Court: Supreme Judicial Court of Maine; December 21, 2010; Maine; State Supreme Court
Randall R. Whitehead appeals a District Court ruling that mandates he pay his entire child support obligation to Mary E. Perry in cash, rather than allowing credits for payments he made on the residence where Perry and their children live. Whitehead contends that certain housing payments should be considered as in-kind credits against his child support. The court affirms the judgment.
Perry and Whitehead, who were never married, began cohabiting in 1994 and have three children. They purchased a home in Belgrade, Maine, in 2001, financed by the sale of Whitehead's property and a mortgage taken out by Perry. An agreement from July 2001 stated that Whitehead would be responsible for all mortgage payments and associated costs, with Perry agreeing to transfer her interest in the property once the mortgage was paid off.
Perry initiated legal proceedings for parental rights and child support in April 2008, coinciding with a protection order against Whitehead, which barred him from the Belgrade residence and required him to contribute to the mortgage. An interim child support order was established requiring Whitehead to pay $128 weekly, later increased to $298.91 per week. The court specified that a portion of this support could be in-kind payments for housing but mandated a minimum cash payment of $200 weekly.
During hearings in November 2009, the court clarified that it would not address the ownership of the Belgrade property in the parental rights case and highlighted that existing orders governed the parties' rights and responsibilities, including the established child support amount.
The trial focused on determining attorney and guardian fees, as well as whether Whitehead should receive credit against his child support obligation and arrears totaling $14,672.94 for payments related to the Belgrade property (mortgage interest, property taxes, and insurance). On March 31, 2010, the court ruled that these payments were intended to protect Whitehead's ownership interest in the property and were not related to his child support obligations. Consequently, it ordered that his child support payments be made entirely in cash.
Child support payments, as defined by 19-A M.R.S. 1501(2) and 2006(4), must be made in money and cannot typically be satisfied by in-kind contributions. This requirement ensures that the custodial parent can reliably plan for the child’s needs based on consistent financial support. Courts are generally hesitant to allow parents to use property-related payments to offset their child support obligations, as this undermines the custodial parent's ability to manage funds for the children's welfare.
While the principle is that child support payments should be monetary, exceptions may arise under "compulsion of circumstances," which allows for credits in certain situations. However, this is seen as an extraordinary measure, and courts must explicitly find that any claimed in-kind expenditure is necessary, directly related to the child support purpose, and compelled by circumstances. In Whitehead's case, the court determined that his payments for the Belgrade property were distinct from his child support responsibilities, which would remain regardless of his property ownership.
Whitehead is required to pay child support in monetary form, aligning with legal statutes and policies, while retaining the option to seek credit for property-related payments in a separate ownership action. The court reinforced this decision by referencing the parties’ 2001 agreement, which obligates Whitehead to make the payments he now seeks credit for, highlighting the distinct nature of the child support and property issues. The court's reasoning is upheld as it did not demonstrate an abuse of discretion, resulting in the affirmation of its judgment. Furthermore, the court clarified that, despite a prior mention of child support in a protection from abuse order, no support was mandated in that context. A previous judge's error in linking child support to the parental rights and responsibilities case was rectified, as the court lacks authority to adjudicate property matters under the parental rights statutes. The option for the parties to consolidate litigation through a partition action was noted as a potential alternative to avoid fragmented legal processes.
