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Katzberg v. Regents of University of California
Citations: 58 P.3d 339; 127 Cal. Rptr. 2d 482; 29 Cal. 4th 300; 19 I.E.R. Cas. (BNA) 545; 2002 Daily Journal DAR 13337; 2002 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 11504; 2002 Cal. LEXIS 8099Docket: S097445
Court: California Supreme Court; November 27, 2002; California; State Supreme Court
The Supreme Court of California reviewed the case of Richard W. Katzberg v. The Regents of the University of California to determine if an individual can seek monetary damages for a violation of the California Constitution without a statutory or common law basis for such a remedy. Katzberg alleged a violation of his due process liberty interest under California Constitution article I, section 7(a) due to the lack of a timely "name-clearing" hearing following his removal as chairperson of the Department of Radiology at the University of California at Davis Medical Center amid an investigation into alleged financial misconduct. Although Katzberg was removed from his position, he remained a tenured professor and staff physician. The investigation did not implicate him in personal misconduct but involved the handling of departmental funds. The court concluded that damages for the alleged constitutional violation were not available, highlighting that while at-will employees lack a property right to their positions, they retain liberty interests that may be violated by stigmatizing statements related to their discharge. A party whose liberty has been deprived is entitled to a 'name-clearing hearing' as established in Codd v. Velger. The plaintiff's third amended complaint claimed he was denied such a hearing before and after his removal, seeking relief including an injunction, damages, attorney fees, and costs. The trial court struck down the relief request and, three and a half years post-removal, the defendants offered a name-clearing hearing, which the plaintiff ultimately rejected after unsuccessful negotiations on its terms. Defendants then filed for summary judgment, arguing that (i) the alleged false statements were not legally stigmatizing, and (ii) even if they were, the only remedy would be a name-clearing hearing that the plaintiff had rejected. The plaintiff contended that the proposed hearing was inadequate. In April 2000, the trial court granted summary judgment to defendants, concluding that they had offered an adequate hearing and that such a hearing was the exclusive remedy for the claimed due process violation, denying the availability of money damages under California law for liberty interest infringements. The Court of Appeal affirmed this decision, noting that a violation of the due process liberty interest under the state constitution is recognized similarly to that of the federal Constitution, as established in Roth. The Court of Appeal also concluded that damages are not available for such violations under article I, section 7(a) of the California Constitution. The plaintiff argues for damages under this section, while defendants maintain that a name-clearing hearing is the only appropriate remedy. The court assumed, for the sake of the damages analysis, that the plaintiff's allegations sufficiently indicated a violation of his due process rights. Article I, section 26 of the California Constitution states that its provisions are mandatory unless explicitly declared otherwise. All branches of government must adhere to constitutional mandates, as established in several California cases, asserting that any actions violating constitutional provisions are void. Specifically, the due process clause of article I, section 7(a) is deemed self-executing, obligating compliance without the need for additional legislation. This clause allows private individuals to initiate actions for declaratory relief or injunction against relevant defendants. The primary issue at hand is whether a plaintiff can seek monetary damages for an alleged violation of due process under this constitutional provision. The precedent set by Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents is significant, as it affirms the right to recover damages for constitutional rights infringements against federal agents, even in the absence of explicit legislative remedies. The Bivens court determined that federal courts may provide remedies to address wrongs, highlighting that there were no compelling reasons against recognizing such rights, no effective alternative remedies, and no congressional stipulation preventing recovery for Fourth Amendment violations. The Supreme Court has since reviewed multiple cases of plaintiffs seeking damages based on alleged violations of various federal constitutional rights. The excerpt outlines the evolution of federal constitutional tort actions for damages, highlighting a trend where the Supreme Court has, over the past two decades, declined to recognize such actions despite earlier cases allowing them under certain circumstances. Initially, cases like Davis v. Passman and Carlson v. Green established the possibility of damages for constitutional violations, specifically under the Fifth and Eighth Amendments. However, subsequent rulings, including