City of Tucson v. Clear Channel Outdoor, Inc.

Citations: 78 P.3d 1056; 206 Ariz. 335; 412 Ariz. Adv. Rep. 14; 2003 Ariz. App. LEXIS 179Docket: 2 CA-CV 2002-0183

Court: Court of Appeals of Arizona; October 31, 2003; Arizona; State Appellate Court

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The City of Tucson appealed a summary judgment favoring Clear Channel Outdoor, Inc., in a case related to enforcing Tucson's sign and zoning ordinances against nonconforming billboards. The City contended that the trial court incorrectly applied the two-year statute of limitations outlined in A.R.S. § 9-462.02(C) retroactively, which barred most of its enforcement claims for violations discovered prior to the statute's effective date. The City filed its initial complaint on July 17, 2000, against Eller Media Company, Clear Channel's predecessor, alleging violations by 122 billboards and subsequently amended the complaint to include an additional 51 billboards.

Clear Channel sought summary judgment, asserting that the statute of limitations precluded the City from pursuing claims based on violations discovered over two years before the complaint was filed. Although the City acknowledged that many violations were discovered prior to the two-year limit, it argued that the legislature did not intend for the statute to apply retroactively and cited legislative materials suggesting the statute was not meant to affect existing claims. The trial court dismissed the City's evidence, ruling that the statute did apply retroactively, resulting in the dismissal of 89 out of 173 alleged violations.

On appeal, the City argued that applying the two-year limit retroactively would be unconstitutional, referencing case law that prohibits statutes from eliminating existing causes of action unless explicitly stated by the legislature. The court ultimately affirmed the trial court's ruling, supporting the retroactive application of the statute.

Clear Channel argues that prior cases cited by the City are not applicable because they involved private rights that had already vested, which is not the case here. Generally, a statute does not apply retroactively unless explicitly stated, but exceptions exist for procedural and remedial statutes that do not impair vested rights. Cities lack vested rights in their municipal powers, as the legislature has broad authority to grant or revoke these powers. Consequently, the City’s authority to enact and enforce zoning and sign codes is derived solely from state law, meaning it has no vested rights in that authority.

The City attempts to differentiate its case from prior rulings by noting that it involves a statute of limitations rather than the repeal of substantive zoning authority. However, this distinction is deemed insignificant since the City’s enforcement powers are still subject to state control. The legislature can modify or eliminate the City’s enforcement authority at any time. In analogous cases, it has been established that applying new statutes, such as a statute of limitations, to pre-existing government claims does not raise constitutional concerns, as causes of action based solely on statute are not considered vested rights.

The City further contends that in cases where new legislation does not explicitly mention retroactive application, A.R.S. 12-505 governs the situation. The City argues that the trial court incorrectly determined that the limitation period began upon discovery of violations rather than on the effective date of the relevant statute. However, the language of A.R.S. 12-505(B) is clear, indicating that the limitation period is governed by the new statute's terms, starting at the time specified in the legislation, which is when the City discovered the violations.

The legislature did not intend for a "window" period in A.R.S. 12-505(B) for existing claims, as evidenced by its explicit provision for such a period in 12-505(C). The City referenced Rutherford v. Babcock to argue that new legislation cannot summarily bar existing claims. However, the court clarified that Rutherford is inapplicable because it dealt with a different context and involved vested rights in child support arrears, whereas the City lacks vested rights in enforcing zoning and sign codes.

The City contended that the trial court erred by not considering documents related to legislative history and intent regarding A.R.S. 9-462.02(C). Interpretation of a statute is a legal question focused on legislative intent, with clear language requiring straightforward application without additional interpretation. The court agreed with the City that 9-462.02(C) is unambiguous. Statutory changes can apply retroactively to pending cases unless specified otherwise or if vested rights are affected, which in this case, they are not.

The trial court correctly declined to consider the City’s documents on legislative intent. Furthermore, the City cited a judicial policy favoring the elimination of nonconforming uses, advocating for a narrow construction of 9-462.02 with prospective application.

Public policy in the common law is influenced by legislative action, which takes precedence when the legislature has made a clear statement on a matter, provided there are no constitutional barriers. The primary responsibility for declaring public policy lies with the legislature. In this case, the judgment favoring Clear Channel is affirmed, and they are entitled to appeal fees under A.R.S. 12-348(A), contingent upon compliance with Rule 21(c) of the Arizona Rules of Civil Appellate Procedure. Notably, the defendant changed from Eller to Clear Channel during the litigation. Relevant legislative provisions indicate that municipal authorities can enforce zoning ordinances. Additionally, the provision allowing for the extension of limitation periods for actions under amended laws does not apply if the action is not barred by prior law, which both Clear Channel and the City acknowledge is relevant here. The City's reliance on a prior case regarding legislative history was deemed misplaced, as that case involved different legal principles concerning vested rights.