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Travis v. County of Santa Cruz

Citations: 94 P.3d 538; 16 Cal. Rptr. 3d 404; 33 Cal. 4th 757; 2004 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 6822; 2004 Cal. LEXIS 6834Docket: S109597

Court: California Supreme Court; July 29, 2004; California; State Supreme Court

Narrative Opinion Summary

The case involves a challenge to a Santa Cruz County ordinance regulating second dwelling units, brought by residential property owners who argue that the ordinance conflicts with state laws and constitutes an unconstitutional taking. The primary legal issue centers on the timeliness of the plaintiffs' claims under Government Code section 65009. The court found that Steven Travis's challenge to permit conditions was timely, filed within 90 days of the final administrative decision, while the Sokolows' claims were untimely, filed after the statutory period. The court also addressed preemption claims under the Costa-Hawkins Rental Housing Act, determining these were subject to a three-year statute of limitations under Code of Civil Procedure section 338 but ultimately barred due to the timing of the filing. The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's decision on statute of limitations grounds, emphasizing that all claims were facial and subject to the specific statutory timeframes. The ruling underscores the importance of adhering to procedural timelines in land-use disputes and highlights the complex interplay between local ordinances and state statutes. The case was remanded for further proceedings regarding the constitutional claims, with a dissenting opinion questioning the limitations imposed on fundamental rights.

Legal Issues Addressed

Facial vs. As-Applied Challenges

Application: The court categorized the plaintiffs' claims as facial challenges, which must be brought within specific statutory timeframes, rather than as-applied challenges.

Reasoning: The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's decision solely on statute of limitations grounds, concluding that all claims were facial rather than as-applied, as plaintiffs did not demonstrate that the Ordinance was applied differently to their properties or that it imposed a disparate fiscal effect on them compared to other property owners.

Regulatory Takings and Property Rights

Application: The court distinguished between timely challenges to permit conditions and broader claims of ordinance invalidity, indicating that the latter are subject to a three-year statute of limitations.

Reasoning: The action challenging the validity of conditions imposed by the County on Travis's development permit is deemed timely under Government Code section 65009, subdivision (c)(1)(E). However, claims concerning broader invalidity, such as preemption or unconstitutionality, are subject to a three-year statute of limitations under Code of Civil Procedure section 338 and are permanently barred thereafter.

Statute of Limitations for Preemption Claims

Application: The court ruled that preemption claims based on later-enacted state laws are governed by the three-year statute of limitations under Code of Civil Procedure section 338.

Reasoning: The court agrees with the plaintiffs, determining that their challenge, based on preemption by later-enacted state laws like the Costa-Hawkins Act and Civil Code section 51.2, falls under the three-year limit of section 338.

Timeliness of Legal Challenges under Government Code Section 65009

Application: The court assessed the timeliness of the plaintiffs' challenges to conditions imposed on their second dwelling unit permits, finding Travis's claim timely but the Sokolows' untimely.

Reasoning: It determined that Travis's action to remove conditions on his development permit was timely, as it was filed within 90 days of the final decision on those conditions, per Government Code § 65009, subdivision (c)(1)(E). However, the Sokolows' challenge was deemed untimely since they failed to act within the same 90-day period post-permit issuance.