctor, Dr. Ralph Raper, has advised Runkle to maintain a regular sleep schedule and avoid alcohol, as his seizures can be triggered by sleep deprivation and flashing lights. Runkle initially worked the midnight shift but, after a few weeks, requested a shift change to accommodate his medical needs, which was granted. Dr. Raper formally requested that Runkle not be assigned to the midnight shift due to concerns over his health. The court is considering the defendant's motion for summary judgment, having reviewed the parties' arguments and supporting documents.

Mr. Ronald Runkle has been under Dr. Raper's care since 1989 for a seizure disorder that began in 1976, potentially linked to past head trauma. His seizures have been managed with Depakote, but factors like flashing lights and sleep deprivation can increase seizure risk. Dr. Raper advised Mr. Runkle against midnight shifts due to potential health risks from sleep disturbance, which could lead to breakthrough seizures. Following this recommendation, the U.S. Postal Service assigned Mr. Runkle to day and afternoon shifts from January 1996 to January 2001. 

In July 2000, the Detroit BMC underwent a major tour realignment to improve operations due to previously unmet goals. Management analyzed mail arrival profiles, determining that most processing needed to occur before the 5:00 p.m. dispatch. Consequently, they converted the midnight shift (Tour 1) into a major tour and adjusted other shifts, including scaling back Tour 3 to a "mini-tour." 

On January 5, 2001, Tour 2 Manager Ephrain Alvarado, Jr. informed Mr. Runkle via letter that he was to report to Tour 1 beginning January 13, 2001, stating that the Postal Service could no longer accommodate his request for a tour change. The letter directed him to address any further inquiries regarding tour changes with the Plant Manager, Stephanie McCarthy.

On January 8, 2001, Runkle sent a letter to Ms. McCarthy requesting accommodation for his seizure disorder, explicitly stating that he cannot work between 11:00 PM and 6:00 AM as advised by his doctor, Dr. Ralph W. Raper. Runkle referenced prior management discussions and accommodations that allowed him to work daytime hours. He argued that forcing him to work the midnight shift would not only violate his medical advice but also constitute harassment, given his history of effective work performance and attendance.

Dr. Raper supported Runkle's request in a letter to Ms. McCarthy, emphasizing that maintaining normal sleep patterns is crucial to preventing seizures and that working nights could exacerbate Runkle's condition. He noted that Runkle's seizure disorder is permanent and unlikely to improve, advising against any midnight work.

Additionally, Leonard Brown, Human Resources Manager for the Detroit Post Office, received a letter from Congresswoman Lynn Rivers urging consideration of Runkle’s request for accommodation. Brown forwarded this correspondence to McCarthy, who sought his guidance on handling Runkle’s request. Brown instructed her to tell Runkle to submit a request for reassignment, clarifying that McCarthy lacked the authority to reassign him unilaterally. Only Runkle could request a transfer to another craft or facility.

Ms. McCarthy's deposition revealed that permanently assigning Runkle to Tour 2 would disrupt operations at the Detroit BMC, as part-time flexible employees were scheduled for Tour 1 based on a July 2000 realignment and agreements with employee unions. Ms. Alvarado indicated that Tours 2 and 3 were fully staffed, and part-time clerks were essential for Tour 1's mail processing. In a letter dated January 11, 2001, McCarthy informed Runkle that he must return to Tour 1 after previously being accommodated on Tour 2 and suggested he seek transfer opportunities if he could not work Tour 1 due to medical reasons. Runkle did not follow this suggestion, arguing it was unreasonable as it would jeopardize his seniority. He and his wife, a full-time employee on Tour 2, requested a schedule switch, which McCarthy denied, stating schedule changes were not granted for convenience. Runkle sought Pre-Complaint Counseling from the EEOC on January 16, 2001, alleging disability discrimination and opted for mediation under the REDRESS program. Following a medical examination by Dr. Robbins, who advised against a shift change due to Runkle’s seizure history, mediation on March 19 failed to resolve the dispute. Subsequently, Runkle filed an EEO Complaint on March 26, 2001, alleging discrimination for being required to work Tour 1 despite his disability. The EEOC completed its investigation by September 17, 2001, but when the Postal Service had not issued a final decision by February 1, 2002, Runkle filed a complaint alleging disability discrimination under the Vocational Rehabilitation Act of 1973.

The Postal Service has filed a motion for summary judgment, asserting that the Plaintiff does not meet the definition of a disability according to the Rehabilitation Act and is not a "qualified individual with a disability" under the Act. Summary judgment is appropriate when evidence, such as pleadings and affidavits, demonstrates no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, as outlined in Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Landmark Supreme Court cases from 1986 have established that the burden on the movant has been lowered; specifically, the movant must demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue regarding a material fact essential to the non-movant's case. The non-movant must provide affirmative evidence to counter the motion rather than relying on the hope that the court will disbelieve the movant's claims. The trial court now exercises more discretion in evaluating the evidence presented by the respondent and is not obligated to scour the entire record for evidence. The court will apply these standards to assess the Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. Additionally, the Plaintiff has not established a prima facie case of disability discrimination under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, which prohibits discrimination against qualified individuals with disabilities by the United States Postal Service. The standards for determining violations under this Act align with those of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990.

