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Commonwealth v. Paddy
Citations: 15 A.3d 431; 609 Pa. 272; 2011 Pa. LEXIS 686Docket: 478 CAP
Court: Supreme Court of Pennsylvania; March 30, 2011; Pennsylvania; State Supreme Court
Donyell A. Paddy, the Appellant, appeals the dismissal of his petition for collateral relief under the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA) by the PCRA court, which was upheld by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania with one exception. The court affirmed the dismissal of all claims except for one concerning the investigation and presentation of mitigating evidence related to Paddy's background during the penalty phase of his trial. In this specific instance, the Supreme Court vacated the PCRA court's order and remanded for an evidentiary hearing. Paddy was convicted of first-degree murder for the shooting of Lashawn Whaley on April 28, 1993, who had previously identified him as the perpetrator in a separate double murder case. The prosecution argued that Paddy killed Whaley to prevent her from testifying against him. After a mistrial in his first trial due to a deadlocked jury, Paddy was convicted in a second trial on December 18, 1995, of first-degree murder, criminal conspiracy, retaliation against a victim or witness, and possessing instruments of crime. The jury found three aggravating circumstances leading to a death sentence, which was formally imposed on May 29, 1997. Following his conviction, Paddy's post-sentence motions were denied, and an appeal led to the affirmation of his sentence by the Supreme Court on July 8, 2002. He filed a pro se PCRA petition on September 20, 2002, which was followed by a series of procedural developments including the appointment and withdrawal of counsel. After multiple petitions and amendments, the PCRA court announced its intent to dismiss Paddy's petition without a hearing, but later dismissed it altogether on May 23, 2005, prompting Paddy's timely appeal to the Supreme Court. The PCRA court directed Appellant to submit a statement of matters complained of on appeal under Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925(b), which Appellant complied with. The PCRA court issued its opinion on March 10, 2006. Appellant's appeal includes multiple claims of error across various phases, primarily alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. The review standard for PCRA relief involves determining if the PCRA court's ruling is supported by the record and free of legal error, with credibility determinations being binding if supported. The court applies a de novo review to the PCRA court's legal conclusions. To qualify for PCRA relief, a petitioner must demonstrate, by a preponderance of the evidence, that their conviction or sentence resulted from specific circumstances listed in 42 Pa.C.S. 9543(a)(2), including constitutional violations and ineffective counsel that undermined the truth-determining process. Petitioner must also show that the claims were not previously litigated or waived, as outlined in 42 Pa.C.S. 9543(a)(3) and (4) and 42 Pa.C.S. 9544(b) and (a)(2). Under Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 909, the PCRA court may dismiss a petition without a hearing if there are no genuine material facts in dispute and the defendant is not entitled to relief. To reverse a PCRA court's dismissal without a hearing, the appellant must demonstrate a genuine issue of fact that could lead to relief or show that the court abused its discretion. For claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, a petitioner must satisfy three criteria established in Commonwealth v. Pierce: the underlying claim must have merit, counsel must lack a reasonable basis for their actions, and the petitioner must demonstrate prejudice from the ineffectiveness. The evaluation of counsel's decisions focuses on whether they had any reasonable basis, not on the existence of alternative strategies, which must show a significantly greater potential for success than the chosen course. To satisfy the prejudice prong required for proving ineffective assistance of counsel, a petitioner must demonstrate a reasonable probability that the outcome would have been different if not for the alleged ineffectiveness. Generic claims and unsubstantiated assertions do not meet this burden. Since the Appellant's direct appeal occurred before the ruling in *Commonwealth v. Grant*, and he was represented by new counsel, he was obligated to raise any ineffective assistance claims at that time. Claims not raised on direct appeal are considered waived. The Appellant did assert several claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel in his direct appeal, and some of those claims are repeated in his Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA) petition, rendering them non-cognizable as they have already been litigated. Under pre-Grant procedures, claims of appellate counsel ineffectiveness are validly brought before the PCRA court, including those concerning appellate counsel's failure to address trial counsel's ineffectiveness. To succeed in such a layered claim, a petitioner must satisfy all three prongs of the Pierce test for both trial and appellate counsel. If the petitioner fails to prove trial counsel's ineffectiveness, the derivative claim against appellate counsel necessarily fails, negating the need to evaluate the other two prongs. It's important to distinguish between claims of appellate counsel ineffectiveness where trial counsel's claims were waived versus those that have been previously litigated. If a claim has been litigated, the focus shifts to whether appellate counsel was ineffective in presenting that claim; if waived, the issue is whether appellate counsel was ineffective for not raising it. The Appellant's issues are categorized into guilt phase claims, penalty phase claims, and PCRA claims. In the guilt phase, the Appellant alleges trial counsel ineffectiveness for failing to call witnesses, investigate police corruption, avoid conflicts of interest, rebut contradictory testimony, and challenge forensic evidence. Appellant claims ineffective assistance of appellate counsel for not raising trial counsel ineffectiveness on direct appeal. However, claims not raised on direct appeal are waived, while claims of ineffective appellate counsel can be pursued in collateral review. Some claims of trial counsel ineffectiveness were previously raised by appellate counsel and rejected by the court, including the failure to call witnesses to challenge the testimony of Shawn Roussaw and to present alibi witnesses regarding the Panati Playground murders. The court asserts that Appellant failed to provide rationale for deeming appellate counsel ineffective, as the mere rejection of counsel's arguments does not constitute ineffectiveness. Consequently, these claims are dismissed for lack of development. Moreover, the remaining claims of trial counsel ineffectiveness are also waived but form the basis for Appellant’s derivative claims against appellate counsel. The court finds no merit in these underlying claims. Specifically, Appellant's assertion that trial counsel was ineffective for not calling witnesses who could implicate other potential killers is unsubstantiated; affidavits from Ms. Whaley’s cousins do not provide evidence of other suspects or link her boyfriend’s family to her murder. Additionally, Appellant's argument regarding trial counsel’s failure to investigate police corruption is countered by the record, which indicates trial counsel did address the issue of a police officer's indictment