Chappell v. Wallace, Bush v. Lucas, and others, indicate a shift where the Court identified 'special factors' that advised against recognizing federal constitutional torts. The Court has also retreated from earlier assumptions that the absence of a complete alternative remedy supports a damages claim, now asserting that a meaningful alternative remedy suffices. Additionally, the presumption that money damages are available unless explicitly prohibited by Congress has been implicitly rejected. Some state jurisdictions have recognized constitutional tort actions based on their common law and legislative history, but many have followed the Supreme Court’s more restrictive stance, often denying such claims due to a lack of historical support for implied damages actions. California courts have recognized limited instances for actions seeking damages to remedy violations of constitutional rights. Notably, two decisions from the past two decades are central to this context. The case of Gay Law Students Assn. v. Pacific Tel. Tel. Co. (1979) involved employees alleging discrimination based on sexual orientation. The court acknowledged their pursuit of both equitable relief and monetary damages but did not explicitly affirm the availability of damages under the California equal protection clause. The reference to Bivens was noted but not interpreted as an endorsement of a damages remedy. In Laguna Publishing Co. v. Golden Rain Foundation (1982), the Court of Appeal found that a gated community's restriction on the distribution of free newspapers violated the publisher's free speech rights under the California Constitution. The court allowed for the possibility of proving damages, emphasizing the significance of free speech rights, yet it did not decisively conclude that a damages remedy was universally applicable to all constitutional violations. Following this, Fenton v. Groveland Community Services Dist. (1982) involved a claim regarding the denial of voting rights. Although the court addressed immunity issues, it suggested, without directly ruling on it, that the plaintiffs could seek damages for the alleged violation of their voting rights under the California Constitution. Overall, these cases illustrate a cautious approach by California courts towards recognizing damages for constitutional violations, with a stronger emphasis on certain rights over others. In the context of California law, courts have largely refrained from recognizing a constitutional tort remedy for damages based on violations of constitutional rights, diverging from the federal Bivens framework. The California courts, including those in cases like *Leger*, *Clausing*, *Gates*, and *Bonner*, focus on whether specific constitutional provisions explicitly or implicitly intended to allow for damage claims. In *Leger*, the court ruled that the "safe schools" clause of the California Constitution did not indicate an intention to support a damages action, as the plaintiff did not present a constitutional tort theory. Similarly, in *Clausing*, the court found no legislative history supporting a damages claim under the "safe schools" and privacy clauses, stating that the privacy clause only permits injunctive relief. In *Gates*, the court examined the equal protection clause and concluded there was no intent for a damages remedy. Lastly, in *Bonner*, the court upheld the absence of a damages remedy for violations of due process and equal protection rights related to property loss, echoing the findings in *Gates*. Overall, these cases emphasize that California courts require clear intent from constitutional provisions to allow for damages claims, a standard that has not been met in the examined cases. The court in Bonner analyzed voters' intent regarding the provision of a damages action for violations of the due process clause. It concluded, referencing Bivens and its progeny, that the federal due process clause supports a damages action when no alternative remedy exists. The court hypothesized that the intent behind California's due process right in article I, section 7(a) was to align with its federal counterpart, thus suggesting a right to damages under state law in similar circumstances. However, Bonner ultimately found that damages were unavailable because the plaintiff had an effective alternative remedy—common law conversion. In Bradley v. Medical Board, the plaintiff sought damages for a due process violation related to the surrender of his medical license, but the court, relying on Bonner, ruled that there is no right to sue for monetary damages under article I, section 7(a). Similarly, in Carlsbad Aquafarm, the court rejected a damages claim for procedural due process violations, emphasizing that the decision to recognize a state constitutional tort hinges on various policy considerations, including voter intent, availability of alternative remedies, self-executing nature of the provision, and the significance of the constitutional right. The court concluded that the plaintiff could not recover damages for the alleged procedural due process violation, establishing a framework to evaluate the existence of a damages action for constitutional violations based on intent inferred from the