Court: District Court of Appeal of Florida; June 4, 2010; Florida; State Appellate Court
Frank G. Timmons, Jr. and Jacquelyn Timmons Forman appeal a final summary judgment favoring co-trustees Myrtle Timmons Ingrahm and David Carter. The court found that the trial court incorrectly interpreted the term "lineal descendants" in determining the intent of the testator, Frank Timmons, Sr. Therefore, the appellate court reversed the judgment and directed entry of partial summary judgment for the Timmons.
At his death in 1999, Frank Sr. was married to Myrtle, who had four children not adopted by him. Frank Sr. had two adopted children, the Timmons. His will established two trusts: the Timmons Family Trust, valued at $650,000, and the Timmons Marital Trust, which contained the majority of his estate. Myrtle was the sole income beneficiary of both trusts and could withdraw funds at her discretion. Upon Myrtle's death, the remaining principal of the Marital Trust would transfer to the Family Trust, to be distributed among Frank Sr.'s and Myrtle's children, defined in the will to include both adopted and stepchildren.
The dispute arose when Myrtle attempted to disinherit the Timmons using a limited power of attorney from the Family Trust, which allowed her to allocate trust principal to her "lineal descendants." The appellate court found that the term's legal definition was not properly applied in the trial court's judgment.
Myrtle executed a "Limited Power of Appointment," intending to distribute all principal and income from the Timmons Family Trust to her four natural children, explicitly disinheriting Frank G. Timmons, Jr. and Jacquelyn Forman, along with their descendants. The co-trustees began distributing trust assets to Myrtle's children and denied the Timmons access to trust records. The Timmons filed a lawsuit against the co-trustees for breach of fiduciary duty and an accounting, arguing that Myrtle's disinheritance was invalid because the limited power of appointment could only benefit Frank Sr.'s "lineal descendants," which they claimed did not include Myrtle's children.
The co-trustees contended that Myrtle's execution of the limited power of appointment was valid and effectively disinherited the Timmons, leaving them without standing to sue. Both parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment, leading to a trial court ruling that denied the Timmons' motion and granted the co-trustees' motion based on the interpretation of Frank Sr.'s will. The case was appealed, with the trial court's decision being reviewed de novo.
In interpreting the will, the court emphasized that the testator's intent must prevail. The legal definition of "lineal descendant" was cited, which includes children and grandchildren but excludes collateral heirs. The court noted that while adopted children are considered lineal descendants, step-children are not unless explicitly included. The co-trustees argued that Frank Sr. intended to broaden the definition of "lineal descendants" to include step-children, a claim the court rejected, stating that Frank Sr. did not modify the legal definition of "lineal descendants" in his will, indicating an intention to adhere to its standard legal meaning.
Frank Sr. referenced "lineal descendants" in his will on two occasions, stipulating that if Myrtle predeceased him, his personal property would go to his surviving children or, if none survived, to their lineal descendants, per stirpes. Additionally, he bequeathed stock to his son, Frank Timmons, Jr., or his lineal descendants, also per stirpes. The usage of "lineal descendants" aligns with its legal definition and indicates no intent to allow Myrtle to disinherit Frank Sr.'s children in favor of her own. The court concluded that Frank Sr.'s will did not demonstrate any intent to broaden the definition of "lineal descendants" to include step-children, rendering Myrtle's attempt to exercise her limited power of appointment in favor of her natural children invalid. The ruling was reversed and remanded. The appeal further noted that the previous marital trust's restructuring did not affect the case and deemed unnecessary to address additional arguments regarding Myrtle's powers or the Timmons' entitlement to an accounting from the co-trustees, as the trial court found Timmons lacked standing.