related to the case. Ultimately, the court finds no merit in Appellant's claims of trial counsel ineffectiveness, thus undermining the basis for his claims against appellate counsel. Appellant's claims of trial counsel ineffectiveness are deemed speculative and lack merit. In Issue 1(C), Appellant alleges a conflict of interest due to a single private investigator being hired for both him and co-defendant Kevin Green, asserting that evidence beneficial to him could harm Green. However, Appellant fails to substantiate this claim or specify the nature of the supposed evidence. Thus, the assertion is deemed without merit. In Issue 1(D), Appellant argues that trial counsel should have countered and sought to exclude contradictory preliminary hearing testimony from Shawn Roussaw. This claim overlaps with prior issues and is analyzed within those contexts. In Issue 1(E), Appellant contends trial counsel was ineffective for not challenging the thoroughness of the crime scene investigation and forensic evidence, criticizing the police work as inadequate and suggesting reliance on dubious scientific methods. Specific failures cited include: inadequate evaluation of blood-stained sunglasses, lack of evidence recovery and photography, insufficient investigation of the vehicle used in the murder, incomplete fingerprint recovery, absence of DNA testing on cigarette butts, and failure to contest the fiber expert's testimony. The court notes that most of these claims were not raised at the PCRA court, leading to their waiver. Regarding the fingerprint evidence, Appellant's counsel effectively cross-examined relevant witnesses, and Appellant fails to articulate additional actions that could have been taken. The argument concerning DNA testing of the cigarette butts is also rejected, as it does not effectively demonstrate Appellant's non-involvement in the case. Ultimately, Appellant's inability to establish trial counsel ineffectiveness results in the failure of his related claims against appellate counsel, leading to no relief being granted on the first issue. Appellant argues that his rights to confront a witness and to legal representation were infringed upon when the trial judge excluded him from an in camera hearing involving prosecution witness Freddy Murphy. He claims ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failing to object to his exclusion and ineffective assistance of appellate counsel for not raising this issue on appeal. However, the only viable claim remaining is the alleged ineffectiveness of appellate counsel, which is contingent upon the success of the underlying claim against trial counsel. Since the latter cannot succeed, the claim against appellate counsel also fails. Murphy testified about a conspiracy to prevent witness Ms. Whaley from testifying against Appellant. During cross-examination, Murphy's statements were inconsistent, and he later sought an in camera discussion with the prosecutor. Although trial counsel did not formally object to Appellant's absence, she inquired about his right to attend. The trial court denied his presence, reasoning that no testimony was being offered against him. The in camera hearing was sealed, and counsel was instructed not to disclose its content to Appellant. During the in camera session, Murphy admitted to lying due to fear of Appellant, but the following day he reaffirmed his original testimony before the jury. The Sixth Amendment grants an accused the right to confront witnesses, ensuring the opportunity for effective cross-examination. The court determined that trial counsel's performance was not ineffective because Appellant had the chance to cross-examine Murphy thoroughly before and after the in camera hearing. Thus, any potential error in excluding Appellant from the in camera proceeding did not affect the trial's outcome. The trial court correctly conducted an in camera proceeding regarding Appellant, who was on trial for murdering a witness set to testify against him in a previous murder case. Appellant's right to confront the witness, Mr. Murphy, was not violated, and he was not prejudiced by his counsel's failure to formally object to his absence during the in camera session. Appellant's claim that he was hindered in confirming Mr. Murphy's alleged involvement in the Scutching family drug organization lacks merit, as he could have provided this information to his counsel at any time, and the Scutching family was not mentioned in the in camera hearing. Consequently, Appellant cannot argue that his counsel was ineffective, nor can he support his derivative claim against appellate counsel's ineffectiveness regarding this issue. Appellant's claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel for not adequately litigating trial counsel's ineffectiveness on direct appeal—specifically regarding the admission of preliminary hearing testimony and witness statements identifying him as the shooter—were previously denied on the merits. Appellant fails to present a substantiated claim of appellate counsel’s ineffectiveness, merely asserting that counsel did not raise the issues "properly" or "fully," without specifying any actions or omissions. Such vague claims are unreviewable and thus waived. Finally, Appellant argues that the trial court improperly admitted evidence of his prior bad acts related to the Panati Playground murders, particularly regarding a conspiracy to prevent a witness from testifying. This claim suggests a concern over the admissibility and influence of such evidence during the trial. Appellant argues that the trial court improperly instructed the jury regarding his flight from police prior to Ms. Whaley's murder, asserting that such flight cannot indicate consciousness of guilt for a crime not yet committed. He claims ineffective assistance from trial counsel for failing to object to this instruction and from appellate counsel for not adequately addressing these issues on direct appeal. However, the issues concerning trial counsel's ineffectiveness had already been litigated and rejected, making them non-cognizable under the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA). Appellant does not substantiate his claim against appellate counsel's performance, leading to a waiver of this argument. In his sixth issue, Appellant alleges five instances where the Commonwealth failed to disclose exculpatory evidence, violating his due process rights as established in Brady v. Maryland. To prove a Brady violation, he must demonstrate that the evidence was favorable, suppressed, and material enough to affect the trial's outcome. The burden is on Appellant to prove that evidence was withheld, and there is no violation if the evidence was known or accessible to the defense. Appellant's first claim involves the prosecution's failure to disclose police reports related to a kidnapping and assault involving Ms. Whaley's boyfriend, which occurred two years before her murder and had no direct connection to the case. He argues these reports could have provided an alternative theory of the murder, but his claims are deemed unfounded. Evidence presented at trial indicated that Ms. Whaley occasionally lived with Mr. Scutching above his family's store. The Appellant theorizes, without supporting evidence, that Ms. Whaley was murdered by someone associated with the Scutching enterprise to prevent her cooperation with police. Even under the assumption that police reports indicate an investigation into the Scutching family's drug activities, these reports do not qualify as Brady material, as Brady does not demand disclosure of non-exculpatory information or every