constitutional provision. The inquiry will assess the language and historical context of the constitutional provision to determine if it implies a monetary remedy, along with relevant common law history. If such intent is found, it will be upheld. If no clear intent exists regarding damages, the analysis will follow the 'constitutional tort' framework established by Bivens. Key considerations in this analysis include the existence of an adequate remedy, the potential impact on established tort law, and the significance of the constitutional provision. If these factors suggest against recognizing a constitutional tort, the inquiry concludes; if they favor it, other considerations will be evaluated, such as legislative deference, policy implications, fiscal concerns, proof challenges, and judicial competence. The inquiry begins by examining the original intent behind the constitutional provision when it was adopted, particularly focusing on Article I, Section 7(a), which states, "A person may not be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law." This language does not explicitly indicate an intention to authorize or deny damages for violations. Therefore, the inquiry will explore the drafting history and voter materials related to the adoption of Proposition 7 in November 1974, which aimed to enhance the California Constitution's declaration of rights. The ballot pamphlet indicated that the measure included rights from the federal Constitution, including the due process clause, clarifying that the right applied broadly beyond criminal cases, thereby affirming its general civil applicability. A review of the debates surrounding the 1849 and 1879 Constitutions reveals no evidence that the drafters contemplated a damages remedy for violations of the due process clause in article I, section 7(a). Additionally, the 1974 revision, which expanded due process protections, similarly lacks indications of intent to create such a remedy. Examination of the 1974 ballot materials does not support the notion that voters intended to establish a damages remedy within this constitutional provision. The Court of Appeal's decision in Gates also found no voter intent to create a damages remedy for due process violations. Although the Bonner case concluded that voters intended to allow for damages in the absence of alternative remedies, this analysis is deemed unpersuasive. The Bonner court's reliance on post-Proposition 7 Supreme Court decisions and a limited interpretation of the voter pamphlet does not convincingly establish that voters understood they were adopting a damages remedy framework. The plaintiff argues that without a damages remedy, the provision would become meaningless; however, this view is rejected. The conclusion drawn is that the 1974 ballot materials do not support inferring an intent to permit damages for violations of the due process clause. The document further explores whether the provision includes guidelines or mechanisms that could imply a damages remedy, but no such support is found. The court aligns with the Carlsbad Aquafarm decision, stating that California's article I, section 7(a) does not provide specific guidelines, mechanisms, or procedures for asserting a claim for damages related to alleged procedural due process violations. While the plaintiff argues that California courts can create such procedures, the relevance of this argument is dismissed. The core issue is whether the language of article I, section 7(a) implies an intent to allow damage claims for violations of due process, which the court concludes it does not. The court references the common law history and practices of other jurisdictions, particularly New York, which have recognized implied rights to damages under similar constitutional provisions. It notes that historical precedents from English common law support damage remedies for unlawful searches and seizures, but no comparable historical support exists for article I, section 7(a). Consequently, the court finds no implied right to seek damages within this provision. However, the court does not rule out the possibility of recognizing a constitutional tort action for damages, similar to precedents set by the U.S. Supreme Court and other jurisdictions, suggesting that the absence of an implied right does not preclude the recognition of such a remedy. When a legislative or constitutional provision protects a class of persons by requiring or prohibiting certain conduct but fails to provide a civil remedy for violations, courts may grant a right of action to an injured party if deemed appropriate to further the provision's purpose. Courts evaluate the underlying policy of the provision and identify the necessary remedy to achieve its intent. This document aligns with jurisdictions that support recognizing tort actions for damages to remedy constitutional violations under certain conditions. The adequacy of existing remedies is a key consideration, as established in prior cases. For instance, in *Carlsbad Aquafarm*, it was determined that the affected party could have sought immediate relief through a writ of mandate instead of delaying and pursuing compensatory damages. Similarly, the current plaintiff had the option to seek a