To establish a prima facie case of discrimination under the ADA or the Rehabilitation Act, a plaintiff must demonstrate three elements: (1) that they are a disabled person as defined by the Act; (2) that they are qualified to perform the essential job functions, with or without reasonable accommodations; and (3) that they experienced an adverse employment decision due to their disability.

A "disabled" person under the ADA or the Rehabilitation Act is defined as someone who has (A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities; (B) a record of such an impairment; or (C) is regarded as having such an impairment. The term "substantially limits" requires the plaintiff to show a significant limitation in performing a major life activity compared to the average person. Regulations stipulate that "substantially limits" can mean being unable to perform a major life activity or being significantly restricted in doing so.

The Supreme Court has clarified that a plaintiff must show a considerable limitation affecting a major life activity to a large degree, evaluated in their medicated state. Additionally, the determination of whether an individual is substantially limited must consider the present condition rather than potential or hypothetical scenarios. Major life activities include tasks such as caring for oneself, walking, seeing, and working.

In applying these standards to the current case, the Court concludes that while the plaintiff's epilepsy/seizure disorder is acknowledged as a physical impairment, the critical question is whether this impairment substantially limits any major life activities. The Court finds that the plaintiff does not qualify as "disabled" under federal law based on the definitions provided.

Plaintiff claims that his epilepsy/seizure disorder significantly restricts his ability to engage in major life activities, including self-care, manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, and working. However, he has not provided evidence of limitations in performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, or speaking due to his condition. Although he experienced respiratory arrest during a grand mal seizure 19 years ago, he has since managed his seizure disorder with medication, resulting in only occasional mild symptoms such as twitching and brief "staring" spells occurring two to three times monthly. Citing the Supreme Court's ruling in Sutton, the document asserts that a condition controlled by medication does not qualify as substantially limiting a major life activity. The Fourth Circuit's decision in EEOC v. Sara Lee Corporation is also referenced, highlighting that intermittent seizures, even if permanent, do not automatically constitute a substantial limitation under the ADA. For the major life activity of working, "substantially limits" implies a significant restriction in performing a class or broad range of jobs compared to individuals with similar skills, rather than an inability to perform a specific job.

In Welsh v. City of Tulsa, the court emphasized that being substantially limited in the major life activity of working does not equate to being unable to work in any job; rather, it pertains to the inability to work in a broad class of jobs. Courts may evaluate the number of job types the plaintiff is disqualified from due to their impairment, considering both similar jobs and a wider range of job opportunities in the geographic area. Several cases illustrate that a physical or psychological impairment does not automatically indicate a substantial limitation in the ability to work if the individual can still perform other jobs. For instance, impairments preventing individuals from specific jobs, like airline pilots or assembly line positions, were deemed insufficient to establish substantial work limitation. The mere existence of a physical impairment does not satisfy the criteria for being "disabled" under the ADA/Rehabilitation Act. In this case, the plaintiff has only demonstrated an inability to work a single shift, and his work history undermines claims of substantial impairment. The plaintiff's reliance on Otting v. J.C. Penney Co. is misplaced, as that case involved much more severe symptoms compared to those presented by the plaintiff.

The case Rowles v. Automated Production Systems, Inc. illustrates that despite serious epilepsy symptoms, individual disability assessments are key, as emphasized by the Supreme Court. A disability determination is based on how an impairment affects an individual’s life, not merely on the diagnosis. Therefore, the outcomes in Otting and Rowles regarding disability under the ADA do not apply to the current case. The Court concluded that the Plaintiff did not demonstrate a disability under the Rehabilitation Act.

Additionally, even if a disability were established, the Plaintiff must prove the ability to perform essential job functions, with or without reasonable accommodation. The employer's judgment on job essentials is paramount, and accommodations that remove essential functions are inherently unreasonable. The Plaintiff, employed as a part-time flexible clerk, was required to be available for all shifts, a fact he acknowledged. The Postal Service is not obligated to compromise the flexibility integral to his role, leading to the conclusion that he is not a qualified individual with a disability capable of fulfilling essential job functions.

Lastly, the Court noted that any accommodation violating a collective bargaining agreement is considered unreasonable. Circuit courts consistently rule that reasonable accommodations must not infringe on existing employee rights or require significant changes to job structures.

In the case of Runkle v. Postal Service, the court determined that the requirement for "reasonable" accommodation under the Rehabilitation Act does not necessitate permanent reassignment of the plaintiff to a different work shift due to his seizure disorder, as such action would breach the collective bargaining agreement with his union. Testimony from various medical professionals, including a neurologist, recommended limited work conditions for the plaintiff, specifically that he only work day shifts. The court found that accommodating Runkle's request for a shift change would be unreasonable under the circumstances. Consequently, the court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment, resulting in the dismissal of the case with prejudice. Additional notes highlight definitions of employee classifications within the Postal Service, reaffirm that Runkle's claims of race and sex discrimination were not pursued, and emphasize the legal context regarding the standards for establishing a disability under the relevant statutes. The court also referenced a trend favoring summary judgment to eliminate frivolous lawsuits. Overall, Runkle was unable to demonstrate that his condition substantially limits major life activities, which is necessary for protection under the Act.