unfruitful lead in an investigation. In a second Brady claim, the Appellant argued that car keys discovered during police searches of his residences, which did not match the vehicle used in Ms. Whaley's murder or the Ford Mustang he had driven prior to the murder, constituted Brady material. This claim was deemed frivolous; even if accurate, the absence of keys related to the vehicles in question was not material or exculpatory, as evidence showed the murder vehicle was driven by co-defendant Kevin Green, not the Appellant. In his third Brady claim, the Appellant asserted that the prosecution withheld evidence of cigarette butts found in the murder vehicle, arguing that they could impeach Officer Aponte's trial testimony, which claimed only hair fibers were recovered. However, the Commonwealth argued that the police report provided to the Appellant did list the cigarette butts, disputing allegations of suppression. The PCRA court found that the cigarette butts were not exculpatory and upheld the Commonwealth's position. Exhibit C-59, presented during the trial, consists of four pages: a three-page investigation report (form 75-49) and a one-page property receipt (form 75-3). Officer Aponte confirmed the report's content and length during his testimony. The report's third page contains details about cigarette butts, countering the Appellant's claim that the Commonwealth did not disclose their presence in the murder vehicle. In the Appellant's fourth Brady claim, he alleges the prosecution suppressed an interview record with Renee Mitchell regarding the vehicle linked to Ms. Whaley's murder. However, the document is a vague one-page note from Detective Baker, lacking substantive exculpatory information. Appellant's reliance on an affidavit from Ms. Mitchell is flawed; she clarified that she did not see Kevin Green in a car on her block and never reported otherwise. The Appellant's arguments are characterized as disjointed and unsupported by the evidence. In the fifth Brady claim, the Appellant asserts the prosecution concealed that key witness Freddy Murphy received early parole for his testimony. The record disproves this, as Murphy testified he was granted immunity and expected probation for cooperating. His agreement with the Commonwealth was entered as evidence, further undermining the Appellant's claims. The Commonwealth agreed to recommend probation for Mr. Murphy in his drug-related case, as evidenced by the Memorandum of Agreement dated December 4, 1995, and this was acknowledged by defense counsel during cross-examination at trial. The Appellant's Brady claim is deemed frivolous due to a misrepresentation of the record. All issues related to the guilt phase of the trial were found meritless, leading to the affirmation of the PCRA court's dismissal of those claims. In the penalty phase, the Appellant argues that trial counsel was ineffective for not requesting a jury instruction indicating that a life sentence equates to life without parole, and that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise this issue on appeal. Citing Simmons v. South Carolina, the court noted that such an instruction is only mandated if the prosecutor argues the defendant's future dangerousness and if the defendant requests the instruction. The court clarified that references to a defendant's violent history do not necessarily invoke future dangerousness, thus not requiring a Simmons instruction. The court concluded that Appellant's trial counsel was not ineffective, as the prosecution's comments focused on past acts rather than future dangerousness, aligning with precedents set in previous cases such as Carson and Spotz. Appellant argues against the prosecutor's comments made during the penalty phase, which referenced his past violent actions and questioned whether he had the right to seek clemency after not sparing his victim's life. The court concluded that future dangerousness was not a relevant issue, thus Appellant was not entitled to a Simmons instruction, and his trial counsel's decision not to request such an instruction was deemed effective. Consequently, the related claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel fails as well. In a separate issue, Appellant contends that trial counsel was ineffective for not objecting to the jury instruction regarding an aggravating factor related to the murder of a prosecution witness. He argues that the trial court incorrectly instructed the jury that the Commonwealth did not need to prove that Appellant committed the murders observed by the victim. The court referenced precedent from Commonwealth v. Zettlemoyer, which clarified that the Commonwealth is not required to prove the actual commission of the collateral crime by the defendant to establish this aggravating factor. Thus, the court concluded that trial counsel was not ineffective for not objecting to the jury instruction concerning this aggravating factor. Trial counsel's effectiveness was upheld, precluding Appellant from satisfying the arguable merit prong of the appellate counsel ineffectiveness claim, resulting in the failure of Appellant's eighth issue. In issues nine and ten, Appellant argues trial counsel was ineffective for not objecting to jury instructions on weighing aggravating versus mitigating circumstances and the "grave risk" aggravating circumstance. He also claims appellate counsel was ineffective for not developing these issues on direct appeal. The PCRA court found these claims previously litigated and rejected on direct appeal, where it was determined that, despite some merit, Appellant was not prejudiced by any errors due to the jury's finding of three aggravating circumstances and no mitigating circumstances. Thus, the faulty instruction on weighing was deemed insignificant. Even if the "grave risk" factor were removed, the jury's findings would still necessitate a death sentence. Appellant argues these conclusions misinterpret federal constitutional law, relying on Sochor v. Florida, which requires a harmless error analysis when an aggravating factor is struck. However, he misinterprets Florida law, which does not mandate a death sentence upon finding at least one aggravating factor without mitigating factors. Additionally, Pennsylvania law, as upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court, does not compel a death sentence under similar circumstances, further distinguishing his case from Sochor. In his eleventh issue, Appellant reiterates his challenge to the jury instruction regarding the grave risk aggravating circumstance as part of an ineffective assistance claim. Appellant argues that the trial court incorrectly implied he accepted the grave risk aggravator and claims ineffective assistance of trial counsel for not objecting to this instruction, as well as ineffective assistance of appellate counsel for failing to challenge trial counsel's performance. Even if these claims have some merit, relief is denied because Appellant cannot demonstrate prejudice; disregarding one aggravating circumstance would still leave two aggravating and no mitigating factors, necessitating the death penalty. In his twelfth issue, Appellant contends the trial court erred by allowing the Commonwealth to use his murder conviction of Wilbur "Little Man" Thomas as an aggravating factor under 42 Pa. C.S. § 9711(d)(11), arguing the conviction is unconstitutional. He cites his claimed innocence, a pending federal habeas corpus petition, and expectations of a new trial as support for this claim. Appellant asserts ineffective assistance from trial, post-sentence motion, and appellate counsel for failing to