Bluetarp Financial, Inc. v. Eastern Materials

Citations: 592 F. Supp. 2d 188; 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1532; 2009 WL 59128Docket: 08-cv-324-P-S

Court: District Court, D. Maine; January 9, 2009; Federal District Court

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In the case of BlueTarp Financial, Inc. v. Eastern Materials Corp., the United States District Court for Maine addressed a motion for summary judgment filed by the plaintiff, BlueTarp, just eight days after the defendant, Eastern, submitted its answer in a breach-of-contract dispute. The court denied the motion without prejudice, citing Eastern's invocation of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(f) to argue that the motion was premature due to insufficient discovery. 

The court outlined the summary judgment standard, emphasizing that it is granted only when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Key definitions were provided: "material" refers to facts that could affect the case outcome, and "genuine" implies evidence that could lead a reasonable jury to favor the nonmoving party. The moving party must demonstrate a lack of evidence supporting the nonmoving party's claims, while the nonmovant must present specific facts to create a trialworthy issue. 

If discovery is inadequate, Rule 56(f) allows for the denial of summary judgment if the opposing party shows, via affidavit, why essential facts cannot be presented. The court emphasized the need for substantial compliance with the rule and outlined three requirements for invoking it: good cause for the inability to gather facts earlier, a plausible belief that additional facts exist, and an explanation of how these facts would counter the summary judgment motion.

The dispute involves a construction project in which Eastern purchased "Venetian Plaster" materials from Decoplast, Inc. for International Exterior Fabricators, LLC (IEF), the subcontractor for the Tanger Outlet Center in Deer Park, New York. In February 2008, Eastern and IEF notified Decoplast of defects in the materials and requested replacements. Following Decoplast's inaction, IEF filed a lawsuit against Decoplast in New York State Supreme Court. 

Eastern's relationship with BlueTarp is contested: BlueTarp claims it provided credit to Eastern for purchasing materials, supported by a signed "BlueTarp Financial Account Agreement." Conversely, Eastern argues that its relationship with BlueTarp was solely administrative, where payments to Decoplast were processed through BlueTarp, which acted as a collection agency without extending credit. Eastern maintains it owed its debt directly to Decoplast.

BlueTarp moved for summary judgment shortly after Eastern filed its answer, but the court deemed this premature due to the lack of discovery. The Second Circuit emphasizes that summary judgment is rarely granted before discovery is conducted. Eastern's Vice-President Ed Harms submitted an affidavit asserting that essential evidence exists to oppose summary judgment, particularly regarding BlueTarp's role and the nature of its agreement with Eastern. BlueTarp wishes to limit the court's review to the Financial Account Agreement, while Eastern argues that the additional evidence is critical to challenge the agreement's enforceability and BlueTarp's breach-of-contract claim.

Harms' affidavit is characterized as general due to the early stage of discovery. The Court references the First Circuit's caution against delving into complex issues without a fully developed record, determining that Eastern has adequately met its obligations under Rule 56(f). Consequently, Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment is denied without prejudice, allowing for the possibility of future dispositive motions post-discovery deadline. The Court emphasizes adherence to Local Rules concerning the submission of evidence and material facts, noting that both parties failed to comply, which could lead to the automatic admission of uncontroverted facts. The criteria for "delayed discovery" cases do not fully apply since discovery has not begun. BlueTarp initially claimed outstanding charges of $418,275.80, later adjusting this to $161,375.35 after accounting for offsets. Some discovery materials were provided by BlueTarp after Eastern's opposition was filed. The Court does not address Eastern's substantive arguments against BlueTarp's motion, refraining from commenting on the merits of the claims or defenses involved.