writ of mandate for a name-clearing hearing under the relevant procedural code, rather than filing for damages against the defendants. Thus, the existing remedies available do not support the recognition of a constitutional tort for the alleged due process violation. Plaintiff's claim for damages due to defendants' alleged failure to provide a timely name-clearing hearing is undermined by his own delay in seeking such a hearing through a section 1085 action. Furthermore, he had alternative remedies available, including a defamation claim, which could provide compensation for reputational harm resulting from delays in the hearing. The Regents argue that these alternative remedies reduce the need for a judicially created tort action for damages. Plaintiff cites Civil Code sections 1708 and 3333 as supporting his assertion that a violation of his due process liberty interest warrants a damages action. However, it is argued that section 3333 is not substantive law but merely outlines the measure of damages in tort, and section 1708 does not substantiate the claim that a constitutional violation leads to a direct cause of action for damages outside existing tort law. The court ultimately rejects the notion that tort law supports a damages claim for the asserted due process violation. The due process "liberty" interest under Article I, Section 7(a) is recognized as fundamental. The plaintiff references Laguna Publishing, which emphasized the significance of free speech and press rights, leading to the conclusion that damages can be sought for violations of the state’s free speech clause. The Fenton case similarly recognized the special dignity of voting rights. While the plaintiff argues for a comparable recognition of due process rights, the court expresses caution, referencing Carlsbad Aquafarm, which suggests that while the due process right is fundamental, its relative importance does not significantly aid in determining the viability of a damages remedy for its violation. The court ultimately decides against recognizing a constitutional tort for the due process violation in this instance, primarily due to the availability of alternative remedies. The judgment of the Court of Appeal is affirmed, indicating no implicit intent within Article I, Section 7(a) to allow for damages related to due process violations. A concurring opinion by Justice Brown agrees with the majority’s conclusion but criticizes the broader analysis applied to the California Constitution, asserting it should be evaluated on its own merits without reliance on federal tort frameworks like Bivens. The California Constitution's rights are distinct from those in the federal Constitution, as established in various California case law. Article I, section 24 explicitly states that rights guaranteed by the state Constitution are not contingent upon those in the federal Constitution. Even when language is identical, interpretations may differ between state and federal courts. When constitutional provisions are adopted via initiative, courts must interpret them according to voter intent. The current majority opinion concludes that there is no evidence suggesting voters intended to create a monetary damages right under the due process clause of article I, section 7, subdivision (a). However, it does not satisfactorily explain how this absence translates into an authorization for courts to provide such a remedy at their discretion. The Constitution inherently regulates the relationship between government and citizens, and judicial interpretation should not expand its provisions arbitrarily. Historically, the court has protected legislative intent, particularly regarding initiatives, but the majority's current stance appears to deviate from this principle and relies on U.S. Supreme Court precedents rather than California jurisprudence. The California Constitution serves as the supreme law of the state, establishing governmental powers and protecting individual rights. The California Supreme Court holds the exclusive authority to interpret state constitutional provisions, independent of the U.S. Supreme Court or any other entity. When interpreting these provisions, the court considers their specific language, intent, and historical context, adhering to established principles of constitutional interpretation. The text critiques the majority's approach, suggesting it undermines the court's role as the final arbiter of state constitutional law by erroneously equating state and federal constitutional provisions. The majority's reliance on federal interpretations creates a misconception that state constitutions are part of common law, failing to recognize the distinct nature of constitutional interpretation, which is tethered to textual and contextual analysis rather than judicial extension for policy reasons. Furthermore, the critique highlights that the majority's reliance on federal precedents weakens California's constitutional jurisprudence by neglecting a thorough analysis of the state’s own due process guarantees. This reliance risks diminishing the independent significance of the California Constitution for future generations. The excerpt concludes with a note clarifying that it does not address the