adequately address this issue. However, these claims lack merit. The court’s precedent indicates "conviction" simply means "found guilty" in the context of aggravating circumstances, and a non-final conviction does not negate its status as an aggravating factor unless it is overturned on appeal. Evidence established Appellant's conviction for first-degree murder in May 1994, for which he was sentenced to life imprisonment. The trial court correctly admitted this conviction as an aggravating factor, and trial counsel was not ineffective for not objecting, rendering Appellant's related claims against appellate counsel unsuccessful. In his thirteenth issue, Appellant presents various allegations of prosecutorial misconduct during the penalty phase and asserts ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failing to object, along with ineffective assistance of appellate counsel for not raising these issues on appeal. Improper cross-examination tactics were identified, including: (A) questioning of Martha Paddy, the Appellant's mother, regarding a prior consistent statement; (B) the prosecutor inserting personal beliefs during the Appellant's cross-examination; (C) questioning Maudi Fields, the mother of the Appellant's sister's former boyfriend, in a way designed to provoke the jury; and (D) a closing argument that dehumanized the Appellant by labeling him an animal, also aimed at inflaming jury passions. The Appellant did not acknowledge that two claims regarding trial counsel's ineffective assistance related to these issues were previously raised and rejected on direct appeal. Additionally, the Appellant failed to provide a sufficient argument that appellate counsel was ineffective in addressing these claims, leading to their waiver. The remaining claims pertained to ineffective assistance of appellate counsel for not raising specific allegations of trial counsel ineffectiveness related to prosecutorial misconduct. However, the court found no merit in the prosecutorial misconduct claims, indicating trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise them, and thus the appellate claims could not succeed. The standard for evaluating prosecutorial misconduct during the penalty phase emphasizes that the prosecutor may comment on evidence with some latitude. Prosecutorial remarks do not constitute reversible errors unless they bias the jury against the defendant, preventing an objective assessment of evidence. The context of such comments is critical, and the prosecutor may respond to defense points within reasonable bounds, especially concerning the death penalty, which is the primary issue during this phase of the trial. References to victims and their families, while needing to avoid irrelevance, are not inherently prejudicial, and it is permissible for the prosecutor to argue for the death penalty. The Court has identified that overly aggressive advocacy that could unduly influence a death sentence is improper. Appellant claims that the prosecutor improperly impeached his mother, Mrs. Paddy, by referencing her prior consistent statements during her testimony about Appellant's character. The prosecutor questioned her about earlier statements made during a previous trial concerning another murder, asserting that her current testimony about Appellant being loving and caring was inconsistent given his convictions for two murders. The Court found that the prosecutor's questioning was not misconduct but rather an examination of Mrs. Paddy's potential bias, as she maintained her positive view of Appellant despite his criminal history. The Appellant's argument that this questioning hinted at his previous conviction was deemed frivolous, as the jury had already been informed of Appellant's conviction for the murder of Wilbur Thomas, which had been stipulated in court. Additionally, Appellant argued that the prosecutor's questions to Maudi Fields, who testified favorably about Appellant, were designed to incite emotional reactions from the jury. The prosecutor asked her if her opinion would change knowing that Appellant had committed a violent act against a victim. This questioning aimed to challenge the credibility of her testimony regarding Appellant's character. The Court concluded that there were no grounds for objections to the prosecutor's comments and that the questioning was relevant to the jury's assessment of Appellant's character in light of his actions. Ms. Fields acknowledges that the individual in question could be considered a good person who meant no harm, despite the prosecutor's graphic line of questioning. The defense counsel objected to this questioning but was overruled. The court determined that the questioning, while vivid, did not compromise the jury's ability to objectively assess the evidence, as it reflected properly admitted evidence. The prosecutor's comments were deemed permissible as they had a reasonable basis in the record, consistent with prior rulings allowing vigorous prosecutorial advocacy. The Appellant argues that the prosecutor's closing remarks were improper and aimed to inflame the jury's emotions. Specific remarks criticized include the prosecutor's call for the jury to show the same mercy to Appellant as he showed to the victim, the request for a death sentence for the murder of Wilbur Thomas, belittling Appellant's display of remorse, and arguing Appellant's potential future danger. The court found these contentions to be without merit, indicating that trial counsel had no grounds to object. It reaffirmed that asking the jury to consider the mercy shown to the victim is a permissible prosecutorial tactic, supported by precedent. The court concluded that the prosecutor’s comments did not constitute misconduct and were appropriate within the context of the trial. Mr. Paddy's actions, particularly the murder of witnesses and prior convictions, were highlighted by the prosecutor as reasons to impose the death penalty, asserting that the jurors need not deliberate due to the overwhelming evidence of guilt. The prosecutor emphasized that if any aggravating circumstances were found without mitigating factors, a death sentence was mandatory. While the prosecutor's phrasing lacked clarity, particularly regarding the significance of aggravating factors, it was not deemed prejudicial to Mr. Paddy. Additionally, the prosecutor criticized Mr. Paddy's emotional displays during the trial, suggesting that the jury should not be swayed by tears but rather focus on the legal evidence. The prosecutor pointed out that while Mr. Paddy showed emotion during testimony, it should not influence the jury's decision, which must align with the law and facts rather than emotional appeals. Ultimately, the remarks were found to be within permissible bounds, reinforcing that the jury's focus should remain on the evidence rather than emotional testimony. The prosecutor's comments regarding the Appellant's credibility were deemed appropriate, and trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to object. The Appellant claimed the prosecutor argued for the death penalty based on future danger, but the court clarified that the prosecutor was referencing the Appellant's past violent actions instead. Consequently, the Appellant's claims of prosecutorial misconduct were found to lack merit, and trial counsel's inaction was justified. In the Appellant's fourteenth issue, he argued that the trial court improperly restricted his ability to present relevant mitigation evidence during the penalty hearing by not allowing the jury to hear his expressions of innocence and by removing them when he and his counsel