State v. Riggins

Citations: 44 P.3d 615; 180 Or. App. 525; 2002 Ore. App. LEXIS 548Docket: 98-08-9012C2; A104512

Court: Court of Appeals of Oregon; April 10, 2002; Oregon; State Appellate Court

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Robert Lee Riggins appeals his convictions for burglary and theft, arguing that the sentencing court improperly included two uncounseled juvenile adjudications in his criminal history score. Riggins contended that these adjudications were constitutionally defective because he did not have legal representation during the juvenile proceedings, and he had not waived his right to counsel. During the sentencing, it was established that Riggins' father, who had the means to hire an attorney, chose not to do so, leading to Riggins being unrepresented. Riggins testified that he desired legal counsel but his father refused to request a court-appointed attorney, which Riggins was told he did not qualify for due to parental income. The defense argued that a juvenile's due process rights cannot be waived by a parent. The prosecutor contended that the issue was about entitlement to a court-appointed attorney rather than waiver. The sentencing court sided with the prosecutor, questioning whether the family's financial situation could nullify the juvenile adjudications. The Court of Appeals found that including the juvenile adjudications in the criminal history was erroneous and remanded the case for resentencing.

The sentencing court upheld the defendant's criminal history score, which included juvenile adjudications, rejecting his challenge regarding lack of counsel. On appeal, the defendant reiterated his claim that he was not represented by counsel, did not waive his right to counsel, and argued that his father's failure to hire an attorney did not constitute a valid waiver. He cited precedent requiring a prima facie showing of lack of representation for prior uncounseled convictions to enhance a sentence, shifting the burden to the state to prove either representation or valid waiver. The state countered that the defendant did not request court-appointed counsel, asserting that under ORS 419C.200(1), the juvenile court has no obligation to appoint counsel unless requested. 

Legal principles surrounding a youth's right to counsel in delinquency proceedings were outlined, affirming that a youth has a constitutional right to counsel when facing potential loss of liberty, similar in seriousness to felony prosecutions. Notification of this right is essential, and valid waiver of counsel must be established, requiring more than mere acknowledgment of the right. A waiver must be voluntary, knowing, and intelligent, akin to adult standards. The court rejected the state's argument that waiver issues arise only when a youth has taken steps to request appointed counsel, emphasizing that the right to counsel must be actively upheld regardless of such steps.

The right to counsel in juvenile cases must be validly waived, similar to adult criminal cases, ensuring that both the youth and their parents understand the right to representation and the risks associated with self-representation. Waiver principles apply equally to indigent individuals and those with the means to retain counsel. A defendant can challenge prior uncounseled juvenile adjudications in criminal cases, requiring the sentencing court to assess compliance with legal and constitutional standards. A defendant must initially demonstrate a prima facie case that a prior conviction was uncounseled, shifting the burden to the state to prove either representation or a valid waiver of counsel. The record must affirmatively show a lack of representation or remain silent on the issue for the defendant to establish that the prior conviction was uncounseled. If the state claims a waiver, it must prove that the youth and their parents were aware of the right to counsel and intentionally relinquished it, showing understanding of self-representation risks, typically through a court colloquy or a signed waiver. In this case, the defendant successfully demonstrated a lack of representation in the juvenile record, which does not indicate any counsel involvement. The state conceded this point but failed to demonstrate a valid waiver, countering the argument that waiver is not relevant, a stance that was rejected.

The examination of the complete record, including juvenile proceedings, indicates that there is no valid waiver of counsel by either the defendant or his parents. There is no written waiver in the juvenile court record, nor evidence of discussions regarding the risks of proceeding without legal representation. Although the defendant and his father were aware they could retain counsel and believed they were not entitled to appointed counsel, this does not demonstrate a sufficient understanding of the consequences of self-representation. Consequently, the state failed to meet its burden of proving a valid waiver. The trial court incorrectly utilized the defendant's uncounseled convictions to determine his criminal history score. The case is remanded for resentencing, while the trial court’s other decisions are affirmed. 

Additionally, ORS 419C.200(1) mandates the appointment of counsel for youth lacking financial means. The state's position, acknowledged during oral arguments, assumed that a waiver was unnecessary, which was incorrect. The protections established in Gideon v. Wainwright also extend to juveniles, requiring that waivers of counsel must be knowing and intelligent, similar to adult proceedings. The presence of a signed Miranda waiver by the father does not suffice for establishing a waiver of the right to representation in the adjudication process. Finally, while courts in various jurisdictions have ruled that a youth desiring counsel cannot be denied representation due to parental refusal, this case does not necessitate a determination on the right to court-appointed counsel since no valid waiver exists.