validity of actions based on common law tort principles. A breach of duty or public policy violation can be established by showing a constitutional provision violation, allowing for damages as a remedy for the tort. The focus is on whether damages can be awarded for constitutional violations not linked to common law or statutory actions. Defendants submitted an unopposed motion for judicial notice regarding earlier related litigation, which was granted before oral arguments. Key cases highlight that due process requires individuals to have an opportunity to refute charges if their liberty interests are affected, such as in employment removal situations. The concept of a "self-executing" clause is discussed regarding its enforceability and whether it provides a damages remedy in the absence of legislative backing. The court emphasized that individuals should have the right to seek legal protection for injuries caused by violations of their rights, specifically under the Fourth Amendment, and that the Bivens case allows for lawsuits against federal agents similar to those against state agents under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Although the Supreme Court has not expanded the Bivens doctrine, its foundational principles remain valid. A Bivens claim cannot be filed against a federal agency, but an individual officer can be held liable. Various cases allow for damages in instances of violations of state search and seizure and equal protection rights, often referencing the Restatement Second of Torts and early case law which established the right to damages when alternative remedies are inadequate. For example, New York’s Brown case permits damages for search and seizure violations, while Maryland's Widgeon case recognizes damages based on common law. Louisiana’s Moresi also allows such damages, citing English common law. Connecticut's Binette supports damages for constitutional violations based on policy considerations. North Carolina's Corum suggests damages for free speech violations, yet emphasizes reliance on alternative remedies. Wisconsin's Old Tuckaway hints at possible damages for due process violations in dicta. Illinois’ Walinski confirms the right to damages for constitutional anti-discrimination violations. Conversely, a number of cases, such as Phillips and Cooper, indicate that while jurisdictions may differ, the specific endorsement of monetary damages is not universally accepted. Additionally, other cases like Dick Fischer and Kelley conclude that damages for due process violations are not warranted due to the availability of alternative remedies. No damages are awarded for violations of state equal protection rights, as courts have emphasized the availability of alternative remedies and the need to defer to legislative policy-making expertise. Various cases illustrate this principle: in Moody v. Hicks, no damages were granted for state search and seizure rights; Rockhouse Mountain Prop. v. Town of Conway denied damages for due process and equal protection violations; Augat v. State declined to extend prior rulings to allow damages for due process and freedom of association claims; Hanton v. Gilbert similarly dismissed due process claims; Provens v. Stark Cty. Bd. of Mental Ret. refused damages for free speech violations; Hunter v. City of Eugene found no historical basis for implying a right to damages for free expression; City of Beaumont v. Bouillion noted the absence of evidence for a damages remedy for free speech and assembly; Spackman ex rel. Spackman v. Board of Educ. also denied damages for due process violations; and Shields v. Gerhart dismissed claims for free speech and due process violations based on similar reasoning. Additional references include California cases that have recognized the self-executing nature of constitutional provisions related to damages, such as in Rose v. State of California and Weber v. County of Santa Clara. The excerpt also mentions that the due process liberty right is tied to equal protection under article I, section 7(a) of the state constitution. Lastly, it notes that five cases cited by the plaintiff are distinguishable from the current matter. California law establishes a legal right to privacy for all residents, which can support actions for injunctions but does not inherently guarantee claims for damages. In **Payton v. City of Santa Clara**, the Court of Appeal reversed a dismissal related to privacy violations after an employer publicly announced an employee's termination, recognizing a prima facie case of privacy infringement without addressing potential damages. Similarly, in **Porten v. University of San Francisco**, the court allowed a privacy claim regarding unauthorized grade disclosure despite lacking specific legislation, implying damages could be available but not explicitly discussing it. The decisions in **Wilkerson v. City of Placentia** and **Lubey v. City and County of San Francisco** are relevant due to their focus on due process in employment terminations, permitting reinstatement with backpay while not clarifying damages' availability under due process claims. The current case differs as the plaintiff acknowledges a lack of due process property interest. Furthermore, Article