displayed emotion. The Appellant asserted this hindered his ability to show remorse and claimed ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel for not raising this issue. However, the PCRA court concluded that the trial court's limitations did not adversely affect the presentation of mitigation evidence or testimony. It was reiterated that the penalty phase's purpose is to determine sentencing rather than to relitigate guilt, allowing for a wide range of evidence regarding mitigating circumstances, including the defendant's demeanor and perceived remorse. Testimony regarding a defendant's guilt is deemed irrelevant during the penalty phase of a trial and may be excluded, as established in Commonwealth v. Stokes and supported by prior cases such as Fletcher. In this instance, the trial court properly excluded the appellant's testimony asserting his innocence and presenting an alibi, as such assertions had no bearing on the penalty phase. The appellant's claim that the court restricted his emotional expression is contradicted by the record, which shows the court's instruction to maintain decorum rather than suppress feelings. Following the jury's withdrawal, the court emphasized the need for professionalism in the proceedings, allowing the appellant to express his thoughts and feelings about his family and personal struggles. While the court curtailed tearful displays, it did not inhibit the appellant from conveying his heartfelt concerns. The record indicates that the appellant had the opportunity to present his demeanor and express himself adequately. Consequently, the appellant's claims are unsupported by the record and inconsistent with Pennsylvania law, leading to the conclusion that trial counsel had no grounds for objection to the exclusion of testimony, thereby rendering the appellant's claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel unviable. Appellant claims ineffective assistance of trial counsel for not investigating and presenting mitigating evidence related to his difficult childhood during the penalty phase hearing, as well as ineffective assistance of appellate counsel for not raising this issue on direct appeal. The mitigating evidence relates to how his upbringing affected his mental health and psychological development. Appellant contends that the failure to explore his background deprived the jury of considering this evidence under the catchall mitigator in 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711(e)(8). He argues that this deficiency violated his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The excerpt references Strickland v. Washington, which establishes the standard for evaluating claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. Counsel is required to conduct reasonable investigations or make reasonable strategic decisions not to investigate further. If a strategic choice follows a thorough investigation, it is largely unassailable; however, if made after a less than complete investigation, it must be backed by reasonable professional judgment. Evaluations of counsel's performance are highly deferential, and decisions should not be judged with hindsight. The effectiveness of counsel's investigation also relies significantly on the information provided by the defendant. If counsel is unaware of mitigating evidence due to a lack of communication from the defendant, they cannot be deemed ineffective for not pursuing it. Courts have held that counsel's duty includes discovering mitigating evidence through direct questioning but cannot be found ineffective if the defendant denies relevant history, such as mental illness, that counsel had no reason to suspect. In Commonwealth v. Bracey, 568 Pa. 264, 795 A.2d 935, 944 (2001), the court determined that trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to present evidence of the appellant's history of abuse because the appellant and his family did not disclose this history during consultations. The court emphasized that the effectiveness of counsel's performance is assessed based on whether they inquired about the background and were not informed, versus failing to ask altogether. The appellant claimed trial counsel did not investigate mitigating evidence regarding his troubled childhood, including instability, parental neglect, and early involvement with juvenile authorities and drug dealing. He argued that proper investigation would have revealed the negative impact of his upbringing on his emotional and psychological development. To support his claims, he provided written statements from two siblings, asserting that no witnesses were interviewed by counsel. The Commonwealth countered that the appellant did not provide sufficient evidence to substantiate his claim, lacking an affidavit from counsel or other supporting documents. The PCRA court agreed, stating the appellant failed to present additional evidence or identify potential witnesses for the penalty phase and thus did not qualify for relief. Although the PCRA court did not evaluate the thoroughness of trial counsel's investigation into mitigating factors, the record indicated that defense counsel called five witnesses during the penalty phase. These witnesses attested to the appellant's respectful nature and loving relationships with family. Only the appellant's mother offered insight into his childhood, describing him as a caring and supportive child who maintained a close family bond. Simonia Paddy, the Appellant's sister, testified at the penalty phase, expressing her love for the Appellant and noting his positive role as an uncle. However, in a declaration made shortly before the Appellant filed objections to the PCRA court's dismissal notice, she claimed that defense counsel had not prepared her for her testimony and had not inquired about the Appellant's childhood or background. The Appellant contended that trial counsel failed to gather critical life history records, including prison and presentence reports. The presentence report indicated that the investigator could not interview the Appellant's family due to the mother's reluctance to cooperate without counsel present, and communications from the investigator to the counsel went unanswered. The report detailed the Appellant's strained relationship with his father, his upbringing in a financially challenging environment, chronic truancy, and psychological evaluations reflecting a low normal IQ and impulsivity. Despite these claims, the Appellant did not sufficiently demonstrate that appellate counsel was ineffective for not raising trial counsel's alleged ineffectiveness regarding the investigation of mitigating circumstances. Nevertheless, the PCRA court's failure to hold a hearing necessitated that the Appellant only show a genuine factual issue potentially entitling him to relief. Upon review, it was determined that the Appellant had indeed raised material questions about whether defense counsel adequately investigated mitigating factors related to his life history and the implications of potentially not presenting such evidence. As a result, the PCRA court erred by dismissing the issue without a hearing, leading to a remand for an evidentiary hearing focused on whether appellate counsel was ineffective for not addressing the trial counsel's alleged shortcomings in investigating and presenting mitigating evidence. The burden remains on the Appellant to prove counsel's ineffectiveness. Appellant's sixteenth issue presents a vague claim of ineffective assistance from all prior counsel, lacking specific challenges or supporting arguments, resulting in waiver of the issue. In the seventeenth