State v. Arbolida

Citations: 78 P.3d 275; 206 Ariz. 306; 411 Ariz. Adv. Rep. 5; 2003 Ariz. App. LEXIS 178Docket: 1 CA-CR 02-0735

Court: Court of Appeals of Arizona; September 9, 2003; Arizona; State Appellate Court

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Joseph Arbolida appealed his conviction for aggravated assault, a class 6 felony, stemming from an incident where he pushed a police officer during a domestic disturbance investigation. The jury found him guilty, and the trial court determined he had a prior felony conviction for endangerment from 1999. Consequently, he received a super-mitigated sentence of 0.75 years and 43 days of presentence incarceration credit.

Prior to sentencing, defense counsel argued that, despite A.R.S. Section 13-604 (2001) not allowing probation for repetitive offenders, the court could suspend the sentence and grant probation under A.R.S. 13-702(G) (Supp. 2002). This statute permits probation for certain class 6 felonies if the court deems a felony sentence unduly harsh, provided the offense does not involve serious physical injury or a deadly weapon, and the defendant does not have multiple prior felony convictions.

Defendant asserted that the phrase "notwithstanding any other provision of this title" in A.R.S. 13-702(G) meant it should take precedence over A.R.S. 13-604(A). However, the trial court ruled that A.R.S. 13-604(A) defined the sentencing range for defendants with historical prior felony convictions, such as Arbolida's, and thus applied to him. The court noted that A.R.S. 13-604(A) allows for specific exceptions, none of which included A.R.S. 13-702(G). Ultimately, the court stated it would have ordered probation if legally permissible and left the class 6 offense undesignated. The appellate court reversed the conviction and remanded for resentencing.

Defendant claims the trial court erred by not applying A.R.S. 13-702(G) to impose probation instead of a prison term. The appellate review of the trial court's sentencing is for abuse of discretion, while statutory interpretation is reviewed de novo. The court aims to fulfill legislative intent, adhering to the statute's plain language and applying the rule of lenity when multiple interpretations exist. The trial court expressed concern about potentially imposing an illegally lenient sentence through probation, noting the statutory nature of probation powers and the legislative mandate in A.R.S. 13-604(A), which outlines sentencing ranges.

However, the appellate court finds that the trial court narrowly interpreted A.R.S. 13-702(G). Both Defendant and the State argue that the statute's clear language overrides other provisions in Title 13, including A.R.S. 13-604(A), suggesting that trial courts have discretion to mitigate sentences for minor felonies based on the crime's nature and the defendant's character. The trial court's interpretation incorrectly excludes defendants with historical prior felony convictions, contrary to the statute, which only restricts those with two or more prior felonies.

The court emphasizes that "felonies" refers to all felonies unless specified otherwise by the legislature. Defendant qualifies for leniency under A.R.S. 13-702(G) as he has not been previously convicted of two or more felonies. The Maricopa County Attorney's Office argues that historical felonies should bar leniency, but this interpretation imposes limitations not intended by the legislature, ignoring the statute's initial wording.

The County contends that the interpretation adopted makes A.R.S. 13-604(A) "meaningless" for defendants convicted of a class 6 felony with one historical prior felony conviction. This claim is exaggerated because A.R.S. 13-702(G) does not automatically exempt anyone from the applicable sentencing statutes, including A.R.S. 13-604(A). A trial court can apply A.R.S. 13-702(G) only after evaluating the crime's nature, circumstances, and the defendant's "history and character," determining that a felony sentence would be "unduly harsh." A.R.S. 13-604(A) remains fully applicable in typical cases involving a class 6 felony conviction with a historical prior felony conviction. Due to the trial court's incorrect interpretation of the statutes, the sentence is vacated and the case is remanded for further proceedings. Judges Maurice Portley and Don Kessler concur. Additionally, a note specifies that a prior class 4, 5, or 6 conviction is considered historical if committed within five years of the current offense, and the Maricopa County Attorney's Office's motion to intervene was denied, although their amicus curiae brief was accepted.