I, section 28(c) of the California Constitution guarantees students and staff the right to safe schools, outlining that while this right is inalienable, the legislature determines its implementation. This provision parallels the broader rights articulated in Article I, section 1, affirming inherent rights to life, liberty, property, and privacy. Safety and happiness are recognized as inalienable rights under the Constitution; however, this provision does not provide a self-executing right to private action for damages or impose an affirmative duty on the state to ensure these rights for all citizens. Relevant case law, including Langdon v. Sayre and White v. Davis, indicates that while certain constitutional provisions may support actions for injunctions, the availability of monetary damages remains ambiguous and varies by case. The court in Gates criticized previous decisions for not addressing whether the constitutional provisions were intended to enable damage claims. Historical context reveals that the California Constitution Revision Commission aimed to maintain equal protection and due process guarantees akin to the Fourteenth Amendment. Defendants' claims that ballot language intended to bar damage claims were dismissed, as the court did not interpret the language as precluding such actions. Additionally, a precedent from New York highlights that civil suits for damages resulting from constitutional violations were assumed to exist, reflecting the delegates' understanding during the 1938 Constitutional Convention. Judge Cardozo's opinion in *People v. Defore* suggests that the delegates at the 1938 New York Constitutional Convention believed damages were available for victims of unconstitutional actions, using this argument to advocate against the need for exclusionary rules to deter official misconduct. The debates indicate that the idea of damages for constitutional violations was acknowledged and not rejected by the delegates. The adoption of the equal protection provision without discussion of the damage remedy does not imply disfavor towards it. The Maryland Supreme Court in *Widgeon* elaborated on precedents from English case law that supported civil actions for damages stemming from unlawful searches and seizures, which Maryland courts have long recognized. Notably, in *Meisinger v. State*, both the majority and dissent acknowledged that a civil action for damages remains an option despite the exclusion of evidence obtained through unlawful means. Legal scholars have consistently argued that unlawful searches and seizures can lead to damage actions against both the executing officer and the official responsible for issuing illegal warrants. The Louisiana Supreme Court in *Moresi* linked individual rights preserved by the Magna Carta to the ability to seek damages for constitutional violations, framing such violations as trespasses. In *Melvin v. Reid*, the court recognized a common law tort action based on claims of using the plaintiff's real name in a film about her past, but the case does not support the plaintiff's claim for a constitutional violation remedy in the current case, as the court's reasoning was based on established inalienable rights rather than directly addressing constitutional damages. The court in Melvin established that California's article I, section 1 supports a common law tort action for invasion of privacy, referencing historical advocacy for privacy rights. However, it clarified that Melvin does not permit direct actions for damages under this constitutional provision. Instead, it serves as the foundation for the common law invasion of privacy tort. The Second Restatement's commentary indicates that constitutional provisions can be seen as "legislative provisions" that create duties, allowing courts to grant civil remedies based on policy decisions. While courts have discretion in providing remedies, they must exercise this cautiously. The Regents argued that the plaintiff had waived the right to a hearing under university policies by not requesting one, while the possibility of recovering damages through a writ of mandate under section 1085 was noted. The plaintiff initially pursued a defamation claim but withdrew it before the trial court's ruling. The court refrained from deciding the impact of potential federal remedies on state damage claims for constitutional violations. Additionally, it disapproved of the methodologies used in Laguna Publishing and Fenton to the extent they conflicted with this opinion, without commenting on the correctness of their outcomes. Cited cases include Bush, Schweiker, Meyer, Chappell, Kelley, and Smith, focusing on legal precedents regarding causes of action and their implications on the judicial system. The discussion emphasizes the need for courts to evaluate the burden that new causes of action impose on judicial resources, referencing the Restatement of Torts. The excerpt also highlights the relevance of Bivens and King v. Alaska State Housing Authority in understanding judicial considerations. Key points include the importance of established case law in shaping legal standards and the necessity for courts to assess administrative impacts when introducing new legal claims.