issue, Appellant argues that his due process rights were violated due to the PCRA court's refusal to allocate sufficient funds for investigation and expert testimony necessary to support his PCRA claims, as well as a denial for additional time for new counsel to investigate. The court finds these assertions meritless and unsupported by the record. Appellant's pro se petition for investigative and expert funds, filed on March 15, 2004, cited his indigency but provided only vague details about the intended use of the funds, asserting he needed resources to investigate and develop claims related to trial counsel's failures. He requested $5,000 for investigative services, $10,000 for experts, and $1,000 for record collection, but offered no specifics about the investigations, types of expert services, or potential witnesses. During a May 20, 2004 hearing on the petition, Appellant mentioned wanting to investigate witnesses allegedly coerced by police but did not specify the experts he sought. The court requested further details regarding the investigator's qualifications and the specific investigative tasks. On October 18, 2004, the PCRA court approved $2,500 for investigative services, but the record lacks information on how these funds were utilized. In the appeal, Appellant contends the $2,500 was insufficient, claiming it hindered his ability to hire experts and complete investigations related to his claims, but fails to provide a rationale for this assertion. Appellant argues that his due process rights were violated when the PCRA court denied his request for funds to hire experts necessary to demonstrate his innocence and claim of prejudice. However, he does not specify what expert testimony is needed or how it would support his claims. He asserts that the court had an obligation to provide the requested amount of public funds but fails to cite legal authority for this assertion. Although Appellant references Ake v. Oklahoma, which mandates psychiatric assistance under specific circumstances during trial, the court clarifies that Ake applies only to the guilt and penalty phases and is not relevant to PCRA proceedings. Since neither Appellant's sanity nor future dangerousness were contested, he is not entitled to public funds for a psychiatric expert. The court granted him $2,500 for investigative services, which it deemed sufficient. Additionally, Appellant's request for a continuance for further investigation was denied; the court maintains that the decision to grant continuances is at the trial court's discretion. Factors including Appellant's desire to represent himself and counsel's late appointment indicate that the court did not abuse its discretion. Appellant filed a pro se PCRA petition in September 2002, and new counsel was appointed in March 2003 after the original counsel withdrew due to a conflict of interest. On May 8, 2003, the PCRA court considered Appellant's motion to represent himself and allowed counsel to withdraw, subsequently appointing new counsel on May 20, 2003. Appellant received continuances on July 9 and October 1, 2003, for further investigation. On October 22, 2003, a conflict of interest led to counsel's withdrawal, and another new counsel was appointed on October 30, 2003. After a video conference on November 14, 2003, the court granted Appellant's self-representation request, appointing back-up counsel and allowing a continuance until February 20, 2004, for an amended PCRA petition. Appellant requested an additional ninety days, ultimately filing his amended pro se petition on May 20, 2004. In March 2004, he also sought funds for investigative assistance and a discovery hearing. A video hearing on May 20, 2004, resulted in an order for the Commonwealth to locate documents for Appellant. However, on October 18, 2004, the court rescinded the discovery order, affirming Appellant had received all entitled discovery, and authorized $2,500 for investigative services. A deadline of December 18, 2004, was set for filing an amended petition, with the Commonwealth's response due by February 17, 2005. Appellant filed a 108-page second amended pro se petition on November 17, 2004. The Commonwealth moved to dismiss the petition on February 9, 2005, and at a hearing on February 18, 2005, Appellant's counsel requested a continuance, which the court denied, indicating an intent to dismiss without a hearing. A formal notice of intent to dismiss was issued on February 25, 2005, granting Appellant and his counsel sixty days to respond. Lengthy objections were filed on April 26, 2005, but the court denied the PCRA petition on May 23, 2005. The court found no abuse of discretion in denying another continuance, as Appellant had voluntarily chosen to represent himself over two years, filing three petitions. Counsel's appearance came shortly before the dismissal intent, and the court allowed an extended response time, exceeding Rule 909 requirements. Appellant could not reverse his self-representation decision to delay further proceedings. Thus, the PCRA court acted within its discretion in denying the motion for a continuance. The order of the PCRA court is affirmed regarding all of Appellant's claims, except for one concerning ineffective assistance of counsel during the penalty phase for failure to investigate and present mitigating evidence related to Appellant's background. This specific claim is remanded to the PCRA court for an evidentiary hearing. Jurisdiction is relinquished. Justice Orie Melvin did not participate in this case, while Justices Baer and Todd joined the majority opinion. Chief Justice Castille and Justice Eakin filed concurring opinions, and Justice Saylor provided a concurring and dissenting opinion, expressing concerns over the unpredictability of the court's merits review of ineffectiveness claims and pointing out perceived inconsistencies in the court's approach within this case. Justice Saylor highlighted a lack of distinction between claims deemed unworthy of consideration and the penalty phase argument that warranted remand. Chief Justice Castille countered the allegations about the challenges faced by capital defense counsel, suggesting that such claims are exaggerated. The legal standard for assessing ineffective assistance of counsel claims is established in Strickland v. Washington and its subsequent interpretations, emphasizing that proving Strickland claims is challenging, as reiterated in recent case law. An ineffective-assistance claim can bypass waiver and forfeiture rules, necessitating meticulous application of the Strickland standard to preserve the integrity of the adversary process. For petitioners seeking merits review of an appellate Strickland claim, compliance with the Sixth Amendment requirements established by Strickland and Smith v. Robbins is essential. Failure to adequately brief any legal claim risks its defeat. The excerpt emphasizes that shortcomings in developing arguments according to federal standards reflect a deliberate litigation strategy focused on future federal habeas corpus relief rather than the court's evolving standards. Although the term "waiver" is used for addressing insufficiently developed claims, this approach is viewed as a form of merits review. The court notes that a failure to substantiate claims with necessary arguments dooms them under the Strickland standard. The majority opinion asserts that assuming counsel's ineffectiveness without demonstrating both the performance and prejudice prongs of Strickland results in meritless claims. The text acknowledges inconsistencies in how similarly briefed claims are treated, particularly emphasizing that a lack of meaningful briefing on Strickland elements is a frequent issue, leading to varying judicial responses. Undeveloped claims in legal cases may be deemed waived, a principle applicable beyond criminal matters and Strickland claims, as outlined in Pa.R.A.P. 2119 and illustrated in Purple Orchid, Inc. v. Pa. State Police. The document highlights the challenges faced by the Court in capital collateral appeals, particularly due to strategic and burdensome briefing practices, such as presenting multiple claims and sub-claims to create delay. Such complexity can lead courts to dismiss claims based on insufficient development, a practice supported by precedent, including Justice Ginsburg's reasoning in Walker v. Martin. The excerpt asserts that courts have discretion in choosing among various legitimate grounds for denying claims, without needing to prioritize one over another. It references Commonwealth v. Marrero, where the court rejected ineffective assistance claims based on meritless underlying claims rather than procedural shortcomings. The overall message emphasizes that courts are not bound to evaluate ineffectiveness claims in a specific order, allowing flexibility in judicial efficiency and discretion in addressing claims. The implications of these practices for PCRA petitioners and legal practitioners are also noted, raising questions about how disposition methods affect broader legal strategies. Appellant's arguments attempt to demonstrate the merit of her waived claims while incorrectly assuming that a failure to pursue these claims equates to per se ineffective assistance of counsel. This per se ineffectiveness argument does not satisfy the performance prong (lack of a reasonable basis) or the prejudice prong of the Strickland test, leading to the inevitable failure of her claims. The excerpt emphasizes the importance for PCRA petitioners and practitioners to adequately address all substantive elements of a claim to attain relief, rather than relying on undeveloped claims that may survive waiver due to judicial leniency. The discussion highlights the necessity of focusing on substantive deficiencies in arguments, particularly in pervasive cases like this. Additionally, it notes that the U.S. Supreme Court has reaffirmed the deference owed to state procedural default rules during federal habeas corpus review, provided these rules do not discriminate against federal claims. The Court acknowledges that some petitioners have received undue consideration in Strickland claims despite insufficient development, indicating that this has not resulted in discrimination against federal claimants. The excerpt suggests that the Court should consistently identify Strickland briefing inadequacies to minimize litigation incentives for federal counsel to mischaracterize the state's approach in capital cases. Finally, it contrasts the implications of granting relief on one inadequately developed Strickland claim while waiving others with similar deficiencies. The Majority's approach waives standalone claims of appellate counsel ineffectiveness but remands one layered claim related to trial counsel’s failure to present a stronger mitigation case during the penalty phase. In this layered claim, the appellant's brief extensively develops the underlying issue of trial counsel ineffectiveness, while the derivative claim regarding appellate counsel is presented in a notably superficial manner. Justice Saylor notes that differentiating between layered and stand-alone claims is justified based on the precedent set in Commonwealth v. McGill. Layered Strickland claims differ from stand-alone claims, which focus solely on appellate counsel's performance and necessitate showing specific instances of ineffectiveness, such as failing to present additional evidence or recognizing a winning legal theory that could have altered the appeal's outcome. The appellant's arguments regarding appellate counsel's ineffectiveness are criticized as boilerplate and insufficient, lacking the necessary specificity regarding appellate advocacy. However, the treatment of layered claims is distinct, particularly when deficiencies in appellate counsel's briefing reflect similar inadequacies in the PCRA court's initial pleadings, which were not identified as grounds for dismissal. According to McGill, such cases warrant a review of the underlying trial counsel ineffectiveness claim to determine its merits. If the trial claim holds merit, a remand is necessary; if not, the layered claim is rejected. The court acknowledges that the appellant's stand-alone claims were not dismissed due to insufficient development, thus he was not given a chance to amend. Despite recognizing the parallels in the appellant's insufficient arguments across both claim types, the court has not established a similar pass-through mechanism for stand-alone claims as it has for layered claims. McGill was established to clarify the requirements for merits review in layered ineffectiveness cases, particularly regarding claims of counsel effectiveness beyond immediate prior counsel. There is established clarity on the Strickland/Pierce test when challenging immediate prior counsel, but uncertainties arise in preserving and proving Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA) claims against other counsel. It is emphasized that petitioners must adequately develop stand-alone claims of appellate counsel ineffectiveness, as federally mandated standards are well-established. The lack of development in appellate claims can serve as a basis for dismissal, regardless of whether the PCRA court cited this reason. Justice Eakin, in his concurring opinion, stresses that counsel's performance should be assessed based on the legal standards at the time of the trial, rather than future standards. He argues that requiring counsel to anticipate legal changes would unfairly burden them. This perspective aligns with U.S. Supreme Court rulings, which assert that the effectiveness of counsel should be judged against prevailing professional norms at the time of representation. The Supreme Court has reaffirmed that counsel is entitled to develop strategies based on the context of their time and that evaluations of conduct must consider the circumstances faced by counsel at the time of the trial. Justice Saylor concurs with the majority opinion on these points while dissenting on others. A substantial portion of the Appellant's guilt-phase claims has been deemed waived due to inadequate briefing, aligning with the precedent set in Commonwealth v. Steele. Concerns arise about the strategic motivations behind the application of the Court's rules for written arguments, as noted by various Justices. The inconsistencies in the application of these rules raise questions about predictability in which arguments receive consideration. The author observes no significant differences between the claims deemed unworthy of review and those that prompted a remand for penalty arguments. It is concluded that the uneven enforcement of briefing requirements results in some claims being reviewed while others are not, leading to potential ineffectiveness of appellate post-conviction counsel. The Court's current stance suggests limited state-level recourse for ineffective representation. Although supportive of the remand for the penalty matter, the author advocates for a merits review of the Appellant's other claims, emphasizing the need for consistency in reviewing capital claims. Additionally, the PCRA court incorrectly cited Rule 907 instead of Rule 909, which is relevant to death penalty cases, though both rules contain identical provisions. Shawn Nolan and Victor Abreu from the Federal Capital Habeas Corpus Unit, along with Michael Dodge and Raymond Jamieson from Quarles Brady LLP, filed a 104-page document titled "Petitioner's Objection to 907 Notice to Dismiss, Amendment to PCRA Petition and Memorandum of Law Requesting Habeas Corpus Relief." The court has jurisdiction over the appeal under 42 Pa.C.S. § 9546(d), as referenced in *Commonwealth v. Dennis*. The PCRA court's opinion was criticized for being insufficient, with less than six pages dedicated to the Appellant's multiple claims, many addressed minimally. The Appellant's claims, listed for clarity, include: 1. Ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. 2. Violation of the right to confrontation due to exclusion from an in camera hearing. 3. Use of a primary witness's preliminary hearing testimony to convict, violating confrontation and due process rights. 4. Failure of trial counsel to exclude inadmissible hearsay statements, affecting effective assistance and fair trial rights. 5. Admission of evidence regarding prior bad acts and improper jury instructions about such evidence. 6. Non-disclosure of material exculpatory evidence and reliance on false testimony by the Commonwealth. 7. Lack of jury instruction on parole ineligibility if sentenced to life. 8. Erroneous jury instruction concerning aggravating circumstances related to the killing of a witness. 9. Misleading jury instructions regarding the imposition of the death sentence based on mitigating versus aggravating circumstances. 10. Instructions that allowed for a grave risk aggravating circumstance to be established based on conduct "probably certain." 11. Jury instruction suggesting Appellant agreed to the existence of an aggravating circumstance. 12. Use of an unconstitutionally obtained prior conviction to enhance the sentence, violating Appellant's rights. The lower court's dismissal of Appellant's claims regarding prosecutorial misconduct during the penalty phase, restrictions on testimony, ineffective assistance of counsel, and denial of investigative funds is under scrutiny. Specifically, the court did not conduct a proper waiver analysis for the claim of appellate counsel ineffectiveness, failing to differentiate it from trial counsel ineffectiveness or trial court error. The PCRA court inadequately addressed Appellant's claims, lacking a thorough legal analysis and supporting authority, merely concluding that Appellant's confrontation rights were not violated. Additionally, the court incorrectly categorized certain claims as previously litigated, overlooking that claims of appellate counsel ineffectiveness had not been addressed. This distinction is crucial, as established precedents affirm that claims of counsel ineffectiveness are separate from claims of trial court error. The PCRA court's brief treatment of these issues is criticized, emphasizing the need for detailed reasoning and factual findings in capital appeals. A PCRA court must treat claims of ineffective assistance of counsel as separate issues, applying the three-prong ineffectiveness standard established in *Commonwealth v. Pierce*. The PCRA court incorrectly interpreted the Appellant's ineffectiveness claims as direct trial court error claims, which are considered waived or previously litigated and not permissible under the PCRA. Most of the Appellant's claims relate to ineffective assistance, yet the PCRA court did not apply the Pierce standard. When ineffectiveness claims are based on trial court error, the Pierce standard may include an analysis of that underlying error. The PCRA court must frame each issue correctly to apply the appropriate standard. Regarding specific issues, the Appellant repeated his claim about the improper admission of identification evidence, which the court deemed waived as a direct trial court error claim. The court acknowledged that claims of trial counsel ineffectiveness were previously litigated but failed to recognize that claims of appellate counsel ineffectiveness regarding trial counsel's performance are distinct. The Appellant also raised a Brady violation claim related to his conviction, which was deemed irrelevant. The Superior Court had affirmed the Appellant's judgment of sentence, and his petition for allowance of appeal was denied. The PCRA court mistakenly indicated that the Appellant's claims of prosecutorial misconduct were previously litigated when, in fact, only trial counsel ineffectiveness claims were raised on direct appeal. The Appellant noted that his counsel attempted to object during the trial but was silenced by the court. Additionally, the Appellant argued that the trial court's penalty phase instructions were inadequate. Appellant challenges the jury instruction that it should consider all evidence from the guilt phase without a caution against using testimony related to the Panati Playground murders as evidence of Appellant’s guilt. This issue was not raised in the PCRA court, leading to its waiver under Pa.R.A.P. 302(a). Furthermore, Appellant submitted a psychiatrist's affidavit dated after the PCRA petition dismissal, which the court could not consider. Appellant also mischaracterizes a written declaration from Ms. Paddy as an affidavit, which lacks the required sworn statement, rendering it insufficient to support claims of ineffective counsel. Appellant's claims of trial counsel ineffectiveness for failing to present mitigation evidence are based on three U.S. Supreme Court cases decided post-trial. However, these cases do not introduce new constitutional standards for ineffective assistance; they apply the established Strickland v. Washington standard, which governs such claims. The Pennsylvania standard for ineffective assistance of counsel is materially identical to Strickland. Recent Supreme Court opinions reaffirm that Strickland remains the governing standard for ineffectiveness claims. Criminal defendants are entitled to representation that meets an objective standard of reasonableness based on prevailing professional norms, as established in Strickland. In Porter v. McCollum, the court found that defense counsel's failure to seek additional mitigating evidence did not constitute ineffective assistance, as the existing evidence was already substantial. Conversely, in Sears v. Upton, the court determined that defense counsel's lack of investigation into mitigating evidence did not reflect reasonable professional judgment, highlighting failures to interview witnesses or gather pertinent records. Under Rule 909(B)(2)(b), defendants have 20 days to respond to a PCRA court's intent to dismiss without a hearing. Significantly, the U.S. Supreme Court's unanimous decisions in federal habeas corpus cases, particularly Beard v. Kindler, clarified that state procedural bars can be adequate grounds for denying federal habeas petitions, even with state discretion to consider merits despite defaults. The Walker v. Martin decision further established that a state procedural default rule does not need to be invoked in every instance to be deemed adequate. Within the context of appellate counsel ineffectiveness, claims are often presented summarily, relying on perceived strength and clarity of underlying issues. The appellant asserts that appellate counsel lacked a reasonable basis for omitting claims of trial counsel's ineffectiveness, indicating a need for a hearing to substantiate these claims, which are viewed as meritorious. The appellant contends that there was no strategic justification for failing to raise these arguments or investigate the appellant's background.